“[5] ….The decision-maker at trial will usually have a better grasp of the case as a whole, because of the added benefits of hearing the evidence tested, of receiving more developed submissions and of having more time in which to digest and reflect on the materials…. [17] It is well settled by the authorities that the Court should exercise caution in granting summary judgment in certain kinds of case. The classic instance is where there are conflicts of fact on relevant issues, which have to be resolved before a judgment can be given … A mini-trial on the facts conducted underCPR Part 24 without having gone through normal pre-trial procedures must be avoided, as it runs a real risk of producing summary injustice. [18] In my judgment, the Court should also hesitate about making a final decision without a trial where, even though there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case.”
“[57] I do not underestimate the importance of a finding adverse to the integrity to one of the parties. In itself, the risk of such a finding may provide a compelling reason for allowing a case to proceed to full oral hearing, notwithstanding the apparent strength of the claim on paper, and the confident expectation, based on the papers, that the defendant lacks any real prospect of success. Experience teaches us that on occasion apparently overwhelming cases of fraud and dishonesty somehow inexplicably disintegrate. In short, oral testimony may show that some such cases are only tissue paper strong. As Lord Steyn observed in Medcalf v Weatherill[2003] 1 AC 120 at paragraph 42, when considering wasted costs orders: ‘The law reports are replete with cases which were thought to be hopeless before investigation but were decided the other way after the Court had allowed the matter to be tried’. And that is why I commented in Esprit Telecoms UK Ltd and others -v- Fashion Gossip Ltd, unreported,27 July 2000 that I was ‘troubled about entering summary judgment in a case in which the success of the claimant's case involves, as this one does, establishing allegations of dishonesty and fraud, which are strongly denied, and which cannot be conclusively proved by, for example, a conviction before a criminal court.’ [58] This collective judicial experience does not always, or inevitably, provide a compelling reason for allowing the case to proceed to trial, nor for that matter require the judge considering the application to reject the conclusion that there is no real prospect of a successful defence of the claim if he is satisfied that there is none. That is not what the Rules provide, and if that had been intended, express provision would have been made. It is however a factor constantly to be borne in mind, if and when, as here, the reason for concluding summary judgment is appropriate is consequent on a disputed finding, adverse to the integrity of the unsuccessful party.”
“A powerful reason for being very cautious before inferring dishonesty in relation to Mr Cerri, or from any of the evidence or the circumstances, is the extreme unlikelihood that if he were the fraudster he would have come up with a scheme or scam quite as poor as this one”
“reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case.”
“if a defence is shadowy or of doubtful good faith that will no doubt be a relevant consideration in exercising the power to make a conditional order and deciding the amount of any security which should be ordered.”