“(1) A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground— (a) that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or (b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.”
“(1) If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court’s order may— (a) regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future; (b) require the company— (i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or (ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do; (c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct; (d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; (e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company’s capital accordingly.” (a) regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future; (b) require the company— (i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or (ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do; (c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct; (d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; (e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company’s capital accordingly.”
“145. […] It is for the court to decide what it considers to be the appropriate orders to make, and it does so by reference to the state of affairs existing when it gives judgment: Grace v Biagioli[2005] EWCA Civ 1222 ;[2006] 2 BCLC 70 at paras 73–74. […] Other factors relevant to the exercise by the court of its discretion as to the relief, if any, which it will give are the proportionality of the remedy to the conduct found to be unfairly prejudicial (Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd and others[2002] EWCA Civ 1740 ,[2003] 1 BCLC 76 at para 51) and the petitioner’s own conduct (Interactive Technology Corporation Ltd v Ferster[2016] EWHC 2896 (Ch) at para 318 and the cases there cited). 146. The court’s order may provide for the payment of a specified sum, by way of compensation or otherwise …”
“18 In breach of one or more of the obligations you have: (a) To attempt to deceive EELVS by concealing the organisation and purpose of Kent van solutions Ltd (‘Kent’) (b) You have undoubtedly breached the terms of the “inter alia”
“162. […] Zedra is not claiming equitable relief. It is claiming relief from unfairly prejudicial conduct in the management of the Company and that relief is available only because section 996 of the 2006 Act gives the court power to grant such relief […].”
“The concept of fairness must be applied judicially and the content which it is given by the courts must be based upon rational principles. […] Although fairness is a notion which can be applied to all kinds of activities, its content will depend upon the context in which it is being used.”
“that does not mean that there are no principles by which those circumstances may be identified. […] The way in which such equitable principles operate is tolerably well settled and in my view it would be wrong to abandon them in favour of some wholly indefinite notion of fairness. […] The parallel is not in the conduct which the court will treat as justifying a particular remedy but in the principles upon which it decides that the conduct is unjust, inequitable or unfair.”
“74. It was, therefore, incumbent on the judge to consider the whole range of possible remedies and to choose the one which on his assessment of the existing state of relations between the parties was most likely both to remedy the unfair prejudice already suffered and to deal fairly with the situation which had occurred. […] 75. In most cases, the usual order to make will be the one requiring the Respondents to buy out the petitioning shareholder at a price to be fixed by the court. […] The reasons for making such an order are in most cases obvious. It will free the petitioner from the company and enable him to extract his share of the value of its business and assets in return for foregoing any future right to dividends.”
“30. We have described the issue of quasi-interest as logically anterior to the exercise of discretion as to the choice of the valuation date. But in practice the two cannot be completely separated, because the circumstances in which it may be fair for the court to take an early valuation date (or in which it is simply not possible to take a more recent date) may also be highly relevant to the petitioner's claim for the equivalent of interest. If (to take an extreme example) a majority shareholder had used his control to misappropriate a company’s staff, customers and goodwill so as to make the company's shares virtually worthless by the time of the hearing, the only fair valuation date may be the date of presentation of the petition (and there will probably also be a notional adjustment to allow for the misappropriation, a course specifically approved, in relation tos.210 of the Companies Act 1948 , by the House of Lords in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer[1959] AC 324 , considered further below). But in the meantime the petitioner has (in an extreme case of that sort) been receiving no benefit of any sort from his membership of the company, either in the form of dividends, or in the form of director’s remuneration, or otherwise. He has been locked into an investment which has been made worthless as a result of the majority shareholder's oppression. […] 31. In our judgment the deputy judge was right in his view that an order for the equivalent of interest is not beyond the powers of the court under s.461(1). The court has repeatedly emphasised the width of the discretion conferred by that subsection, which is not limited to the particular powers enumerated in subsection (2). The House of Lords has (in relation to the court's closely comparable powers unders.210 of the Companies Act 1948 ) approved the making of adjustments in the valuation process which mean that the court is actually valuing shares, not as they are, but as they would have been if events had followed a different course; and that practice is regularly followed by the court in orders under s.461(1).”
“One of the most useful orders mentioned in the section … is to order the oppressor to buy their shares at a fair price: and a fair price would be, I think, the value which the shares would have had at the date of the petition, if there had been no oppression. … It is, no doubt, true that an order of this kind gives to the oppressed shareholders what is in effect money compensation for the injury done to them: but I see no objection to this. The section gives a large discretion to the court and it is well exercised in making an oppressor make compensation to those who have suffered at his hands.”