“There has been considerable judicial exposition of these principles by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court in recent years – [Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd[2009] 1 AC 1101 ; Re Sigma Finance Corp[2010] 1 All ER 571 and Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank[2011] 1 WLR 2900 ]. There is no point in my going over the same ground again at any length. The court’s job is to discern the intention of the parties, objectively speaking, from the words used in the commercial document, in the relevant context and against the factual background in which the document was created. The starting point is the wording of the document itself and the principle that the commercial parties who agreed the wording intended the words used to mean what they say in setting out the parties’ respective rights and obligations. If there are two possible constructions of the document a court is entitled to prefer the construction which is more consistent with “business common sense,” if that can be ascertained. However, I would agree with the statements of Briggs J, in Jackson v Dear[2012] EWHC 2060 at [40], first, that “commercial common sense” is not to be elevated to an overriding criterion of construction and, secondly, that the parties should not be subjected to “…the individual judge’s own notions of what might have been the sensible solution to the parties’ conundrum”
“The party seeking rectification must show that: (1) the parties had a common continuing intention, whether or not amounting to an agreement, in respect of a particular matter in the instrument to be rectified; (2) there was an outward expression of accord; (3) the intention continued at the time of the execution of the instrument sought to be rectified; (4) by mistake, the instrument did not reflect that common intention.”
“85 By way of reinforcement of those points, it may be helpful to consider the policy considerations justifying the intervention of equity by rectification for mutual mistake of a contract binding on the parties at common law. There are primarily four factual situations to consider. The first one is where the parties subjectively and objectively (that is to say in their communications passing between them—or “crossing the line”) are in agreement but the formal documentation as executed fails to give effect to that prior agreement. The documentation should be rectified to bring it into line (retrospectively) with their prior accord. Subject to such matters as delay and prejudice to any third party interests, there is no good reason not to do so. 86 The second scenario is where the parties never subjectively had the same intention, but the communications crossing the line show that objectively there was a common continuing intention at all relevant times prior to the execution of the final documentation, and the formal documentation reflected those prior communications. In that situation, whether or not rectified, one or other of the parties will be bound by a contract which they did not subjectively intend to enter into. It is right that the claimant should not be entitled to rectification to bring the documentation into line with a subjective intention and belief that was never communicated to the defendant and to which the defendant never agreed. 87 The third scenario is where there was objectively a prior accord, but one of the parties then subjectively changed their mind, but objectively did not bring that change of mind to the attention of the other party. It is right that, if the documentation gives effect to the objective prior accord, the formal documentation should not be rectified to reflect the changed but uncommunicated subjective intention; and if the documentation as executed reflects the changed but uncommunicated subjective intention, it should be rectified to give effect to the objective prior accord. To do otherwise would be to force on one of the parties a contract which they never intended to make on the basis of an uncommunicated intention and belief. 88 The fourth scenario is where there was objectively a prior accord (whether or not a subjective common intention), and one of the parties then objectively changed their mind, that is to say objectively made apparent to the other party that they intended to enter into the transaction on different terms. Leaving aside rectification for unilateral mistake (the requirements for which are quite different), it is right that, if the documentation as executed gives effect to the objectively indicated change of mind, a claim for rectification to give effect to the earlier prior accord should be refused. Once again, to do otherwise would force on the defendant a contract which they never intended to make on the basis of the claimant's uncommunicated subjective intention to enter into a contract on the basis of the original accord notwithstanding the defendant's objectively communicated change of mind. 89 That analysis shows why it is good policy to favour objective accord or objective change of accord over subjective belief and intention in cases of rectification for mutual mistake.”
“64 ….in Cambridge Antibody Technology Ltd v Abbott Biotechnology Ltd[2005] FSR 590 , in which he rejected a submission that evidence of the subjective state of mind of one of the parties contained in statements which had not been communicated to the other party (“crossed the line”) was inadmissible. In my opinion, Laddie J was quite right not to exclude such evidence, but that is not inconsistent with an objective approach to what the terms of the prior consensus were. Unless itself a binding contract, the prior consensus is, by definition, not contained in a document which the parties have agreed is to be the sole memorial of their agreement. It may be oral or in writing and, even if the latter, subject to later variation. In such a case, if I may quote what I said in Carmichael v National Power plc[1999] 1 WLR 2042 , 2050–2051: “The evidence of a party as to what terms he understood to have been agreed is some evidence tending to show that those terms, in an objective sense, were agreed. Of course the tribunal may reject such evidence and conclude that the party misunderstood the effect of what was being said and done.” 65 In a case in which the prior consensus was based wholly or in part on oral exchanges or conduct, such evidence may be significant. A party may have had a clear understanding of what was agreed without necessarily being able to remember the precise conversation or action which gave rise to that belief. Evidence of subsequent conduct may also have some evidential value. On the other hand, where the prior consensus is expressed entirely in writing, (as in George Cohen Sons & Co Ltd v Docks and Inland Waterways Executive 84 Ll L Rep 97) such evidence is likely to carry very little weight. But I do not think that it is inadmissible.” “The evidence of a party as to what terms he understood to have been agreed is some evidence tending to show that those terms, in an objective sense, were agreed. Of course the tribunal may reject such evidence and conclude that the party misunderstood the effect of what was being said and done.”
“4. Payment of hire starting as of1st January 2010 . As of1st January 2010 the actual charter hire for each of the VLCCs as published by the Clarksons monthly index [such index is to be clarified by the parties] (the "Market Rate"), however, in no event less than a minimum floor rate, is payable monthly in advance to the KGs: (a)The minimum payable floor rate is USD22,000 per day per vessel and is payable monthly in advance ("the Floor Rate"). (b) The Market Rate will be adjusted semi annually according to the following principle: (aa) Should the average of the Market Rate over the previous period of six months be in excess of the actually paid Market Rate, Charterers will remit the difference to the KGs together with the next monthly charter hire payment. (bb) Should the average of the Market Rate over the previous period of six months be lower than the actually paid Market Rate, the KGs will credit the difference to the Charterers at the next semi annual adjustment date of the Market Rate.”
"3 a) Time Charter Vessels For vessels on period time charter, i.e. MERCURY GLORY, ARTEMIS GLORY AND LEO GLORY, hire shall be calculated at the net time charter rate, meaning the gross charter hire less brokerage commission (5% commission rate for MERCURY GLORY and 3.75% commission rate each for ARTEMIS GLORY and LEO GLORY) to be evidenced by copies of the relevant recaps which include details of commissions and payees. The net time charter rate so arrived at (the "
“5. With effect from1 January 2010 (so as to be applicable to hire payable in respect of January 2010 and subsequent periods), the obligation to pay hire under the Charter Parties of each of the Time Chartered Vessels shall be varied so that the respective Charterer of the Time Chartered Vessel shall pay hire in accordance with this Paragraph and Paragraph 6 below and not in accordance with Article 2 until30th January 2013 or, if earlier, such time as the employment of the relevant Time Chartered Vessel under the relevant Sub-Charter is terminated. The period during which hire is payable as aforesaid is the “Vessel's Deferred Hire Period” . 10. In respect of any period after the elapse of the Vessel’s Deferred Hire Period (even if the Sub-Charter continues), hire in respect of such Vessel shall be payable in accordance with Article 2 rather than Article 3. ...”
“6. Charterer 4, 6 and 7 shall each inform Owner 4, 6 and 7 (as the case may be) in relation to their Vessel of the date and time of re-delivery (for whatever reason such re-delivery may occur) within 5 banking days of such re-delivery. Further, these Charterers shall also provide such information confirming that the Time Chartered Vessels are still employed under the Sub-charters as may be reasonably requested by Owner 4, 6 and 7 for the purposes of this Agreement. In case such information is not provided to Owner 4, 6 or 7 within 5 banking days from such reasonable request by Owner 4, 6 or 7, Charterer 4, 6 and 7 shall become obliged to pay the Market Rate for the respective Time Chartered Vessel until such information is provided and shows the relevant Time Chartered Vessel is still employed under the relevant Sub-charter. However, in any event and regardless of any extension of the Mercury Sub-Charter, the Artemis Sub-Charter or the Leo Sub-Charter or the entering into any new commitment for the Time Chartered Vessel, Charterers 4, 6 and 7 shall pay the Market Rate after the elapse of Vessel’s Deferred Hire Period.”