“The Bank does not advance the case that the present claim by Mrs. Papamichael is made in execution of a conspiracy between Mrs. Papamichael and her husband, Mr. Paparounis, to defraud the Bank, or that she is making a fraudulent claim herself.”
“10(b) … (Mrs Papamichael) had knowledge that Mr Paparounis had some form of currency dealing arrangement with the Bank and knew that he was sending this money from the joint account in connection with that purpose; …”
“A few months ago I became aware that my defendant husband had unbeknown to me become involved in personal matters of mine of a financial nature and due to his negligence I am in danger of sustaining a massive financial loss. It should be noted that I never interfered in his financial affairs and indeed have never asked him to give me details of his business affairs, since in any case he was and is an experienced businessman very active in Greece and abroad, occupied with international transport etc. Whereas during the first three years of our marriage our relationship was harmonious, the aforementioned interference of my defendant husband in my financial affairs resulted in damage to our relationship. Specifically in April 1999 I was intending to invest a large sum in a Swiss bank but, following recommendations and exhortations from my defendant husband, I changed my mind and invested the money in a big English bank with which he was intending to work. ”
“Today26 April 1999 Mr Dimitrios Paparounis and Messrs Nikalaos Papaionnou and Gheorghios Yannikopoulos have agreed to enter into a joint contract with the Nat West Bank, London, for the purpose of trading in Currencies. Mr Paparounis shall deposit with the Bank the corresponding sum of 2 billion drachmas in US dollars as a guarantee for the said dealings which will be transacted on his behalf, crediting and debiting his account, by Mr N. Papaioannou and Mr G. Yannikopoulos as his Financial Advisers.”
“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN We hereby certify that Dimitrios Paparounis with passport No M 950778 is customer of our Bank for two years and holds a personal account with us. We are also in a position to certify from the documentation we have the legal origin of the amount deposited in the above-mentioned account. We finally certify that Mr D. Paparounis has been prompt in meeting its obligations. This certificate is given without any responsibility on our part for your strict personal use.”
“Okay, I have just spoken to Mr Paparounis. He has just left the bank. You should receive a fax within fifteen minutes or perhaps you have received it already. I mean, the confirmation…”
“CURRENCY GRD AMOUNT 2,000,000,000 VALUE 30/4/99 BY ORDER OF A/C No. 1153665-5 DESP. PAPAMICHAEL INTERMEDIARY BANK NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE BENEFICIARY A/C No. 0409202455 (DESP. PAPAMICHAEL) NATWEST GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET ATTN: MR MAKRIS PAYMENT DETAILS TRANSFER OF INVESTMENT FUNDS”
“Q. You were just acting in accordance with what your husband had asked you to do? A. He did not ask me to do. I wanted to send the money and he made the arrangements. He gave the information to the bank so they can send my money to the bank, to the English bank. … … … MS GLOSTER: What you were doing, Mrs Papamichael, was carrying out your husband's instructions. A. What do you mean, "carrying out my husband's instructions"? That is what I do not understand. JUDGE CHAMBERS: Mr Interpreter -- A. My husband gave instructions to the bank. In one way it was the instructions from my husband to the bank, but it was not instructions to me because I wanted to send the money. I did not follow instructions as for my money, but we followed instructions as to how we send the money. …” husband had asked you to do? A. He did not ask me to do. I wanted to send the money and he made the arrangements. He gave the information to the bank so they can send my money to the bank, to the MS GLOSTER: What you were doing, Mrs Papamichael, was A. What do you mean, "carrying out my husband's was the instructions from my husband to the bank, but it was not instructions to me because I wanted to send the but we followed instructions as to how we send the money. …”
“/040202455 NATWEST GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET FOR FURTHER CREDIT MRS DESPINA PAPAMICHAEL”
“I have received the money, I have received… they have just sent me the confirmation, that the money is indeed in. We have the money. We do have it …”
“At your request, we certify that by your instructions, we transferred on28/12/2000 the amount of GRD 650,000,000, from your account No 2390165 (in USD) to the account of Mr Anastasios Voulgarakis. We also certify that the account No. 2390165 was opened by your application, solely and exclusively in your name and that there are no co-beneficiaries into the account.”
“To NATWEST – GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS Dear Sirs, Please arrange the remittance of the amount of usd 6.511.483.95 equivalent to drs. 2.000.000.000, which I deposited with you on 30.04.1999 to your account no. 0409202455 in National Bnak of Greece, Athens to my credit for investment producing interests, together with all the up to date interests to my account no. 2390165 in Bank of Cyprus, 171, Alexandras Ave., Athens. The remittance must be effected on02/01/2001 so that the interests till31/12/2000 are calculated since they are the highest which are paid for blocked accounts for such a big period. The money must be definitely in Bank of Cyprus on02/01/2001 since I have commitment with another Bank which offers me an interesting investment of my money. Please send me your confirmation to the fax no 01/6229372 and let me know also the exact amount of interests produced from my capital investment from 30.04.1999 till 31.12.2000. Thanking you in advance , Despina Papamichael (address*)”
“Remind 22/12/00 Please let me know the exact amount of interests.”
“15. I am also aware that Mr Paparounis has alleged that I was somehow aware that the moneys transferred on 30 April belonged to his wife and that Mr Paparounis had discussed with me that these moneys were to be invested with the Bank on his wife’s behalf. As I previously told Alex Bouchier and Helen Cockroft of the Bank in July 2001, the allegation is simply untrue. At no time in my discussions with Mr Paparounis did he inform me of any interest of his wife in the moneys. Nor was there therefore any discussion of any investment opportunity for his wife. It was always the case in our discussions that the moneys which were transferred belonged to Mr Paparounis and were to be used as collateral for his trading activity, and not for any other purpose. 16. I have been shown a copy of the SWIFT advice dated30 April 1999 , which it has been alleged that I was referring to on the telephone at the time of the transfer on30 April 1999 . I do not recall having seen this document before although it is possible that I might have done. Doing the best I can now to recollect what happened, the reference to Mrs Papamichael would not have caused me any concern because I knew at the time that Mr Paparounis was using a joint account with his wife’s name on it to transfer his moneys to the Bank.”
“…In our view the case law is authority for the simple proposition that the plaintiff will succeed if he can show that he would not have made the payment if he had not been mistaken.”
“… It is, of course, plain that the defence (of change of position) is not open to one who has changed his position in bad faith, as where the defendant has paid away the money with knowledge of the facts entitling the plaintiff to restitution … ”
“122. Mr. Bloch submitted that the only ground on which a recipient of money paid under a mistake will be deprived of the defence of change of position is bad faith and that bad faith in this context means dishonesty. He therefore drew my attention to several recent authorities in which the courts have considered what constitutes dishonesty in the context of ancillary liability for breach of trust. He submitted that, whether or not CAI acted negligently, it did not act dishonestly and is therefore entitled to rely on its change of position. 123. It is necessary to begin by referring to the recent decision of the Privy Council in Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 193. In that case Dextra drew a US dollar cheque on its bankers in favour of the Bank of Jamaica which was delivered to that bank by an intermediary. The Bank of Jamaica negotiated the cheque to another bank which collected the sum in question from Dextra. Dextra and the Bank of Jamaica were deceived as to each other’s intentions by persons involved in a fraud: Dextra drew the cheque intending to lend the sum in question to the Bank of Jamaica, whereas the Bank of Jamaica intended to buy the sum in question from Dextra with Jamaican dollars. The Bank of Jamaica delivered the Jamaican dollars to the fraudsters whom it believed to be authorised to receive them on behalf of Dextra. 124. Dextra sought to recover the value of the cheque from the Bank of Jamaica on a variety of grounds including mistake of fact giving rise to a right to restitution. The Bank of Jamaica relied on the defence of change of position. In response Dextra argued that in such cases it was necessary to balance the respective faults of the two parties in order to decide whether it would be inequitable to require the payee to make restitution and that in that case the Bank of Jamaica was the more blameworthy. In the event the claim in restitution failed because it was held that Dextra had not issued the cheque under any relevant mistake of fact. Nonetheless, the Privy Council went on to consider whether an assessment of the relative fault of the parties has a part to play in the defence of change of position. Having considered the position in other countries their Lordships declined to admit the concept of relative fault into this branch of the common law, considering that good faith on the part of the recipient was a sufficient criterion. They reached that decision partly on the grounds that since a claimant who makes a payment under a mistake of fact is not precluded by negligence from recovering in restitution, it would be anomalous if the defendant’s conduct were to be examined for negligence and even more anomalous if it were then necessary to examine the payer’s conduct to see which of them was more at fault. 125. The decision of the Privy Council in the Dextra Bank case is authority for the proposition that mere negligence on the part of the recipient is not sufficient to deprive him of the defence of change of position, but it leaves open the question of what exactly constitutes lack of good faith in this context. The Privy Council was not concerned with that question, any more than was the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale. (having considered the authorities on dishonest assistance in a breach of trust the judge continued) 131. Mr. Bloch submitted that lack of good faith is really the same as dishonesty and that the same test should apply in each case, whether one is dealing with an accessory to a breach of trust or with a recipient of a mistaken payment who seeks to rely on a change of position that he has himself brought about. In either case the defendant should not be liable unless he has acted in a way which he knows ordinary people would regard as dishonest. 132. Miss Andrews challenged the proposition that good faith in the context of the defence of change of position is to be equated with dishonesty. She did so by reference to the law relating to the position of an agent who receives payment on behalf of his principal. In such cases, she submitted, no question of dishonesty arises; the agent acts at his peril if he pays the money over to his principal after receiving notice of the claim for restitution. 133. Although it has similarities with the modern defence of change of position, the defence available to an agent who has paid money over to his principal before receiving notice of the claim has been recognised for a long time. Nowadays it is not normally regarded as an example of a change of position of the kind contemplated by Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale,but as a rule by which the correct defendant may be identified when payment is made to one who is known to be acting as an agent. … 209. … … … Nonetheless, it is perhaps instructive that notice of the claim is said to be sufficient to deprive the agent of the benefit of this defence. 134. To answer the question raised by Mr. Bloch I think it is necessary to return to the principles stated by Lord Templeman and Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, namely, that unjust enrichment gives rise to an entitlement to restitution unless it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require the recipient of the benefit to make restitution in full or in part. These are broad principles the details of which have yet to be developed. It was not necessary in that case for their Lordships to consider the range of circumstances which would prevent a recipient from relying on the defence of change of position and insofar as they dealt with that subject I do not understand either Lord Templeman or Lord Goff to have provided more than a broad indication of what they might be. It is, however, interesting to note that they contemplated that a change of position after the payee “receives notice of the victim’s claim for restitution” (per Lord Templeman at page 560) or “with knowledge of the facts entitling the claimant to restitution” (per Lord Goff in the passage at page 580 cited earlier) would not provide a defence. 135. In the light of these observations, and having regard to the nature of the principles underlying the right to restitution in the case of a mistaken payment and the defence of change of position, I do not think that dishonesty in the sense identified in Twinsectra Ltdv Yardley is the sole criterion of the right to invoke the defence of change of position. I do not think that it is desirable to attempt to define the limits of good faith; it is a broad concept, the definition of which, insofar as it is capable of definition at all, will have to be worked out through the cases. In my view it is capable of embracing a failure to act in a commercially acceptable way and sharp practice of a kind that falls short of outright dishonesty as well as dishonesty itself. The factors which will determine whether it is inequitable to allow the claimant to obtain restitution in a case of mistaken payment will vary from case to case, but where the payee has voluntarily parted with the money much is likely to depend on the circumstances in which he did so and the extent of his knowledge about how the payment came to be made. Where he knows that the payment he has received was made by mistake, the position is quite straightforward: he must return it. This applies as much to a banker who receives a payment for the account of his customer as to any other person: see, for example, the comment of Lord Mersey in Kerrison v Glyn, Mills,Currie & Co. (1912) 81 L.J.K.B. 465 (H.L.) at page 472. Greater difficulty may arise, however, in cases where the payee has grounds for believing that the payment may have been made by mistake, but cannot be sure. In such cases good faith may well dictate that an enquiry be made of the payer. The nature and extent of the enquiry called for will, of course, depend on the circumstances of the case, but I do not think that a person who has, or thinks he has, good reason to believe that the payment was made by mistake will often be found to have acted in good faith if he pays the money away without first making enquiries of the person from whom he received it. 138. ……The need to make enquiries of Bank Sepah is not a matter to be viewed in terms of a duty owed by one banker to another; it is a matter to be viewed in terms of a duty of good faith which a person who has received a payment that he has good reason to think was made under a mistake owes to the person who made it. If under those circumstances the payee fails to make enquiry of the payer before disposing of the money he can properly be described as failing to act in good faith because he acts in the knowledge that he may be infringing the rights of another despite having the means of avoiding that consequence. In fact I think that the present case is even stronger than that because on the information available to him Mr. Francis had no real basis for thinking that Milestone was entitled to receive or retain the funds that had been remitted by Bank Sepah or that there was any proper basis for complying with Mr. Mahdavi’s instructions. Although Mr. Francis did not consciously act in disregard of the standards to be expected of an ordinary honest banker, he was willing in the circumstances to accept the risk that releasing the money might infringe Bank Sepah’s rights.”
“The cause of action As I have already pointed out, the plaintiffs seek to vindicate their property rights, not to reverse unjust enrichment. The correct classification of the plaintiffs’ cause of action may appear to be academic, but it has important consequences. The two causes of action have different requirements and may attract different defences. A plaintiff who brings an action in unjust enrichment must show that the defendant has been enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, for he cannot have been unjustly enriched if he has not been enriched at all. But the plaintiff is not concerned to show that the defendant is in receipt of property belonging beneficially to the plaintiff or its traceable proceeds. The fact that the beneficial ownership of the property has passed to the defendant provides no defence; indeed, it is usually the very fact which founds the claim. Conversely, a plaintiff who brings an action like the present must show that the defendant is in receipt of property which belongs beneficially to him or its traceable proceeds, but he need not show that the defendant has been enriched by its receipt. He may, for example, have paid full value for the property, but he is still required to disgorge it if he received it with notice of the plaintiff’s interest. Furthermore, a claim in unjust enrichment is subject to a change of position defence, which usually operates by reducing or extinguishing the element of enrichment. An action like the present is subject to the bona fide purchaser for value defence, which operates to clear the defendant’s title. ”
“(i) Equity operates upon the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purpose for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust). (ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his conscience, i.e. until he is aware that he is intended to hold the property for the benefit of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, in the case of a constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his conscience. (iii) In order to establish a trust there must be identifiable trust property. The only apparent exception to this rule is a constructive trust imposed on a person who dishonestly assists in a breach of trust who may come under fiduciary duties even if he does not receive identifiable trust property. (iv) Once a trust is established, as from the date of its establishment the beneficiary has, in equity, a proprietary interest in the trust property, which proprietary interest will be enforceable in equity against any subsequent holder of the property (whether the original property or substituted property into which it can be traced) other than a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice. ”
“(B) Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd.[1981] Ch. 105 In that case Chase Manhattan, a New York bank, had by mistake paid the same sum twice to the credit of the defendant, a London bank. Shortly thereafter, the defendant bank went into insolvent liquidation. The question was whether Chase Manhattan had a claim in rem against the assets of the defendant bank to recover the second payment. Goulding J. was asked to assume that the moneys paid under a mistake were capable of being traced in the assets of the recipient bank: he was only concerned with the question whether there was a proprietary base on which the tracing remedy could be founded: p. 116B. He held that where money was paid under a mistake, the receipt of such money without more constituted the recipient a trustee: he said that the payer “retains an equitable property in it and the conscience of [the recipient] is subjected to a fiduciary duty to respect his proprietary right: p. 119. It will be apparent from what I have already said that I cannot agree with this reasoning. First, it is based on a concept of retaining an equitable property in money where, prior to the payment to the recipient bank there was no equitable interest. Further, I cannot understand how the recipient’s “conscience” can be affected at a time when he is not aware of any mistake. Finally, the judge found that the law of England and that of New York were in substance the same. I find this a surprising conclusion since the New York law of constructive trusts has for a long time been influenced by the concept of a remedial constructive trust, whereas hitherto English law has for the most part only recognised an institutional constructive trust: see Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc.[1990] 1 QB 391 , 478-480. In the present context, that distinction is of fundamental importance. Under the institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust, as I understand it, is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court. Thus for the law of New York to hold that there is a remedial constructive trust where a payment has been made under a void contract gives rise to different consequences from holding that an institutional constructive trust arises in English law. However, although I do not accept the reasoning of Goulding J., Chase Manhattan may well have been rightly decided. The defendant bank knew of the mistake by the paying bank within two days of the receipt of the moneys: see p. 115A. the judge treated this fact as irrelevant (p. 114F) but in my judgment it may well provide a proper foundation for the decision. Although the mere receipt of the moneys, in ignorance of the mistake, gives rise to no trust, the retention of the moneys after the recipient bank learned of the mistake may well have given rise to a constructive trust: see Snell’s Equity, p. 193; Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 7th ed. (1993) p. 168; Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc.[1990] 1 QB 391 , 473-474. ”
“To revert briefly to the authorities relied upon by the plaintiffs, the passages in Neste Oy and McCormick v Grogan are, in my judgment, unreliable for the reasons which I have endeavoured to state. The observation of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Westdeutsche case only assists the plaintiffs if it is to be treated as a general statement of the law applicable to all cases of fraud. In my view it would be wrong so to treat it. It was a general statement of certain underlying principles instanced by examples two of which concerned transactions which were void, not voidable, and the third of which comes from the field of secret trusts where “fraud” is referred to in no special sense. I do not think that Lord Browne-Wilkinson can be taken to have been laying down a principle applicable to all cases of fraud when he did not deal with the reasoning in the other cases which I have mentioned.”
“… Mr Murad was the plaintiff’s fiduciary, and he was bribed to purchase the shares. He committed a gross breach of his fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff, and that is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to invoke the assistance of equity. Other victims, however, were less fortunate. They employed no fiduciary. They were simply swindled. No breach of any fiduciary obligation was involved. It would, of course, be an intolerable reproach to our system of jurisprudence if the plaintiff were the only victim who could trace and recover his money. Neither party before me suggested that this is the case; and I agree with them. But if the other victims of the fraud can trace their money in equity it must be because, having been induced to purchase the shares by false and fraudulent misrepresentations, they are entitled to rescind the transaction and revest the equitable title to the purchase money in themselves, at least to the extent necessary to support an equitable tracing claim: Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd(1986) 160 CLR 371 at 387-390 per Brennan J. There is thus no distinction between their case and the plaintiff’s. They can rescind the purchase for fraud, and he for the bribery of his agent; and each can then invoke the assistance of equity to follow property of which he is the equitable owner. But, if this is correct, as I think it is, then the trust which is operating in these cases is not some new model remedial trust, but an old-fashioned institutional resulting trust. This may be of relevance to the degree of knowledge required on the part of a subsequent recipient to make him liable.”
“For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty.”
“Before considering this issue further it will be helpful to define the terms being used by looking more closely at what dishonesty means in this context. Whatever may be the position in some criminal or other contexts (see, for instance, Reg. v. Ghosh [1982] Q.B. 1053), in the context of the accessory liability principle acting dishonestly, or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances. This is an objective standard. At first sight this may seem surprising. Honesty has a connotation of subjectivity, as distinct from the objectivity of negligence. Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or appreciated. Further, honesty and its counterpart dishonesty are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not inadvertent conduct. Carelessness is not dishonesty. Thus for the most part dishonesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, these subjective characteristics of honesty do not mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. If a person knowingly appropriates another's property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour.” 128. Again, at page 390 Lord Nicholls said: “The analysis of the position of the accessory, such as the solicitor who carries through the transaction for [the trustee], does not lead to such a simple, clear-cut answer in every case. He is required to act honestly; but what is required of an honest person in these circumstances? An honest person knows there is doubt. What does honesty require him to do? The only answer to these questions lies in keeping in mind that honesty is an objective standard. The individual is expected to attain the standard which would be observed by an honest person placed in those circumstances. It is impossible to be more specific. Knox J. captured the flavour of this, in a case with a commercial setting, when he referred to a person who is "guilty of commercially unacceptable conduct in the particular context involved:" see Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust Plc. [1992] 4 All E. R. 700, 761.” 129. These passages might be taken to suggest that in this context dishonesty is to be judged in objective terms, but in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley the House of Lords held that that is not what Lord Nicholls meant. Lord Hoffmann dealt with the matter in this way: “19. My noble and learned friend Lord Millett considers that the Court of Appeal was justified in taking this view because liability as an accessory to a breach of trust does not depend upon dishonesty in the normal sense of that expression. It is sufficient that the defendant knew all the facts which made it wrongful for him to participate in the way in which he did. In this case, Mr Leach knew the terms of the undertaking. He therefore knew all the facts which made it wrongful for him to deal with the money to the order of Mr Yardley without satisfying himself that it was for the acquisition of property. 20. I do not think that it is fairly open to your Lordships to take this view of the law without departing from the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378. For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Hutton, I consider that those principles require more than knowledge of the facts which make the conduct wrongful. They require a dishonest state of mind, that is to say, consciousness that one is transgressing ordinary standards of honest behaviour. I also agree with Lord Hutton that the judge correctly applied this test and that the Court of Appeal was not entitled, on the basis of the written transcript, to make a finding of dishonesty which the judge who saw and heard Mr Leach did not.” 130. Lord Hutton, having analysed in some detail what Lord Nicholls said, concluded that Lord Nicholls had not intended to hold that in this context a person can be dishonest even if he does not know that his conduct would be regarded as dishonest by honest people. For his own part he considered that it would be wrong to allow a finding of dishonesty to be made against a person who did not know that what he was doing would ordinarily be regarded as dishonest. He said: “35. There is, in my opinion, a further consideration which supports the view that for liability as an accessory to arise the defendant must himself appreciate that what he was doing was dishonest by the standards of honest and reasonable men. A finding by a judge that a defendant has been dishonest is a grave finding, and it is particularly grave against a professional man, such as a solicitor. Notwithstanding that the issue arises in equity law and not in a criminal context, I think that it would be less than just for the law to permit a finding that a defendant had been "dishonest" in assisting in a breach of trust where he knew of the facts which created the trust and its breach but had not been aware that what he was doing would be regarded by honest men as being dishonest.”
“(The constructive trustee) is not liable for failing to make inquiry, but for the misapplication of the plaintiff’s property. He is under no duty to make inquiry. His only duty is to act honestly. If he makes inquiry, he does so for his own protection. If he does not make inquiry, the loss is not caused by his failure to do so but by his participation in the misapplication of the plaintiff’s funds. He is liable only if he acted with knowledge; and this must be judged in the light of all the circumstances known to him and any explanation actually given to him. But it is not, in my view, to be judged by considering the hypothetical explanations which might have been given to him if he had sought them. If it were otherwise his liability would depend upon whether the fraudster would have been sufficiently inventive to supply a plausible explanation if asked for one… In my judgment, the fact that a false but credible explanation would or might have been given is no defence to a party put on inquiry who makes none. Mr. Jackson and Mr. Griffin are not to be held liable for the misapplication of the plaintiff’s funds because they failed to make inquiries which would have discovered the fraud, but because they dishonestly assisted in the misapplication. Their failure to make the inquiries which honest men would have made to satisfy themselves that they were not engaged in furthering a fraud is merely the evidence from which that dishonesty is to be inferred. ”