Kevin-Gerald Stanford v Klotho Brands Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC 1917 (Ch)

Case No’s: BL-2025-001103 and BL-2021-002235[2026] EWHC 1917 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 27 July 2026
BEFORE AMANDA HARDY KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
B E T W E E N (in BL-2025-001103):
KEVIN-GERALD STANFORD
Claimant/Respondent
- and –
(1) KLOTHO BRANDS LIMITED
(formerly known as Lion/Heaven UK II Limited)
(2) LYNDON LEA
(3) PROSKAUER ROSE (LONDON) LLP)
Defendants/Applicants
AND B E T W E E N (in BL-2021-002335):
KLOTHO BRANDS LIMITED
(formerly known as Lion/Heaven UK II Limited)
Claimant/Applicant
- and -
KEVIN GERALD STANFORD
(now known as Kevin-gerald Stanford)
Defendant/Respondent
Hearing Hearing date: 5 May 2026
Ben Valentin KC and Ellen Tims (instructed by Proskauer Rose (London) LLP) for the First and Second Defendants
Adam Wolanski KC and Lily Walker Parr (instructed by RPC) for the Third Defendants
Mr Kevin-gerald Stanford in person
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30am on 27 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives
Amanda Hardy KC sitting as a Judge of the High Court:
Introduction and Preliminary Matters
Between
Kevin-Gerald StanfordClaimantKlotho Brands Limited & OrsDefendant

Introduction

[1]This is my judgment in respect of the following applications (“the Applications”).[2]First, the application of Klotho Brands Limited (“Klotho”) and Mr. Lyndon Lea (“Mr Lea”) dated 21 January 2026, to strike-out, alternatively for summary judgment to be entered in respect of a claim commenced by Mr. Kevin-gerald Stanford (“Mr. Stanford”) by Claim Form issued on 27 November 2025 (Claim No. BL-2025-001103, the “2025 Claim”) (“Klotho’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application”).[3]By the 2025 Claim, Mr. Stanford seeks to set aside an order of this Court, made in April 202 2, on the groundthat it “was procured by fraud on the court, material non-disclosure, serious procedural irregularity and/or misuse of CPR Part 8”, as set out in paragraph 12.1 of the Particulars of Claim.[4]Secondly, the application of Klotho and Mr. Lea, also dated 21 January 2026, for an extended civil restraint order against Mr. Stanford, which is brought within both the 2025 Claim and the earlier proceedings commenced by Klotho in 2021 (Claim No. BL-2021-002235, the “2021 Claim”) (the “ECRO Application”).[5]Thirdly, the parallel application of Proskauer Rose (London) LLP (“Proskauer”), dated 21 January 2026, to strike-out, alternatively for summary judgment to be entered in respect of, the 2025 Claim (“Proskauer’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application”).[6]In light of the significant factual overlap between them, the Applications were listed to be heard together.[7]At the beginning of the hearing, I informed the parties that when reading the Hearing Bundle I noticed that there were two passing references to the sale of the fashion brand Karen Millen, which Mr. Stanford had co-founded. I noted that I had advised Mr. Stanford’s then wife (Karen Millen) and possibly Mr. Stanford in respect of that company. As the advice given in respect of Karen Millen Limited was in 2000/2001, some 25 years ago, I did not have access to the papers given the passage of time to check any further information. I noted that that matter did not appear to have any connection to the subject matter of the Applications but I invited the parties to comment in advance of the start of the hearing and make submissions on whether they were content for me to proceed. All parties consented.[8]I am grateful to all counsel and to Mr. Stanford for their detailed written and oral submissions.

Proskauer’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application

[9]Proskauer, the Third Defendant in the 2025 Claim, is a law firm representing Klotho and Mr Lea and who represented Klotho in the 2021 Claim and the contempt proceedings set out below.[10]Mr. Stanford served and filled a Notice of Discontinuance in respect of the Third Defendant on 29 April 2026. Mr Wolanski and Ms. Parr attended the start of the hearing, however, after I had dealt with the consequential application for costs, Proskauer took no further part in the hearing. Relevant Background The parties

Relevant Background

[11]Klotho is an indirect subsidiary of Lion Capital LLP (“Lion Capital”), a private equity firm which specialises in investments in the consumer sector. Lion Capital owns or invests in several consumer brands which are held by its subsidiary companies or funds. One such fund is Lion/Nala Investors L.P., a Limited Partnership based in Guernsey which owns Klotho indirectly through two holding companies, Nala AS Topco Ltd and Nala AS Bidco Ltd. On 25 July, Klotho changed its name from Lion/Heaven UK II Limited to Klotho Brands Ltd.[12]Mr. Lea and Mr. Robert Darwent are both co-founders of Lion Capital and are its Designated Members. Mr. Lea and Mr. Darwent are both also directors of Klotho along with Ms. Elaine Deste and Ms. Catherine Jobling.[13]Klotho owns shares in All Saints Retail Limited (“ASRL”), which it acquired from Mr. Stanford pursuant to a share purchase agreement entered into on 5 May 2011 (“the 2011 Sale Agreement”). Klotho and Mr. Stanford later entered into a settlement agreement in 2012 (“the 2012 Settlement Agreement”). The historic disputes involve, in brief, a dispute about the ownership of ASRL.[14]For ease of reference, Mr. Valentine referred to Klotho and Mr. Lea together simply as “Klotho” and I adopt that reference.[15]Mr. Stanford is the Respondent in the present Applications and has long experience in the retail fashion sector.

Mr Stanford’s legal representation and attendance

[16]Mr. Stanford did not serve any evidence in response to the Applications, notwithstanding that Klotho, in compliance with CPR r. 24.5(2)(f), had stated in the Application Notice for Klotho’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application that Mr. Stanford had a right to rely on evidence in opposition to it.[17]I did, however, have the advantage of a detailed Skeleton Argument from Mr. Stanford and his appearance in person at the hearing. Mr. Stanford had not attended the trial of the 2021 Claim or any of the hearings in the contempt proceedings dealt with below.[18]In conducting the hearing and in considering the Applications, I bear in mind that Mr. Stanford is a litigant in person and not a trained lawyer and he cannot be expected to communicate with the precision expected of such a lawyer. As noted, however, Mr. Stanford is a sophisticated and experienced businessman and there is no special dispensation for litigants in person from obeying the ordinary procedural rules, and indeed the substantive laws, which apply just as much to unrepresented as to represented litigants: see Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119, SC.

The 2021 claim, trial and the judgment of Deputy Judge Ambrose (“the Ambrose Judgment”)

[19]The 2021 Claim was issued by Klotho against Mr. Stanford on 8 December 2021 under CPR Part 8. Those proceedings for declaratory and injunctive relief were undertaken as a result of Mr. Stanford’s assertions in correspondence from September 2017 that Lion Capital had not acquired good title to the ASRL Shares, inter alia, because of alleged ‘fraud’.[20]As noted in paragraph 13 above, Klotho had acquired the ASRL Shares in 2011 pursuant to the Sale Agreement between Axis Fiduciary Ltd (a trustee of the DS Family Trust, a trust related to Mr. Stanford), Kaupthing Bank h.f., Glitnir Bank h.f., Mr. Stanford and itself.[21]In advance of the trial of the 2021 Claim, Mr. Stanford objected to it proceeding under CPR Part 8. He advanced that objection:(i) in his Acknowledgment of Service dated 23 December 2021;(ii) in a witness statement also dated 23 December 2021 which Mr. Stanford filed with his Acknowledgment of Service; and(iii) orally and in person at a hearing before Mr. Justice Marcus Smith on 11 February 2022 at which Klotho sought the expedition of the 2021 Claim.[22]In light of Mr. Stanford’s current complaint, inter alia, that the CPR Part 8 process was “misused”, I note that Mr Justice Marcus Smith ordered that the 2021 Claim should proceed as a CPR Part 8 Claim to a final disposal hearing at paragraph 1 of his order sealed on 14 February 2022 and Mr. Stanford did not seek to appeal that case-management decision.[23]The trial of the 2021 Claim took place on 5 April 2022 before Deputy Judge Ambrose, who granted Klotho the relief it sought, including its costs of the 2021 Claim. Judge Ambrose granted the following declaratory relief in her Order sealed on 6 April 2022: “Pursuant to a Share Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 5 May 2011, and a Settlement Agreement dated 22 November 2012, each between (among other parties) Lion/Heaven UK II Limited and Mr. Stanford:(1) Mr. Stanford has no rights, interest or claims in or to the “A” ordinary shares and preference shares which he had formerly held in the capital of All Saints Retail Limited (“the Shares”) (or any of them) because Lion/Heaven UK II Limited is the legal and beneficial owner of the Shares; and/or(2) Mr. Stanford, having agreed not to assert that he has any rights, interest or claims in or to the Shares (or any of them), and having released Lion/Heaven UK II Limited from any claim to the contrary, is not entitled to claim or assert that he has any rights, interest or claims in or to the Shares (or any of them)”. (1) Mr. Stanford has no rights, interest or claims in or to the “A” ordinary shares and preference shares which he had formerly held in the capital of All Saints Retail Limited (“the Shares”) (or any of them) because Lion/Heaven UK II Limited is the legal and beneficial owner of the Shares; and/or (2) Mr. Stanford, having agreed not to assert that he has any rights, interest or claims in or to the Shares (or any of them), and having released Lion/Heaven UK II Limited from any claim to the contrary, is not entitled to claim or assert that he has any rights, interest or claims in or to the Shares (or any of them)”.[24]Deputy Judge Ambrose further ordered that: “Mr. Stanford is restrained, by himself, or through others acting on his behalf or on his instructions or with his encouragement, from asserting in any way whatsoever any rights, interest or claims in or to the “A” ordinary shares and preference shares which he had formerly held in the capital of All Saints Retail Limited”.[25]At paragraph 74 of her Judgment, Deputy Judge Ambrose held: “Mr. Stanford has made assertions in these proceedings that he was fraudulently induced to conclude the 2011 SPA and 2012 Settlement Agreement, and on that basis the agreements were null and void or were vitiated. He also asserts that a number of the Claimant’s directors had knowledge of that fraud. He failed to justify the matter being decided under Part 7. More significantly, he failed to provide any realistic evidential basis for substantiating these serious allegations of fraudulent inducement. His own assertions and statement evidence did not substantiate his case on fraud or knowledge of fraud, and I reject it”.[26]Mr. Stanford did not seek to appeal the Ambrose Judgment or Order.

Mr. Stanford’s bankruptcy

[27]Mr. Stanford did not pay Klotho’s costs of the 2021 Claim as required by the Ambrose Order, within the 28 days permitted, or at all. That led to his being adjudged bankrupt by order dated 23 May 2023 (the “2023 Bankruptcy Order” and the “2023 Bankruptcy”) and the appointment of the Official Receiver as interim trustee in bankruptcy.[28]From 22 March 2024, the discharge of the 2023 Bankruptcy was suspended by the County Court at Medway indefinitely.[29]On 22 December 2025, following Mr. Stanford’s first attempt to serve the 2025 Claim, Proskauer wrote a letter to Mr. Stanford, copied to the Deputy Official Receiver (Mr. Mark Ireson), asking Mr. Stanford to explain whether he had attempted to commence the 2025 Claim with the permission of the Official Receiver.[30]Mr. Ireson responded the same day, confirming that Proskauer’s letter was the first the Official Receiver had heard of the 2025 Claim and that the Official Receiver had received no request from Mr. Stanford to issue the 2025 Claim or any other claim and had given no permission for him to do so. The Official Receiver confirmed that “any such claim would vest in the Official Receiver as Mr. Stanford’s trustee in bankruptcy”.[31]In the 2025 Claim, Mr. Stanford refers in passing to an earlier bankruptcy, to the “2019 bankruptcy trustees” in the Claim Form and, in his Witness Statement dated 12 December 2025 served in connection with the 2025 Claim, to a (different) bankruptcy order made on 12 February 2019.

The contempt proceedings

[32]Mr. Stanford’s breaches of the Ambrose Order led to Klotho successfully applying to commit him for contempt of court on 23 June 2025 (the “Contempt Application”).[33]In the course of the Contempt Application, His Honour Judge Paul Matthews dismissed five separate applications that were made by Mr. Stanford with the aim of postponing or avoiding the consequences of the Contempt Application. At least three of those applications were certified by HHJ Matthews as being totally without merit at that time. Mr. Stanford was ordered to pay Klotho’s costs of the Contempt Application and the five other dismissed applications in HHJ Matthews orders in respect of costs dated 28 October 2025 and 1 December 2025.[34]In paragraph 12 of his judgment dated 1 August 2025, reported at [2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch), HHJ Matthews noted: “A third submission [by Mr. Stanford] was that the order of 5 April 2022 had been obtained by fraud, in that some of the evidence filed on behalf of the claimant had been fraudulent and that this had not been tested, because this was a claim trued under CPR Part 8, rather than Part 7. The problem with this, of course, is that the deputy judge in 2022 had considered the respondent’s allegations of fraud, but had expressly rejected them, and there was no appeal”.[35]HHJ Matthews held, in paragraph 67 of his 1 August 2025 judgment, that he was satisfied to the criminal standard that Mr. Stanford had committed contempt of court in breaching the order of Deputy Judge Ambrose, by preparing and sending correspondence on 2 January 2025 and 9 May 2025.[36]HHJ Matthews reminded Mr. Stanford that he would be entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the findings of contempt he had made, without the need for permission, within 21 days of the order being made. No order was lodged and, in the course of his submissions before me, Mr. Stanford expressed his contentment with HHJ Matthew’s judgment.[37]In a postscript to his judgment, HHJ Matthews dealt with four further matters raised by Mr. Stanford subsequent to the judgment being handed down in draft but before it was formally handed down. HHJ Matthews noted that it was far too late for the first three points (which he recorded could have been raised by Mr. Stanford before the hearing took place) and the fourth (the re-arguing of the non-joinder of the family trust) was an abuse and he noted he accordingly ignored all of them.[38]On 17 September 2025, HHJ Matthews concluded (the judgment is reported at [2025] EWHC 2367) that the matters which were subject to the Contempt Application necessitated a custodial sentence of 32 weeks, suspended for two years.

The 2025 Claim

[39]The Claim Form in Mr. Stanford’s 2025 Claim was sealed on 27 November 2025; it was first served on 14 December 2025 and thereafter re-served on 22 December 2025 (in neither case compliantly with the CPR, although I note that Klotho takes no point in respect of this for the purposes of the Applications).[40]The 2025 Claim appears to have been commenced (and amended) by Mr. Stanford in reliance on observations made by HHJ Paul Matthews when presiding over the Contempt Application.[41]On 21 July 2025, Mr. Stanford had made an application for the immediate stay of all ‘enforcement proceedings’ arising from the Ambrose Order, including contempt, because, inter alia, he alleged that the Ambrose Order was obtained by fraud.[42]In dismissing that application, HHJ Paul Matthews observed that “[n]o application ha[d] been made to set aside the order of the court [i.e. the Ambrose Order], for example on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud”: [2025] EWHC 2284 (Ch), at paragraph 9.[43]In those circumstances, HHJ Paul Matthews held that “any allegation to the effect that the [Ambrose Order] was obtained by fraud [wa]s simply irrelevant to the present [contempt] proceedings”: [2025] EWHC 2284 (Ch), at paragraph 17.[44]On 13 August 2025, after the Contempt Application had been determined, but prior to Mr. Stanford’s sentencing, Mr. Stanford issued an application (by Form N244) seeking to set aside the Ambrose Order because he claimed it had been procured by fraud on the Court: see HHJ Matthews decision, [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch), at paragraph 9.[45]As part of that application, Mr. Stanford contended that the Court (in particular, at paragraph 57 of its judgment on the Contempt Application, where HHJ Matthew’s stated “But the difficulty for [Mr. Stanford] is that the order of 5 April 2022 has never been appealed, let alone overturned on appeal, and has never been set aside on any application for that purpose based on the alleged fraud. In these circumstances, I am not able to go behind that order”) had “preserved” and contemplated the separate determination of the ‘fraud issue’, which remained “live, unresolved, and procedurally open” on a proper application.[46]In dismissing that application, principally on the grounds that if the Ambrose Order were set aside that would not have retrospective effect (and as such, any established breaches of it would not be cured by the Ambrose Order having been set aside), HHJ Paul Matthews observed that “an application to set aside an existing judgment for fraud had to be brought by a fresh claim rather than an application within the original proceedings”, see [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch), at paragraph 9.[47]On 9 September 2025, after Mr. Stanford’s sentencing hearing on the Contempt Application but before HHJ Paul Matthews handed down his reserved judgment, Mr. Stanford issued a further application seeking to stay such sentencing pending determination of the (unsealed) Part 7 Claim that was appended to his application: see [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch), paragraph 12.[48]At that time, HHJ Paul Matthews had assumed that the Part 7 Claim Form that was before him had in fact been “issued”, see [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch), at paragraph 14, which, it now transpires, was not the case, as the Claim Form in the 2025 Claim was, in fact sealed on 27 November 2025.[49]Mr. Stanford’s reliance on the prior judgments of HHJ Paul Matthews as the justification for the 2025 Claim is evident on the face of the Claim Form in the 2025 Claim, where it is stated that it “relies on the Court’s own findings, including paragraph 55 of the sentencing judgment dated 17 September 2025, confirming that any evidential challenge must proceed only by a fresh Part 7 claim on sworn evidence”.[50]This appears, however, to be a reference to paragraph 55 of HHJ Paul Matthews’ judgment [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch) which reads:
“I will therefore lean towards mercy, and suspend the sentence of imprisonment for two years, on terms that the respondent does not during that time further breach the injunction of 5 April 2022. I make clear that in my judgment the true construction and scope of the injunction extends to not saying or doing anything to cast any doubt on the full validity on the applicant's ownership of the shares.”
[51]Mr. Stanford’s position is repeated in numerous paragraphs in the Particulars of Claim in the 2025 Claim, and in the Witness Statement of Mr. Stanford (defectively) served in connection with the 2025 Claim dated 12 December 2025, at paragraphs 117, 124 and 140.[52]In summary, by his 2025 Claim, Mr. Stanford seeks to set aside what he terms the “2022 Declaration” because it was, he considered “obtained by misleading the Court through misuse of the CPR Part 8 procedure and... [was] subsequent[ly] reli[ed] [on] to engage the Court’s penal jurisdiction... [in] fraud on the Court and an abuse of the Court’s process”.[53]Mr. Stanford relies on, inter alia, Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd [2019] UKSC 13, dealing with judgments procured by fraud, at paragraph 1.7 of the Particulars of Claim in the 2025 Claim. In addition, the relief Mr. Stanford seeks includes various declarations and an order that the ‘2022 Declaration’ is set aside, see paragraph 12 of the Particulars of Claim.[54]In the Particulars of Claim at paragraph 1.6, Mr. Stanford characterises “the issue for determination on [the 2025 Claim]” as: “whether the Court was misled into granting the 2022 Declaration through misuse of the CPR Part 8 procedure and whether reliance on that Declaration as a judicial fact to engage the Court’s penal jurisdiction constituted fraud on the Court and an abuse of the Court’s penal jurisdiction.[55]Mr. Stanford alleges, in paragraph 4 of the Particulars of Claim, the ‘misuse’ of the CPR Part 8 procedure in the determination of the 2021 Claim, which was, he contends, “legally unavailable”; and that the use of that procedure constituted “a serious procedural irregularity, an abuse of process, and a jurisdictional defect”.[56]Mr. Stanford alleges, in paragraph 5 of the Particulars of Claim, that Mr. Lea’s witness statement (adduced by Klotho at trial in support of the 2021 Claim) included allegedly material “false or misleading” assertions and failed to disclose matters which were “directly material to the Court’s jurisdiction and to the availability of declaratory relief” in connection with the 2021 Claim. Linked to this is an objection, in paragraph 9 of the Particulars of Claim, to the refusal by Mr. Lea (and also by Mr. Baker of Proskauer) to “verify, reaffirm, or deny” Mr. Lea’s statement on oath.[57]As I have noted, I had the advantage of both a written Skeleton Argument from Mr. Stanford and his appearance in front of me and his arguments both in writing and orally proceeded on a different basis as exemplified in paragraph 1 of his Skeleton Argument:
“This is a claim brought under CPR Part 7 concerning the declaration dated 5 April 2022 (the “2022 Declaration”). The claim as pleaded includes allegations that the 2022 Declaration was obtained on a misleading evidential basis, including fraud on the court. However, for the purposes of this application, the Claimant does not invite the Court to determine those allegations or to set aside the 2022 Declaration. The issue for the purposes of this application is one of scope, namely whether the matters now relied upon by the Defendants as establishing their asserted title were identified, put in issue, and adjudicated in the 2022 proceedings. The Claimant’s case is that they were not. This claim therefore raises a distinct and anterior issue, namely whether the 2022 Declaration can properly be relied upon as determinative of matters said to support title which were not identified or adjudicated as issues in those proceedings.”
[58]Mr. Stanford also states, at paragraphs 3 and 4 of his Skeleton Argument, and confirmed in his oral submissions that “It is not suggested that the Court was wrong in 2022. The Court determined the issues which were put before it, and no more…The present issue arises independently of any challenge to the validity of the 2022 Declaration and concerns only the scope of what was determined”. This is repeated throughout Mr. Stanford’s Skeleton Argument and was his position in oral argument.[59]In respect of the contempt proceedings, Mr. Stanford also submitted that he did not challenge HHJ Matthews’ decisions, and as I have noted, there was no appeal against the orders made by HHJ Matthews. However, Mr. Stanford also submitted:
“The present claim arises because the 2022 Declaration is now relied upon to engage the Court’s penal jurisdiction. The Claimant is subject to a suspended custodial sentence of 32 weeks’ imprisonment imposed on 17 September 2025, which will be activated if he is found to be in breach of the injunction granted in 2022. As HHJ Paul Matthews held at [55]– [56], the injunction extends to not saying or doing anything to “cast any doubt on the “full validity of the Defendants’ legal and beneficial title to the shares”
. Breach therefore exposes the Claimant to immediate imprisonment, save for statements made in good faith in these proceedings. The present claim does not challenge the validity of the order, or the findings made in the contempt proceedings, including the sentence imposed. It is concerned only with the prospective scope of the injunction when relied upon for contempt. Where an order is relied upon for contempt, its scope must be clear and certain in advance so that the person subject to it may know what conduct is prohibited. The Defendants’ position treats the injunction as extending to the “full validity” of ownership. That formulation necessarily depends upon the underlying factual foundation of title, which was not determined as an issue in the 2022 proceedings. In those circumstances, the boundary of what is said to constitute “casting doubt” depends upon matters outside what was determined. The scope of the injunction is thereby rendered uncertain. Orders relied upon for contempt must be clear and certain in their scope: JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2013] 1 WLR 1331. That requirement is not satisfied where the boundary of prohibited conduct depends upon matters not determined as issues. Unless and until those matters are determined as issues, they cannot define the boundary of conduct said to constitute contempt”.[60]Mr. Stanford’s further arguments in respect of the 2025 Claim are as follows.[61]Mr. Stanford challenges the basis on which the 2022 Declaration was sought and relied upon. Mr. Stanford states that Klotho’s assertion of “good title” was advanced by reference to the contractual framework of the of the 2011 Sale Agreement and the 2012 Settlement Agreement, without identifying any underlying mechanism by which that title is said to have arisen.[62]Mr. Stanford again reiterated that he does not contend that the Ambrose decision was wrong, however, he submits an issue arises as to whether the underlying factual matters said to support the asserted title were identified and determined as issues in those proceedings.[63]Mr. Stanford also asserts that at the material time, the transfer of title was not contained within the 2011 Sale Agreement alone but depended upon a wider set of factual and legal steps across multiple jurisdictions, including collateral arrangements associated with Kaupthing Bank S.A and that none of these matters were identified or determined as issues in the 2022 proceedings.[64]He recognises, however, that they were not matters which required determination on the claim as framed, which was directed to the contractual effect of the agreements as between the parties but asserts that the underlying factual foundation of title, upon which the contractual framework depends, was not adjudicated, and therefore remains unestablished.[65]It follows, in Mr. Stanford’s submission that the 2022 Declaration, granted without determining those matters, does not constitute a determination of them.[66]Mr. Stanford also considers that actions taken in respect of the shares in ASRL following the 2022 Ambrose decision confer rights that are capable of being exercised “without the participation or consent of the affected shareholder” and operate on the footing that ownership is settled and capable of being acted upon without qualification, providing no mechanism by which that position is tested and made conditional upon the determination of competing or underlying claims. I comment that I consider that this is the resultant effect of the Ambrose Judgment and Order which are binding on Mr. Stanford.[67]In paragraphs 6 to 8 of the Particulars in the 2025 Claim and in paragraphs 16 to 24 of his Skeleton Argument, Mr. Stanford submits that the ‘reliance’ on the ‘2022 Declaration’ for the purposes of the Contempt Application, “proceeded on the footing that the 2022 Declaration conclusively determined the relevant ownership position”. Again, I comment that I agree that this is the effect of the Ambrose Judgment and Order.[68]Mr. Stanford also characterises this as a consistent pattern of mischaracterisation, over extension and reliance on the Ambrose Order, including in respect of the trust connected with Mr. Stanford and his family.[69]Again, Mr. Stanford contends that the issue is one of scope and not correctness and he does not challenge the validity of the 2022 Declaration.[70]Finally, Mr. Stanford disputes that the claim vests in the Trustee in Bankruptcy and as he proceeds, for the purposes of the Applications,(i) on the basis that the Ambrose Order remains valid and binding as between the parties and(ii) does not ask the Court to set it aside or determine any entitlement to the shares, he submits that the issue is therefore “inherently and uniquely personal to the Claimant”. I note that this submission is at odds with, inter alia, paragraph 12 of the Particulars of Claim which asks for the Ambrose Order to be set aside. THE LAW Klotho’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application

THE LAW

[71]I turn now to consider the relevant law. Applicable legal principles Striking out[72]The Court has the power to strike out a statement of case (either in whole or in part) under CPR r. 3.4(2), inter alia, if:(a) the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim;(b) the statement of case is an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; and/or(c) there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.[73]Klotho relies on grounds (a) and (b), which cover statements of case which are “unreasonably vague, incoherent, vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded and other cases which do not amount to a legally recognisable claim or defence”. A claim may be struck out as not being a valid claim as a matter of law, see Price Meats Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 346. It is generally preferable to consider whether a claim is properly arguable (i.e. ground (a)) first, before the question of abuse of process (i.e. ground (b)) is considered, see Allsop v Banner Jones Ltd [2022] Ch. 55, at paragraph 47(iii).[74]A statement of case which discloses no reasonable grounds may also be an abuse of the court’s process, and, in respect of it, the opposing party may be entitled to summary judgment under CPR Part 24. There is no exact dividing line between ground(a) and ground(b) under CPR r. 3.4(2), nor between either of them and CPR Part 24 (and Klotho applies for summary judgment in the alternative: see below).[75]Although the term “abuse of the court’s process” is not defined in the rules or practice direction, it has been explained in another context as “using that process for a purpose or in a way significantly different from its ordinary and proper use”: Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 F.L.R. 759. The categories of abuse of process are varied and are not closed, and the courts have declined to define or circumscribe the circumstances in which an abuse may be established: Municipio de Mariana and others v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2022] 1 W.L.R. 4691, [172].[76]Mr. Valentine submitted that the established categories of abuse of process include the following.[77]First, in respect of vexatious proceedings, i.e. two or more sets of proceedings in respect of the same subject matter amounting to the harassment of the defendant by making them fight the same battle more than once with the attendant multiplication of costs, time and stress, referring to the White Book (2026), at paragraph 3.4.4. In this context it is immaterial whether the proceedings are brought concurrently or serially. In addition to striking out the statements of case in such proceedings the court may make a civil restraint order.[78]Secondly, res judicata, which is concerned with the principle of finality of earlier civil decisions, as to which, see Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2014] A.C. 160, at paragraph 17.[79]Thirdly, collateral attacks on earlier decisions: see Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] A.C. 529, at paragraph 541B.[80]Finally, pointless and wasteful litigation, where it can be demonstrated that the benefit attainable by the claimant in the action is of such limited value that “the game is not worth the candle” and the costs of the litigation will be out of all proportion to the benefit to be achieved: see Jameel v Dow Jones and Co [2005] Q.B. 946, at paragraph 69.[81]Mr. Valentine further submitted that, under CPR r. 3.4(6), if the Court strikes out a claimant’s statement of case and it considers that the claim is totally without merit:(a) the Court’s order must record that fact; and(b) the Court must at the same time consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order, see White Book (2026), at paragraph 3.4.24. It is for this reason that Klotho has requested that Klotho’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment is determined first and the ECRO Application is determined thereafter.

Summary judgment

[82]Klotho advances its application for summary judgment in the alternative, recognising the overlap between these two distinct powers and the guidance that it is “often appropriate” for a party to combine a striking out application with an application for summary judgment, see White Book (2026) at paragraph 3.4.21.[83]The overlap between CPR r. 3.4 and Part 24 is not complete. For instance, it has been observed that the focus of the Court on an application under CPR r. 3.4 will be on the statement of case:
“Swain v Hillman [2000] P.I.Q.R. P51, P52: “Clearly, there is a relationship between r. 3.4 and r. 24.2 However the power of the court under Part 24, the grounds are set out in r. 24.2, are wider than those contained in r. 3.4. The reason for the contrast in language between r. 3.4 and r. 24.2 is because under r. 3.4, unlike r. 24.2, the court generally is only concerned with the statement of case which it is alleged discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim.”
[84]Pursuant to CPR r. 24.3, the Court may give summary judgment against a claimant on the whole of a claim or issue if:(a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; and(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.[85]The principles to be applied in deciding whether summary judgment should be given are well-known and were summarised by Lord Justice Lewison in Easyair Ltd (t/a Openair) v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at paragraph 15: “The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows: i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91; ii) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8] iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10] v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63; vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725”.[86]A more recent summary can be found in Amersi v Leslie [2021] EWHC 1368 (KB), at paragraph 142. Notably, where a respondent to a summary judgment application claims that further evidence will be available at trial, they must substantiate that assertion by describing (at least in general terms) the nature of the evidence, its source and its relevance to the issues before the Court (and as such, it is insufficient simply to say that further evidence will or may be available): see Korea National Insurance Corp v Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG (formerly Allianz Marine & Aviation Vershicherungs AG) [2007] 2 C.L.C. 748, at paragraph 14.[87]Where a summary judgment application concerns the making of a declaration, the key issue is whether the underlying facts or matters relevant to the declaration are made out: Abaidildinov v Amin [2020] 1 W.L.R. 5120, at paragraph 47.[88]Klotho advances its Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application on four principal grounds(i) Mr. Stanford has no standing to pursue the 2025 Claim;(ii) it is not open to Mr. Stanford to challenge the decision to determine the 2021 Claim under CPR Part 8;(iii) the 2025 Claim discloses no arguable grounds for setting aside the Ambrose Judgment; and(iv) that the 2025 Claim is vexatious. Ground 1: Mr. Stanford, who is an undischarged bankrupt, has no standing to pursue the 2025 Claim Klotho’s submissions on Ground 1[89]The first ground for Klotho’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application is that Mr. Stanford has no standing to pursue the 2025 Claim, as it is a claim that has vested in the Official Receiver.[90]As explained above, pursuant to the 2023 Bankruptcy Order and as recently confirmed by Mark Ireson, Deputy Official Receiver on 22 December 2025, Mr. Stanford is an undischarged bankrupt.[91]Mr. Valentine submitted that, pursuant to section 306(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 1986”), Mr. Stanford’s estate vested automatically in the Official Receiver immediately upon his becoming trustee (i.e. when the 2023 Bankruptcy Order was made on 23 May 2023).[92]He further submitted that this is clear on the face of the 2023 Bankruptcy Order, the “Important Notice to Bankrupt” being in the following terms: “The Official Receiver attached to the Court is by virtue of this Order trustee of the bankrupt's estate. You are required to attend upon the Official Receiver of the Court at Official Receivers Office (Chatham), Po Box 16660, Birmingham, B2 2HE immediately after you have received this order”.[93]Mr. Valentine submitted that automatic vesting includes rights of action possessed by the debtor at the time of his bankruptcy and which form part of the estate under the control of the trustee pursuant to section 436 IA 86.[94]Mr. Valentine accepted that certain causes of action which are personal to the bankrupt do not vest in his trustee, such as actions for defamation and assault, see for example Wilson v United Counties Bank Ltd [1920] A.C. 102, however, he says that these are not relevant on the facts before me. Accordingly, he submitted that the bankrupt cannot commence any proceedings that are based upon such a cause of action (and, if the proceedings have already been commenced, he ceases to have sufficient interest to continue them).[95]Mr. Valentine submitted that the cause of action which Mr. Stanford asserts by the 2025 Claim relates to the Ambrose Judgment and/or Order, which precede the 2023 Bankruptcy Order. Accordingly, it is a right of action forming part of his estate under the control of the Official Receiver and he has no standing to issue nor pursue it. The Deputy Official Receiver has confirmed that Mr. Stanford did not obtain its permission prior to issuing the 2025 Claim and has not retrospectively granted such permission notwithstanding having since been furnished with the 2025 Claim documents.[96]Mr. Valentine further submitted that the appropriate procedural consequence flowing from Mr. Stanford’s lack of standing depends on whether he pursued the 2025 Claim with the knowledge that he lacked locus standi to do so. Mr. Valentine relied on the following three cases: Pathania v Adedeji [2014] EWCA Civ 681, Lilley v Financial Times Ltd [2017] EWHC 1916 (Ch) and Mahmood v KPMG [2025] EWHC 15 (Ch), which I deal with below.[97]Mr. Valentine contended that in the instant case, it is clear that Mr. Stanford knew before he issued the 2025 Claim that he had no standing to do so.[98]As a preliminary matter, Mr. Valentine made two submissions as to the standard of ‘actual knowledge’. First, in certain contexts, actual knowledge may encompass forms of deliberate ignorance. For instance, the first three of the so-called Baden categories of knowledge are regarded as types of actual knowledge, including:(i) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious; and(ii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make, see Baden Delvaux v Société Générale pour Favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de l’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509, at paragraphs 575-576 and T Grant and D Mumford, Civil Fraud (1st Edn incorporating 1st Supplement, Sweet & Maxwell 2022), at paragraph 12-038.[99]Secondly, Mr. Valentine submitted that a distinction must be drawn between the degree of knowledge that must be established and the proof of that degree of knowledge. Thus, if the facts point on the balance of probabilities to an individual having actual knowledge, the Court may infer it, see Lewin on Trusts (20th Edn incorporating 1st Supplement, Sweet & Maxwell 2023), at paragraph 42-072.[100]Mr. Valentine submitted that Klotho relies on the following facts and matters as establishing Mr. Stanford’s knowledge of his lack of standing to bring the 2025 Claim: 100.1. First, the 2025 Claim, at paragraph 11.1 of the Particulars of Claim, seeks a direction that “Joint Trustees in Bankruptcy” are joined as necessary parties to the 2025 Claim “as the statutory holders of all rights formerly vested in the Claimant by operation of section 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986”. This, Mr. Valentine submits, clearly establishes Mr. Stanford’s understanding of both section 306 IA 1986 and the fact that his trustees hold title to the 2025 Claim. 100.2. Secondly, the Claim Form in the 2025 Claim refers to the impact of the non-joinder of the 2019 bankruptcy trustees as entailing that the ‘2022 Declaration’ “was made without jurisdiction” (emphasis added), suggesting Mr. Stanford’s awareness of the consequences of non-compliance with this requirement. 100.3. Thirdly, the documents served by Mr. Stanford in support of the 2025 Claim are replete with references to the vesting of rights purportedly held by Mr. Stanford in his trustees in bankruptcy pursuant to section 306 IA 1986 by reference to Mr. Stanford’s 2019 bankruptcy trustees and the 2021 Claim, for example, paragraph 11.1 of the Particulars of Claim in the 2025 Claim and the eight references to section 306 IA 1986 within Mr. Stanford’s Witness Statement served in connection with the 2025 Claim. Mr. Valentine submits that it is apparent from those passages that Mr. Stanford understands (as set out in paragraph 65 of his Witness Statement served in connection with the 2025 Claim, that “upon the making of a bankruptcy order [...] [his] standing to assert or pursue any claim [...] [then held] would be extinguished, and any such rights would vest exclusively in [...] [the relevant trustee in bankruptcy] pursuant to section 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986”.[101]Mr. Valentine notes that Klotho set out these points, and gave notice to Mr. Stanford of them in their own witness evidence and Mr. Stanford has filed no responsive evidence disavowing such knowledge on his part (nor has he said anything in correspondence to this effect), as he would be required to do if that were the true position.[102]In light of the above, Klotho invites the Court to conclude (or infer) that Mr. Stanford knew he lacked title to commence the 2025 Claim and, on that basis, to strike out the 2025 Claim as an abuse of the Court’s process.

Mr. Stanford’s submissions on Ground 1

[103]As I have already noted, Mr. Stanford dealt with the issue of standing in his Skeleton Argument and before me. He submitted that Klotho’s contention that the present claim vests in the Claimant’s trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to section 306 of the IA 1986 proceeds on a mischaracterisation of the nature of the claim.[104]Mr. Stanford submitted that the issue is one of proper characterisation: whether the present claim is a proprietary cause of action forming part of the bankruptcy estate, or whether it concerns the scope of an order regulating the Claimant’s personal conduct and exposing him to committal and imprisonment. Properly characterised, Mr. Stanford submits, the claim falls into the latter category.[105]Mr. Stanford further submitted that the 2025 Claim does not seek to assert any proprietary interest in the shares, nor to recover or realise any asset of the bankruptcy estate. He proceeds, for the purposes of the Applications, on the basis that the 2022 Declaration remains valid and binding as between the parties and does not ask the Court on this application to set it aside or to determine any entitlement to the shares.[106]Mr. Stanford submitted that the 2025 Claim is not concerned with ownership or title, but with the consequences of the order made and the scope of the obligations it imposes. The relief sought is declaratory only and directed to clarifying the scope of the Court’s own order in advance of any alleged breach.[107]Mr. Stanford therefore submitted that the issue is therefore inherently and uniquely personal to him as only he is subject to the penal consequences of breach, and only he can comply with the injunction and regulate his conduct accordingly. A trustee in bankruptcy cannot be subject to committal in his place and cannot determine the scope of the order for the purposes of compliance.[108]Further, Mr. Stanford submitted that the nature of the obligation imposed by the injunction requires him to determine, in real time and at his own risk, whether conduct would “cast doubt” on the “full validity of the applicant’s legal and beneficial title to the shares.” That assessment necessarily depends upon the factual foundation of that title. That obligation cannot be understood or applied in the abstract; it is necessarily dependent upon the scope of what was determined in the 2022 proceedings. Where those matters were not identified, put in issue, or adjudicated in the 2022 proceedings, Mr. Stanford cannot regulate his conduct without knowing what was in fact determined. No other person can undertake that assessment or bear its consequences. It follows that standing lies with the Mr. Stanford.[109]Mr. Stanford submitted that a trustee in bankruptcy cannot determine the scope of an order regulating the Claimant’s personal conduct or exposure to imprisonment and cannot be subject to the penal consequences of breach in his place. The trustee’s refusal to act therefore provides no mechanism by which the issue raised by this claim can be determined.[110]Mr. Stanford further submitted that, as recognised by HHJ Paul Matthews, the matters now relied upon could not be examined within the contempt proceedings and must, if at all, be pursued by way of a separate claim. The 2025 Claim is brought in accordance with that procedural position.[111]Mr. Stanford stated that the position of the trustee underscores the difficulty. The Official Receiver has indicated that he has received no request to bring the claim and has given no permission for it to be issued, proceeding on the assumption that any such claim would vest in the estate. He says that no analysis is provided as to the nature of the present claim or whether it is one the trustee could bring. The trustee’s position therefore does not resolve the issue of standing and provides no mechanism by which the issue raised by this claim can be determined.[112]Mr. Stanford submitted that Klotho’s position denies his standing to bring this claim while maintaining reliance on the same order to impose penal consequences. Its effect is that the issue raised by the 2025 Claim is never determined in any forum. It cannot be examined in the contempt proceedings and is said to be unavailable by way of a fresh claim. Mr. Stanford would remain subject to penal consequences without any mechanism to determine the scope of the obligation said to justify them. That is not a proper use of the Court’s process.[113]Mr. Stanford stated that Klotho’s position is further circular. The Claimant was made bankrupt by order dated 23 May 2023 on the petition Klotho following the enforcement of liabilities arising from the 2022 proceedings relied upon by Klotho, including a costs order dated 5 April 2022 in the sum of £167,831.20, together with accrued interest and petition costs bringing the total demand to in excess of £200,000. The bankruptcy relied upon is therefore a direct consequence of the 2022 proceedings. The Defendants then seek to use that consequence to prevent any examination of the scope of the order giving rise to those liabilities, while continuing to rely on that same order to impose penal consequences. That is not a proper use of procedural consequences.[114]Mr. Stanford submitted that Klotho’s case thereby separates control of the claim from exposure to penal consequences. He remains subject to the risk of imprisonment but is said to have no standing to determine the scope of the obligation giving rise to that risk. A person exposed to committal must be able to determine the scope of the obligation said to justify it. Klotho’s position is not a lawful or coherent one.[115]Mr Stanford stated that it would be procedurally unfair to treat the underlying factual matters he is seeking to establish as conclusively determined in circumstances where they were never identified, put in issue, or subject to adversarial testing, while denying him any mechanism to determine the scope of the order in advance.[116]Mr. Stanford submitted that the 2025 Claim is narrowly confined to the identification of what was determined as a matter of issue in the 2022 proceedings and does not expand the scope of the dispute beyond that question. It does not seek to vary or set aside the 2022 Declaration, nor to assert any right inconsistent with it. Success in this claim would not vest any property in Mr. Stanford or affect the bankruptcy estate but would serve only to define the limits of the injunction governing his conduct.[117]Accordingly, Mr. Stanford contends that the present claim is properly brought by him in his personal capacity and does not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy.

Decision on Ground 1

[118]I consider that Mr. Stanford has no standing to pursue the 2025 Claim as it is vested in the Official Receiver.[119]I agree with Mr. Valentine that, pursuant to section 306 of the IA 1986, Mr. Stanford’s estate vested automatically in the Official Receiver when the Bankruptcy Order was made on 23 May 2023.[120]Further, pursuant to section 436 IA 1986, the property which vests in the trustee includes “things in action”, including rights of action possessed by the debtor at the time of his bankruptcy, which form part of the estate under the control of the trustee, see Lord Justice Hoffmann (as he then was) in Heath v Tang [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1421 at page 1423 A.[121]The cause of action which Mr. Stanford asserts by the 2025 Claim relates to the Ambrose Judgment and/or Order, which both proceed the 2023 Bankruptcy Order.[122]I have carefully considered Mr. Stanford’s submissions that the cause of action is personal to him, but I do not consider that is correct as the categories of causes of action which are personal are narrow and are not relevant on the facts of this case. Lord Hoffmann, in Heath v Tang held at page 1423A -C as follows:
“The property which vests in the trustee includes “things in action:” see section 436. Despite the breadth of this definition, there are certain causes of action personal to the bankrupt which do not vest in his trustee. These include cases in which “the damages are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his body, mind, or character, and without immediate reference to his rights of property”: see Beckham v. Dale (1849) 2 H.L.Cas. 579, 604, per Erle J. md Wilson v. United Counties Bank Ltd. [1920] A.C. 102. Actions for defamation and assault are obvious examples. The bankruptcy does not affect his ability to litigate such claims. But all other causes of action which were vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, whether for liquidated sums or unliquidated damages, vest in his trustee. The bankrupt cannot commence any proceedings based upon such a cause of action and if the proceedings have already been commenced, he ceases to have sufficient interest to continue them.”
[123]In the present case, in my judgment, the heart of Mr. Stanford’s claim remains a challenge to the rights of property in the ASRL Shares. This is clear on the face of the 2025 Claim and the supporting documentation including Mr. Stanford’s sworn witness evidence and despite Mr. Stanford’s inconsistent written and oral submissions that he does not seek to challenge the Ambrose Judgment or Order.[124]I do not consider it is possible to disentangle what Mr. Stanford refers to as the “underlying factual foundation of title” or the “Underlying Factual Matters” which are not, in my judgment “distinct and anterior” issues from the substance and effect of the Ambrose Judgment and Order, and for which the appropriate route for any challenge by Mr. Stanford was a timeous appeal.[125]Mr. Stanford’s submission that the 2025 Claim does not seek to assert any proprietary interest in the shares, nor to recover or realise any asset of the bankruptcy estate are clearly inconsistent with the documentation issued in respect of the 2025 Claim which itself describes the details of the claim as “the Claimant seeks to set aside the declaration dated 5 April 2022 in BL-2021-002235 [the Ambrose Order] on the ground that it was procured by the fraud on the Court”.[126]Therefore, the 2025 Claim does not, in my judgment, fall within the limited exceptions of actions personal to the bankrupt, and as Lord Justice Hoffmann indicated “all other cause of action …vest in his trustee”.[127]The Deputy Official Receiver has confirmed that(i) Mr. Stanford did not obtain its permission prior to issuing the 2025 Claim;(ii) it has not retrospectively granted such permission notwithstanding having since been furnished with the 2025 Claim documents and(iii) that title vests in it.[128]In considering the appropriate procedural consequence flowing from Mr. Stanford’s lack of standing, I agree with Mr. Valentine that the key question is whether Mr. Stanford pursued the 2025 Claim with the knowledge that he lacked locus standi to do so.[129]In the Court of Appeal decision of Pathania v Adedeji [2014] EWCA Civ 681,

Lord Justice Floyd said at paragraphs 15-16:

“15. Where a bankrupt is commencing or pursuing a claim which he knows he does not have, the abuse of process in commencing or pursuing that claim is obvious. No claimant is entitled to sue on a right which he knows belongs to someone else. The abuse lies in knowingly pursuing a claim which, as presently constituted, is bound to fail. The abuse does, however, depend on actual knowledge of the lack of title to the cause of action, not on what he or she ought to have known. 16. Nevertheless, where an action is commenced or continued after the cause of action has vested in a trustee in bankruptcy, the action does not abate and the position is capable of being regularised by the joinder of the trustee or by the taking of an assignment from him. Whether the court will permit that to happen will involve an exercise of discretion. It will be necessary to have regard to the interests of those likely to be affected, including the creditors in the bankruptcy. The court would be likely to stay the action until the position in the bankruptcy is clarified.”
(emphasis added)[130]In Lilley v Financial Times Ltd [2017] EWHC 1916 (Ch), Mr. Justice Birss, held, at. Paragraphs 30-31 (applying the principles summarised in Pathania):
“30. ... I should not strike out this action simply on that ground that Mr Lilley brought it when the claim was vested in the trustee because, as the judgment of the Court of Appeal makes clear, the right thing to do in such a case is not to strike it out but to stay the action on that basis, whereas the action can be struck out as an abuse if it was brought with actual knowledge of the lack of title. 31. Proving whether Mr Lilley actually knew, before the action was brought, that it was an abuse is not straightforward. It is quite clear that after the claims were issued, Mr Lilley now knows that the cause of action vested in the trustee. That can be seen from various letter [sic] which were written by Mr Lilley after that date. I am bound to say I think it is highly likely that Mr Lilley did know before he brought his claims that the causes action vested in the trustee, but there is no evidence before me other than an inference. Given that abuse of process depends on the difference between actual knowledge of a lack of title as opposed to imputed, constructive knowledge, I am not satisfied that there is enough material to which my attention has been drawn to show that Mr Lilley did know, before he issued these proceedings, that he had no title to bring them.”
(emphasis added)[131]Finally in Mahmood v KPMG [2025] EWHC 15 (Ch), at paragraph 60, Nicola Rushton KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) rejected a submission that the Court had a discretion to stay an action where a claimant had actual knowledge of his lack of title to the cause of action: “My view is that paragraph [15] [of Pathania] should be read as affirming the decision in Pickthall, that where the claimant knows he does not have title to the action by reason of his bankruptcy, the claim is improper and abusive and should be struck out without more. In my view paragraph [16] must therefore be intended to refer to situations where such actual knowledge does not exist”.[132]I agree with Mr. Valentine’s submissions as to the standard of ‘actual knowledge’. First, that actual knowledge may encompass forms of deliberate ignorance(i) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious; and(ii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make, see Baden Delvaux v Société Générale pour Favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de l’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509, at paragraphs 575-576 and T Grant and D Mumford, Civil Fraud (1st Edn incorporating 1st Supplement, Sweet & Maxwell 2022), at paragraph 12-038.[133]Secondly, a distinction must be drawn between the degree of knowledge that must be established and the proof of that degree of knowledge. Therefore, if the facts point on the balance of probabilities to an individual having actual knowledge, the Court may infer it. Lewin on Trusts (20th Edition incorporating 1st Supplement, Sweet & Maxwell 2023), at paragraph 42-072.[134]Further, I agree with Mr. Valentine: 134.1. that the terms of the 2025 Claim seek a direction that “Joint Trustees in Bankruptcy” are joined as necessary parties to the 2025 Claim “as the statutory holders of all rights formerly vested in the Claimant by operation of section 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986”; 134.2. that the Claim Form in the 2025 Claim refers to the impact of the non-joinder of the 2019 bankruptcy trustees as entailing that the ‘2022 Declaration’ “was made without jurisdiction”; and 134.3. the frequent references in the documents served in support of the 2025 Claim to the vesting of rights purportedly held by Mr. Stanford in his trustees in bankruptcy, including at paragraph 65 of his Witness Statement served in support of the 2025 Claim that that upon the making of a bankruptcy order “[i]n that event, my standing to assert, revive, or pursue any claim relating to the A-shares would be extinguished, and any such rights would vest exclusively in the Joint Trustees pursuant to section 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986.” together establish to the requisite standard that Mr. Stanford had actual knowledge that he did not have standing to bring the 2025 Claim and his subsequent (inconsistent) attempts to disavow that he was challenging the Ambrose Judgment or Order do not remove or impinge on that actual knowledge.[135]I therefore conclude that Mr. Stanford lacked title to commence the 2025 Claim and I strike it out as an abuse of the Court’s process.

Ground’s 2, 3 and 4

[136]In the circumstances, it is not necessary for me to deal in detail with Klotho’s remaining Ground’s for Striking Out the 2025 Claim and/or for summary judgment.[137]I note, however, that if it had been necessary, I would have decided Ground’s 2, 3 and 4 in Klotho’s favour on the following basis.[138]In respect of Ground 2, I consider that it is an abuse of process for Mr. Stanford to seek to relitigate Mr. Justice Marcus Smith’s direction (after hearing submissions) that the 2021 Claim proceed under Part 8 by way of the 2025 Claim as Mr. Stanford could have, but did not, appeal that case-management decision. In addition, I note that the Ambrose Judgment at paragraph 74 referred to Mr. Stanford as having “failed to justify the mater being decided under Part 7”.[139]In respect of Ground 3, I consider that the 2025 Claim discloses no arguable grounds for setting aside the thorough and well-reasoned Ambrose Judgment. Although in his written and oral submissions, Mr. Stanford submitted that he was not suggesting the Ambrose Judgment was wrong and that the 2025 Claim arises independently of any challenge to the validity of the 2022 Declaration and concerns only the scope of what was determined, as I have set out above, I consider that is fundamentally at odds with the 2025 Claim itself and its supporting evidence which, inter alia, clearly alleges fraud.[140]This is, therefore, a case in which the relevant allegation of fraud was raised at the trial which led to the judgment Mr. Stanford now seeks to challenge. The allegations of fraud were considered and finally determined by Deputy Judge Ambrose in the Ambrose Judgment and Deputy Judge Ambrose expressly held that there was “no realistic evidential basis [before her] for substantiating [Mr. Stanford’s] serious allegations of fraudulent inducement” and she rejected, in terms, his case on fraud. No additional evidence has been adduced by Mr. Stanford.[141]I consider that, unfortunately, the 2025 Claim appears to have been made, in part at least, in mistaken reliance on the observations that Mr. Stanford misconstrued as having been made by HHJ Paul Matthews when presiding over the Contempt Application and in respect of paragraph 55 of the sentencing judgment.[142]I do not consider that when HHJ Matthews observed in the contempt proceedings that “[n]o application has been made to set aside the order of the court [i.e. the Ambrose Order], for example on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud” he was in any way suggesting or inviting Mr. Stanford to make such an application.[143]Indeed HHJ Matthews statement at paragraph 12 of his judgment in the Contempt Application indicates that he considered precisely the opposite: “A third submission [by Mr. Stanford] was that the order of 5 April 2022 had been obtained by fraud, in that some of the evidence filed on behalf of the claimant had been fraudulent and that this had not been tested, because this was a claim trued under CPR Part 8, rather than Part 7. The problem with this, of course, is that the deputy judge in 2022 had considered the respondent’s allegations of fraud, but had expressly rejected them, and there was no appeal”.[144]The Ambrose Judgment therefore finally and conclusively determined Klotho’s legal and beneficial entitlement to the Shares and Mr. Stanford is estopped from attempting to relitigate what is, in substance, the same issue through the 2025 Claim and, alternatively, it is an abuse of process.[145]Accordingly, Mr. Stanford’s attempt to have a further bite of the cherry by issuing a ‘fresh’ fraud claim in the form of the 2025 Claim is precluded by an issue estoppel and/or because it is an abuse of process.[146]In respect of Ground 4, I consider that 2025 Claim is vexatious litigation as(i) the 2025 Claim is, in substance, a collateral attack on the final decisions of Mr. Justice Marcus Smith and the Ambrose Judgment, notwithstanding that Mr. Stanford had the opportunity to seek to challenge those decisions at the time by way of appeal, which he failed to take and,(ii) it is objectively pointless and wasteful. The ECRO Application[147]As I have held that the 2025 Claim should be struck out for the reasons set out above, I will also order that the 2025 Claim was totally without merit.[148]Accordingly, I must, under CPR r. 3.4(6) consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order (“CRO”).[149]In addition, Klotho has of its own motion made the ECRO Application in order to place additional relevant factual material before the Court going to the threshold criterion of ‘persistence’ and justifying the making of an extended civil restraint order (“ECRO”) in particular, rather than any other form of order.

Applicable legal principles

[150]The power to make an ECRO is contained in CPR r. 3.11. The relevant practice direction is PD 3C, which applies where the Court is considering whether to make a limited, extended or general civil restraint order against a party who has issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit (including under CPR r. 3.4(6), see CPR PD 3C, paragraph 1).[151]The underlying feature of all cases in which a CRO is made is that the person restrained has repeatedly made applications or issued claims which are totally without merit, that is, bound to fail in the sense that there is no rational basis on which they could succeed.[152]In R. (on the application of Grace) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3432, Lord Dyson MR noted at paragraph 19: “The phrase “totally without merit” is now firmly embedded in our Civil Procedure Rules. It is perhaps unfortunate that the word “merit” is included in the phrase. We are familiar with the notion of a claim being meritorious or having merit, connoting the idea that the claim is just or is in accordance with the merits, but the word “merit” in the phrase totally without merit does not have this meaning. Although the court always seeks to do justice, the purpose of totally without merit is to enable the court to root out claims which are bound to fail, and, the reasons given by Maurice Kay LJ, I would construe that phrase as meaning bound to fail”.[153]An ECRO restrains a person against whom it is made from issuing claims or making applications in any court identified in the order, which are directly or indirectly linked to the proceedings (here, the ECRO Application is issued in both the 2021 and 2025 Claims) in which the order is made: see PD 3C, at paragraph 3.2.[154]The threshold requirement for an ECRO is proof that the party against whom it is sought “has persistently issued claims or has made applications which are totally without merit” (emphasis added): see paragraph 3.1, PD 3C.[155]‘Persistence’ requires, at a minimum, three unmeritorious claims or applications, see Re Ludlam (A Bankrupt) [2009] EWHC 2067 (Ch), at paragraph 9 and CFC 26 Ltd v Brown Shipley & Co Ltd [2017] 1 W.L.R. 4589, at paragraph 13, where Mr. Justice Newey held “that an ECRO cannot be made unless there have, overall, been at least three totally without merit claims or applications”.[156]However, the requirement has both a quantitative and qualitative element (the latter may include a “determined refusal to accept the Court’s assessment that the underlying case is hopeless, a refusal that has absorbed an enormous quantity of Court resources both in and out of Court...” see Mr. Justice Norris in Ghadami v Bloomfield [2017] EWHC 2020 (Ch), at paragraph 61.[157]In deciding whether a litigant has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit, the Court is entitled to and should consider the litigant’s conduct as a whole, so far as it is able to do so; all aspects of the litigant’s conduct are capable of being relevant, not only their conduct in the particular proceedings in which the point arises: see Mr. Justice Birss in Lilley v Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc [2014] EWHC 2364 (Ch), at paragraph 97.[158]I also take into consideration the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 F.L.R. 759 (concerning a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981), at paragraph 22: “The hallmark usually is that the plaintiff sues the same party repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing on defendants the burden of resisting claim after claim; that the claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against successive parties who if they were to be sued at all should have been joined in the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every adverse decision on appeal; and that the claimant refuses to take any notice of or give any effect to orders of the court. The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop.”.[159]In Sartipy v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] EWCA Civ 225, Lord Justice Males held, at paragraph 27: “A claim or application is totally without merit if it is bound to fail in the sense that there is no rational basis on which it could succeed: R (Grace) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ1091, [2014] 1 WLR 3432 and R (Wasif) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 82, [2016] 1 WLR 2793. It need not be abusive, made in bad faith, or supported by false evidence or documents in order to be totally without merit, but if it is, that will reinforce the case for a civil restraint order”.

Lord Justice Males also gave the following guidance:

[160]1. Where a claim itself is totally without merit and individual applications are also totally without merit, there is no reason why both the claim and the individual applications should not be counted for the purpose of considering whether to make an ECRO (paragraph 29). 160.2. Although at least three claims or applications are the minimum that is required for the making of an ECRO, the question remains whether the party concerned is acting “persistently”; that will require an evaluation of the party’s overall conduct (paragraph 30). It may be easier to conclude that a party is persistently issuing claims or applications which are totally without merit if it seeks repeatedly to re-litigate issues which have been decided than if there are three or more unrelated applications many years apart (the latter situation not necessarily constituting persistence). 160.3. Only claims or applications where the party in question is the claimant (or counterclaimant) or applicant can be counted (although this includes a totally without merit application by the defendant in the proceedings) (paragraph 31). 160.4. When considering whether to make a restraint order, the court is entitled to take into account any previous claims or applications which it concludes were totally without merit, and is not limited to claims or applications so certified at the time, albeit that in such cases the court will need to ensure that it knows sufficient about the previous claim or application in question (at paragraph 37, citing R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2007] 1 W.L.R. 536, paragraphs 67-68).[161]Once that threshold requirement has been met, the Court ultimately has a discretion as to whether an ECRO is justified and, if so, what form of order should be made, paying particular regard to the objective assessment of the risk posed by the litigant (i.e. the ‘threat level’): see Mr.

Justice Fordham in Reelworld Europe Ltd v Uddin [2021] EWHC 535 (QB) at paragraph 16:

“The fact that the trigger test is satisfied does not mean the making of an ECRO follows. The Court has an important judgment and discretion to exercise as to whether an order is justified and, if so, what order should be made. In addressing the exercise of the judgment and discretion I have had regard in particular to the objective assessment of the risk posed by the Respondent. Put another way, I have evaluated the ‘threat level’. It is not necessary for me to set out the relevant case-law or White Book commentary. I am quite satisfied that, unless restrained, the Respondent would issue claims and make applications which would abuse the court process. I am satisfied that the risk which he poses is a high ‘threat level’: borne out of a refusal to take no for an answer, and a refusal to accept defeat; and borne out of a strategy of making claims which fail and then making further claims, to seek to burden the Applicant with the objective of seeking a pay-out”
. Klotho’s submissions on

The ECRO Application

[162]In light of the procedural history Mr. Valentine submitted that Mr. Stanford’s restraint by means of an ECRO is plainly justified and proportionate.[163]Mr. Valentine further submitted that Mr. Stanford’s conduct readily surpasses the threshold requirement of persistence. In particular: 163.1. First, Mr. Stanford’s obsessive persistence is established by the background to the Applications. Mr. Stanford has refused to accept his loss at the trial of the 2021 Claim (despite not attending that trial or lodging any appeal) and has been committed for contempt of court by reason of his deliberate breach of the terms of the Ambrose Order. The 2025 Claim is simply the latest in a series of repeated attempts to go behind Deputy Judge Ambrose’s decision in 2021 notwithstanding Mr. Stanford having, now as then, adduced no evidence whatsoever in support of the very serious allegations he advances against Klotho. The deluge of correspondence which Mr. Stanford has addressed to Klotho and its stakeholders, professional advisors and other third parties lends further support to this point. 163.2. Secondly, HHJ Paul Matthews has previously certified at least three applications issued by Mr. Stanford in the course of the contempt proceedings as totally without merit: [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch), at paragraph 27:
“Accordingly, the application of 9 September 2025 for a stay pending the prosecution of the fresh Part 7 claim must fail, and it is accordingly dismissed. I will record that it was totally without merit, as always bound to fail, as indeed were those of 13 August 2025 and 4 September 2025”. 163.3. Mr. Valentine submits that those applications advanced similar or identical arguments and accordingly repeatedly sought to re-litigate points that have repeatedly been dismissed in detailed reasoning of the Court, such as the purported requirement for the witness statement of Mr. Lea admitted in evidence in the 2021 Claim be “verified under oath”
. Mr. Valentine notes that this remains part of the 2025 Claim, although the existence of such a requirement was rejected by a prior judgment of HHJ Paul Matthews: see [2025] EWHC 3075 (Ch), at paragraphs 2-17. 163.4. Thirdly, Mr. Valentine submits that this Court also has the power to determine that other of Mr. Stanford’s applications and/or statements of case were totally without merit, irrespective of whether they were certified as such at the time. 163.5. Fourthly, Mr. Valentine submits that the outcome of Klotho’s Strike-Out/Summary Judgment Application will also be relevant to the Court’s assessment, because if the Court grants that Application, those same reasons also mean that the 2025 Claim was always bound to fail. I have noted above that I have found that the 2025 Claim is totally without merit. 163.6. Finally, Mr. Valentine submits that an ECRO is plainly justified and proportionate in all of the circumstances, including in light of an objective assessment of the risk that is posed by Mr. Stanford’s litigation conduct. In particular, that risk is informed by the 2025 Claim’s repetition of materially identical arguments to those that were previously advanced by Mr. Stanford in response to the 2021 Claim, the Contempt Application, and in his numerous stay or analogous applications aimed at derailing the contempt proceedings. Mr. Stanford’s issuance of a new set of proceedings suggests that a limited CRO would not meet the mischief which the ECRO Application seeks to eliminate, given the risk that Mr. Stanford might issue yet further new claims.

Mr. Stanford’s submissions on the ECRO Application

[164]In his written an oral submissions in respect of the ECRO Application, Mr. Stanford maintains that the 2025 Claim is not an abuse of process supporting the making of an ECRO on the basis that the claim is not a repetition of matters already determined but raises a distinct and anterior question as to what was identified, put in issue and adjudicated in the 2022 proceedings.[165]Mr. Stanford states: “The Court has recognised that any challenge to the validity of the 2022 Declaration must be brought by way of a fresh claim. The present claim is not such a challenge. It does not seek to set aside the 2022 Declaration or to revisit its correctness, nor to reopen what was decided in 2022. Rather, it seeks to identify what was determined, and what was not determined, as a matter of issue in those proceedings. In those circumstances, it cannot be an abuse of process to pursue the procedural route identified by the Court as the proper mechanism for determining that question”.[166]As I have set out above, I consider that Mr. Stanford is proceeding on a misapprehension that the Court (His Honour Judge Matthews) was recognising or encouraging a further Claim in respect of the Ambrose Judgment or Order.[167]I have also rejected Mr. Stanford’s submissions that the 2025 Claim does not seek to impugn the Ambrose Judgment or Order on the basis of, inter alia, fraud.

Decision on the ECRO application

[168]In all the circumstances, in the present case the high evidential bar which applies in the context of an ECRO has, in my judgment, been met. There have now been (at least) four applications that have been determined totally without merit.[169]Further, there is, in my view, nothing in the nature of an appropriate response from Mr. Stanford which the Court would be able to consider accepting as an alternative to an order. Having evaluated Mr. Stanford’s overall conduct, I consider this is a case of repeated attempts to relitigate the same subject matter. As counselled by the Court of Appeal in Barker, my objective assessment is that in the interests of all the parties (including Mr. Stanford) and the administration of justice “the time has come to stop”.[170]Having regard to the appropriateness of and the need for protecting Klotho, and others linked with or associated with it, from the waste of time and resources generated by unfounded litigation and having regard to the appropriateness of and need for protecting court resources, I am satisfied that the order sought is necessary and proportionate.[171]I am also satisfied both that the Order should be made in both the 2021 Claim and the 2025 Claim and that the appropriate duration of the order necessitated in this case is the full maximum three-year period. I will make any necessary consequential orders (including costs) and invite counsel in the first instance to agree the terms of an order with Mr. Stanford reflecting these conclusions.