Klotho Brands Limited v Kevin-Gerald Stanford [2025] EWHC 3075 (Ch)

[2025] EWHC 3075 (Ch)Case No BL-2021-002235
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 24 November 2025
Before
HHJ PAUL MATTHEWS(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
Between
KLOTHO BRANDS LIMITEDClaimant/KEVIN-GERALD STANFORDDefendant/
Ben Valentin KC and Ellen Tims (instructed by Proskauer Rose (London) LLP) for ApplicantThe Respondent in person for in personApplication dealt with on paper
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30 am on 24 November 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National ArchiveHHJ Paul Matthews :

Introduction

[1]On 1 August 2025 I handed down judgment ([2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch)) finding the defendant guilty of two counts of contempt of court, in breaching an injunction made by Claire Ambrose, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court on 5 April 2022: see [2022] EWHC 850 (Ch). I held the sentencing hearing on 5 September 2025, in the absence of the defendant, and handed down a written judgment on 17 September 2025 ([2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch)). On 28 October I ordered the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs.in the sum of £343,887.32, including VAT, by 4 pm on 11 November 2025. By notice dated 3 November 2025 the defendant has applied to stay the costs order. The application is supported by the witness statement of the defendant dated 3 November 2025, and opposed by the Claimant’s Note dated 19 November 2025, drafted by the claimant’s counsel, Ben Valentin KC and Ellen Tims.

The application

[2]I assume that the costs order has not been paid to date. The defendant’s application notice seeks “Stay of costs order dated 28/10/25 unless the claimant verifies the witness statement dated 8/12/21 under oath. Also restrict reliance unless the claimant verifies the same witness statement under oath. I request determination on the papers by HHJ Paul Matthews”. (I note in passing that paragraph 9.2(b) of the defendant’s witness statement asks in addition that the enforcement of the costs order be stayed until “Steven Baker, as certifying solicitor, files a sworn affidavit confirming that the PD 57 AC certificate of compliance he signed was, at the time of service, accurate, complete, and based on proper enquiry.” But that is not in the application notice.) The witness statement dated 8 December 2021 referred to is the first witness statement of Mr Lyndon Lea, filed in support of the original CPR Part 8 claim which was decided by Clare Ambrose in 2022 and resulted in the injunction which the claimant subsequently breached. The claimant raised no objection to the matter being dealt with on the papers, and agreed that it should be dealt with by me.[3]Paragraph 1.3 of the defendant’s witness statement in support of the application reads as follows “I do not seek to challenge the contempt finding, the injunction, or the costs order itself. However, I respectfully submit that the costs order which flowed directly from the 2022 Declaration should not be enforced unless and until the witness statement on which it was based is verified under oath by both the witness and the certifying solicitor, as the minimum safeguard now required under PD57AC and CPR 32.10. That statement, filed in 2021, has never been tested or sworn. It continues to support a judgment affecting liberty, enforcement, and governance. In the absence of sworn confirmation, reliance on that foundation is procedurally unsafe.” Discussion Did the injunction cause the costs order?

Discussion

[4]I do not agree with the claimant that the costs order “flowed directly” from the injunction made in 2022. Instead, it flowed directly from the findings of contempt against the defendant, which themselves flowed from the conduct of the defendant himself. If the defendant had not breached the injunction, those findings would not have been made. There is no necessary connection between the injunction and the costs order. The indirect cause of the costs order was the defendant’s own choice of his conduct to pursue in the light of the injunction.

The requirements of PD57AC nor CPR rule 32.10

[5]However, even if the costs order had flowed directly from the injunction, neither PD57AC nor CPR rule 32.10 would require that a witness statement such as that dated 8 December 2021 which was admitted in evidence in the original CPR Part 8 claim be “verified under oath”. Rule 32.10 says nothing about verification of statements at all. And PD57AC, paragraph 4.1, says instead that it be “verified by a statement of truth” under CPR Part 22. A false statement so verified can give rise to liability for contempt of court: Clarkson v Future Resources FZE [2022] EWCA Civ 230, [47], per Simler LJ (with whom Lewison and Snowden LJJ agreed); CPR rule 32.14. It may also amount to an offence under section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911. So there is no substantive need for the additional requirement that a witness statement be verified on oath.[6]I accept that CPR rule 32.1(1)(c) provides “The court may control the evidence by giving directions as to – [ … ] (c) the way in which the evidence is to be placed before the court.” By virtue of this, the court certainly has power to direct that evidence which might have been given by witness statement should be given by affidavit. Indeed, CPR PD 32 paragraph 1.4 provides that affidavits must be used as evidence in certain kinds of interlocutory proceedings, such as an application for a search order or a freezing injunction. But that does not apply to this case.

The decision to retain the trial under the Part 8 procedure

[7]Moreover, in the Part 8 claim which led to the granting of the injunction in April 2022, the parties had been before Marcus Smith J in February of that year, and he had expressly considered whether the matter should be transferred from Part 8 procedure to Part 7. After consideration, he declined so to order. Retaining the matter in the Part 8 procedure therefore entailed that there would be no automatic tendering of witnesses for cross-examination on oath. It would have to be applied for. When the matter came to trial, it would have been for the deputy judge hearing the case to decide whether the evidence of Mr Lyndon Lea, given in his witness statement subject to a statement of truth, should be given in some other form, such as a (sworn) affidavit, or even viva voce.[8]However, the defendant did not apply to the judge for either of those two things, and thus the normal Part 8 rules continued to apply. Indeed, he did not even attend the trial, either remotely or in person, and gave no satisfactory reason for his non-attendance. That was of course his choice, but the corollary is that he must accept the consequences. Whether the deputy judge would have acceded to an application at the trial for verification of Mr Lyndon Lea’s evidence on oath I do not know. But in my judgment it does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to say now, more than three years later, that that evidence should belatedly (and retrospectively) be verified on oath, when the judge dealing with the matter at the time was not so asked, and did not so order. That boat has sailed, and, to mix my metaphors, the matter is now water under the bridge.

Evidence in Part 8 claims

[9]In his witness statement, the defendant says at paragraph 7.10:
“Under CPR 32.2(1), facts must ordinarily be proved by oral evidence or by verified witness statement. Where a witness is not called and their evidence is challenged it may only be admitted as hearsay if the requirements of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 are met. No hearsay notice has been served. The 2021 statement remains unverified and procedurally non-compliant. In the absence of sworn confirmation of the witness being made available for cross-examination, the statement is inadmissible unless and until it is verified on oath”
[10]So far as the first sentence of this paragraph is concerned, the defendant has not correctly stated rule 32.2(1). This in fact reads:
“(1) The general rule is that any fact which needs to be proved by the evidence of witnesses is to be proved – (a) at trial, by their oral evidence given in public; and (b) at any other hearing, by their evidence in writing.” (a) at trial, by their oral evidence given in public; and (b) at any other hearing, by their evidence in writing.”
[11]There is first of all no reference in this rule to any “verified witness statement”. More importantly, rule 32.2(2) (immediately following) provides that:
“This [ie rule 32.2(1)] is subject – (a) to any provision to the contrary contained in these Rules or elsewhere; or (b) to any order of the court.” (a) to any provision to the contrary contained in these Rules or elsewhere; or (b) to any order of the court.”
[12]CPR rule 8.6 makes provision to the contrary for cases subject to the procedure in Part 8. It provides that written evidence may be relied on at the trial of a Part 8 claim if it has been served in accordance with CPR rule 8.5, or the court gives permission. Moreover, under that rule, the court “may require or permit” a party to give oral evidence at the hearing. The rule is written in that way because the primary method of adducing evidence in a Part 8 claim is in writing, rather than orally.[13]As to the second and third sentences of paragraph 7.10, the defendant has not correctly stated the effect of CPR rule 32.5(1). That rule makes clear that the court has power to dispense with the requirement that party’s witness attend for cross-examination before that party can rely on the written statement of that witness. However, even if that rule had been correctly stated, it would make no difference. The defendant did not attend the trial and did not challenge the witness statement of Mr Lyndon Lea. There was therefore no need to serve a hearsay statement.[14]The fourth sentence of paragraph 7.10 is simply wrong. The statement of Mr Lyndon Lea was “verified” by the statement of truth contained in it, in accordance with CPR Part 22. It was therefore not “procedurally non-compliant”. The final sentence of paragraph 7.10 is also wrong. The statement of Mr Lyndon Lea was indeed admissible without the need for any verification on oath.

Continuing liability for the claimant’s costs

[15]But there is more. The costs order proceeds from the establishment by the claimant of the defendant’s contempts of court by breaching the injunction. Even if a new Part 7 claim (of the kind which I understand to have now been issued by the defendant, though not yet served on the claimant) were to succeed in showing that the court was induced to grant the injunction in 2022 by the fraud of some other person, that would not help the defendant. He would still be in contempt of court and liable to pay the costs ordered on 28 October.[16]As I explained in my judgment handed down on 1 August 2025 ([2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch)), “57. … the injunction is one granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, and so, unless and until it is overturned or set aside, or at least varied in a material way, the respondent is obliged to obey it: see Chuck v Cremer (1846) 1 Coop t Cott 338, 342-343; Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97, at 101-102; M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, 423; R v Kirby (John Martin) [2019] 4 WLR 131, [13]; R (Majera) v Home Secretary [2022] AC 461, [56]. Even if it were subsequently overturned or set aside, it would still be a contempt of court to have disobeyed it in the meantime.”

Conclusion

[17]In my judgment, the defendant has shown no good reason for imposing a stay on the costs order until the evidence of Mr Lyndon Lea is so verified. The same is equally true in relation to the defendant’s alternative application for an order imposing a restriction on the power to rely on the witness statement of Mr Lyndon Lea until it is so verified. The application is therefore dismissed. In my judgment, it was doomed to fail from the beginning.

Consequential matters

[18]In the claimant’s Note dated 19 November 2025, the claimant, in the event that the application failed, invited the court to do two things. The first was to order that the defendant pay the claimant’s costs of the application in an amount to be summarily assessed based on a costs schedule attached to the Note. The, second was to record that the claimant’s application was also totally without merit within CPR rule 23.12(a).[19]As to the second of these matters, I am quite satisfied that the application was totally without merit and will so record. As to the first point, I invite the defendant by 4 pm on 26 November 2025 to file and serve any submissions in writing he wishes to make on(i) the question whether he should pay the claimant’s costs of the application;(ii) whether such costs should be assessed summarily;(iii) what challenges (if any) he makes to the costs claimed in the claimant’s costs schedule; and(iv) any other consequential orders he seeks. If the claimant wishes to respond to any of the submissions that may be made by the defendant, it may do so in writing, such submissions being filed and served by 4 pm on 28 November 2025.

Cited in 1 later judgment