“Where after the commencement of this Act a person dies domiciled in England and Wales and is survived by any of the following persons: - (a) the spouse or civil partner of the deceased; (b) a former spouse or former civil partner of the deceased, but not one who has formed a subsequent marriage or civil partnership; (ba) any person (not being a person included in paragraph (a) or (b) above) to whom subsection (1A) below applies; (c) a child of the deceased; (d) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who in relation to any marriage or civil partnership to which the deceased was at any time a party, or otherwise in relation to any family in which the deceased at any time stood in the role of a parent, was treated by the deceased as a child of the family; that person may apply to the court for an order under section 2 of this Act on the ground that the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant.” 1(2) In this Act “reasonable financial provision”— (a) in the case of an application made by virtue of subsection (1)(a) above by the husband or wife of the deceased (except where the marriage with the deceased was the subject of a judicial separation orderand at the date of death the orderwas in force and the separation was continuing), means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or her maintenance; (aa) in the case of an application made by virtue of subsection (1)(a) above by the civil partner of the deceased (except where, at the date of death, a separation order under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of theCivil Partnership Act 2004 was in force in relation to the civil partnership and the separation was continuing), means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for a civil partner to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or her maintenance; 1(2A) The reference in subsection (1)(d) above to a family in which the deceased stood in the role of a parent includes a family of which the deceased was the only member (apart from the applicant). 2(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, where an application is made for an order under this section, the court may, if it is satisfied that the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant, make any one or more of [various orders]. 2(4)An order under this section may contain such consequential and supplemental provisions as the court thinks necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the order or for the purpose of securing that the order operates fairly as between one beneficiary of the estate of the deceased and another and may, in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection— (a) order any person who holds any property which forms part of the net estate of the deceased to make such payment or transfer such property as may be specified in the order; (b) vary the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by the will or the law relating to intestacy, or by both the will and the law relating to intestacy, in such manner as the court thinks fair and reasonable having regard to the provisions of the order and all the circumstances of the case; [...]”
“depending on the circumstances of a particular case, it may be appropriate to give great weight to an unexplained or extortionate delay and it would not be appropriate to exercise the section 4 power if the claim has no merit in the sense that it would not pass the test for summary judgment.”
“It seems to me that although the applicant must put forward a substantial case, that it is not necessarily true that there must be a good reason for all delay in every case. Each case turns on its own facts and, in each case, the judge is required to weigh the Berger factors and to reach a decision. If, as in McNulty v McNulty[2002] WTLR 737 the applicant has a strong claim for reasonable financial provision, it may be appropriate, taking into account all of the other relevant factors, to exercise the section 4 power, despite the lack of a good reason for delay or some part of it.”
“it is necessary to decide whether an applicant’s claim has a real prospect of success rather than a fanciful one. If the claim has no real prospect of success, there is no point in considering the other relevant factors.The court will not entertain a claim with no merit which is commenced outside the six-month time limit, merely because the delays can be explained and no one is prejudiced. The corollary is not necessarily true. If the claim would pass the summary judgment test, it does not mean that the court will exercise the section 4 power to extend time. It is dependent upon an evaluation of all of the relevant factors in the circumstances.”
“I understand the First Defendant cannot use the letter in her evidence and that I may need to make an application in this regard so I do not want to say too much about it except that the evidence BGS had uncovered was clearly relevant to my potential claims at that time and the possibility of such evidence becoming public in the course of proceedings or otherwise would obviously be a relevant consideration for any litigant. I had no part in Shannon Productions approaching the First Defendant.”
“I know Lonan’s and Hugh’s relationship was incredibly strong. Hugh was clearly a wealthy man but his affection for Lonan was shown in so many other ways than purely through money. His help with Lonan’s direction in business, their general playfulness and comfort in each other’s presence around the dinner table, and his interest in Lonan’s schooling, his school friends and his sporting endeavours al [sic] pointed to a relationship not just between a man and his wife’s son but more akin to that of a father and son.”
“I have no doubt that Hugh would have been prepared to say whatever would be necessary in order to defend as vigorously as possible that claim and so strike the best deal he could. That degree of calculation and positioning can be seen in Hugh’s letter to my mother of27 April 2004 exhibited by the First Defendant (pages 1 to 2 of JMT1), which she accepts was after my mother had issued her family proceedings.”
“I created this as a joke with my friends. My friends and I were discussing another friend of ours who had set up a real online shop. As a joke, I used an available ‘shop’ function of my businesses website to mock-up a shop selling ridiculously overpriced goods that lauded the sort of oblivious, ‘trust fund’, privileged lifestyle that is lived by some people my friends and I do know. It is obvious this is not a commercial Lonan Fit enterprise because none of the (quite badly) photoshopped ‘goods’ bear any Lonan Fit name or branding at all. None of it ever existed or was for sale.”
“It follows from the above that, subject to waiver, communications by the Defendants to Powerhouse which contain or refer to the content of legal advice are capable of being privileged. This includes Level 3 communications. Whether or not it includes Level 1 and Level 2 communications I do not have to decide, because on any footing there has been a waiver of such privilege as might otherwise have existed in those references.”
“not to my knowledge, no.”
“Unfortunately, I had again exhausted the funds I had available to pursue my claim. Particularly in light of the First Defendant’s response, through Macfarlanes, to my intimated claim – which was entirely dismissive of it having any merit and threatened to fight it aggressively and pursue costs orders against me (rather than seek to negotiate or engage in any form of alternative dispute resolution) – I was not in a position financially or otherwise to pursue my claim.”
“Fortunately, my now legal representative, Najinder Klear of Myddletons, and I have a mutual friend who, being aware of my position, put us in touch with each other this summer. Najinder agreed to represent me on a Conditional Fee Arrangement as I would not otherwise be able to bring the litigation. Najinder recognised that I had a claim under the 1975 Act but that I had run out of time to bring it as of right and instead would require the Court’s permission. Accordingly, Najinder instructed counsel on my behalf to assist with the preparation of this application.”
“So far as beneficiaries are concerned, there will usually be a real psychological change when the estate is distributed. Before the distribution, they would have only the expectation of payment … After the distribution, they have the money itself, and know the exact amount. If an order is made under the Act, the difference will be the difference between the prospect of receiving in due course less than they had hoped, and on the other hand having something that they had already received and regarded as their own taken away from them … If it is always prejudicial to claimants not to receive money that they are entitled to receive at the earliest possible moment, it is likely to be even more prejudicial to have taken away from them money that they have actually received and begun to enjoy.”
“The Claimant has made a number of efforts to obtain payment out of Hugh’s estate, as set out in the legal correspondence the Claimant has exhibited to his witness statement. After the first round of correspondence in 2020 to 2021 had concluded with no claim brought by the Claimant [LDOH 1, 48-57], I had thought this matter was finished. It was then a cause of surprise and concern that the Claimant resurrected his efforts to demand payment in December 2022 [LDOH 1, 58-70]. However, after this correspondence concluded in summer 2023 [LDOH 1, 71-81 and JMT 1, 95-113], again with no claim brought by the Claimant, I again thought the matter was settled. I was then shocked when in November 2024 my former solicitors received an email indicating that the Claimant had issued this claim [JMT 1, 117]. I had long thought that this matter was concluded and that I was free to move on from the Claimant and his demands for payment.”
“When it comes to considering what is the weight to be given to the existence of a claim for damages against solicitors in these cases, it seems to me that the right approach is to consider the justice of the case as between the parties, first of all, and to take into account all the matters set out very helpfully by the Vice-Chancellor in In re Salmon. It is only if, having done that computation, one finds that the plaintiff on the one hand has suffered severe prejudice and the defendant on the other has suffered severe prejudice, or will if the limitation period is extended, that the claim for damages against the plaintiff’s solicitors becomes relevant. In other words if, as in this case, all the indications are on the plaintiff’s side and all point to extending time, and prejudice on the defendant’s side is what I would call purely formal in the sense that they have lost the benefit of such protection as s.4 gives them, then the claim for damages against solicitors is of little weight.”
“One of the matters that the court is obliged to have regard to in determining both of the issues the judge identified is set out under section 3(l)(d) "any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards . . . [the plaintiff]." Such obligations and responsibilities are clearly constraints on the deceased's freedom of action to dispose of his property as he wishes. Such constraints are in the nature of duties, and may be legal or—see In re Coventry—moral. The judge rightly asked himself whether such obligations were limited to those existing at the date of death, or extended to include those arising in infancy and still undischarged. He held that the obligations under section 3(1)(d)need not exist at the time of death. In my judgment that was wrong as a matter of law. The deceased's freedom of action to dispose of his property must be judged at the time of death, and it is only his then current obligations and responsibilities that must be taken into account. Some undischarged responsibilities from the past may still be current—for instance a child of the deceased might have given up a university place to nurse the deceased through his long last illness and now wish to go to take up that place. The moral obligation there would be both current and clear. But where the undischarged responsibility does not amount to an obligation present at the date of death, the statute does not require it to be taken into account.”
“After it became apparent to me that I would not be joining and ultimately succeeding to Hugh’s property business I felt totally betrayed and bereft and could not bear the idea of working in that sector without Hugh. The First Defendant had also mentioned on multiple occasions that she would make it her priority to ensure that I never succeed in property or classic cars. Accordingly, I trained as a personal trainer and am now a self-employed personal trainer.”
“But in my judgment the word ‘maintenance’ connotes only payments which, directly or indirectly, enable the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of his daily living at whatever standard of living is appropriate to him. The provision that is to be made is to meet recurring expenses, being expenses of living of an income nature. This does not mean that the provision need be by way of income payments. The provision can be by way of a lump sum, for example, to buy a house in which the applicant can be housed, thereby relieving him pro tanto of income expenditure. Nor am I suggesting that there may not be cases in which payment of existing debts may not be appropriate as a maintenance payment; for example, to pay the debts of an applicant in order to enable him to continue to carry on a profit-making business or profession may well be for his maintenance.”
“Whatever the rights and wrongs of what occurred, the most important aspect of his relationship with his daughters [the applicants] for present purposes is that, after he had made the gifts to them in 2008, Tony [the deceased] was not prepared to provide further financial assistance to them. The lifestyle choices they made were, as I have said, not dependent upon the expectation of any such assistance.”