"The Tribunal hereby: (1) Orders [MTF] to pay to Nomihold the sum of US$170 million in exchange for the remaining 49 per cent of Tarino shares in respect of [MTF's] failure to comply with the Put Notice. (2) Orders [MTF] to pay to Nomihold the sum of US$5.88 million in damages in respect of [MTF's] breach of clause 3.5 of the [POA]."
"(1) an Award made by the Tribunal pursuant to an Arbitration agreement may, by leave of the court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court to the same effect. (2) where leave is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the Award."
"We accept that the court should not automatically exercise its discretion in favour of permitting service out of the jurisdiction unless it is just to do so and that it will ordinarily not be just to do so unless there is a real prospect of a legitimate benefit to the Claimant from the English proceedings. We see no reason why that benefit should not be indirect or prospective."
"Once an Award has been made -- and not challenged in the court -- it should be entered as a judgment and given effect accordingly. It should not be held up because the losing party says he wants to argue some point or other or wants to set up a counterclaim or anything on that sort. He would not be allowed to do so in the case of a judgment not appealed from, nor should he do so in the case of an Award that he has not challenged. I am in agreement with what Diplock J said in [Margulies]: I think that it would be contrary to the purpose ofsection 26 of the Arbitration Act 1950 if in a case where the validity of the Award and the right to proceed upon it is beyond doubt, it should be given less effect than a judgment. In this case the judge was impressed by In Re Boks & Co and Peters, Rushton & Co Ltd[1919] 1 KB 491 . But in that case the validity of the award was doubtful -- very doubtful I would say -- because of the illegality of the whole transaction. Naturally enough, no leave was given. But I think that Scrutton LJ went a good deal too far. He said at p497 that "this summary method of enforcing awards is only to be used in reasonably clear cases."
"Subsections 66(1) and (2) reenact with minor drafting amendments theArbitration Act 1950, section 26(1) ... The law is unchanged. In particular enforcement under this section should only be granted in 'reasonably clear cases'. In other cases enforcement should be by an action on the award. The effect of subsection 66(4) is than an action on the award is still permitted and that such an action is still governed by the common law."
"11. Enforcement is a plain word and means something quite different from a restatement of the effect of the award in the form of a judgment. The summary procedure provided by s 33 of the Act is a procedure with a purpose, the purpose of enabling the victorious party in an arbitration to obtain the material benefit of the award in its favour in an easier manner than having to sue on the award. There has been nothing put forward in this case to suggest any occasion for enforcement of the declarations made in the interim award. They are binding on the parties and bind them for the balance of the Arbitration and beyond that. 12. I agree with Smart AJ's view that there is no utility in making the order sought, but for the perhaps more fundamental reason that there is just no question of enforcement yet arising. In the absence of any question of enforcement arising, it would not be appropriate to grant leave to enforce the award."
"32. The argument is very finely balanced and is in my judgment unusual. Mr Salzedo submits that this is the only way in which he can get his judgment paid. If the event of default clause is left in the Notes, then on 5 March the whole arrangement will come crashing down and there will all kinds of cross-default provisions involving potential loss to the parent company, it seems of a substantial kind. So that is the only way in which he can be sure of his clients getting paid, because otherwise it is apparent that the Defendant and its parent, who are the source of every payment, will take every possible steps to avoid making payment. That has become now apparent by virtue not least of the application under s66 to challenge registration in this country ... "38. [Mr Salzedo] is entitled to his award, he submits, and the only way he can get it [paid] will be by making life so difficult for the Defendant that its parent company will be caused to pay up. That, of course, would extend to any kind of action or injunction or order by a judgment creditor in relation to any kind of transactions which its recalcitrant judgment debtor was proposing to enter into whereby some order could be obtained which would be intended to mean that the Defendant will be forced by commercial embarrassment or commercial difficulties so caused into paying up or, as Mr Salzedo says, at least providing security ... 40. I conclude that that is not where post-judgment freezing orders have got to. They do not legitimise interference in ordinary commercial transactions simply because a judgment debtor is not paying up quickly enough. There has in my judgment to be some element of impropriety. In this case I do not see any impropriety. It was a public declaration that there will be a default and that steps had to be taken, not least in the interests of a number of third parties if that was going to have a catastrophic consequences. I do not conclude, even if one were to extend the ambit of Stuart-Smith LJ's enunciation of the jurisdiction, that it would go so far as to say that a judgment creditor can interfere in any transaction which would render it more likely that he would paid on a judgment which otherwise the judgment debtor is determined not to pay, particularly where the pressure is thus put on a third party, in this case the parent. 41. Accordingly I conclude that it is not appropriate to cover the consent solicitation by the freezing order, but to proceed with that transaction ought not to be a breach of the continuing freezing order."
"On an application under s66 or to set aside a s66 order, it is enough, in my view, in a case such as this for the party seeking to enforce the award to show that he has a real prospect of establishing the primacy of the award over an inconsistent judgment. It is not necessary, nor is it appropriate, for the court finally to decide this hypothetical question -- hypothetical because the unsuccessful party to the Arbitration will not have obtained an inconsistent judgment in a member state at the time the court is dealing with the s 66 application."
"Thirdly, considerations of public policy, if relied upon to resist enforcement of an award, should be approached with extreme caution: Deutsch Shachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbh v Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co[1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 246 , at 254. The reference to public policy in s 103(3) was not intended to furnish an open-ended escape route for refusing enforcement of New York Convention awards. Instead the public policy exception in s 103(3) is confined to the public policy of England (as the country in which enforcement is sought) in maintaining the fair and orderly administration of justice."
"Where the successful party is said to have procured the award in a way which is contrary to public policy, it will normally be necessary to satisfy the court that some form of reprehensible or unconscionable on his part has contributed in a substantial way to obtaining a judgment in his favour. Moreover, I do not think that the court should be quick to interfere under this section. In those cases in which s68 has so far been considered, the court has emphasised that it is intended to operate only in extreme cases."
"(i) The transaction under which Nomihold acquired shares in Tarino was part of a conspiracy to defraud the Kyrghyz authorities to which Nomihold was a party (ii) performance of the sale of the Shares under the Option would realise for Nomihold part of the proceeds of the conspiracy to defraud while the transfer of the Shares in return for US$170 million would confer on Nomihold proceeds resulting from the criminal conspiracy; and (iii) any facilitation or assistance in the transfer of the Shares would contravenes 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2006 ."
"To justify the reception of fresh evidence or a new trial, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial. Secondly, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive. Thirdly, the evidence must be such that it is presumably to be believed, or, in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible."
"No good reason has been shown as to why the Defendant should not have applied to the Swiss court within the period of 90 days, raising the allegation that the award had been obtained by perjured evidence and that is an added factor against granting them leave to amend to raise the issue in this jurisdiction."
"Whereas in the present case the allegation is fraud and the production of evidence, the onus is on the applicant to make good the allegation by cogent evidence."
"Normally the conditions to be fulfilled will be (a) that the evidence to establish the fraud was not available to the party alleging the fraud at the time of the hearing before the Arbitrators, and (b) where perjury is the fraud alleged, i.e. where the very issue before the arbitrators was whether the witness or witnesses were lying, the evidence must be so strong that it would reasonably be expected to be decisive at a hearing, and if unanswered must have that result."
"If it is open to a party to seek to get an enforcing court to retry issues of fact which the Arbitrators had before them and which they had to and did determine, it would appear to present an open invitation to disappointed litigants to relitigate their disputes by alleging perjury and a major inroad would be made into the finality of Convention awards."
"Mr Asylov's lawyers were always expressing their confidence that they would succeed in courts in quashing Order 1570. That is why the21 November 2005 court ruling was an unexpected blow to them. This is evidenced by the fact that Ms Makhadiyeva, who took part in the court hearing, was very nervous when she got back to the office later the same day, after the hearing, and told me that Mr Yerembetov was angry with Mr Asylov because of the court ruling, as such ruling could derail the transaction with [MTF]."
"264. The effect of the21 November 2005 ruling is dealt with earlier in this award, but in brief it was appealable and of no effect until the appeal was heard and disposed of. Thus it could not render any representation to the effect that Tarino indirectly controlled Bitel false. Furthermore, at all times until14 December 2005 the IOM companies controlled Bitel. Therefore the misrepresentation argument falls on this ground. 265. As to knowledge it is alleged by [MTF] that Mr Yerembetov was in fact aware of the21 November 2005 Ruling and concealed it from [MTF]. The Tribunal has already noted that it considered Mr Yerembetov to be an honest witness and believes his testimony that he did not. This is moreover wholly credible on grounds other than[my underlining] Mr Yerembetov's credibility. 266. First, the decision was not of the significant effect contended for by Nomihold. There was no particular reason for Bitel's Kyrghyz lawyers ... to have informed Mr Yerembetov of it in the time between its having been handed down and the signature of the [POA] (little more than one working day). It is more likely in the Tribunal's view that they would have waited until the next scheduled regular update to Nomihold ... 267. Secondly, it is unlikely that they would have informed Mr Yerembetov of the impending decision before it happened, leaving him possibly asking them what happened on21 November 2005 . The evidence seems to show that Bitel only intervened in the proceedings on18 November 2005 , the Friday before the Monday, leaving little time for Bitel's lawyers to have informed Mr Yerembetov. 268. For these reasons the Tribunal concludes that Mr Yerembetov was not aware of the21 November 2005 ruling when the [POA] was signed."
"If Mr Yerembetov did know, then it is alleged that this knowledge rendered false a representation that he had told Ms Evtoushenkova all of the risks about the transaction. On the evidence before the Tribunal (Ms Evtoushenkova's absence once again being a handicap), this is rejected. It is to be assumed that all discussions about risk were made in the context of the overall deal and not separately for the SPA and the [POA]. The only sensible understanding of the evidence is that Mr Yerembetov warned Ms Evtoushenkova and Ms Zhirikova that there were substantial risks and that Nomihold was making no representations. Mr Yerembetov's knowledge of the21 November 2005 ruling, if he had such knowledge, could not have rendered any representation false."
"271. Moreover, Clause 12.1 of the [POA] is an entire agreement and non-reliance clause that would estop [MTF] from bringing any claim for innocent or negligent misrepresentation ... 273. As to fraud, the Tribunal accepts the high standard of proof set out by the House of Lords in Re H (Minors). [MTF] has not reached this standard. The Tribunal further notes that, as the misrepresentation argument only arose after the hearing in December 2007, Mr Yerembetov was not cross-examined on it and thus did not have the opportunity to defend himself against accusations of fraud. On this ground alone, the Tribunal would have been hesitant to conclude that there was a fraudulent misrepresentation ... 275. Further, the Tribunal finds that [MTF] affirmed the [POA]. At least ten days but perhaps a month after the signature of the [POA], Mr Zubov told Mr Yerembetov that '[MTF]'s lawyers regarded the [POA] as a valid agreement'. This amounts to an affirmation which would defeat even a fraudulent misrepresentation. Even on [MTF]'s own case, namely that Steiner und Zingerman LLP or Bitel told Mr Yerembetov of the21 November 2005 ruling before the date of the [POA], and even if the effect of that knowledge were to falsify a representation given to [MTF] (neither of which propositions is accepted by the Tribunal), immediately thereafter [MTF] had the same knowledge, as it was managing Bitel and instructing Bitel's lawyers (including no doubt about an appeal from the21 November 2005 ruling). It would be odd, to put it no higher, were Bitel and/or its lawyers not to have told its new managers that they had made Mr Yerembetov aware of the21 November 2005 ruling. In the absence of evidence from Bitel's former managers and/or lawyers, the Tribunal must assume that [MTF's] managers asked Bitel's lawyers whether they had told Yerembetov. Given the absence of any allegation that they were asked and answered negatively, the Tribunal infers that their evidence would be unhelpful to [MTF]. [MTF] nonetheless, in the person of Mr Zubov, affirmed the agreement by confirming that it would be honoured. 276. Finally, [MTF]'s delay in seeking rescission means that that remedy is no longer available to it, even if (which it has not) it had made out a case of actionable misrepresentation. 277. For the avoidance of doubt, having found no deceit or misrepresentation the Tribunal also dismisses [MTF]'s non-contractual claims concerning or arising from the same matters, including the tort of deceit."
"63.Despite the creativeness and vigour with which [MTF] pursued this argument, the Tribunal considers it hopeless. [MTF] has the burden of establishing the alleged agreement, yet it has failed to demonstrate who the proper parties to it were or that such parties were even capable of performing it. The only written evidence of the alleged agreement is hopelessly vague: the Memorandum of Understanding, which was not a binding agreement and did not even specify a precise buyer or seller of Tarino. Moreover, Mr Yerembetov gave evidence in relation to the Kazakh Group negotiations, including the late payment and subsequent refund in relation to that proposed, but not concluded, transaction. The Tribunal found Mr Yerembetov to be a straight-talking credible witness. The Tribunal accepts his evidence that no agreement was concluded orally or in writing with the Kazakh group. 64. Even were this not the finding [my underlining] of the Tribunal, [MTF]'s claims would still fail. 65. The Tribunal is entirely satisfied that there was no binding agreement with the Kazakh group that would possibly have amounted to an encumbrance upon the Tarino shares. Consistent with this finding no claim was in fact ever made by the Kazakh group. Moreover, the Tribunal is satisfied that even had there been a binding agreement with the Kazakh group, MTS would have defeated any such claim by the Kazakh group as a bona fide purchaser, which took the Tarino shares free of any encumbrance. 66. Accordingly, [MTF]'s claims based on the existence of an encumbrance on the shares by virtue of an agreement with the Kazakh group (including mistake, misrepresentation and breach of warranty) fail."