West One Loan Limited v Anna Okroyan [2026] EWHC 1428 (Ch)

Neutral Citation Number:[2026] EWHC 1428 (Ch)Claim Number: PT-2024-000241
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)
Venue Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter LaneDate 11 th June 2026
London, EC4A 1NL
MR JUSTICE EDWIN JOHNSON
WEST ONE LOAN LIMITEDClaimantANNA OKROYANDefendant
Ian Tucker (instructed by Graphene Legal) for ClaimantSimon Arnold (instructed by Gherson Solicitors LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 18 th and 19 th March 2026
JUDGMENTRemote hand-down: This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday, 11 th June 2026 by circulation to the parties and their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

[1]This is a claim for possession of a residential property known as Dorchester House, Portnall Rise, Virginia Water, Surrey GU25 4JZ (“the Property”). By a deed executed on 14th October 2022 the Defendant, Ms Anna Okroyan, charged the Property by way of legal mortgage to the Claimant, West One Loan Limited, as security for a mortgage loan provided to her by the Claimant.[2]The claim has its origins in the fact that the Defendant has been identified as a designated person for the purposes of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/855). By a financial sanctions notice dated 6th December 2023, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“the OFSI”) named a number of individuals as designated persons for the purposes of these Regulations (“the Regulations”). One of those individuals was the Defendant.[3]The effect of the Regulations, so far as the present case is concerned and in very broad terms, is that the Defendant cannot make any payments to the Claimant in respect of her indebtedness under the mortgage loan, and the Claimant cannot receive any such payments. The Defendant’s assets, including the Property, are effectively frozen, and financial dealings between the Defendant and the Claimant are not permitted. Contravention of the Regulations is a criminal offence. It is however possible, under the terms of the Regulations, for parties to apply to the OFSI for a licence to carry out activities which would be otherwise be prevented by the Regulations.[4]The Claimant’s case is that the sums due under the mortgage loan agreement have, for various reasons, become immediately due and payable, and have not been paid. The Claimant’s case is that for this and other reasons it has the right to enforce its security. In these circumstances the Claimant has commenced these proceedings, by claim form issued on 21st March 2024 (“the Claim”), seeking an order for possession of the Property.[5]It is common ground that the Regulations did not prevent the Claimant from commencing the Claim and, if I am persuaded that the Claimant is right in its case, do not prevent the making of a possession order against the Defendant. The Regulations would prevent the Claimant from enforcing any such possession order, but the Claimant has obtained a licence from the OFSI which permits the Claimant, if it obtains a possession order, to take possession of the Property and to deal with, market and sell the Property.[6]The Defendant’s case is that for various reasons, which engage the meaning and effect of the Regulations in the circumstances of this case, the Claimant’s right to possession of the Property has not arisen, with the consequence that the Claim should be dismissed. The Defendant’s evidence is that she wishes herself to sell the Property, and that she has found a purchaser for the Property at a price which will be more than sufficient to discharge the amount due on the mortgage loan.[7]The trial of the Claim took place before me on 18th and 19th March 2026. This is my reserved judgment on the trial (“the Trial”).[8]At the Trial Mr Tucker, counsel, appeared for the Claimant. Mr Arnold, counsel, appeared for the Defendant. I am grateful to both counsel for their assistance, by their written and oral submissions, in my determination of the issues in the Claim.

The background to the dispute

[9]There was no oral evidence at the Trial. In terms of evidence, there was an agreed bundle of documents, and a supplemental bundle of correspondence between the parties. There was also a witness statement of Mr Radia, dated 7th April 2024, for the Claimant. Mr Radia is the Head of Group Servicing at the Claimant. There was also a witness statement of the Defendant dated 10th June 2025. The parties had agreed that no oral evidence was required at the Trial, with the consequence that neither witness was required to attend for cross examination.[10]The following summary of the background to the dispute derives therefore from the documents in the agreed trial bundle, the witness statements and a statement of agreed facts prepared by the parties.[11]The Defendant purchased the Property, which is a high value residential property, in March 2020. Title to the Property is registered. The Claimant was registered as proprietor of the Property (strictly speaking the freehold interest in the Property) on 23rd March 2020. I understand, from the documents which were before me at the Trial, that the Defendant purchased the Property with the assistance of mortgage finance provided by Credit Suisse.[12]In 2022 the Defendant sought to refinance with the Claimant. By a letter dated 5th October 2022, which was described as a conditional mortgage offer (“the CMO”), the Claimant offered the Defendant a short term mortgage loan in the gross sum of £4,550,000, to be secured by a first charge over the Property. For present purposes I note the following features of the CMO:(1) The mortgage was described as a fixed rate bridging loan mortgage.(2) The term of the mortgage loan was 9 months.(3) The net amount of the mortgage loan was £4,040,373.50.(4) The mortgage loan was interest only.(5) The interest was to be paid in 9 monthly instalments; each of £45,500(6) The gross amount of the loan, in the sum of £4,550,000, included fees, in the sum of £100,126.50, and what were referred to as retained interest payments, in the sum of £409,500. The retained interest constituted the total amount of interest payable on the net mortgage loan over the term of the mortgage loan. The retained interest was treated as payable on a monthly basis. The total amount of interest payable in respect of the mortgage loan was therefore retained by the Claimant, and treated as part of the total mortgage loan. The CMO stated that the “retained amount is applied to the loan each month when payments fall due.” (italics have been added to all quotations in this judgment).(7) The CMO was expressed to be subject to what were referred to as the Claimant’s General Terms and Conditions.[13]The CMO contained a declaration which was signed by the Defendant on 10th October 2022, agreeing to the terms and conditions set out in the CMO, including the General Terms and Conditions.[14]By a further letter dated 14th October 2022 the Claimant made a formal binding offer in respect of the mortgage loan to the Defendant, on the terms set out in the CMO. This offer was accepted by the Defendant, by her solicitors, on the same date, whereupon agreement was made between the Claimant and the Defendant for the provision of the mortgage loan on the terms of the CMO.[15]The terms of the mortgage loan were therefore set out in the CMO and in the General Terms and Conditions. I was provided with a document, headed “Terms and Conditions September 2021” which, it was common ground, constituted the General Terms and Conditions referred to in the CMO. I will use the Claimant’s expression “the LTC” to refer to these terms and conditions. I will refer to the agreement for the provision of the mortgage loan, brought into existence by the Defendant’s acceptance of the binding offer in the letter of 14th October 2022, as “the Loan Agreement”. I will refer to the mortgage loan made by the Claimant to the Defendant pursuant to the Loan Agreement as “the Mortgage Loan”. References to the Mortgage Loan mean the total amount due by way of the Mortgage Loan, at any particular time, pursuant to the terms of the Loan Agreement.[16]On the same date as the Loan Agreement was made, namely 14th October 2022, the Defendant executed a deed of legal mortgage (“the Mortgage Deed”) whereby she charged the Property, by way of first legal mortgage, as continuing security for the payment and discharge of the Secured Liabilities; being all monies owed by the Defendant to the Claimant.[17]At this point I should make reference to the Claimant’s evidence as to how it dealt with the retained interest. As I have described above, the total amount of the interest payable on the Mortgage Loan, over its term, was treated as part of the Mortgage Loan and was retained by the Claimant. The Claimant’s evidence, by Mr Radia, was that this retained interest was applied to the Mortgage Loan on a monthly basis, on the 14th day of each month. The process is described in the following terms by Mr Radia, in paragraphs 13 and 14 of his witness statement:
“13. It was a condition of the Loan Facility that there was a retained sum of £409,500 for the monthly interest payments. It can be seen from the Statement of Account at Exhibit 8, SR1 that the sum of £45,500 was applied to the Loan Facility from the retained interest on the 14th of every month. 14. As to the retained interest: a. Kept in a separate account. b. Belonged to the Defendant. c. Applied to the Claimant’s account on the 14th of each month. d. Before that application, the Claimant has no interest in those monies.” a. Kept in a separate account. b. Belonged to the Defendant. c. Applied to the Claimant’s account on the 14th of each month. d. Before that application, the Claimant has no interest in those monies.”
[18]The original term of the Mortgage Loan was 9 months which, measured from the date of the Loan Agreement (14th October 2022), meant that the term of the Mortgage Loan expired on 13th July 2023. On 21st June 2023 the Defendant applied for an extension of the term of the Mortgage Loan, for a further period of 12 months. The application form described the reason for the extension as being “House sale delayed due to market conditions”, and identified the repayment strategy as being “Sale”; I assume meaning a sale of the Property.[19]By letter dated 10th August 2023 the Claimant approved the extension to the term of the Mortgage Loan on the same terms as in the Loan Agreement. The extension was agreed subject to a stipulation that there be a capital reduction in respect of the Mortgage Loan, in the amount of £1,000,000. As with the Loan Agreement in its original form, the amount of the Mortgage Loan was increased to include, as retained interest, the amount of interest which would be payable over the extended term of the Mortgage Loan, and also to include a fee charged by the Claimant for the extension.[20]The Defendant complied with the requirement to make a capital reduction payment of £1 million, and also made a further voluntary capital reduction payment of £1 million. In recognition of these capital reduction payments, the amount of the monthly interest payable was reduced to £35,520.65 per month.[21]As a result of this agreed extension, the term of the Mortgage Loan expired on 13th July 2024.[22]In the remainder of this judgment references to the Loan Agreement mean the Loan Agreement as varied by the agreement for the extension of its term.[23]On 6th December 2023 the OFSI issued its notice identifying a number of persons, including the Defendant, as designated persons for the purposes of the Regulations. As I have already outlined, this left the parties in a position where neither party could, directly or indirectly, deal with the funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by the Defendant. These funds and economic resources were not limited to the Property, but did include the Property. On 8th December 2023 the Claimant notified the OFSI of its relationship with the Defendant and of the Loan Agreement. For the purposes of this notification the Claimant submitted a compliance reporting form, to which some reference was made in the course of the submissions at the Trial.[24]The Claimant’s case is that, as a consequence of the Defendant being named as a designated person for the purposes of the Regulations (“the Designation”), circumstances arose which resulted in the Defendant being in breach of the terms on which the Mortgage Loan was made, and which also constituted Events of Default, within the meaning of the LTC. The Claimant’s case is that this triggered an immediate obligation to repay the entire sum due under the terms of the Loan Agreement, and also gave the Claimant the right to take possession of the Property.[25]By a letter dated 19th January 2024 the Claimant gave formal notice to the Defendant of the alleged breaches of the Loan Agreement and the alleged Events of Default. The letter also gave formal notice that all sums due under the terms of the Loan Agreement had become immediately due and payable. This was followed by a formal letter of claim from the Claimant’s then solicitors dated 25th January 2024.[26]At this stage it is only necessary to make specific mention of one of the matters alleged in the letter of 19th January 2024. The relevant allegation was that the Defendant was in breach of an obligation to pay interest on the Mortgage Loan. I have already made reference to the Claimant’s evidence that, in each month, it applied the retained interest to the payment of the relevant interest due for that month. The Claimant’s case is that once it had been notified that the Defendant was a designated person, it could not, by reason of the Regulations, continue with the application of the retained interest for this purpose. As such, the Claimant’s case was, and remains, that the last payment of interest which was made by the Defendant, by this application of the retained interest, was the interest payable on 14th November 2023. Thereafter no applications of the retained interest were made and, on the Claimant’s case (which is disputed by the Defendant), the monthly instalments of interest were not thereafter paid.[27]On 13th February 2024 the Claimant applied to the OFSI for a licence. The licence was initially granted on 10th April 2025, but was subsequently amended on 25th June 2025. It is not entirely clear to me what was originally applied for by the Claimant or in what circumstances the licence came to be amended. The relevant point, for present purposes, is that this licence, in its amended form (“the Claimant’s Licence”) permits the Claimant to take various actions in relation to the Mortgage Loan. I need only mention, for the purposes the first three of these permitted actions:
“i. West One may deduct the Retained Interest, in one or more instalments, and apply it to the sums due it, per the terms of the Facility; ii. Subject to a UK Court Order being granted, West One may make use of, take into possession, deal with, market and sell, the Property in accordance with the UK Court Order and its wider legal rights; iii. Subject to a UK Court Order being granted, West One may receive all proceeds generated by the sale of the Property and deduct and retain, per the terms of the Facility, the Principle Loan Amount, any Additional Interest and costs, fees, charges, expenses and other sums due to it, excluding legal fees, expenses or disbursements, per the terms of the Facility;”
[28]The Claimant’s Licence thus authorised the Claimant, assuming that authority was required for this activity, to continue its process of applying the retained interest to the monthly payments of interest due under the Loan Agreement. The Claimant’s Licence also authorised the Claimant to take possession of the Property and to sell the Property, subject to obtaining a possession order.[29]The Claim itself was, as I have said, commenced by claim form issued on 21st March 2024. The principal relief claimed by the Claimant is an order for possession of the Property. The sole claim for relief dealt with at the Trial was the claim for an order for possession of the Property.[30]It is common ground between the parties that the Regulations prevent the Claimant from enforcing an order for possession of the Property, in the absence of an authorisation for this activity from the OFSI. This problem has been addressed by the Claimant obtaining the Claimant’s Licence. It is also common ground between the parties that the Regulations do not prevent the Claimant from pursuing the Claim and obtaining an order for possession of the Property, if the Claimant can establish its entitlement to an order for possession.[31]The extended term of the Loan Agreement expired on 13th July 2024 whereupon, under the terms of the Loan Agreement, the Mortgage Loan fell due for repayment assuming(i) that the Mortgage Loan had not already fallen due for repayment on the basis of the matters alleged in the Claimant’s letter of 19th January 2024, and(ii) that the Designation and the application of the Regulations did not prevent the repayment obligation from taking effect.[32]By a letter dated 22nd August 2024 the Claimant’s solicitors gave further formal notice to the Defendant of an alleged Event of Default. The letter alleged that, following the expiration of the term of the Mortgage Loan, the Defendant had failed to redeem the Mortgage Loan, in breach of the terms of the Loan Agreement. The content of the letter was stated to be without prejudice to any prior notices of Events of Default and demands.[33]The Defendant made her own application for a licence from OFSI on 24th September 2024. In her witness statement the Defendant explains that she made the decision to sell the Property because, by reason of the Designation, she had no other lawful means of repaying the Mortgage Loan. The Defendant had insufficient funds in the UK and the EU to repay the Mortgage Loan. She had sufficient funds in Russian banks to repay the Mortgage Loan, but those funds could not be used. The Defendant says that she had found a buyer for the Property by September 2024, and then made the application for the licence to sell the Property.[34]The licence for the sale of the Property by the Defendant (“the Defendant’s Licence”) was eventually granted on 19th August 2025. The Defendant’s Licence authorises various activities on the part of the Defendant, for the purposes of effecting the sale of the Property and dealing with the proceeds of sale, and imposed various conditions in respect of the sale.[35]As can be seen, this is an unusual case. Both parties wish to see the Property sold and the Mortgage Loan paid off. The essential issue between the parties is whether the Claimant is entitled to an order for possession of the Property. This issue, in turn, engages the question of whether a right to possession has arisen, in circumstances where the Designation and the application of the Regulations has prevented a normal course of dealing between the Claimant and the Defendant.

The Mortgage Deed

[36]The only term in the Mortgage Deed which I need to set out is clause 9, which deals with the question of when the security constituted by the Mortgage Deed becomes enforceable. Clause 9 provides as follows:
“9.1 Security becomes enforceable following certain events The security constituted by this deed shall be immediately enforceable if: 9.1.1 an Event of Default occurs, or 9.1.2 any of the Secured Liabilities shall not be paid or discharged when the same ought to be paid or discharged by the Borrower (whether on demand or at scheduled maturity or by acceleration or otherwise, as the case may be), or 9.1.3 the Borrower shall be in breach of any of its obligations under the Facility Letter, this deed or under any other agreement deed or document between the Borrower and the Lender, or 9.1.4 any representation, warranty or statement made, repeated or deemed made by the Borrower in, or pursuant to, any of the Facility Letter or this deed is (or proves to have been) incomplete, untrue, incorrect or misleading in any material respect when made, repeated or deemed made. 9.2 Discretion After the security constituted by this deed has become enforceable, the Lender may, in its absolute discretion, enforce all or any part of that security at the times, in the manner and on the terms it thinks fit, and take possession of and hold or dispose of all or any part of the Charged Property.”
The security constituted by this deed shall be immediately enforceable if: After the security constituted by this deed has become enforceable, the Lender may, in its absolute discretion, enforce all or any part of that security at the times, in the manner and on the terms it thinks fit, and take possession of and hold or dispose of all or any part of the Charged Property.”[37]The Secured Liabilities are, as I have said, defined to mean all monies owed by the Defendant to the Claimant. An Event of Default is defined to mean any event falling within the definition of an Event of Default in any of the Facility Letters. The definition of a Facility Letter is sufficiently widely drafted to include all the terms of the Loan Agreement, which brings me to the terms of the LTC.

The LTC

[38]The basic repayment obligation in the LTC is to be found in clause 6.1, which provided as follows:
“6.1. The Borrower shall repay the Debt and any other amount payable under the Agreement by the Repayment Date.”
[39]The Repayment Date was the date specified in the Particulars as the Repayment Date. The Particulars were defined to mean the loan particulars set out in the Offer. The Offer was defined to mean “the offer document by which the Lender has offered to make a loan available to the Borrower on the terms set out in the Offer and these Terms and Conditions”. This definition, by a somewhat roundabout route, seems to me to take one to the CMO, as varied by the Claimant’s letter dated 10th August 2023, which extended the term of the Loan Agreement. The extended term of the Loan Agreement was defined as 12 months from 14th July 2023. The Repayment Date was not formally defined in the CMO or the letter of 10th August 2023, but it is clear, following the extension of the term of the Loan Agreement, that the Repayment Date should be taken to be 13th July 2024.[40]Clause 7 of the LTC permitted the Claimant to require prepayment of the Mortgage Loan in the following circumstances of illegality:
“7.1. The Lender may refuse to make the Loan or require the Borrower to prepay the Debt and all other amounts payable under the Agreement, if: 7.1.1. any change in law or regulation or in the way any court or regulatory authority interprets or applies any law or regulation, or 7.1.2. any direction, request or requirement (whether or not having the force of law) from any monetary agency, central bank, or governmental or regulatory authority, or 7.1.3. any judgment, order or direction of any court, tribunal or authority binding on the Lender, makes it unlawful for the Lender to make the Loan or allow the Debt to remain outstanding.” 7.1.1. any change in law or regulation or in the way any court or regulatory authority interprets or applies any law or regulation, or 7.1.2. any direction, request or requirement (whether or not having the force of law) from any monetary agency, central bank, or governmental or regulatory authority, or 7.1.3. any judgment, order or direction of any court, tribunal or authority binding on the Lender, makes it unlawful for the Lender to make the Loan or allow the Debt to remain outstanding.”
[41]The bold print is my addition. I have added the bold print because it seems to me that what is presented as the last part of sub-clause 7.1.3, shown by the bold print, actually belongs on a separate line, as the final part of clause 7.1, and should be read as applying to all three of sub-clauses 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3.[42]Clause 11 of the LTC had the effect of deeming the Defendant to provide certain specified warranties on a recurring basis: “11.1. The Borrower represents and warrants that: 11.1.1. Where a purchase price for the Property is stated in the Particulars it is true and correct and is the bona fide arm’s length purchase price at full value. There neither were nor are any cash-back, incentive, rental guarantee, discount, payment, allowance, retention or other collateral arrangements with the seller of the Property affecting the price or value of the Property. 11.1.2. The information, in written or electronic format, supplied by the Borrower to the Lender in connection with the Agreement and the Transaction Documents was, to the best of the Borrower’s knowledge, complete, true and accurate in all material respects at the time it was supplied, and not misleading in any material respect, nor rendered misleading by a failure to disclose other information except to the extent that it was amended, superseded or updated by more recent information supplied by the Borrower to the Lender. 11.1.3. No Event of Default has occurred, is continuing or will occur when the Loan is made. 11.1.4. There has been no material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Borrower since the date of the Agreement. 11.2. The Borrower makes the Warranties on the date of the Agreement. 11.3. The Borrower repeats the Warranties on the Drawdown Date, and the first day of each Interest Period by reference to the facts and circumstances existing on each such date.” 11.1.1. Where a purchase price for the Property is stated in the Particulars it is true and correct and is the bona fide arm’s length purchase price at full value. There neither were nor are any cash-back, incentive, rental guarantee, discount, payment, allowance, retention or other collateral arrangements with the seller of the Property affecting the price or value of the Property. 11.1.2. The information, in written or electronic format, supplied by the Borrower to the Lender in connection with the Agreement and the Transaction Documents was, to the best of the Borrower’s knowledge, complete, true and accurate in all material respects at the time it was supplied, and not misleading in any material respect, nor rendered misleading by a failure to disclose other information except to the extent that it was amended, superseded or updated by more recent information supplied by the Borrower to the Lender. 11.1.3. No Event of Default has occurred, is continuing or will occur when the Loan is made. 11.1.4. There has been no material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Borrower since the date of the Agreement.[43]It will be noted that these warranties (“the Warranties”) were deemed to be repeated on the first day of each Interest Period. The definition of an Interest Period is to be found in clause 5.3, which provided as follows:
“5.3. For the computation of interest on the Debt, the period commencing on and including the Drawdown Date up to and including the Repayment Date shall be divided into successive periods of one month ("Interest Periods"). Each Interest Period (other than the first) will start at the end of the previous Interest Period.”
[44]The terms of the Mortgage Loan commenced on 14th October 2022. Going back to the CMO, I take the first day of each Interest Period to mean the 14th day of each month, starting from and including 14th October 2022 and continuing, following the extension of the term of the Mortgage Loan, to 14th June 2024, when the final Interest Period, to 13th July 2024 would have commenced.[45]Clause 13 dealt with Events of Default. Events of Default were defined in Schedule 1 to the LTC (“Schedule 1”). Clause 13 gave the Claimant the right, on notice to the Defendant, to make the Mortgage Loan immediately due and payable, in the following terms:
“13.1.Each of the events or circumstances set out in Schedule 1 is an Event of Default. 13.2. At any time after an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, the Lender may, by giving notice to the Borrower: 13.2.1. cancel the Lender’s obligation to make the Loan if it has not already been made, or 13.2.2. make the Debt and all other amounts payable or outstanding under the Agreement or the Transaction Documents immediately due and payable whereupon they shall become immediately due and payable.” 13.2.1. cancel the Lender’s obligation to make the Loan if it has not already been made, or 13.2.2. make the Debt and all other amounts payable or outstanding under the Agreement or the Transaction Documents immediately due and payable whereupon they shall become immediately due and payable.”
[46]Turning to the Events of Default, as set out in Schedule 1, the alleged Events of Default relied upon by the Claimant are those set out in paragraph 1 (non-payment), paragraph 8 (illegality) and paragraph 12 (material adverse change) of Schedule 1:
“1 NON-PAYMENT The Borrower: 1.1 is late in paying any sum payable by the Borrower under the Agreement, the Transaction Documents the Security or under any other agreement, deed or document between the Borrower and the Lender, the amount unpaid is at least equal to two months’ interest payable under Clause 5.1 to 5.6, and the Borrower has failed to remedy the breach within a reasonable time of the Lender requesting the Borrower to do so; or 1.2 fails to repay the Debt and any other amount payable under any other provision of the Agreement by the Repayment Date.” “8 ILLEGALITY All or any part of any of the Agreement, any Transaction Document or any Guarantee becomes invalid, unlawful, unenforceable, terminated, or ceases to have full force and effect, unless such invalidity, unlawfulness, unenforceability, termination or ceasing to have force and effect occurs as a result of negligence or any unlawful act or omission on the part of the Lender.” “12 MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE Where any event occurs (or circumstances exist) which, in the reasonable opinion of the Lender, is likely to materially and adversely affect: 12.1 the Borrower’s ability to perform all or any of the Borrower’s obligations under, or otherwise comply with, the terms of the Agreement or the Transaction Documents or any of them; or 12.2 the Guarantor’s ability to perform all or any of the Guarantor’s obligations under, or otherwise comply”
The Borrower: 1.1 is late in paying any sum payable by the Borrower under the Agreement, the Transaction Documents the Security or under any other agreement, deed or document between the Borrower and the Lender, the amount unpaid is at least equal to two months’ interest payable under Clause 5.1 to 5.6, and the Borrower has failed to remedy the breach within a reasonable time of the Lender requesting the Borrower to do so; or 1.2 fails to repay the Debt and any other amount payable under any other provision of the Agreement by the Repayment Date.” All or any part of any of the Agreement, any Transaction Document or any Guarantee becomes invalid, unlawful, unenforceable, terminated, or ceases to have full force and effect, unless such invalidity, unlawfulness, unenforceability, termination or ceasing to have force and effect occurs as a result of negligence or any unlawful act or omission on the part of the Lender.” Where any event occurs (or circumstances exist) which, in the reasonable opinion of the Lender, is likely to materially and adversely affect: 12.1 the Borrower’s ability to perform all or any of the Borrower’s obligations under, or otherwise comply with, the terms of the Agreement or the Transaction Documents or any of them; or 12.2 the Guarantor’s ability to perform all or any of the Guarantor’s obligations under, or otherwise comply”

The Claimant’s case

[47]The Claimant’s case is that its right to enforce its security over the Property, by making this claim for possession, has arisen pursuant to all four sub-clauses of clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed. The Claimant’s case is that:(1) Events of Default have occurred;(2) there has been a failure to pay Secured Liabilities;(3) the Defendant has breached her obligations under the Loan Agreement;(4) the Defendant has given Warranties which are or have proved to have been incomplete, untrue, incorrect or misleading in a material respect.[48]In more detail, the Claimant relies upon the following grounds, in support of its claim to possession of the Property.[49]The designation of the Defendant has had the consequence that it is unlawful for the Defendant to make any payments under the Loan Agreement, and unlawful for the Claimant to accept any such payments. The Claimant’s case is that this illegality has engaged paragraph 8 of Schedule 1, with the consequence that an Event of Default has occurred.[50]As from, and including 14th December 2023 the Claimant says that it was, by reason of the Designation, unable to apply the retained interest to payment of the monthly interest due on the Mortgage Loan. The Claimant’s case is that the Defendant was thereby in breach of her obligation, under clause 5.1 of the LTC, to make the interest payments on the due dates. The Claimant also says that this alleged breach of the Loan Agreement constituted an Event of Default, within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Schedule 1.[51]The Claimant’s case is that the sanctions placed upon the Defendant by the Designation had, in the reasonable opinion of the Claimant, a material and adverse effect upon the ability of the Defendant to perform her obligations under the Loan Agreement. As such, the Claimant says that paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 is engaged, and an Event of Default occurred.[52]The Claimant’s case is that the situation referred to in the previous paragraph also constituted a breach of the Warranty in clause 11.3 of the LTC; namely the Warranty that there had been no material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Defendant since the date of the Loan Agreement (“the No MAC Warranty”).[53]The Claimant’s case is that, in breach of clause 6.1 of the LTC, the Defendant has failed to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date; namely 13th July 2024. The Claimant also says that this alleged breach of the Loan Agreement constituted an Event of Default, within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Schedule 1.[54]The essential defence of the Defendant to these various claims is that she was legally prevented, by the Designation, from making any payments under the Mortgage Loan, despite having the finances to be able to do so in Russian banks which had been sanctioned and from which she was unable either to withdraw the relevant funds or to use those funds to pay the Claimant. The Defendant’s case, on various grounds, is that this situation did not render her in breach of any of her obligations under the Loan Agreement, and did not give rise to any Events of Default.[55]I will take each of the grounds relied upon by the Claimant in turn. I will however take first the last of the grounds relied upon by the Claimant; that is to say the Claimant’s case that the Defendant is in breach of clause 6.1 of the LTC on the basis of failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. I do so because this last ground engages the most fundamental issue which lies between the parties; namely whether the effect of the Designation was to suspend the obligations of the Defendant to make payments under the Loan Agreement.

Is there a right to possession? – Clause 6.1 of the LTC

[56]The starting point is the basic repayment obligation in the Loan Agreement, which can be found in clause 6.1 of the LTC, which I repeat for ease of reference:
“6.1. The Borrower shall repay the Debt and any other amount payable under the Agreement by the Repayment Date.”
[57]As I have explained, earlier in this judgment, it is not entirely straightforward to identify the Repayment Date within the documents which comprise what I am referring to as the Loan Agreement. As I have also explained however, if one follows through the documents, and takes account of the agreed extension of the term of the Loan Agreement, the Repayment Date can be identified, in the events which have occurred, as 13th July 2024. As I understood the submissions of the parties, this was not in dispute.[58]On the face of it there has been a breach of clause 6.1 of the LTC. The Mortgage Loan was not repaid by 13th July 2024. On the face of it, this entitles the Claimant to enforce its security over the Property, pursuant to clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed.[59]The Defendant had what were, in effect, two answers to this ground of the claim for possession. The Defendant argued, first, that her obligation to repay the Mortgage Debt was suspended during the period of the Designation, because it was unlawful for her to make this payment, or for the Claimant to receive this payment. The Defendant also argued, second, that she could not be liable, in this action, for the consequences of her failure to repay the Mortgage Debt by the Repayment Date, by virtue of the provisions of Section 44 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (“Section 44”).[60]I will take these two grounds of defence in turn, starting with the Defendant’s argument that her obligation of repayment was, and remains suspended during the period of the Designation.[61]The principal authority relied upon by the Defendant in this context was the judgment of Michael Green J in Fortenova Grupa D.D. v LLC Shushary Holding [2023] EWHC 1165 (Ch). The circumstances in which the case came on for trial were summarised by Michael Green J in the following terms in his judgment, at [4]:
“4. The claim concerns loan notes with a face value, excluding interest, of approximately €400 million, which were issued by the Company and are held by Shushary. The notes are governed by English law and are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English court. They are also secured over various assets owned by the Company and its associates. Because of a proposed refinancing, the Company wishes to redeem the notes held by Shushary before their maturity date in September 2023. The trouble is that because of the sanctions in place against VTB and Shushary, the sums required to redeem the notes cannot be paid to or for the benefit of Shushary. Accordingly, the Company is asking for an order that moneys be paid into court and it would then be for Shushary to apply for the moneys to be released from there, when and if sanctions are lifted. The Company also seeks a declaration that it is not liable for default interest on the notes because it has been unable to pay interest to Shushary in accordance with the Subscription Agreement while the sanctions have been in place.”
[62]The relevant part of the judgment, for present purposes is the final part, where the judge dealt with the claimant’s argument that the sum which it was seeking permission to pay into court should not include default interest. The claimant argued that default interest was not due, on the proper construction of the relevant agreement, or constituted an unenforceable penalty in the circumstances of the case. The judge recorded the claimant’s construction argument in the following terms, at [45]-[46] and [48]-[49]: “45. Default interest is governed by clause 10.4 of the Subscription Agreement which states: "If an obligor fails to pay any amount payable by it under a finance document on its due date, interest shall accrue on the overdue amount from the due date up to the date of actual payment." 46. The construction argument is that the Company cannot be said to have failed to pay sums due to Shushary in circumstances where the Company(a) is willing to pay those sums to Shushary, but(b) is unable to do so as a result of international sanctions which prohibit the Company from paying those sums to Shushary.” “48. Mr. Robins submitted that the commercial purpose of a default interest clause is to identify the circumstances in which the note holders become exposed to a greater credit risk by reason of the obligors’ default. In such circumstances the obligors are liable to pay interest at a higher rate than the rate than would otherwise apply. He therefore said that a failure to pay within clause 10.4 is therefore a failure by the obligors in the nature of a default which reveals that the obligors pose a heightened credit risk. Such a failure to pay will not exist where the obligors have been unable to pay due to international sanctions. In the case of non-payment due to international sanctions, there has been no deterioration in the financial position of the obligors and no increase in the credit risk faced by the holders. Rather, it has become unlawful for the obligors to make payment to the sanctioned person and the obligors are therefore unable to do so. 49. However, that is not a change in circumstances which discloses a deterioration in the financial standing of the obligors so as to justify the imposition of a higher rate of interest. As a matter of contractual interpretation, therefore, it does not fall within the scope of the concept of failure to pay within clause 10.4 of the Subscription Agreement.” "If an obligor fails to pay any amount payable by it under a finance document on its due date, interest shall accrue on the overdue amount from the due date up to the date of actual payment."[63]The judge then went on to record the alternative way in which counsel for the claimant put the construction argument, at [50]-[51]:
“50. Mr. Robins put it another way, that the concept of a failure to pay within clause 10.4 presupposes that it is lawful for the obligors to pay the debt. If the debt cannot lawfully be paid, whilst it would be right to say that the obligors are not permitted to pay the debt, it would be inaccurate to say that they have failed to pay it. He referred to some old case law on bills of exchange and an inability to pay during wartime. Under section 57 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1884, the court has power to award interest where a debtor has failed to pay a bill of exchange. In a series of cases decided during wartime, the courts held that there is no failure to pay in circumstances where payment would be unlawful as a result of the creditor being an enemy alien. The reason in these cases is that a debtor cannot be said to be in default of an obligation if the performance of the obligation would be unlawful. Rather, for the period in which the performance would be unlawful, the obligation is suspended. Default will only occur if non-performance continues after the point in time in which performance has become legally possible. 51. The authorities he referred to were: Hugh Stevenson and Sons Limited v Aktiengesellschaftfur Cartonnagen-Industrie, [1918] A.C. 239, 256; Biedermann v Allhausen & Co [1921] 37 TLR 662, a decision of Darling J; and NV Ledeboter and Van der Held's Textielhandel v Hibbert [1947] KB 964, per Morris J. Those cases were effectively summarised in McGregor on Damages, 21st Edition, paragraph 30-022, which records that "the act which would have constituted the breach of duty was the very thing which the defendant could not lawfully do. The defendant was therefore not in default".”

The judge accepted the claimant’s construction, at [52]-[53]:

“52. That does seem to me to be analogous to the situation that I have before me here. On 5th April 2023, Zacaroli J expressed the preliminary view that the Company had the better of the argument on this point and said that it would be "a harsh construction” to suggest that the Company was fixed with default interest when it was at all times willing and able to pay, but was prevented from doing so by sanctions. 53. I agree. In my view, the correct construction is that in these circumstances, the Company has not become liable to pay default interest.”
[65]The decision in Fortenova, so far as the default interest was concerned, was therefore that, as a matter of construction of the default interest clause, there had not been a failure to pay. Mr Arnold, for the Defendant, argued that the position was analogous in the present case. There was no failure to pay or breach of the Loan Agreement, because it was unlawful for the Defendant to repay the Mortgage Loan, either by the Repayment Date or thereafter. The obligation to repay the Mortgage Loan was suspended during the period of Designation.[66]It will be noted that, in support of the claimant’s construction argument in Fortenova, the claimant’s counsel referred the judge to a trilogy of older cases, each of which involved claims arising out of wartime trading restrictions. It is easiest to take these three cases in reverse chronological order, and start with NV Ledeboter and Van der Held’s Textielhandel v Hibbert [1947] KB 964. In this case the plaintiff, a Dutch company carrying on business in Holland, drew a bill of exchange in Rotterdam on the defendant in 1932. The defendant was a British citizen, residing in England. The bill was payable on 1st July 1940, and contained no provision for the payment of interest. In May 1940 Holland was occupied by the Germans. This meant that it was not practically possible for the defendant to pay the bill of exchange on 1st July 1940, independent of the fact that such payment would by then have been illegal by reason of the Trading with the Enemy Act 1940. Payment of the bill of exchange became possible in September 1945, and the defendant paid the bill of exchange in December 1945. The defendant refused however to pay the interest which was claimed by the plaintiffs, calculated from 1st July 1940.[67]Morris J decided that because payment of the bill of exchange would have been illegal at the date of maturity, there was no breach of contract which could give rise to damages, with the consequence that the plaintiff could not recover the interest which had been claimed. The essential reasoning of Morris J can be found in his judgment at page 32 of the report:
“In considering the claim for interest made in this action it is, in my judgment, necessary to bear in mind that it is a claim for damages for breach of contract. Section 57 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, lays down what is the measure of damages to be applied in the normal case when a bill is dishonoured. In the present case, although the defendant did not perform his contractual obligation to meet the bill at maturity, he could not lawfully have done so. Apart from the position at common law, there was express statutory provision which prohibited him from paying the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, in my opinion, he is not liable in damages for having failed to pay. He was obliged not to pay. There seems to me to be something incongruous in asking the court to award damages against a man for failing to do what the law forbade him to do. This, in my view, disposes of the claim which is made.”
[68]Morris J went on, in his judgment, to reject the argument that it was only reasonable that the defendant should have to pay interest, having had the use of the money during the period after the bill of exchange fell due for payment. At page 34 of the report, Morris J said this:
“It was submitted by Mr. Ashworth on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendant had had the use of the plaintiffs' money for five and a half years, and that it would be only reasonable that he should pay interest. It was further submitted that the defendant could have paid the Custodian, but, in my judgment, none of these considerations can result in deflecting inquiry from an issue whether damages for breach of contract ought to be awarded against the defendant. There is a distinction in principle, in my opinion, between cases where interest becomes payable by way of damages for non-payment, and cases where interest is payable by reason of express agreement.”
[69]It will be noted that Morris J, in this part of his judgment, drew a distinction between a case where interest became payable by way of damages for non-payment, and cases where interest was payable by reason of express agreement.[70]The second of the three cases referred to in Fortenova is the decision of Darling J in Biedermann v Allhausen [1921] 37 TLR 662. This was another case concerning bills of exchange, where a claim was made for interest on bills of exchange which were accepted before the First World War, but fell due for payment after war broke out. Darling J decided that interest could only be recovered on the bills of exchange from 10th January 1920, when peace was declared with Germany and payment became legal. The plaintiff was resident in Germany, although not a German citizen. As such, wartime legislation in Britain made it unlawful for the defendants to pay the bills of exchange until the declaration of peace. Darling J accepted the argument of the defendants that there was a suspension of rights and liabilities in respect of the bills, as a result of the war. There was no breach of duty on the part of the defendants in not paying the bills on the dates fixed for payment, and there could be no breach until 10th January 1920. As such, no interest could be claimed, by way of damages, until it became legal to make payment on the bills.[71]The third of the three cases is the decision of the House of Lords in Hugh Stevenson and Sons Limited v Aktiengesellschaft Fur Carton-Nagen-Industrie [1918] AC 239. This case was concerned with a partnership business carried on in England between an English company and a German company. The outbreak of the First World War operated as a dissolution of the partnership, following which the English company continued to carry on the business and to use the partnership plant for that purpose. The House of Lords decided that the German company was entitled to a share of the profits which had been made, after the dissolution, by the carrying on of the business. The decision is lengthy, and each of their Lordships gave a separate speech. In these circumstances it is not easy to distil any particular principle from the speeches which is relevant in the present case. It is however to be noted that Lord Atkinson, in his speech, rejected any analogy with cases where it had been held that interest, in the nature of damages, was not payable in respect of a period where it was not lawful for the debtor to pay the debt. As Lord Atkinson explained, the case was not one of debtor and creditor, but rather a case between a principal and an agent who had got possession of his principal’s property and traded with it for profit. The principle of awarding interest as damages for withholding payment of a debt had no application.[72]It should also be noted that Lord Parmoor, at the conclusion of his speech, also rejected any analogy with the principle that interest could not be recovered, by way of damages, on a debt which the debtor could not lawfully pay as a result of wartime legislation restricting trade with the enemy. Lord Parmoor explained the position in the following terms, at pages 23 and 24 of the report:
“In the course of the argument two American cases were called to the attention of your Lordships—Hoare v. Allen (1) and Brown v. Hiatts. (2) These cases have not, in my opinion, any direct bearing in this appeal, and I should require further research and investigation before accepting them as an authority that interest is not payable though there is a stipulation for its payment. In such a case it is difficult to see any difference in principle between the payment of interest and the payment of a capital sum. The case of Du Belloix v. Lord Water-park (3) illustrates this point. This was an action on a promissory note which did not contain a stipulation for payment of interest. In the absence of such a stipulation the judge directed the jury that interest was damage for the detention of the debt, and that the question whether it should be allowed was peculiarly for their consideration. The jury found a verdict only for the principal sum named in the note. The Court held that the jury had been rightly directed and that the question of interest was entirely for them. In the course of his judgment Abbott C.J. said : “But there is another objection to the plaintiff's recovering interest on the debt, for during the greatest part of that time he was an alien enemy, and could not have recovered even the principal in this country." My Lords, in my opinion this dictum would not apply either to a case in which there is a stipulation for interest, or where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties on the dissolution of a partnership.”
[73]The effect of this trilogy of cases, and other cases involving wartime restrictions on trading is summarised in McGregor on Damages (22nd Edition), at 31-022, in the context of contracts to pay or to lend money. The principle stated in McGregor is in the following terms:
“Where, at the time the bill or note would in the ordinary course have become payable, whether on maturity or on demand, it has been illegal to pay money to the person entitled because that person was an alien enemy, interest has been held to run only from the time payment again became legal.”
[74]Biederman and Ledeboter are both cited as authorities for this principle. Reference is then made to the difficulty with those decisions as a result of their treatment in The Berwickshire [1950] P. 204. The editors of McGregor go on however to justify those decisions on the following basis:
“Some difficulty, however, has arisen because of the treatment of these decisions in The Berwickshire.93 In that case, which involved the tortious sinking of a ship owned and manned by then alien enemies, interest was awarded as damages on the value of the ship and of the seamen’s effects from the date of the tort in 1940 and not from the date in 1944 when the claimants ceased to be alien enemies. Lord Merriman P, although declaring himself not to be concerned to express any opinion whether the bills and notes cases were rightly decided,94 treated them unenthusiastically and in particular pointed out that the dicta in their Lordships’ speeches in Stevenson v Aktiengesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie 95 were hardly in their favour.96 It is submitted, however, that the bills and notes cases present an exceptional situation, and are properly decided for the reason that the act which would have constituted the breach of duty was the very thing which the defendant could not lawfully do. The defendant was therefore not in default 97 and consequently did not become liable to pay damages at all until the claimant ceased from being an alien enemy. This rationale appears from Morris J’s judgment in Ledeboter v Hibbert,98 where he said that there seemed to him: “… to be something incongruous in asking the court to award damages against a man for failing to do what the law forbade him to do” , and also in Lord Atkinson’s speech in Stevenson v Aktiengesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie,99 where he said that the principle upon which the bills and notes cases 100 appeared to him to be based was: “… that interest is in the nature of damages payable by the debtor by reason of his withholding his debt, his default in not paying his debt, and since during war he cannot lawfully pay his debt to an alien enemy without committing a crime, he is not in any default in omitting to pay it, and should not therefore be mulcted in damages for not doing what he cannot do lawfully.”101” “… to be something incongruous in asking the court to award damages against a man for failing to do what the law forbade him to do” , “… that interest is in the nature of damages payable by the debtor by reason of his withholding his debt, his default in not paying his debt, and since during war he cannot lawfully pay his debt to an alien enemy without committing a crime, he is not in any default in omitting to pay it, and should not therefore be mulcted in damages for not doing what he cannot do lawfully.”101”
[75]It is however to be noted that the editors of McGregor then proceed to confine the scope of these decisions fairly narrowly:
“This reasoning can only apply where the defendant’s primary obligation is itself to pay money and reaches neither cases of tort, such as The Berwickshire,102 where the duty imposed by the general law is invariably something other than the payment of money, nor all other cases of breaches of contract where the duty arising from the promise is not to pay money but, for instance, to deliver or accept goods under a contract of sale. And, even where the primary obligation is to pay money, this reasoning should not apply where the defendant is in breach in not paying before payment became illegal; it is therefore submitted that a different conclusion might be reached where the claimant became an alien enemy after the claimant’s cause of action had arisen by reason of a failure to pay the bill or note on maturity or on demand.103 Nor, finally, does this reasoning apply where, although the primary obligation is to pay money, the claim is not one for damages so that no default need be shown.104 Indeed in cases with facts similar to those such as Biedermann v Allhausen 105 and Ledeboter v Hibbert 106 themselves, the subsequently more developed principles of unjust enrichment might profitably be explored by claimants for a possible ground of recovery.”
[76]In this context I should also quote footnote 104 in the above commentary (shown underlined in bold), which further confirms that the reasoning in Biedermann and Ledeboter does not extend to a case where the primary obligation is to pay money:
“Thus interest was awarded in Wolff v Oxholm (1817) 6 M. & S. 92 where interest was payable by the express terms of the bill; and in Stevenson v Aktiengesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie [1918] A.C. 239 (which was a claim not on a bill but for a share of the profits of a partnership) where there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Contrast Lord Parmoor in the latter case, where he said that in his opinion the view expressed in Du Belloix v Waterpark (1822) 1 Dow. & Ry. 16 against the award of interest during the period in which it could not lawfully be paid “would not apply either to a case in which there is a stipulation for interest, or where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties on the dissolution of a partnership”: [1918] A.C. 239 at 259–260.”
[77]Returning to the present case, I have difficulty in seeing how either Fortenova, or the cases referred to by Michael Green J in his judgment at [51] can support the argument in the present case that the Defendant’s obligation to repay the Mortgage Debt on the Repayment Date must be treated as suspended, so that the Claimant’s right to possession cannot be enforced. As Lord Atkinson explained in his speech in Stevenson, the principle which emerges from the earlier case law, as applied in Biedermann and Ledeboter, is that interest, in the form of damages, cannot be awarded where a debt payable on a bill or note is not paid because it would have been, at the relevant time, unlawful for the debtor to make the payment. In Stevenson it was explained that the principle does not reach a claim for a share of profits following a dissolution of a partnership by the outbreak of war. Equally, as the editors of McGregor explain, the principle does not reach a variety of other situations, including a case where, although the primary obligation is to pay money, the claim is not one for damages so that no default need be shown.[78]In Fortenova itself, Michael Green J relied upon the earlier cases, cited in his judgment at [51], as supporting the argument of the claimant, recorded at [50], that there was no default in the obligation to pay, for the purposes of the default interest clause, in circumstances where performance of that obligation would be unlawful. This, in turn, paved the way for the judge’s conclusion that, on the correct construction of the default interest clause, the claimant had not become liable to pay default interest.[79]Given the distinction drawn both by Morris J in Ledeboter and Lord Parmoor in Stevenson between interest payable by way of damages and interest payable pursuant to a contractual term, there might be grounds for considering whether the principles accepted in these cases do in fact extend to a case where the relevant interest, as in Fortenova, is payable pursuant to a contractual term rather than as damages. For present purposes however, the relevant point is that there is nothing in Fortenova to suggest that the principle relied upon by Michael Green J, in his construction of the default interest clause in that case, extends beyond a claim for interest arising out of a failure to pay a debt which it was not lawful to pay at the time when payment was required to be made.[80]In the present case, and so far as this ground is concerned, the Claimant is not making a claim for interest, either as damages or pursuant to a term of the contract. The Claimant is making a claim for possession on the basis that the Mortgage Loan was not repaid on the term date of the Loan Agreement.[81]I can see the argument of the Defendant that the situation is analogous to that in Fortenova and the earlier cases. I can see the argument that the claim for possession, so far as this ground of possession is concerned, depends upon the failure of the Defendant, in breach of clause 6.1 of the LTC, to repay the Mortgage Loan by the Repayment Date. Applying the reasoning in Fortenova and the earlier cases, so it can be argued, there was no breach of clause 6.1, because it was not lawful for the Defendant to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date.[82]In my view there are at least four related difficulties with this argument.[83]The first difficulty, which I have mentioned, is that this is a claim for possession. As the commentary in McGregor makes clear, the reasoning in the relevant case law does not apply where “although the primary obligation is to pay money, the claim is not one for damages so that no default need be shown”. This analysis of the relevant case law, with which I respectfully agree, would appear to rule out the application of the relevant principle where what is claimed is possession.[84]The second difficulty is that the footnote which I have quoted above, from the commentary in McGregor, would appear to support the argument that where a contractual claim for interest is made, the situation is not to be treated as one where default has to be shown. If this is correct for interest, it must equally apply to a claim for repayment of a mortgage loan, on the contractual redemption date.[85]The third difficulty is that there is nothing in Fortenova or the earlier case law to support the argument that the enforcement by a mortgagee of its mortgage security, by a claim for possession of the relevant property, in circumstances where the mortgage debt has not been repaid on the due date, is not possible on the basis that the obligation of the mortgagor to repay the debt must be treated as suspended. This would be a substantial widening of the narrow principle established by the relevant case law and, in my view, is not one which should be made.[86]The fourth difficulty is that the views which I have just expressed may be said to be borne out by the fact that the Claimant has actually obtained, by the grant of the Claimant’s Licence, permission to take possession of the Property, and market and sell the same, provided that an order for possession can be obtained. The grant of the Claimant’s Licence does not, in itself, support the argument that an order for possession can be obtained on the basis of non-repayment of the Mortgage Loan. The grant was made expressly subject to an order for possession being obtained. The grant did not include permission to commence this possession action (the Claim), because, as is common ground between the parties, permission was not required to make the claim for possession. Given the way in which the Regulations work, it strikes me that it would be very odd if a party in the position of the Claimant, having a right to possession of the relevant mortgage security on the basis of non-redemption of the mortgage debt, was unable to do so because the obligation to redeem the mortgage debt had to be treated as suspended for the purposes of the possession claim.[87]The Defendant’s first answer to the claim for possession on the ground of failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date is that her obligation to repay the Mortgage Loan was suspended during the period of the Designation, because it was unlawful for her to make this payment, or for the Claimant to receive this payment. Drawing together all of the analysis set out above, I conclude that this first answer fails. For the reasons which I have set out, the obligation to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date is not to be treated as suspended, at least so far as the entitlement of the Claimant to possession of the Property under the terms of the Mortgage Deed is concerned.[88]This brings me to the Defendant’s second answer to the claim for possession on the ground of failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. The Defendant argues that she cannot be liable, in this action, for the consequences of her failure to repay the Mortgage Debt by the Repayment Date, by virtue of the provisions of Section 44.[89]Section 44 provides as follows: “(1) This section applies to an act done in the reasonable belief that the act is in compliance with—(a) regulations under section 1, or(b) directions given by virtue of section 6 or 7. (2) A person is not liable to any civil proceedings to which that person would, in the absence of this section, have been liable in respect of the act. (3) In this section "act" includes an omission.” (a) regulations under section 1, or (b) directions given by virtue of section 6 or 7.[90]The Defendant argued that she did not repay the Mortgage Loan because she was prevented from doing so by the Regulations. The Defendant took this course in the reasonable belief that her omission to repay the Mortgage Loan was in compliance with the Regulations. As such, so the Defendant argued, Section 44 protected her from liability in the relevant civil proceedings; namely the Claim.[91]The meaning and effect of Section 44 were considered by the Court of Appeal in Celestial Aviation Services Ltd v UniCredit Bank AG [2024] EWCA Civ 628. The Court of Appeal were concerned with two cases where the claimant companies had leased civilian aircraft to a Russian airline. The defendant was the London branch of a German bank which confirmed letters of credit issued by a Russian bank in favour of the claimants in connection with the leases. The leases were terminated and the claimants made demands for payment from the defendant on the letters of credit. The defendant refused to make payment, on the basis that to do so would put it in breach of the Regulations; specifically Regulation 28(3). The judge at first instance decided that payment under the letters of credit was not prohibited by the Regulations. In particular, the judge decided that the defendant did not have a defence to the claims under Section 44, since it did not have a reasonable belief that refusal to make payment under the letters of credit was in compliance with the letters of credit.[92]The appeal of the defendant to the Court of Appeal was allowed in part, on the basis that payment under the letters of credit would have been caught by Regulation 28(3). This rendered it unnecessary to consider the defence based on Section 44. In her judgment however, with which Snowden and Males LJJ agreed, Falk LJ did address the Section 44 defence, both because it had been fully argued and because it raised points of significance which had not previously been considered by the Court of Appeal. This required Falk LJ to consider the scope of Section 44 and the civil proceedings to which it applied. At [86]-[88] in her judgment, Falk LJ explained the purpose of Section 44 in the following terms:
“86 I have concluded that the answer to the conundrum lies in focusing on precisely what section 44(2) applies to, namely civil proceedings to which a person “would, in the absence of this section, have been liable in respect of the act”
. The “act” here is an omission, being a failure to pay under the LCs. 87 The evident purpose of section 44 is to ensure that a person is not pressurised into doing something that risks breaching sanctions by a fear of being exposed to civil claims. The section is concerned to protect against a liability which is created as a result of something done (or not done) in the reasonable belief that it is in compliance with a sanctions regulation. It is not concerned to protect against pre-existing liabilities. 88 The most obvious example of proceedings to which section 44 would apply is proceedings seeking compensation for loss that has been caused by action taken, or not taken, in the reasonable belief that it was in compliance with regulations made under section 1 of SAMLA. For example, a seller may be concerned that a failure to deliver goods could expose it to claims from the buyer for loss of profit and/or to recover amounts for which the buyer becomes liable to its own customers. Section 44 would protect the seller from a claim for damages, provided that the belief that the supply would be sanctioned was a reasonable one.”[93]Falk LJ went on, at [89]-[90], to conclude that Section 44 should not protect a debtor from an action to recover a debt:
“89 It is far less apparent that section 44 should protect a debtor from an action to recover a debt which is otherwise lawfully due but which has not been paid in the reasonable belief that its payment would be in breach of sanctions. Absent sanctions, the debtor would expect to have to pay that sum in the normal course. Exposure to a claim to recover it is not a new financial exposure which might pressurise payment. It is a pre-existing liability. The mischief at which section 44 is aimed (as confirmed by the Explanatory Notes) is not present. 90 The wording of section 44 also supports an interpretation that would allow proceedings to recover a debt. This is because a claim for debt is just that: it seeks payment of the debt. While the inevitable trigger for the claim is that the debtor has not paid, the action is not an action for the non-payment as such (which is the relevant omission for section 44 purposes) and can therefore be said not to be “in respect of” it. Rather, it seeks recovery of an amount which is owed irrespective of any action or inaction in purported compliance with sanctions.”
[94]Although this analysis of Section 44 was strictly obiter to the actual decision in Celestial Aviation, I am in no doubt that I should apply this analysis in the present case.[95]I should mention, for the sake of completeness, that my attention was also drawn, in this context, to the judgment of ICC Judge Greenwood in Chanana v Khan [2025] EWHC 1472 (Ch). In that case the applicant, the tenant of a flat in Eaton Square, London, was seeking to have set aside a statutory demand served upon him by the respondent, his landlord. The statutory demand related to unpaid rent and contractual interest thereon, in the total sum of £850,958.41. The respondent was a designated person pursuant to the Regulations. On that basis the applicant argued, on various grounds, that there had been no failure to pay the rent due under the lease of the flat In particular, the applicant argued that there had been no failure to pay in circumstances where, so it was submitted, payments could not legally be made to the respondent and that, even if there had been a failure to pay, the application was protected by Section 44. Judge Greenwood decided that payment of the rent could in fact be made, by reason of the exception in Regulation 58(5), without breach of the Regulations. In relation to the argument based on Section 44 the judge cited the judgment of Falk LJ in Celestial Aviation, at [88]-[90]. The judge considered that Section 44 was capable of providing protection to the applicant, for the reasons explained by the judge at [28] in his judgment:
“28. In principle, in my judgment, the section could therefore provide protection against insolvency proceedings based on a failure to pay a debt. In such a case, what is sought by the creditor is not mere payment or enforcement of the debt, but something more, an important additional element of which is, in substance, proof of the debtor’s failure to pay the debt when due, despite demand, which is the basis upon which the court might hold that he is insolvent, and thus liable to the collective process of bankruptcy. In other words, in the case of bankruptcy proceedings, unlike the case of proceedings on or to recover a debt, the fact of non-payment as such is material to the case and to the outcome. Put simply, a person cannot be said to be insolvent and made bankrupt because of his failure to pay a debt in circumstances where his very failure to pay the debt was a result of his reasonable belief that payment would be in breach of the Regulations.”
[96]The judge was not however in a position to decide whether, as a matter of fact, the required reasonable belief did in fact exist. In those circumstances the judge decided that the protection to which the applicant might be entitled under Section 44 could be accommodated by giving the applicant further time to pay the outstanding rent and interest, which he had decided could legally be paid. For present purposes however it does not seem to me that Chanana is directly relevant in the present case. This is clear from the reasoning of Judge Greenwood, at [28], where the judge made it clear that Section 44 was capable of providing protection because he was dealing with insolvency proceedings, where “what is sought by the creditor is not mere payment or enforcement of the debt, but something more, an important additional element of which is, in substance, proof of the debtor’s failure to pay the debt when due, despite demand, which is the basis upon which the court might hold that he is insolvent, and thus liable to the collective process of bankruptcy”. These are not the facts of the present case, where it seems to me that the analysis of Falk LJ in Celestial Aviation is directly applicable. In this context I accept the distinction drawn by Mr Tucker, in his oral submissions, between enforcing a debt, as in the present case, and drawing a statutory conclusion from the failure to pay a debt, which is not the present case.[97]The consequence of the analysis set out above, in the present case, seems to me to be this. The Claimant’s claim for possession is, so far as this ground of possession is concerned, based upon the failure of the Defendant to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. The consequential exposure of the Defendant to this ground of possession is not a new financial exposure which might pressurise repayment of the Mortgage Loan. The liability to repay the Mortgage Loan pre-exists the Designation and the application of the Regulations.[98]In these circumstances it seems to me that, just as Falk LJ concluded that Section 44 does not preclude an action to recover a pre-existing debt which has not been paid, so Section 44 cannot, in the present case, preclude a claim for possession based on the failure to repay the Mortgage Loan. The claim for possession has been commenced for the purposes of recovering an amount, namely the Mortgage Loan, which is owed irrespective of any action or inaction on the part of the Defendant in purported compliance with the Regulations.[99]As I have said, the Defendant’s second answer to the claim for possession, on the ground of failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date, is that that she cannot be liable, in the Claim, for the consequences of her failure to repay the Mortgage Debt by the Repayment Date, by virtue of the provisions of Section 44. For the reasons which I have given, I conclude that this second answer fails. The Defendant cannot rely upon Section 44.[100]Drawing together all of the above analysis of the claim to possession based on clause 6.1 of the LTC, I conclude that the Defendant has breached the basic repayment obligation, as I have called it, in clause 6.1, by reason of the Defendant’s failure to redeem the Mortgage Loan on the expiration of its extended term; that is to say on the Repayment Date. The Designation has not prevented this result, and the Defendant cannot rely upon Section 44.[101]It follows from this that the provisions of clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed were engaged. The security constituted by the Mortgage Deed has become immediately enforceable by reason of the Defendant’s failure to redeem the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. For ease of reference, I repeat clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed:
“9.1 Security becomes enforceable following certain events The security constituted by this deed shall be immediately enforceable if: 9.1.1 an Event of Default occurs, or 9.1.2 any of the Secured Liabilities shall not be paid or discharged when the same ought to be paid or discharged by the Borrower (whether on demand or at scheduled maturity or by acceleration or otherwise, as the case may be), or 9.1.3 the Borrower shall be in breach of any of its obligations under the Facility Letter, this deed or under any other agreement deed or document between the Borrower and the Lender, or 9.1.4 any representation, warranty or statement made, repeated or deemed made by the Borrower in, or pursuant to, any of the Facility Letter or this deed is (or proves to have been) incomplete, untrue, incorrect or misleading in any material respect when made, repeated or deemed made. 9.2 Discretion After the security constituted by this deed has become enforceable, the Lender may, in its absolute discretion, enforce all or any part of that security at the times, in the manner and on the terms it thinks fit, and take possession of and hold or dispose of all or any part of the Charged Property.”
The security constituted by this deed shall be immediately enforceable if: After the security constituted by this deed has become enforceable, the Lender may, in its absolute discretion, enforce all or any part of that security at the times, in the manner and on the terms it thinks fit, and take possession of and hold or dispose of all or any part of the Charged Property.”[102]The Defendant’s failure to redeem the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date seems to me to have engaged sub-clauses 9.1.2 and 9.1.3. There was a failure to discharge the Mortgage Loan when it fell due for repayment, on the Repayment Date. The Defendant was thereby in breach of clause 6.1 of the LTC. For what it is worth, it seems to me that the failure to redeem also constituted an Event of Default, within the meaning of paragraph 1.2 of Schedule 1, thereby also engaging sub-clause 9.1.1.[103]I therefore conclude that the Claimant has, on the bases set out in my previous paragraph, established its right to possession of the Property.[104]I add, for the sake of completeness, that the Claimant is, in theory, also entitled to rely upon clause 13.2 of the LTC. I note that, by the letter of 22nd August 2024, the Claimant’s solicitors gave a further notice of an Event of Default and a demand for repayment, in relation to the Defendant’s failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. This notice would, in theory, have had the effect of rendering the Mortgage Loan immediately due and payable, but I am not sure that clause 13.2 adds anything to the Claimant’s rights based on the failure to repay the Mortgage Loan. The Mortgage Loan had already fallen due for repayment on the Repayment Date and, as I read clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed, the right to enforce the Claimant’s security in clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed was not dependent upon prior notice having been given under clause 13.2 of the LTC.[105]My determination on this ground of possession is sufficient to determine the Claim, so far as the Claimant’s right to possession of the Property is concerned. In theory, this renders it unnecessary to determine the remaining grounds upon which the claim to possession is made. As however the remaining grounds were fully argued before me, and in case those grounds remain or become relevant for any reason, I will proceed to determine the remaining grounds.

Is there a right to possession? - Paragraph 8 of Schedule 1

[106]I can take the Claimant’s case on paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 fairly shortly. Paragraph 8 will have been engaged in the present case, and an Event of Default will have occurred if the relevant agreement, that is to say the Loan Agreement, has, in whole or in part, become “invalid, unlawful, unenforceable, terminated or ceases to have full force and effect, unless such invalidity, unlawfulness, unenforceability, termination or ceasing to have force and effect occurs as a result of negligence or any unlawful act or omission on the part of the Lender.”. It is not suggested, in the present case, that there has been negligence on the part of the Claimant, or any unlawful act or omission on the part of the Claimant. It follows that the question is whether the Loan Agreement was, in whole or in part, rendered invalid and/or unlawful and/or unenforceable, as a result of the Designation, and/or was terminated and/or ceased to have full force and effect, as a result of the Designation. The Claimant’s primary argument was that the Loan Agreement had been rendered unlawful by the Designation, in the sense that it had become unlawful to make payment under the Loan Agreement.[107]The essential effect of the Designation in the present case was that the Claimant was prevented from dealing with funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by the Defendant, as the designated person; see Regulation 11. Breach of Regulation 11 would have constituted a criminal offence. Regulation 11 is however subject to Part 7 of the Regulations which include Regulation 64. Regulation 64(1) provides that a number of Regulations, including Regulation 11, do not apply to anything done under the authority of a licence issued by the Treasury pursuant to Regulation 64(1). Both the Claimant and the Defendant have taken advantage of the licensing system by obtaining permission for the actions licensed, respectively, by the Claimant’s Licence and the Defendant’s Licence.[108]I cannot see that there was anything in the Regulations which had the effect, following the Designation, of rendering the Loan Agreement or the Mortgage Deed invalid or unlawful. Neither the Loan Agreement nor the Mortgage Deed became invalid. The Loan Agreement continued in existence as a valid loan agreement. The Mortgage Deed continued in effect, as a registered mortgage security over the Property. Neither instrument was rendered unlawful. There is nothing in the Regulations which had this effect.[109]What the Regulations did do was to render unlawful certain dealings between the Claimant and the Defendant in relation to the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage Deed. Principally, of course, Regulation 11 had the effect that the Defendant could not make payments under the Loan Agreement, and the Claimant could not accept such payments. It seems to me however that this is not the same thing as rendering the actual Loan Agreement or Mortgage Deed invalid or unlawful. I say this independent of the point that, although certain dealings between the Claimant and the Defendant were rendered unlawful, the prohibition was not absolute. A licence could be obtained, and licences were obtained to allow certain activities to take place.[110]Equally, neither the Loan Agreement nor the Mortgage Deed were terminated by the Designation.[111]This leaves the questions of whether it can be said that the Loan Agreement or the Mortgage Deed became unenforceable or ceased to have full force and effect as a result of the Designation.[112]Taking the second of these questions first, I do not think that it is right to say that either the Loan Agreement or the Mortgage Deed ceased to have full force and effect as a result of the Designation. Both remained in full force and effect. What changed, as I have explained, is that certain dealings between the Claimant and the Defendant became unlawful, in the absence of a licence from the OFSI. The Defendant was not released from her obligations under the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage Deed. Equally, the Claimant was not left in a position where it could not enforce the terms of the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage Deed. I accept that enforcement became more difficult and complicated, as this action demonstrates, but both the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage Deed remain in full force and effect. The problem which confronts the Claimant, on the Defendant’s case, is not that the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage Deed have no effect. Both continue to have effect. The problem which confronts the Claimant, on the Defendant’s case, is whether it can demonstrate that its right to possession has arisen. This is a problem of enforceability of the relevant agreements, not the effectiveness of the relevant agreements.[113]This leaves the question of whether it can be said that the Designation did render the Loan Agreement or the Mortgage Deed unenforceable. This is not necessarily an easy question to answer because, on the case of both parties, the enforceability of these instruments has been adversely affected by the Designation. On any view of the case enforcement of these instruments is affected by the fact, in the absence of the required licence, that payments cannot be made or received which fall due under the terms of the Loan Agreement.[114]The problem which seems to me to confront the Claimant in this respect is that paragraph 8 requires that the relevant agreement or Transaction Document or Guarantee, or part thereof must have become “unenforceable”. It seems to me that this cannot be said to have happened in the present case. Both the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage Deed are still enforceable, but their enforceability has been significantly complicated by the effect of the Regulations; principally by Regulation 11. In my view, this is not sufficient to engage paragraph 8 of Schedule 1.[115]I therefore conclude that there has been no Event of Default, within the terms of paragraph 8 of Schedule 1. It follows that the Claimant has no right to possession of the Property, pursuant to clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed, on this particular ground.

Is there a right to possession? - Paragraph 12 of Schedule 1

[116]Paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 will have been engaged in the present case, and an Event of Default will have occurred if the Designation constituted an event or set of circumstances which, in the reasonable opinion of the Claimant, was “likely to materially and adversely to affect the ability” of the Defendant “toperform all or any of the Borrower’s obligations under, or otherwise comply with, the terms of the Agreement or the Transaction Documents or any of them”.[117]It will be noted that paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 can only be engaged where the Claimant has formed a reasonable opinion falling within the terms of paragraph 12. In terms of the evidence of the Claimant having formed such an opinion, I was referred to four items of evidence.[118]The first item of evidence was the Claimant’s letter dated 19th January 2024, by which the Claimant gave formal notice to the Defendant of the alleged breaches of the Loan Agreement and the alleged Events of Default. This letter contained the following paragraph:
“You are further in breach of the above clauses because the sanctions placed on you are, in our reasonable opinion, likely to materially and adversely affect your ability to perform your obligations under the Agreement and Transaction Documents, including but not limited to your ability to pay, release or procure the release of your monthly mortgage instalments or all of the monies due under the Loan upon expiry of its term.”
[119]The second item of evidence was the witness statement of Mr Radia, Head of Group Servicing at the Claimant. Mr Radia does not give any specific evidence of the Claimant having formed the required opinion. Mr Radia does say this, at paragraph 23 of the witness statement:
“23. The Claimant was prohibited from applying the retained interest in the usual way on 14 December 2023 as a consequence of the OFSI notice. To do so would have been to deal with an economic [resource] belonging to a sanctioned person, and specifically to pay, release, or procure the payment of any funds, and the Claimant had no ability to accept funds from the Defendant. As such at that time the Loan Facility was in default for breach of the payment obligation and by virtue of the fact the Defendant was a designated person the Claimant would be in breach of the regulations if it applied the retained interest in the manner the Loan Facility intended. The Defendant’s designation was also a material adverse change as it was highly likely, following the Defendant’s designation, that she would not be able to maintain the interest payments and redeem the loan when it fell due.”
[120]It seems to me that it is also relevant to make reference to the following evidence, at paragraphs 38 and 39 of Mr Radia’s witness statement, which explains the position of the Claimant, as a specialist bridging finance lender:
“38. When the Defendant’s loan, valued in excess of £4 million, fell into default, the Claimant – a specialist bridging lender – was required to act swiftly and proportionately to protect both its financial and legal position. Loans of this size cannot remain in default indefinitely without causing serious harm to a lender’s commercial operations. Interest accrues at a substantial rate (in this case 1% and 1.15%), quickly diminishing the equity in the security property. This situation is not only adverse to the lender’s interests, but is also to the detriment of the borrower, whose liability increases with each passing month of inaction. 39. The Claimant is not a deposit-taking institution; it is a privately funded lender with its own institutional funders to whom it owes duties of transparency, performance, and accountability. A prolonged default with no repayment, no possession, and no agreed path forward is highly prejudicial in the context of funder covenants and audit requirements. A single non-performing loan of this scale can impact the Claimant’s ability to access funding, affect the interest rates applied to new credit lines, and jeopardise other transactions. This prejudice is real, material, and was worsening by the day as this matter stagnated without cooperation from the Defendant. This is why I was so intent to resolve with the Defendant over the telephone, but it was clear there was no progression.”
[121]The third item of evidence also derived from the witness statement of Mr Radia. This evidence comprised a telephone call which took place between Mr Radia and the Defendant on 11th January 2024. The purpose of the telephone call appears to have been to discuss the position, in terms of the Mortgage Loan, following the Designation. Mr Radia gives a summary of the telephone conversation in paragraph 27 of his witness statement. There is also a note of the telephone conversation. Mr Tucker argued that this telephone conversation also demonstrated that the required opinion had been formed.[122]The fourth item of evidence was the letter of claim sent to the Defendant by Addleshaw Goddard, as then solicitors for the Claimant. The letter of claim is dated 25th January 2024. The point made by Mr Tucker, in relation to this letter, was that it set out the breaches and Events of Default which had previously been stated in the Claimant’s letter dated 19th January 2024. This included the Claimant’s reliance upon paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. As such, so I understood Mr Tucker’s argument, the letter of claim served to confirm that the Claimant had formed the opinion required by paragraph 12, because Addleshaw Goddard could only have stated that paragraph 12 applied if they had been instructed by the Claimant that the requisite opinion had been formed. The giving by the Claimant of this instruction, and the Claimant’s presumed approval of the content of the letter of claim, before it was sent, both supported the inference that the required opinion had been formed.[123]Turning to the question of what must be demonstrated, in terms of a material and adverse effect on the ability of the Defendant to perform her obligations under the Loan Agreement, my attention was drawn to several cases. Of these I need only make express reference to the judgment of Blair J in Grupo Hotelero Urvasco S.A. v Carey Added Value S.L. [2013] EWHC 1039 (Comm). In this case Blair J had to consider the application of a clause in a loan agreement whereby the borrower made the following representation on behalf of itself and its guarantor:
“There has been no material adverse change in its financial condition (consolidated if applicable) since the date of this Loan Agreement”
[124]Amongst the issues which Blair J had to consider were the scope of the reference to financial condition and the question of what constituted material adverse change. The lender argued that it was wrong to limit the enquiry into financial condition to matters going to the ability of the borrower to meet its future obligations under the loan agreement. Blair J considered however that the enquiry should be focussed on the ability of the borrower and guarantor to meet their obligations under the relevant agreements to which they were parties. The reasoning of Blair J, at [354]-[355] in his judgment, is relevant in the present case: “354. Carey submits that it is wrong to limit the enquiry into financial condition to matters which go to the ability of the borrower to meet its future obligations under the Loan Agreement. It points out that one of the parties making the MAC representation, Urvasco Ltd which was the SPV set up for the development, had no payment obligations under the Loan Agreement, and that another, GU, had no direct repayment obligations under the BBVA Credit Agreement in respect of which it was a guarantor. 355. I reject Carey’s reasoning in this respect. As GHU says, GU’s obligations (albeit as guarantor) were nonetheless payment obligations. Urvasco Ltd had its own obligations under the agreements of 21 December 2007 in respect of the development. There is not, in my view, a difficulty in treating the “financial condition” of these companies as being generally focused on matters which go to their ability to meet those obligations.[125]In terms of what constitutes material adverse change, Blair J went on to say this, at [356]:
“356. There is some academic writing on this point which supports this view. The Encyclopaedia of Banking Law says at F[1862] that, “It is considered that normally an adverse change in financial condition would be material if the change would have caused the bank not to lend at all or to lend on significantly more onerous terms, eg, as to margin, maturity or security”
. Zakrzewski (ibid at p. 350) puts it slightly differently, considering a change to be material that substantially affects the borrower’s ability to repay, or, more generally, significantly increases the risks assumed by the lender. In other words, to be material, the adverse change must be material in a substantial way to the borrower’s ability to perform the transaction in question.”[126]In the present case it is important to keep in mind that the question, in the context of paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, is not a simple objective one; namely did an event occur or did circumstances exist which were likely to materially and adversely affect the ability of the Defendant to perform her obligations under, or otherwise comply the terms of the Loan Agreement. The question is whether an event occurred or circumstances existed which, in the reasonable opinion of the Claimant, were likely to have the material and adverse effect referred to. I will use the shorthand expression “the MAC” to mean the material and adverse effect referred to in paragraph 12 of Schedule 1.[127]The reference to the reasonable opinion of the Claimant seems to me to have two implications:(1) The first implication is the one which I have already mentioned. The question of whether an event has occurred or a set of circumstances exists which is likely to generate the MAC is not a purely objective one. The question of whether a particular event has occurred or a particular set of circumstances exists is an objective one.(2) Assuming however that such an event has occurred or that such a set of circumstances exists, the second implication is that what has to be demonstrated is a reasonable opinion of the Claimant to the effect that the relevant event or set of circumstances is likely to generate the MAC. The MAC does not have to be demonstrated to exist, on an objective basis. What has to demonstrated is the existence of the opinion, which is required to be reasonable, but is not required necessarily to be correct, in an objective sense. I will refer to this required reasonable opinion of the Claimant as “the Opinion”.[128]The second of these implications can be taken further. In Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC 25 [2016] AC 923 the Board of the Privy Council were concerned with a clause in a facility agreement which included, in its definition of events of default, the following clause 17.16:
“Any event or circumstance which in the opinion of [ATT] has had or is reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the financial condition, assets or business of [CFI].”
[129]The judgment of the Board in this case is lengthy, and there were a number of issues dealt with in the judgment. For present purposes what is relevant is the consideration by the Board of what was described as the central issue in relation to clause 17.16; namely whether ATT had demonstrated that it had formed the required opinion. As the Board explained, at [54]-[55], there was no doubt that the required opinion had to be proved by admissible evidence, no matter how obvious it might seem that the relevant material adverse effect existed:
“54 Turning now to the central issue, namely whether ATT established that it had formed the requisite opinion, it might at first sight seem surprising that ATT be required to prove that it had formed the opinion that the award had had a “material adverse effect on the financial condition, assets or business” of CH. This could be said to be a fairly obvious conclusion. After all, it had been expressed and explained in a letter written on behalf of ATT and signed by its sole director, and seems really self-evident on the facts. 55 While those points undoubtedly would have made it very difficult indeed to challenge the rationality or honesty of the opinion, they do not meet the point that there must be some admissible evidence at the trial to show that the Board of ATT had formed the opinion described in clause 17.16. The clause virtually entitles one contractual party, ATT, to be judge in its own cause on the issue of whether the clause is satisfied, and, if it is so satisfied, has a potentially drastic effect on the economic position of the other contractual parties, CH and CFI. Accordingly, it is only right that the court has to be convinced by admissible evidence that ATT did in fact form the requisite opinion, as well as being convinced that that opinion was honest and rational.”
[130]The Board went on to note that the question of whether the requisite opinion had existed was a matter for the court at first instance, with the consequence that an appellate court, such as the Board, could only interfere if the judge at first instance had gone wrong in finding that the required opinion had not been proved to exist. Although this was a high hurdle for ATT to surmount, the Board were persuaded that the judge at first instance had gone wrong in his conclusion on this question.[131]I will need to come back to the reasoning of the Board, on the question of why the judge at first instance had gone wrong in concluding that the required opinion had not been proved to exist. For present purposes the relevant point is this. Where a lender seeks to rely upon a clause such as paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, which involves the lender holding a particular opinion, the burden is on the lender to plead and prove, by admissible evidence, the existence of the relevant opinion. It follows that, in the present case, the burden was upon the Claimant to plead and prove the existence of the Opinion, in order to demonstrate an Event of Default within the terms of paragraph 12 of Schedule 1.[132]In his written and oral submissions Mr Arnold took what were essentially two points on the question of whether paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 applied. Mr Arnold argued, first, that the Opinion could not have been held, because no event had occurred and no circumstances existed which were capable of generating the MAC. Mr Arnold argued, second, that the Claimant had not proved the existence of the Opinion.[133]I can take the first of these arguments shortly. It seems to me the Designation of the Defendant plainly constituted an event or a set of circumstances likely to generate the MAC. On any view of the matter the Defendant’s ability to repay the Loan and/or to comply with her obligations under the Loan Agreement were likely to be affected in a significant and adverse fashion by the Designation. The events which have occurred, and the continuing inability of the Defendant to repay the Mortgage Loan demonstrate, in and of themselves, the effect of the Designation.[134]It is worth adding, in this context, that it is clear from the Defendant’s own evidence that her problems in complying with the terms of the Mortgage Loan do not derive simply from the Mortgage Loan. They also derive from the fact that the Defendant has funds in Russian banks which are also sanctioned. In these circumstances the Defendant is not able to transfer funds from these banks to the UK; see paragraph 23 of the Defendant’s witness statement. This situation, whether taken individually or in concert with the Designation, seems to me also to constitute a set of circumstances likely to generate the MAC.[135]The second argument requires considerably more analysis. The first point to deal with is that Mr Tucker raised, in his oral submissions in reply, a pleading point on behalf of the Claimant. Mr Tucker argued, in his oral submissions in reply, that the Claimant had been taken by surprise by the Defendant’s argument that the existence of the Opinion had not been proved. Mr Tucker contended that the Defendant had not, in her pleaded case, challenged or raised as an issue the existence of the Opinion. As such, so Mr Tucker contended, the Defendant should not be permitted to argue that the Claimant had failed to prove the existence of the Opinion.[136]The pleading point was, as I have said, raised in Mr Tucker’s oral submissions in reply. I gave Mr Arnold the opportunity, if he wished, to respond to the pleading point by way of further oral submissions. Mr Arnold declined this invitation. I did not however understand Mr Arnold either to concede the pleading point or to abandon his argument that the existence of the Opinion had not been proved. As such, I need to decide the pleading point.[137]In my view the pleading point was misconceived. I say this for the following reasons.[138]The pleading point proceeded on the assumption that the Claimant’s case in relation to paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 was satisfactorily pleaded. In my judgment it was not. In order to rely on paragraph 12 it seems to me that the Claimant needed to plead, in terms, that the Claimant had formed the Opinion. This requires analysis of the Claimant’s Amended Particulars of Claim. This analysis discloses the following, in terms of what is pleaded (the references to paragraphs are to the paragraphs of the Amended Particulars of Claim):(1) Paragraph 13b – Paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 (excluding paragraph 12.2) is set out.(2) Paragraph 16 – Clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed (excluding clause 9.2) is set out.(3) Paragraph 19 – Paragraph 19 pleads the letter of 19th January 2024, by which the Claimant gave formal notice to the Defendant of the alleged breaches of the Loan Agreement and the alleged Events of Default. The terms of this letter are summarised in paragraph 19.(4) The first part of paragraph 19 reads as follows: “By way of letter dated 19/01/2024 the Claimant notified the Defendant of the events of default, such events of default being relied on within these Particulars as being true and giving rise to the relief claimed, by referring to Schedule 1 of the LTC, clauses 7 and 11 of the LTC, clause 9 of the Mortgage because of the Defendant’s designation under UK sanctions which rendered it unlawful for the Claimant to pay, release, or procure the payment of any funds (such as the monthly instalment or the full amount due under the Mortgage) and/or the Claimant’s inability to accept funds from the Defendant or to deal with any economic resources owned, held or controlled by her.”(5) The remaining part of paragraph 19 reads as follows: “Additionally, the Defendant was also notified that because of the sanctions imposed upon her this had materially and adversely affected her ability to perform her obligations under the Agreement and the Mortgage, inter alia, the Claimant’s inability to accept payment, release, procure the release of her monthly mortgage instalments or any other monies due under the loan upon the expiry of its term. Furthermore, the Defendant was informed that because she was under sanctions, this constituted a material and adverse effect on her ability to perform her obligations under the Agreement. In light of the issues brought to the Defendants attention the balance outstanding being the sum of £3,160,443.80 was brought to her attention by way of letter of demand on 22/01/2024 (the “Letter of Demand”).”(6) There is no further reference to paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, in the remaining parts of the Amended Particulars of Claim.[139]Moving to the Re-Amended Defence served by the Defendant, the Defendant responds to paragraph 13 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in paragraph 17 of the Re-Amended Defence. I note, in particular, sub-paragraphs (g), (h) and (i) of paragraph 17 of the Re-Amended Defence, which plead as follows (the amendments and re-amendments are shown underlined, but I have not attempted to reproduce the red and green colouring, which is not material for present purposes):
“17. As to paragraph 13: (a) It is not admitted that the LTC ‘accompanied’ the Mortgage. No particulars are pleaded concerning that assertion and sub-paragraphs 8(e)(i) and 8(e)(ii) above are repeated, (b) The LTC isits not referred to nor mentioned in the Mortgage. (c) If the intended meaning of paragraph 13 is that the Mortgage incorporates the LTC then by reason of the above that assertion is denied. (d) There is no pleaded case that the LTC is said to be a contractual document binding on the Defendant. (e) In the circumstances the LTC is irrelevant. (f) If necessary, the Defendant will rely at trial to on the LTC for its meaning and effect. (g) For the avoidance of doubt, if the Claimant’s case is (which is not pleaded) that the Defendant’s ability to perform her remaining obligation under the extended loan is materially and adversely affected by her current designation under the Notice then that is denied because: (i) For the reasons set out in paragraph 16 the Defendant is under no obligation to pay monthly interest payments to the Claimant. The interest due under both the original loan and the extended loan was retained by the Claimant from the principal loan amount advanced to the Defendant. (ii) The Defendant’s obligation to pay the outstanding capital arises on 13 July 2024 and not beforehand. (iii) Both parties can (and in the Defendant’s case haswill) apply for a licence license on the grounds and in the manner described in paragraph 15(f) above and a copy of an appropriately redacted OFSI Licence Application was previously provided to the Defendant.” (a) It is not admitted that the LTC ‘accompanied’ the Mortgage. No particulars are pleaded concerning that assertion and sub-paragraphs 8(e)(i) and 8(e)(ii) above are repeated, (b) The LTC isits not referred to nor mentioned in the Mortgage. (c) If the intended meaning of paragraph 13 is that the Mortgage incorporates the LTC then by reason of the above that assertion is denied. (d) There is no pleaded case that the LTC is said to be a contractual document binding on the Defendant. (e) In the circumstances the LTC is irrelevant. (f) If necessary, the Defendant will rely at trial to on the LTC for its meaning and effect. (g) For the avoidance of doubt, if the Claimant’s case is (which is not pleaded) that the Defendant’s ability to perform her remaining obligation under the extended loan is materially and adversely affected by her current designation under the Notice then that is denied because: (i) For the reasons set out in paragraph 16 the Defendant is under no obligation to pay monthly interest payments to the Claimant. The interest due under both the original loan and the extended loan was retained by the Claimant from the principal loan amount advanced to the Defendant. (ii) The Defendant’s obligation to pay the outstanding capital arises on 13 July 2024 and not beforehand. (iii) Both parties can (and in the Defendant’s case haswill) apply for a licence license on the grounds and in the manner described in paragraph 15(f) above and a copy of an appropriately redacted OFSI Licence Application was previously provided to the Defendant.”
[140]The Defendant responded to paragraph 19 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in paragraph 23 of the Re-Amended Defence, which pleads as follows (I have, again, not distinguished between amendment and re-amendment):
“23. Paragraph 19 does not plead any breach of any obligations said to have been owed by the Defendant to the Claimant. Paragraph 19 merely seeks to narrate the content of the Claimant’s letter of 19 January 2024 to the Defendant. Without prejudice to the Defendant’s primary position that paragraph 19 narrates the contents of a letter rather than properly pleads a case against the Defendant, the Defendant pleads as follows: (a) It is admitted that the Claimant wrote to the Defendant on 19 January 2024. (b) It is denied that the Defendant was or is in breach of the LTC Schedule 1 and/or clauses 7 and/or 11 of the LTC and/or clause 9 of the Mortgage for the reasons stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 above. (c) The Defendant is not and was not in breach of clause 9 of the Mortgage because there has been no Event of Default as defined by the Mortgage. Further, the Defendant is not in breach of its payment obligation to the Claimant. Paragraphs 16, and 22 and 22A above are repeated. (d) As set out in paragraph 13(c) above the Defendant’s remaining payment obligation is to pay to the Claimant (or arrange to discharge) the sum properly due under the Agreementof £4,218,696.00 no later than 13 July 2024. TheIn the absence of a relevant OFSI licence (which has been applied for) the Defendant is legally prevented by the Regulations from making such a payment to the Claimant.Defendant is not in breach of that obligation. (e) The Defendant’s current status as a designated person under the Regulations does not render the contractual arrangements between the parties illegal. Paragraph 18 above is repeated. (f) The Defendant’s current status as a designated person pursuant to the Regulations does not amount to a material and adverse change within the meaning of the LTC. Paragraph 17 above is repeated. (g) As set out in paragraph 15 above, either party may apply to the OFSI for a licencelicense to dispense with the prohibition contained in Article 11 of the Regulations in respect of the sum due to be paid by 13 July 2024. As stated, the Defendant intends to apply for such a licencelicense. (h) It is therefore denied that the Defendant had any or any lawful basis on which to demand the sums of £3,160,443,80 or any sum from the Defendant. Accordingly, it is denied that the sum demanded in the Claimant’s letter of 19 January 2024 is recoverable from the Defendant or otherwise enforceable. It is noted that the sum demanded by the Claimant in correspondence differs from the amount referred to in paragraph 9B of the Amended Particulars of Claim. (i) It is therefore denied that the Claimant has any legitimate grounds on which to seek possession of the Property. (j) Accordingly, the Claimant’s conduct is and was at all relevant times irrational and thereby in breach of the Rationality Obligation. (jj) To the extent necessary, paragraph 22A above is repeated. (k) Accordingly, save as is inconsistent with the foregoing paragraph 19 is denied.” (a) It is admitted that the Claimant wrote to the Defendant on 19 January 2024. (b) It is denied that the Defendant was or is in breach of the LTC Schedule 1 and/or clauses 7 and/or 11 of the LTC and/or clause 9 of the Mortgage for the reasons stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 above. (c) The Defendant is not and was not in breach of clause 9 of the Mortgage because there has been no Event of Default as defined by the Mortgage. Further, the Defendant is not in breach of its payment obligation to the Claimant. Paragraphs 16, and 22 and 22A above are repeated. (d) As set out in paragraph 13(c) above the Defendant’s remaining payment obligation is to pay to the Claimant (or arrange to discharge) the sum properly due under the Agreementof £4,218,696.00 no later than 13 July 2024. TheIn the absence of a relevant OFSI licence (which has been applied for) the Defendant is legally prevented by the Regulations from making such a payment to the Claimant.Defendant is not in breach of that obligation. (e) The Defendant’s current status as a designated person under the Regulations does not render the contractual arrangements between the parties illegal. Paragraph 18 above is repeated. (f) The Defendant’s current status as a designated person pursuant to the Regulations does not amount to a material and adverse change within the meaning of the LTC. Paragraph 17 above is repeated. (g) As set out in paragraph 15 above, either party may apply to the OFSI for a licencelicense to dispense with the prohibition contained in Article 11 of the Regulations in respect of the sum due to be paid by 13 July 2024. As stated, the Defendant intends to apply for such a licencelicense. (h) It is therefore denied that the Defendant had any or any lawful basis on which to demand the sums of £3,160,443,80 or any sum from the Defendant. Accordingly, it is denied that the sum demanded in the Claimant’s letter of 19 January 2024 is recoverable from the Defendant or otherwise enforceable. It is noted that the sum demanded by the Claimant in correspondence differs from the amount referred to in paragraph 9B of the Amended Particulars of Claim. (i) It is therefore denied that the Claimant has any legitimate grounds on which to seek possession of the Property. (j) Accordingly, the Claimant’s conduct is and was at all relevant times irrational and thereby in breach of the Rationality Obligation. (jj) To the extent necessary, paragraph 22A above is repeated. (k) Accordingly, save as is inconsistent with the foregoing paragraph 19 is denied.”
[141]In terms of the statements of case in the Claim there is a lengthy Amended Reply served by the Claimant. Although the Amended Reply responds to the Re-Amended Defence in some detail, and takes issue with the various allegations in the Re-Amended Defence that the Claimant’s case was not properly pleaded, there is no pleading, in express terms, as to when or how the Claimant formulated the Opinion.[142]It is not necessary to go through the pleaded cases of the parties in more detail, in relation to the Claimant’s case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. The two key points which emerge from the statements of case seem to me to be as follows.[143]First, and if one assumes that the formation of the Opinion by the Claimant was adequately pleaded in the Amended Particulars of Claim, it seems to me that the Re-Amended Defence contains, at least in paragraphs 17 and 23 of the Re-Amended Defence, a denial of the Claimant’s right to rely on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 which is quite sufficiently wide to include a denial of the allegation that the Claimant did form the Opinion. I cannot see that the Re-Amended Defence was required to contain a specific denial of the allegation that the Claimant had formed the Opinion. It seems to me that the relevant denials in the Re-Amended Defence were, as I have said, quite wide enough to include this specific denial. I cannot see any basis, given what is pleaded in the Re-Amended Defence, upon which the Claimant could reasonably have concluded that it was admitted that the Claimant had formed the Opinion.[144]Second, what I have just said assumes that the formation of the Opinion by the Claimant was adequately pleaded in the Amended Particulars of Claim. In my view it was not. In oral submissions Mr Tucker, who was not responsible for the Particulars of Claim, either in their original or in their amended form, sought gallantly to defend the pleading of the Amended Particulars of Claim. Despite the best efforts of Mr Tucker however, it seems to me that the pleading of the Claimant’s case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 was seriously defective. In my view, an adequate pleading of this case required the Claimant to plead, in terms, when, and by whom, and in what terms the Opinion was formed by the Claimant. This objective was not achieved by simply incorporating, by reference, the letter of 19th January 2024 into paragraph 19 of the Amended Particulars of Claim. I say this not least because the letter itself did not contain these particulars, but simply itself made vague reference to “our reasonable opinion”, in the extract from the letter which I have quoted above.[145]There was no application by the Defendant to strike out any part of the Amended Particulars of Claim, and I did not understand Mr Arnold to raise a pleading objection to the Claimant pursuing its case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. In these circumstances it seems to me that it is not open to me to conclude that the deficiencies in the Amended Particulars of Claim, which I have identified above, preclude the Claimant from pursuing its case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. This second point which I have made is however relevant in this sense. Given the deficiencies in the pleading of the Claimant’s case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, and independent of my view that the Amended Defence contains the required denial of the Claimant’s case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, it seems to me that there is a distinct absence of merit in the Claimant’s pleading objection, given the deficiencies in the pleading of the Claimant’s own case which I have identified.[146]I therefore conclude that the pleading point raised by Mr Tucker fails. The Defendant is entitled to take the point that the formation of the Opinion by the Claimant has not been proved by admissible evidence.[147]Before leaving the pleading point I should mention that Mr Tucker also complained, in his oral submissions in reply, that the Claimant had not had a fair opportunity to address the issue of whether the Claimant had formed the Opinion, nor had there been any disclosure in this respect, because the issue had not been raised until Mr Arnold’s oral submissions. Mr Tucker reminded me that the parties had agreed that there was no requirement for oral evidence at the Trial. I understood Mr Tucker’s point to be that the Claimant had made this agreement without appreciating that there was going to be an issue as to whether the Claimant had formed the Opinion. The short answer to Mr Tucker’s complaints is the answer which I have already given; namely that the question of whether the Claimant had formed the Opinion was a pleaded issue. As such, it seems to me that it was incumbent upon the Claimant to ensure that it had the evidence which it needed to prove the required elements of its case on paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. One of those required elements was evidence that the Opinion had validly been formed. Equally, in agreeing that no oral evidence was required at the Trial, it was the Claimant’s responsibility to satisfy itself that this would not create any evidential problems for its case.[148]This clears the way for me to deal with the substantive question of whether the Claimant has proved, by admissible evidence, the formation of the Opinion.[149]Mr Tucker relied upon various items of evidence, to which I have made reference earlier in this section of this judgment, in seeking to demonstrate that the Claimant had formed the Opinion.[150]Before considering these items of evidence, it is necessary to say something more about the evidence required to prove that the Claimant did form the Opinion, prior to asserting a right to possession of the Property pursuant to paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. The Claimant is a company. As such, in circumstances where the Claimant was required to form the Opinion, one would normally expect the Opinion to be formed by the board of the Claimant, and recorded in the minutes of the relevant board meeting at which the Opinion was formed by the Claimant.[151]As Cukurova demonstrates, the formation of the relevant opinion by the relevant company, when relying upon a clause such as paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, does not have to be carried out by the board of the relevant company. The task can be delegated to a director or employee of the relevant company or, as in Cukurova, to the director of another company with responsibility for the management of the relevant company. Alternatively, the relevant company may be one where a director or the director of the relevant company can be treated as a controlling mind of the company. As Cukurova also demonstrates, the important point is that the evidence in such a case must establish who it is who has the authority of the relevant company to form the relevant opinion.[152]Mr Tucker relied, first, on the letter of 19th January 2024 and, in particular, upon the extract which I have quoted above, which asserted that the sanctions imposed upon the Defendant were, “in our reasonable opinion, likely to materially and adversely affect your ability to perform your obligationsunder the Agreement and Transaction Documents, including but not limited to your ability to pay, release or procure the release of your monthly mortgage instalments or an of the monies due under the Loan upon expiry of its term.”. Mr Tucker argued that it could be inferred from the terms of the letter that the Claimant had formed the Opinion, prior to the letter being sent.[153]I do not accept this submission. The reference to “our reasonable opinion” leaves it wholly unclear when, how or by whom the reasonable opinion had been formed. If one assumes that the opinion had been formed by someone, that person is not known. What is also unknown, on that assumption, is whether that person had the authority of the Claimant to form the opinion on behalf of the Claimant. It is not even clear who sent the letter of 19th January 2024 on behalf of the Claimant. It is clear that the letter was intended to be sent, and was sent as a letter from the Claimant to the Defendant, but the actual author of the letter is not identified. The manuscript signature on the letter is illegible, and there is no printed information identifying the person whose signature appears on the letter. Given all these gaps in the evidence, I am unable to accept, or find that the reference to “our reasonable opinion” in the letter is sufficient to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Claimant itself had validly formed the Opinion prior to the letter being sent, or at any point thereafter.[154]I do not think that the letter of claim, sent by Addleshaw Goddard, can be relied upon for the purposes of demonstrating that the Opinion was formed. The letter does not say, in terms, that the Opinion was formed. The letter reiterates the content of the earlier letter of 19th January 2024. The letter of claim was based upon the content of the letter of 19th January 2024 and, it is to be assumed, the instructions given to Addleshaw Goddard by the Claimant. I do not know what instructions were given, but I cannot see that Addleshaw Goddard were under any obligation to conduct their own investigation into whether the Opinion had in fact been formed. They were entitled to rely upon the instructions provided by their client. As such, I cannot see that the letter of claim adds anything, in evidential terms, to the letter of 19th January 2024.[155]Mr Tucker also sought to rely upon the witness statement of Mr Radia. I have quoted those extracts from Mr Radia’s witness statement which explain the prejudice caused to the Claimant by the Designation but, as I have also pointed out, Mr Radia does not give any specific evidence of the Claimant having formed the Opinion. Nor do I consider that this can be inferred from Mr Radia’s evidence. The reality is that Mr Radia simply does not address this point. Equally, I do not think that it can be argued that it is clear from the witness statement that Mr Radia had previously formed the Opinion. There are two obvious problems with this argument. The first is that Mr Radia does not give evidence to this effect in his witness statement. The second is that even if, contrary to my view, one can infer from the witness statement that Mr Radia had formed the Opinion, there is no evidence that Mr Radia, the Head of Group Servicing at the Claimant, had the authority of the Claimant to form the Opinion on behalf of the Claimant.[156]Mr Tucker also sought to rely upon the evidence of a telephone call which took place between Mr Radia and the Defendant on 11th January 2024. The purpose of the telephone call appears to have been to discuss the position, in terms of the Mortgage Loan, following the Designation. Mr Radia gives a summary of the telephone conversation in paragraph 27 of his witness statement. There is also a note of the telephone conversation. There is however no evidence in the note of this telephone conversation, or in Mr Radia’s summary of the telephone conversation of the Claimant having formed the Opinion. Nor is there any evidence from which it can inferred that the Claimant had formed the Opinion.[157]The position is the same in relation to the remainder to the evidence which was before me at the Trial. In relation to the issue of whether the Claimant formed the Opinion there is simply a fatal gap in the evidence.[158]In his oral submissions Mr Tucker sought to stress to me the problems which would be caused if lenders, in particular major lenders were required to hold a board meeting when seeking to rely upon a clause such as paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. Mr Tucker asked, rhetorically, whether it was really Mr Arnold’s case that if HSBC makes a loan, it is the main board of HSBC which has to form the opinion.[159]It seems to me that there are two answers to this submission.[160]The first answer, which is illustrated by the relevant part of the judgment of the Board in Cukurova, is that there is nothing to prevent a lender, in particular a major lender with a large loan book from delegating the authority to form an opinion on behalf of the lender to an appropriate officer or employee of the lender. I can see nothing particularly difficult or burdensome in a lender having to put arrangements of this kind in place.[161]The second answer is more fundamental, and goes back to a point made by the Board in their judgment in Cukurova, at [55], which I repeat, for ease of reference:
“55 While those points undoubtedly would have made it very difficult indeed to challenge the rationality or honesty of the opinion, they do not meet the point that there must be some admissible evidence at the trial to show that the Board of ATT had formed the opinion described in clause 17.16. The clause virtually entitles one contractual party, ATT, to be judge in its own cause on the issue of whether the clause is satisfied, and, if it is so satisfied, has a potentially drastic effect on the economic position of the other contractual parties, CH and CFI. Accordingly, it is only right that the court has to be convinced by admissible evidence that ATT did in fact form the requisite opinion, as well as being convinced that that opinion was honest and rational.”
[162]As the Board pointed out, a clause such as paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 allows the lender to be the effective judge of whether the requirements of the clause have been satisfied. In the present case paragraph 12 allows the Claimant to be the effective judge of whether an event has occurred, or a set of circumstances exists which is likely to generate the MAC. As the Board noted, it is only right that the court should be convinced, by admissible evidence, that the lender seeking to rely upon such a clause did in fact form the requisite opinion, and that the opinion formed was honest and rational. Seen in this light, there is nothing unreasonable or unfair in a lender being required to ensure that the relevant opinion is properly formulated and evidenced.[163]It seems to me, in the present case, that if the Claimant did form the Opinion, it has materially neglected to adduce the evidence required to prove the formation of the Opinion, at the Trial. As the reasoning in Cukurova demonstrates, there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the Claimant being required to address and prove this part of its case at the Trial.[164]I therefore conclude that the Claimant has failed to prove, by admissible evidence, that the Opinion was formed by the Company.[165]In consequence, and drawing together all of the above analysis, I conclude that there has been no event of Default, within the terms of paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. It follows that the Claimant has no right to possession of the Property, pursuant to clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed, on this particular ground.

Is there a right to possession? – Clause 11.3 of the LTC

[166]By way of reminder, the Claimant’s case is that the Designation constituted a material and adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Defendant, which thereby placed the Defendant in breach of the No MAC Warranty. What I am referring to as the No MAC Warranty is the warranty, which was deemed to be given by the Defendant on the date of the Loan Agreement and was deemed to be repeated by the Defendant on the Drawdown Date (as defined in the LTC) and on the first day of each Interest Period. The No MAC Warranty was to the effect that there had been no material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Defendant since the date of the Loan Agreement.[167]It will be noted that the No MAC Warranty is not in quite the same terms as what I have referred to as the MAC in paragraph 12 of Schedule 1. In the case of the No MAC Warranty, the wording refers to the business or financial condition of the Defendant. In the case of the MAC in paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, the wording refers to the ability to perform the obligations of the Defendant under the Loan Agreement.[168]It seems to me that this is not a material distinction. I have already made reference to the decision of Blair J in the Grupo Hotelero case. As I have explained, in that case Blair J had to consider the application of a clause in a loan agreement whereby the borrower made the following representation on behalf of itself and its guarantor:
“There has been no material adverse change in its financial condition (consolidated if applicable) since the date of this Loan Agreement”
[169]In relation to the scope of this clause, Blair J considered that the enquiry should be focussed on the ability of the borrower and guarantor to meet their obligations under the relevant agreements to which they were parties. I have already set out the relevant reasoning of Blair J in his judgment, at [354]-[356].[170]It seems to me that this reasoning is directly applicable to the construction of the No MAC Warranty. The focus is on the ability of the Defendant to meet her obligations under the Loan Agreement. In contrast to paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, there is no requirement to demonstrate a reasonable opinion of the Claimant. What is required, in the case of the No MAC Warranty, is an objective enquiry into the ability of the Defendant to meet her obligations under the Loan Agreement.[171]In terms of the test to be applied in determining whether there had been a material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Defendant, it is convenient to repeat what Blair J said in his judgment, at [356]:
“356. There is some academic writing on this point which supports this view. The Encyclopaedia of Banking Law says at F[1862] that, “It is considered that normally an adverse change in financial condition would be material if the change would have caused the bank not to lend at all or to lend on significantly more onerous terms, eg, as to margin, maturity or security”
. Zakrzewski (ibid at p. 350) puts it slightly differently, considering a change to be material that substantially affects the borrower’s ability to repay, or, more generally, significantly increases the risks assumed by the lender. In other words, to be material, the adverse change must be material in a substantial way to the borrower’s ability to perform the transaction in question.”[172]In the previous section of this judgment, I applied this test in considering whether an event had occurred or a set of circumstances existed which was likely to generate the MAC. I concluded that the Designation had plainly constituted an event or a set of circumstances likely to generate the MAC.[173]It seems to me that the same reasoning can be applied to the question of whether the Designation constituted a material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Defendant. It seems to me, on the basis of this reasoning, that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. On any view of the matter the Defendant’s ability to repay the Loan and/or to comply with her obligations under the Loan Agreement was not only likely to be affected in a significant and adverse fashion by the Designation, but was in fact affected in a significant and adverse fashion by the Designation. As I have already observed, the events which have occurred, and the continuing inability of the Defendant to repay the Mortgage Loan demonstrate, in and of themselves, the effect of the Designation. As such, it seems to me that the Designation did constitute a material adverse change in the business or financial condition of the Defendant.[174]I therefore conclude that the Claimant is correct in its case that the Designation had the effect of placing the Defendant in breach of the No MAC Warranty. This breach of the No MAC Warranty seems to me, in turn, to have constituted an Event of Default; within the terms of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1.[175]This has the consequence that clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed was engaged. Specifically, clauses 9.1.1 and 9.1.4 were engaged by the breach of the No MAC Warranty, thereby rendering the security constituted by the Mortgage Deed immediately enforceable.[176]I therefore conclude that the Claimant has, on the bases set out in my previous paragraph, established its right to possession of the Property.[177]I should add, for the sake of completeness, that the breach of the No MAC Warranty was specified in the letter of 19th January 2024, which gave notice of the alleged Events of Default and demanded repayment of the Mortgage Loan. On the basis that this was an Event of Default, it seems to me that the letter would have constituted notice of this Event of Default to the Defendant, pursuant to clause 13.2 of the LTC, which would thereby have rendered the Mortgage Loan immediately due and payable. Given that the Mortgage Loan was not repaid in response to the demand contained in this letter, this would have given rise to a further ground of possession, based on failure to repay the Mortgage Loan. I am not sure that this adds anything material to the claim for possession because, as I have already stated, it seems to me that the right to enforce the security which is contained in clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed arises when an Event of Default occurs, without the need for the Mortgage Loan to have become immediately repayable. This point may also be said to be redundant because the extended term of the mortgage Loan has now expired, and I have already concluded that the Defendant was required to repay the Mortgage Loan, in any event, on the Repayment Date.

Is there a right to possession? – Clause 5.1 of the LTC

[178]It is convenient to start by repeating my earlier summary of the arrangements in relation to the interest payable pursuant to the Loan Agreement. As I have explained earlier in this judgment, the total amount of the interest payable on the Mortgage Loan, over its term, was treated as part of the Mortgage Loan and was retained by the Claimant.[179]The Claimant’s evidence, by Mr Radia, was that this retained interest was applied to the Mortgage Loan on a monthly basis, on the 14th day of each month. The process is described in the following terms by Mr Radia, in paragraphs 13 and 14 of his witness statement:
“13. It was a condition of the Loan Facility that there was a retained sum of £409,500 for the monthly interest payments. It can be seen from the Statement of Account at Exhibit 8, SR1 that the sum of £45,500 was applied to the Loan Facility from the retained interest on the 14th of every month. 14. As to the retained interest: a. Kept in a separate account. b. Belonged to the Defendant. c. Applied to the Claimant’s account on the 14th of each month. d. Before that application, the Claimant has no interest in those monies.” a. Kept in a separate account. b. Belonged to the Defendant. c. Applied to the Claimant’s account on the 14th of each month. d. Before that application, the Claimant has no interest in those monies.”
[180]The original term of the Mortgage Loan was 9 months, so that the term of the Mortgage Loan expired on 13th July 2023. The term of the Mortgage Loan was however, as I have explained, extended to 13th July 2024. The extension was agreed subject to a stipulation that there be a capital reduction in respect of the Mortgage Loan, in the amount of £1,000,000. As with the Loan Agreement in its original form, the amount of the Mortgage Loan was increased to include, as retained interest, the amount of interest which would be payable over the extended term of the Mortgage Loan, and also to include a fee charged by the Claimant for the extension.[181]The Defendant complied with the requirement to make a capital reduction payment of £1 million, and also made a further voluntary capital reduction payment of £1 million. In recognition of these capital reduction payments, the amount of the monthly interest payable was reduced to £35,520.65 per month.[182]The provisions relating to the calculation and payment of interest can be found in clause 5 of the LTC. For present purposes, I should set out clauses 5.1 to 5.4:
“5.1. The Borrower shall pay interest on the Debt, at the Rate of Interest specified in the Offer, in respect of the period commencing on and including the Drawdown Date up to and including the Repayment Date, both before and after any judgment. 5.2. The amount of interest payable under clause 5.1 above may be retained (in whole or in part) from the Loan, and shall be applied in making monthly interest payments until such interest is exhausted. 5.3. For the computation of interest on the Debt, the period commencing on and including the Drawdown Date up to and including the Repayment Date shall be divided into successive periods of one month ("Interest Periods"). Each Interest Period (other than the first) will start at the end of the previous Interest Period. 5.4. Interest on the Debt in respect of each Interest Period shall be treated, for the purpose of the computation of interest under Clause 5.3, as being paid out of any Retained Interest on the first day of that Interest Period.”
[183]Retained Interest is defined to mean “the interest retained out of the Loan under Clause 5.2 of these Terms and Conditions”. In the present case, the Claimant’s discretion to retain the interest out of the Mortgage Loan was exercised, so that clause 5.2 applied.[184]The Claimant’s argument in relation to interest was that it was prevented, by the Designation, from being able to apply the retained interest against the monthly payments of interest, as they fell due. The problem was not resolved until the Claimant’s Licence was obtained from the OFSI, which permitted the Claimant to apply the retained interest to the monthly payments of interest. In the meantime, so the Claimant argued, the Defendant was in breach of her obligation to pay the interest due in respect of each Interest Period.[185]The Defendant disputed this analysis of the position. The Defendant argued that the Regulations did not prevent the Claimant from applying the retained interest to the monthly payments of interest. The Defendant relied, in particular, upon the terms of a compliance reporting form which the Claimant submitted to the OFSI on 8th December 2023, by which the Claimant notified the OFSI of its relationship with the Defendant and of the Loan Agreement. The compliance reporting form disclosed, so the Defendant contended, that the application of the retained interest to the monthly payments of interest involved no actual transfer of funds between different accounts. Instead, so the Defendant contended, the retained interest remained in the same account, with the Claimant maintaining no more than a ledger record of the application of the retained interest to the monthly interest payments. All the relevant funds remained in the same account, under the full control of the Claimant. As such, the Defendant was not in breach of her obligations in relation to the interest.[186]It seems to me that the starting point, in relation to the Claimant’ reliance upon clause 5.1 of the LTC, is to determine the basis on which the Claimant held the retained interest. Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward task, because the evidential picture is neither clear nor satisfactory. In his submissions for the Defendant Mr Arnold stressed what had been stated by the Claimant in the compliance reporting form. The compliance reporting form was prepared and submitted by Mr Harnett, the Claimant’s Head of Compliance/MLRO. Section 8 of the compliance reporting form required the Claimant to provide information on all funds and economic resources which the Claimant had frozen. In section 8 Mr Harnett identified a single account number and provided the following particulars:
“Account Number: 22808130 Date Opened: 14 October 2022 Date Account frozen: 09 December 2023 Mortgage Balance: £3,100,000 Retained Interest balance: £248,000 Last payment received to the account: 14 November 2023
Date Opened: 14 October 2022 Date Account frozen: 09 December 2023 Mortgage Balance: £3,100,000 Retained Interest balance: £248,000 Last payment received to the account: 14 November 2023

Retained Interest balance: £248,000

[187]Mr Harnett then gave a detailed account of how interest payments were dealt with, which I need to quote in full:
“The mortgage is of course a liability of the designated person as opposed to an asset. However, in the interests of fullest possible disclosure: West One typically lends bridging loans on a “retained interest” basis. This means that a proportion of the total loan balance created at the point of origination is deemed “retained interest” with the net loan balance remitted as cash to the customer. In this case, we advanced to the customer sufficient net funds to redeem the original Credit Suisse mortgage. We also journalled a retained interest amount sufficient to cover the interest on our loan over the contractual term. The retained interest amount is a ledger entry within our systems – it is not backed by actual cash. Each month, on the contractual due date, we journal an amount equal to a monthly interest instalment from the retained interest ledger, into the revenue receipts ledger. At the point the loan is redeemed, the customer would repay the entirety of the gross loan advance – i.e. the net proceeds they received on day one, plus the retained interest balance. At the present moment, the loan is part way through its term. As such there is a positive balance in the retained interest ledger. Whilst this is not physical cash, and its only possible purpose is to pay the interest falling due on the loan each month, contractually it may be argued that it “belongs” to the borrower as it forms a technical part of the original loan advanced. To explain it another way, if the loan redeemed tomorrow, the customer’s final settlement statement would show repayment due of the net loan advance, repayment due of an amount of interest up to the point of redemption, and a credit amount equal to the proportion of retained interest relating to the remaining term of the loan to contractual maturity. As such we are disclosing it here for full transparency. We are presently taking legal advice to ascertain whether we need to freeze the operation of our ledgers, or whether this can continue as normal as it is simply a record-keeping exercise and involves no transfer of tangible value.”
[188]Mr Arnold’s submission was that it was clear, on the evidence of the compliance reporting form, that the Claimant had not maintained a separate account for the retained interest, from which regular payments of interest were credited to a different account. Instead, so Mr Arnold submitted, the Claimant had simply maintained a single account, in respect of which an accounting exercise was carried out to record interest payments out of the retained interest, with no actual transfer of funds. The retained interest was, at all times, held, owned and controlled by the Claimant.[189]On this basis Mr Arnold submitted that the notional crediting of regular interest payments from the retained interest did not involve any dealing with funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by the Defendant, such as to breach Regulation 11. In the alternative, Mr Arnold submitted that even if a transfer of funds was involved in the crediting of interest payments out of the retained interest, this was permitted by the exception in Regulation 58(5).[190]As I have said, the evidential picture is neither clear nor satisfactory. On the basis of what Mr Harnett has said in the compliance reporting form, it seems clear that the Claimant maintained a single mortgage account, in which the retained interest was held and in respect of which an accounting exercise was carried out each month, by which payments from the retained interest were treated as credited to the interest due under the Mortgage Loan, with no actual transfer of funds taking place.[191]On the face of it, the evidence of the compliance reporting form appears to be at odds with what Mr Radia has said in his witness statement in paragraphs 13 and 14, which refer to the retained interest being kept in a separate account. It is not however clear that this is the effect of what Mr Radia has said in his witness statement. Mr Radia does not, in terms, make reference to an account separate to that in which he states that the retained interest was held. There is only a vague reference to “the Claimant’s account”, which might or might not be a reference to a bank account separate to that in which the retained interest was kept. Mr Radia does exhibit to his witness statement what he refers to as a “Statement of Account”, but this document is not a bank statement. It is a statement of account recording monthly payments of interest. The payments of interest are shown as ceasing on 14th December 2023, and remaining unpaid to 14th August 2024; that is to say the month after the extended term of the Mortgage Loan expired.[192]The problems with Mr Radia’s evidence are compounded by the fact that there was no cross examination of Mr Radia, by reason of the parties’ agreement to dispense with oral evidence. No doubt the evidential uncertainties in Mr Radia’s evidence could quickly have been cleared up in cross examination, but unfortunately there was no cross examination. This absence of cross examination also means that it is not open to me simply to reject any part of Mr Radia’s evidence. Instead, I am limited to deciding what Mr Radia meant by the relevant part of his evidence; meaning principally paragraphs 13 and 14.[193]As I have said, Mr Radia’s evidence is not entirely clear. It is not clear to me that he is saying, in paragraphs 13 and 14 of his witness statement that there were two separate bank accounts, with the retained interest being held in one bank account, and the monthly interest payments being transferred out of that bank account into a separate bank account. Doing the best I can with Mr Radia’s evidence, in the absence of oral evidence and cross examination, and taking into account the remainder of the evidence including, in particular, Mr Harnett’s account in the compliance reporting form of how interest payments were dealt with, my findings are as follows:(1) The retained interest was kept in a bank account in the Claimant’s name.(2) The monthly interest payments were recorded by the Claimant as having been paid from the retained interest.(3) The recording of the payment of the monthly interest payments was an accounting or notional exercise. No actual monies were transferred out of the account in which the retained interest was held.[194]These findings do not however lead me to the conclusion contended for by the Defendant; namely that there was nothing in the Regulations to prevent this accounting exercise from taking place, because the Defendant neither owned, nor held, nor controlled the retained interest. The retained interest was held in the Claimant’s account, and no payments were actually made from the retained interest in respect of the monthly interest payments.[195]In my view the Defendant’s argument overlooks the terms upon which the retained interest was held by the Claimant. By reason of clause 5.2 of the LTC the Claimant was not free to make unrestricted use of the retained interest. Instead the Claimant was given the discretion, which it exercised, to retain the interest due on the Mortgage Loan. This was however subject to the contractual stipulation in clause 5.2. The retained interest was to be applied in making monthly interest payments until the retained interest was exhausted. I note that this point was made by Mr Harnett in the compliance reporting form. For ease of reference, I repeat the relevant extract from section 8 of the compliance reporting form:
“At the present moment, the loan is part way through its term. As such there is a positive balance in the retained interest ledger. Whilst this is not physical cash, and its only possible purpose is to pay the interest falling due on the loan each month, contractually it may be argued that it “belongs” to the borrower as it forms a technical part of the original loan advanced. To explain it another way, if the loan redeemed tomorrow, the customer’s final settlement statement would show repayment due of the net loan advance, repayment due of an amount of interest up to the point of redemption, and a credit amount equal to the proportion of retained interest relating to the remaining term of the loan to contractual maturity.”
[196]The Claimant did not formally concede, in the compliance reporting form, that the retained interest belonged to the Defendant. Nevertheless, the analysis of the position by Mr Harnett is illuminating, and I agree with the analysis. The Claimant was not free to do as it wished with the retained interest. The Claimant was required, by clause 5.2, to use the funds to discharge the monthly interest payments, even if only by way of a notional accounting exercise. If there had been an early redemption of the Mortgage Loan, it seems to me that Mr Harnett was right to say that, in those circumstances, any unused balance of the retained interest would be credited to the Defendant. In these circumstances it seems to me that the Defendant did retain some measure of ownership, or at least control over the retained interest. The obvious analysis of the position is that the retained interest was held by the Claimant subject to a purpose trust for the benefit of the Defendant; the relevant purpose being the discharge of the monthly interest payments. This analysis of the position was raised in the oral submissions, but was not properly developed. I do not think that it is necessary to make a final decision on the precise nature of the interest in or control over the retained interest which the Defendant enjoyed. The relevant point is that, in my view, the effect of clause 5.2 of the LTC was that the Defendant did either retain beneficial ownership of the retained interest in the Claimant’s account or, at the least, exercised contractual control over the retained interest in the sense that she was entitled to require the retained interest to be applied to the monthly payments of interest due under the Loan Agreement. The amount of the retained interest to which this retained ownership or control applied then diminished, as monthly payments of interest were treated as having been made from the retained interest. Each amount of interest so paid, or more accurately treated as so paid, then ceased to be subject to the contractual restriction in clause 5.2.[197]I therefore conclude that the use of the retained interest by the Claimant to discharge the monthly payments of interest was caught by Regulation 11, notwithstanding that the monthly payments involved only an accounting exercise. As such, the Claimant was prevented by Regulation 11 from carrying out the accounting exercise of treating the monthly payments of interest as having been paid from the retained interest, unless an exception in the Regulations applied.[198]On the hypothesis that the notional payments of monthly interest were caught by Regulation 11, the Defendant argued that the exceptions in Regulation 58(3) and (5) applied. Both sub-paragraphs of Regulation 58 were relied upon by Mr Arnold in his skeleton argument for the Trial, but I understood from Mr Arnold’s oral submissions that the exception in Regulation 58(3) was not pursued by the Defendant.[199]In any event I do not think that the Defendant can rely upon either of the exceptions in Regulation 58(3) or (5). So far as Regulation 58(3) is concerned, it seems to me that the exercise which was being carried out by the Claimant, in relation to the monthly payments of interest from the retained interest, cannot correctly be described as crediting a frozen account with interest or other earnings due on the account. So far as Regulation 58(5) is concerned, this provides that Regulations 12 and 13 are not contravened by the transfer of funds to a relevant institution for crediting to an account held or controlled (directly or indirectly) by a designated person where those funds are transferred in discharge (or partial discharge) of an obligation which arose before the date on which the person became a designated person. Leaving aside the fact that Regulation 58(5) is expressed to apply only to the prohibitions in Regulations 12 and 13, it seems to me, again, that the exercise which was being carried out by the Claimant, in relation to the monthly payments of interest from the retained interest, was not one which fell within the terms of Regulation 58(5).[200]I therefore conclude that the Claimant was in fact prevented, by the Regulations, from making use of any of the retained interest, as from the Designation and until the Claimant’s Licence was obtained, for the purposes of treating the monthly payments of interest as being discharged. This had the consequence that no interest payments were treated as having been made, as between December 2023 and the expiration of the extended term of the Mortgage Loan.[201]The Defendant’s argument, on the hypothesis that the Claimant was prevented by the Regulations from treating the monthly payments of interest as being paid out of the retained interest, was the same argument as the Defendant relied upon in relation to the claim for possession on the ground of her failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. The Defendant argued that her obligation to pay the relevant interest fell to be treated as suspended, by reason of the Designation. Alternatively, the Defendant argued that she was protected from liability by reason of Section 44.[202]I have already considered the suspension argument and the argument based on Section 44, in the context of the Defendant’s failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date.[203]Taking the suspension argument first, it is true that I am here considering a claim for possession on the basis of failure to pay instalments of interest, as opposed to a failure to repay the Mortgage Loan in its entirety. Nevertheless, my reasoning in relation to the claim for possession on the basis of the failure to repay the Mortgage Loan seems to me to apply equally to a claim for possession on the basis of a failure to pay contractual instalments of interest. It is not necessary to repeat this reasoning, which is set out at length earlier in this judgment. The reasoning seems to me apply equally to the contractual obligation to pay interest in clause 5.1 of the LTC.[204]Turning to the Defendant’s reliance upon Section 44, the position seems to me to be the same. For ease of reference, I repeat by what was said by Falk LJ in her judgment in Celestial Aviation, at [89]-[90]:
“89 It is far less apparent that section 44 should protect a debtor from an action to recover a debt which is otherwise lawfully due but which has not been paid in the reasonable belief that its payment would be in breach of sanctions. Absent sanctions, the debtor would expect to have to pay that sum in the normal course. Exposure to a claim to recover it is not a new financial exposure which might pressurise payment. It is a pre-existing liability. The mischief at which section 44 is aimed (as confirmed by the Explanatory Notes) is not present. 90 The wording of section 44 also supports an interpretation that would allow proceedings to recover a debt. This is because a claim for debt is just that: it seeks payment of the debt. While the inevitable trigger for the claim is that the debtor has not paid, the action is not an action for the non-payment as such (which is the relevant omission for section 44 purposes) and can therefore be said not to be “in respect of” it. Rather, it seeks recovery of an amount which is owed irrespective of any action or inaction in purported compliance with sanctions.”
[205]It seems to me that this reasoning applies as much to the contractual obligation of the Defendant to pay interest on the Mortgage Loan, as it does to the contractual obligation to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date. Accordingly, I conclude that the Defendant is not able to rely upon Section 44, in relation to the claim for possession based upon non-payment of interest on the Mortgage Loan, following the Designation.[206]Drawing together all of the above analysis, I conclude that there was a failure by the Defendant to pay the interest due on the Mortgage Loan, as from December 2023, which constituted a breach of clause 5.1 of the LTC.[207]On this basis I also conclude that the provisions of clause 9 of the Mortgage Deed were engaged. The failure to pay the interest due, in breach of clause 5.1 of the LTC, seems to me to have engaged clause9.1.1 of the Mortgage Deed, as an Event of Default within the meaning of paragraph 1.2 of Schedule 1, and to have engaged clauses9.1.2 and 9.1.3. In consequence, the security constituted by the Mortgage Deed became immediately enforceable.[208]I therefore conclude that the Claimant has, on the bases set out in my previous paragraph, established its right to possession of the Property, additional to its reliance upon the failure of the Defendant to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date and its reliance upon the breach of the No MAC Warranty.[209]I should again add, for the sake of completeness, that the breach of clause 5.1 of the LTC was also specified in the letter of 19th January 2024. Although clause 5.1 was not expressly referred to, the failure to pay interest was specified. In these circumstances it seems to me that clause 13.2 of the LTC would have been engaged, as it was engaged in relation to the breach of the No MAC Warranty; thereby giving rise to the further ground of possession based on failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on it becoming immediately due and payable pursuant to clause 13.2. As with the breach of the No MAC Warranty, and for the same reasons, I am not sure that this adds anything material to the claim for possession.

The outcome of the Trial

[210]For the reasons set out in this judgment the Claimant has established its right to possession of the Property. The Claimant has established its right to possession of the Property on three of the grounds relied upon by the Claimant; namely failure to repay the Mortgage Loan on the Repayment Date, breach of the No MAC Warranty, and breach of clause 5.1 of the LTC.[211]I will therefore make an order for possession of the Property.[212]I will hear counsel further, as necessary, on the terms of the order for possession which is to be made, and on all other matters consequential upon this judgment. In the usual way the parties are encouraged to agree as much as they can, subject to my approval, in terms of the order to be made consequential upon this judgment.