Novo Nordisk A/S & Anor v British Telecommunications & Ors [2026] EWHC 1094 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1094 (Ch)Case No IL-2025-000131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST (CHD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 13/05/2026
Before
THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR
Between
BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLCDefendants/EE LIMITEDRespondentsPLUSNET PLCRespondentSKY UK LIMITEDRespondentTALKTALK TELECOM LIMITEDRespondentVIRGIN MEDIA LIMITEDRespondent
Jaani Riordan (instructed by Covington & Burling LLP) for Applicants for The Respondents (‘the ISPs’) did not appear but did not oppose the applicationHearing Hearing date: 2 nd October 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 13 May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR
[1]On 2 October 2025 I heard the application of the Claimants/Applicants (‘Novo Nordisk’ or ‘NN’) for a website blocking injunction directed at four target websites(1) Viogen Pharma(2) Pharma-Labs(3) Leo Labs and(4) The Steroid Supplier, together with any mirror or successor websites (‘the Target Websites’). All 4 Target Websites are offering, selling and supplying counterfeit and unlicensed versions of Novo Nordisk’s semaglutide and other prescription-only medicines to UK consumers.[2]Semaglutide is the active ingredient in the Novo Nordisk diabetes and anti-obesity medications, marketed under NN registered trade marks for OZEMPIC, RYBELSUS and WEGOVY. It is a receptor agonist for glucagon-like peptide 1 (‘GLP-1’) which regulates blood sugar levels. Injecting a GLP-1 inhibitor such as semaglutide leads to reduced appetite (with associated beneficial effects such as weight loss) and is indicated for the treatment of type 2 diabetes. NN also market another GLP-1 agonist, liraglutide, under registered trade marks for VICTOZA and SAXENDA. I refer to all these trade marks as ‘the NN Marks’.[3]These products have been enormously successful – global sales of GLP-1 products in 2024 were over £17bn. I was provided with the confidential sales figures for the UK but it is clear that since their launches at various dates between 2007 and 2023 these products have been sold in substantial quantities to UK consumers.[4]NN has another product in the final stages of development and approval, involving another active ingredient, cagrilintide, which is said to support improved glycaemic control and significantly greater weight loss when co-administered with semaglutide. This will be marketed as CagriSema once approved. Even though cagrilintide products have yet to receive approval, it is well known in this field that NN have it in their pipeline and expect it to be approved and marketed in the near future.[5]Although semaglutide, liraglutide and cagrilintide are international non-proprietary names (INN) for the active ingredients in NN’s products, semaglutide and cagrilintide are not generic medicines. NN has regulatory exclusivity to supply semaglutide products in the UK and will do so until patent/SPC expiry in 2031. The exclusivity over cagrilintide will last even longer.[6]The evidence clearly established that the popularity of these products has led to a proliferation of ‘falsified’ products in various forms: i) Outright counterfeits labelled OZEMPIC or as one of the other NN brands; ii) Third party manufactured versions of products containing semaglutide, liraglutide or cagrilintide which are unlicensed and marketed under their INN; iii) Products which substitute a different substance or dosage altogether (e.g. insulin).[7]The very detailed and careful evidence with which I was supplied on this application showed that the Target Websites were making available, offering and selling counterfeit and unlicensed versions of NN’s semaglutide, liraglutide and cagrilintide products to UK consumers.[8]Routine applications for website blocking injunctions are often decided on the papers, but this application was correctly listed for a hearing due to two unusual but related features: i) First, it is understood to be the first such application concerned with the supply of counterfeit and unlicensed prescription-only medicinal products. ii) Second, the advertising and offering for sale of unlicensed prescription-only medicines is a criminal offence under the Human Medicine Regulations 2012 (‘the Regulations’).[9]In advance of the hearing I was supplied with 6 electronic bundles of documents along with a very useful Skeleton Argument and a bundle of authorities. Having reviewed Counsel’s Skeleton, I invited him to address two particular topics at the hearing, namely: i) The basis upon which NN has the right to enforce a breach of the Regulations or secure an injunction to prevent repeated offences under the Regulations. ii) The nature of the right(s) which an applicant for a website blocking order must be able to assert.[10]Due to my pre-reading and familiarity with this area of the law, the hearing was short. At the conclusion of it, I announced I would grant the website blocking order substantially in the terms of the draft Order submitted to me, for reasons which I would give in writing later. This judgment contains those reasons and I must apologise for taking so long to complete it.[11]I should add that following the distribution of a draft of this Judgment to NN’s representatives, I received a third witness statement of Mr Brian Kelly for NN very properly correcting an error in his first witness statement, where he stated that, based on his searches of products on the MHRA and EU products databases, he confirmed that no third party was authorised to market or sell VICTOZA, SAXENDA or any other liraglutide-based medicinal product in the UK or EU. However, in the course of preparation of what I understand to be a further application on behalf of NN, Mr Kelly only discovered recently that several third parties had in fact launched generic versions of liraglutide products under various names following patent expiry in late 2024.[12]The consequences of this correction are limited however. Although several third parties are authorised to market licensed generic forms of liraglutide, Mr Kelly confirmed the following: i) First, that none of the Target Websites is authorised to market or sell any liraglutide-based medicinal product in the UK or EU. ii) Second, that the only Target Website which sold liraglutide containing products was Pharma Labs but it was advertising and selling apparent counterfeit VICTOZA and SAXENDA, using NN-branded packaging and NN Marks. iii) Third, the other Target Websites have been re-checked to see whether any were currently selling any liraglutide products. Mr Kelly confirmed that none appear to do so.[13]In what follows, corrections have been included to reflect Mr Kelly’s recent correction. Applicable Legal Principles Website blocking injunctions

Applicable Legal Principles

[14]As Mr Riordan submitted, the law with respect to blocking injunctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent jurisdiction was comprehensively reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 658; [2017] Bus LR 1 (“Cartier CA”), and by the Supreme Court: [2018] UKSC 28; [2018] 1 WLR 3259 (“Cartier SC”).[15]The relevant principles have been summarised in a number of decisions in the analogous context of injunctions under s 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’): see EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [2013] FSR 31 (“EMI”) at [90]-[106] (Arnold J); Nintendo Co Ltd v Sky UK Ltd [2019] EWHC 2376 (Ch), [2019] Bus LR 2773 (“Nintendo [No 1]”) at [36]-[42] (Arnold J); and Nintendo Co Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [2021] EWHC 3511 (Ch) (“Nintendo [No 2]”) at [26]-[31] (Joanna Smith J); and Capitol Records v British Telecommunications plc [2021] EWHC 409 (Ch) (“Capitol Records”).[16]Mr Riordan submitted that the following principles emerge from those authorities: i) First, the threshold requirements for an order are broadly the same as those applicable to s 97A, save that it is not limited to copyright infringement: Cartier CA at [80] (Kitchin LJ):
“First, the ISPs must be intermediaries within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 11. Secondly, either the users or the operators of the website must be infringing the claimant’s trade marks. Thirdly, the users or the operators of the website must use the services of the ISPs. Fourthly, the ISPs must have actual knowledge of this.” ii) Second, the underlying principle is not limited to intellectual property rights and instead derives from the equitable protective jurisdiction, by which courts of equity may order a facilitator (such as an ISP) to take steps to prevent the commission of a legal wrong by a third party with which they are unwittingly mixed up. It is now settled law that this is a “principled basis” for exercising the Court’s inherent power to grant injunctive relief against a party over whom it has in personam jurisdiction. As Lord Sumption JSC observed in Cartier SC at [15]: “Website blocking orders clearly require more than the mere disclosure of information. But I think that it is clear from the authorities and correct in principle that orders for the disclosure of information are only one, admittedly common, category of order which a court may make against a third party to prevent the use of his facilities to commit or facilitate a wrong. I therefore agree … that the website blocking order made in this case could have been made … on ordinary principles of equity.”
Subsequent authorities have expressed this as “settled” law: see Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24(Lord Leggatt JSC) (Lord Briggs, Lord Sales and Lord Hamblen JJSC agreeing) at [52]-[58] per Lord Leggatt JSC; an analysis described by Baker LJ (Phillips and Nugee LJJ agreeing) as “compelling and unanswerable”: In re G [2023] Fam 107 at [61]. See also Bacci v Green [2023] Ch 201 at [50]-[52] (Arnold LJ). iii) Third, it follows from this that although Cartier concerned trade mark infringement, any form of civil or criminal wrongdoing will suffice: see Nintendo [No 2] at [27] (Joanna Smith J) (and in Nintendo [No 1] Arnold J accepted that the Court had jurisdiction on the basis of contraventions of ss 296ZD and 296 CDPA 1988). This is because the Court’s jurisdiction is derived from ordinary principles of equity, in which there is no relevant distinction between being mixed up in a civil or a criminal wrong: see Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29; [2002] 1 WLR 2033 at [53]-[60] (Lord Woolf CJ) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Nolan and Lord Hobhouse agreeing). In Ashworth, jurisdiction was confirmed to extend to someone who was “involved, whether innocently or otherwise, in the wrongdoing which would in these circumstances be criminal”: at [58]. See also the observation of Lord Slynn (agreeing) that “the jurisdiction recognised in [Norwich Pharmacal] … does not depend on whether the person against whom the order is sought has committed a tort, a breach of contract or other civil or criminal wrong”, provided that they have “been ‘involved’” in some way in the wrongdoing. iv) Fourth, where the services of the ISPs allow UK consumers to access the Target Websites and thereby receive infringing advertisements and offers for sale, and conclude agreements to buy counterfeit goods, that involves relevant and sufficient use of the ISPs’ services to engage the Court’s jurisdiction: see Cartier CA at [95] (Kitchin LJ). The ISPs are “essential actors in all of the communications between the consumers and the operators of the target websites”: ibid. The same logic must apply where such advertisements, offers for sale and sales are unlawful. v) Fifth, in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction to make a website blocking order, the Court must consider whether the order is proportionate, including having regard to the principles endorsed by Kitchin LJ in Cartier CA at [100]–[101]. In Nintendo [No 1] at [41], Arnold J summarised the relevant considerations as follows: “The injunction must be (i) necessary, (ii) effective, (iii) dissuasive, (iv) not unduly costly or complicated, (v) avoid barriers to legitimate trade, (vi) a fair balance between the fundamental rights engaged, (vii) proportionate and (viii) safeguarded against abuse. Of these factors, proportionality is the key one, since consideration of the other factors feeds into the proportionality analysis.” vi) Sixth, in considering the overall question of proportionality, the Court is required to embark on a cost-benefit analysis, having regard to the benefits likely to be obtained by blocking, and any adverse consequences, e.g. the risk of “over-blocking” legitimate content: Cartier CA at [177]. vii) Seventh, in order to ensure that orders are proportionate (both as between the parties and as regards third parties who may be affected by the order), it is appropriate to include safeguards, such as a sunset clause and obligations to notify affected website operators, so that any problems that do arise may be brought to the parties’ and, if necessary, the Court’s attention.[17]As Mr Riordan submitted, the approach hitherto taken in the authorities recognises the immense practical utility of website blocking orders and, in particular, their ability to tackle sources of unlawful and infringing material where other attempts at enforcement have failed and further ‘mirror’ websites may be expected to arise during the lifetime of the order so as to evade blocking and continue making available substantially the same infringing material.[18]I accept all those submissions, but it is perhaps worth elaborating on two aspects of Mr Riordan’s submissions: first, the Court’s power to grant injunctions and second, the wrongdoing relied upon under the Regulations.

The Court’s power to grant injunctions

[19]On the wider topic of the power to grant injunctions, Mr Riordan began by reminding me of my judgment in COPA v Wright [2024] EWHC 3315 (Ch) where I reviewed the court’s power to grant injunctions. This was necessary in that case to deal with Dr Wright’s argument that the Court did not have standing to grant the injunctions sought in the absence of a legal or equitable interest which would be vindicated by the relief sought.[20]There are two sections of that judgment to which I was referred. First, the section entitled ‘The modern approach to injunctive relief’. Under that heading Mr Riordan correctly placed particular reliance on [27](ii)-(v), [30](ii), [32](v)&(vi), [33] & [34] as relevant on the current issue. Merely citing those paragraphs would provide a disjointed summary, so it is better to remind myself of the whole section: ‘26. It was common ground that an injunction is an equitable remedy albeit it has a statutory basis in s.37(1) of the Senior Courts Act. 27. It was also common ground that the relevant basic principles governing the modern approach to injunctions were recently reviewed and enunciated by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2024] 2 WLR 45) and that in that case, the Supreme Court adopted key aspects from the Privy Council decision in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2023] AC 389. i) The power to grant injunctions stated in s.37(1) merely confirms and restates the power of the courts to grant injunctions which existed before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 and still exists (Wolverhampton, [17]). ii) It is necessary to distinguish between two senses of the word “jurisdiction”: the power to grant an injunction and the principles and practice governing the exercise of that power. The former is the only really correct sense of the expression (Wolverhampton, [16]). The power of the courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions is, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. (Wolverhampton, [17]). As a court of inherent jurisdiction, the High Court possesses the power, and bears the responsibility, to act so as to maintain the rule of law (Wolverhampton, [18]). iii) Like any judicial power, the power to grant an injunction must be exercised in accordance with principle and any restrictions established by judicial precedent and rules of court (Wolverhampton, [19]). Nevertheless, the principles and practice governing the exercise of the power to grant injunctions need to and do evolve over time as circumstances change (Wolverhampton, [19]-[20]). iv) The width and flexibility of the equitable jurisdiction to issue injunctions are not to be cut down by categorisations based on previous practice (Wolverhampton, [21]). That is not to undermine the importance of precedent, or to suggest that established categories of injunction are unimportant. However, injunctions may be issued in new circumstances when the principles underlying the existing law so require (Wolverhampton, [22]). v) The exercise of the jurisdiction must be principled, but the criterion is injustice. Injustice is to be viewed and decided in the light of today’s conditions and standards, not those of yester-year (Wolverhampton, [21], quoting the “illuminating albeit dissenting” judgment of Lord Nicholls in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284, at 308).28. Accordingly, the Court does have the jurisdiction (in the true sense of the word) to grant the relief COPA seeks. As explained below, the decision of HHJ Birss QC in Samsung v Apple [2012] EWHC 2049 showed that he regarded injunctive relief sought by Samsung, which was in some ways similar to that sought in the present case and was also ancillary to a declaration of non-infringement, to be capable of being granted (though on the facts he did not do so).29. Returning to Wolverhampton, the Supreme Court also discussed the wide range of forms of injunctive relief the English courts had previously developed, all in pursuit of the overriding goal of doing justice: see in particular [20]. These are relevant to this case, as the injunctive relief now sought by COPA bears similarities to a number of existing types of injunction which are routinely granted by English Courts.30. The Supreme Court identified some novel categories of injunction that have been developed by the courts. Those include: i) Injunctions against non-parties, including injunctions contra mundum to protect human rights (Wolverhampton, [23]-[42]). ii) Injunctions in the absence of a cause of action (“It is now well established that the grant of injunctive relief is not always conditional on the existence of a cause of action.” (Wolverhampton, [43]-[49])). Examples of these include: relator and ex officio actions by the Attorney General; the freezing injunction; the Norwich Pharmacal order; the Banker’s Trust order; internet blocking orders. One might also add cases in which local authorities obtain injunctions to preclude criminal conduct such as unlawful trading where the criminal sanctions are insufficient to deter the (usually profitable) conduct.31. The question before the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton was whether the court should grant a so-called “newcomer” injunction, restraining not only present, unidentified travellers who were acting or threatening to act unlawfully, but also unknown persons who might (or might not) form that intention, or so act, in the future. The Supreme Court described this as “a wholly new type of injunction with no very closely related ancestor from which it might be described as evolutionary offspring”, although analogies could be drawn with some established forms of order (Wolverhampton [144]).32. The Supreme Court held that such an injunction could be granted based upon first principles. In summary, it reasoned as follows: i) The principles upon which injunctions are granted or withheld remain equitable. Those principles also generally provide the answer to the question whether settled principles or practice about the general limits or conditions within which injunctions are granted may properly be adjusted over time (Wolverhampton [146]). ii) A well-known passage in Spry on Equitable Remedies regarding the readiness of equity to change and adapt its principles for the grant of equitable relief “has come to be embedded in English law” (Wolverhampton [147], [148]). iii) The basic general principle by reference to which equity provides a discretionary remedy is that it intervenes to put right defects or inadequacies in the common law. One example is where available common law remedies are inadequate to protect or enforce the claimant’s rights (Wolverhampton [149], [150]). The other example given by the Supreme Court was that of conscience-based remedies, such as rectification, undue influence and equitable estoppel. iv) Equity looks to the substance rather than the form. In Wolverhampton, that meant not being confined by the twin silos of interim and final injunctions, and being able to assess the most suitable means of enabling newcomers to have a proper opportunity to be heard (Wolverhampton [151]). v) Equity is flexible, thus enabling the precise form of injunctions and their terms and conditions to be developed over time and to meet the justice of particular cases (Wolverhampton [52]). vi) There is no sacrosanct limiting rule or principle apart from justice and convenience. The best illustration of this is the supposed Siskina limiting principle that an injunction could only be granted in, or as ancillary to, proceedings for substantive relief in respect of a cause of action in the same jurisdiction – now expressly rejected in Broad Idea (see below) (Wolverhampton [153]). vii) There was therefore no immovable obstacle in the way of granting newcomer injunctions.33. The Privy Council in Convoy Collateral held that the granting of injunctive relief extends beyond the protection of legal or equitable rights of the applicant, referring instead to the protection of legitimate “interests”: “The proposition asserted by Lord Diplock in The Siskina and Bremer Vulkan on the authority of North London Railway was that an injunction may only be granted to protect a legal or equitable right. There can be no objection to this proposition in so far as it signifies the need to identify an interest of the claimant which merits protection and a legal or equitable principle which justifies exercising the power to grant an injunction to protect that interest by ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing something. … within a very short time after The Siskina was decided, it had already become clear that the proposition cannot be maintained if it is taken to mean that an injunction may only be granted to protect a right which can be identified independently of the reasons which justify the grant of an injunction.” (Convoy Collateral at [52].)34. That view was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Re G (Court of Protection: Injunction) [2022] EWCA Civ 1312 at [61], [69] and [71]. The Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the “interest of the claimant” formulation, and indeed expanded it to “the interest of the person protected by the injunction” so as to include a third party for whose benefit the original orders were made and which the defendant sought to frustrate. i) The power to grant injunctions stated in s.37(1) merely confirms and restates the power of the courts to grant injunctions which existed before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 and still exists (Wolverhampton, [17]). ii) It is necessary to distinguish between two senses of the word “jurisdiction”: the power to grant an injunction and the principles and practice governing the exercise of that power. The former is the only really correct sense of the expression (Wolverhampton, [16]). The power of the courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions is, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. (Wolverhampton, [17]). As a court of inherent jurisdiction, the High Court possesses the power, and bears the responsibility, to act so as to maintain the rule of law (Wolverhampton, [18]). iii) Like any judicial power, the power to grant an injunction must be exercised in accordance with principle and any restrictions established by judicial precedent and rules of court (Wolverhampton, [19]). Nevertheless, the principles and practice governing the exercise of the power to grant injunctions need to and do evolve over time as circumstances change (Wolverhampton, [19]-[20]). iv) The width and flexibility of the equitable jurisdiction to issue injunctions are not to be cut down by categorisations based on previous practice (Wolverhampton, [21]). That is not to undermine the importance of precedent, or to suggest that established categories of injunction are unimportant. However, injunctions may be issued in new circumstances when the principles underlying the existing law so require (Wolverhampton, [22]). v) The exercise of the jurisdiction must be principled, but the criterion is injustice. Injustice is to be viewed and decided in the light of today’s conditions and standards, not those of yester-year (Wolverhampton, [21], quoting the “illuminating albeit dissenting” judgment of Lord Nicholls in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284, at 308). i) Injunctions against non-parties, including injunctions contra mundum to protect human rights (Wolverhampton, [23]-[42]). ii) Injunctions in the absence of a cause of action (“It is now well established that the grant of injunctive relief is not always conditional on the existence of a cause of action.” (Wolverhampton, [43]-[49])). Examples of these include: relator and ex officio actions by the Attorney General; the freezing injunction; the Norwich Pharmacal order; the Banker’s Trust order; internet blocking orders. One might also add cases in which local authorities obtain injunctions to preclude criminal conduct such as unlawful trading where the criminal sanctions are insufficient to deter the (usually profitable) conduct. i) The principles upon which injunctions are granted or withheld remain equitable. Those principles also generally provide the answer to the question whether settled principles or practice about the general limits or conditions within which injunctions are granted may properly be adjusted over time (Wolverhampton [146]). ii) A well-known passage in Spry on Equitable Remedies regarding the readiness of equity to change and adapt its principles for the grant of equitable relief “has come to be embedded in English law” (Wolverhampton [147], [148]). iii) The basic general principle by reference to which equity provides a discretionary remedy is that it intervenes to put right defects or inadequacies in the common law. One example is where available common law remedies are inadequate to protect or enforce the claimant’s rights (Wolverhampton [149], [150]). The other example given by the Supreme Court was that of conscience-based remedies, such as rectification, undue influence and equitable estoppel. iv) Equity looks to the substance rather than the form. In Wolverhampton, that meant not being confined by the twin silos of interim and final injunctions, and being able to assess the most suitable means of enabling newcomers to have a proper opportunity to be heard (Wolverhampton [151]). v) Equity is flexible, thus enabling the precise form of injunctions and their terms and conditions to be developed over time and to meet the justice of particular cases (Wolverhampton [52]). vi) There is no sacrosanct limiting rule or principle apart from justice and convenience. The best illustration of this is the supposed Siskina limiting principle that an injunction could only be granted in, or as ancillary to, proceedings for substantive relief in respect of a cause of action in the same jurisdiction – now expressly rejected in Broad Idea (see below) (Wolverhampton [153]). vii) There was therefore no immovable obstacle in the way of granting newcomer injunctions. “The proposition asserted by Lord Diplock in The Siskina and Bremer Vulkan on the authority of North London Railway was that an injunction may only be granted to protect a legal or equitable right. There can be no objection to this proposition in so far as it signifies the need to identify an interest of the claimant which merits protection and a legal or equitable principle which justifies exercising the power to grant an injunction to protect that interest by ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing something. … within a very short time after The Siskina was decided, it had already become clear that the proposition cannot be maintained if it is taken to mean that an injunction may only be granted to protect a right which can be identified independently of the reasons which justify the grant of an injunction.” (Convoy Collateral at [52].)[21]Mr Riordan also relied on the section of my judgment entitled ‘The expansion of the categories of injunction’ where I said this:
‘45. Judicial comment over the years has repeatedly recognised that new situations may call for new forms of injunction. The overarching principle is that stated by Kitchin LJ in Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2017] Bus LR 1 at [46], echoing Lord Goff in South Carolina Insurance Co [1987] AC 24 at 44. The courts will “adapt to new circumstances by developing their practice in relation to the grant of injunctions where it is necessary and appropriate to do so to avoid injustice.” This view was endorsed by the Privy Council in Convoy Collateral at [56], then by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton at [21] and [22]. Changing circumstances include those resulting from developments in information technology and globalisation. (Convoy Collateral [59], [60]). 46. In Cartier itself, the Court upheld the decision to make website blocking injunctions to prevent infringement of intellectual property rights, starting from the domestic law propositions that (i) injunctions could be granted against those who had not themselves infringed rights, if they would protect such rights; (ii) an analogy could be drawn with the equitable protective principle underlying Norwich Pharmacal orders; and (iii) the Court’s jurisdiction under s.37(1) was very broad and could “be exercised in new ways”: see [55]-[56].’
[22]Based on those principles, Mr Riordan made it clear that he was not suggesting that his application represented a new category of injunction: rather that it fell within the principle applied in Cartier. I agree.[23]However, I found the analysis in Ashworth (see the summary in [16iii)] above) particularly helpful on the issue concerning the 2012 Regulations: i.e. offences committed under the Regulations comprise wrongdoing which can suffice to give the Court jurisdiction. That only leaves the issue of what standing is required to obtain a website blocking injunction based on the type of wrongdoing under the Regulations which I summarise below. On this point, I concluded it was neither wise nor profitable to attempt to identify any necessary criteria. Suffice to say that I formed the very clear view that NN had the necessary standing, not least because of the support and encouragement from the MHRA for the making of the application.[24]The second aspect is the nature of the wrongdoing the target of an injunction. In this case, as I outline below, various types of wrongdoing were relied upon by NN, but I focus on the wrongdoing under the Regulations, since it is that aspect which engages the point of interest.

The Wrongdoing relied upon

[25]I mentioned above that NN has patent/SPC protection over the active ingredients semaglutide and cagrilintide but, for understandable reasons, NN do not rely on infringement of their patents on this application. Instead they rely on, variously, infringement of registered trade marks, passing off and breaches of the Regulations.[26]Counterfeit products sold under or by reference to the NN trade marks (or one of them) is straightforward infringement of the registered trade marks.[27]As for passing off, it is clear that where semaglutide and liraglutide products may only be lawfully advertised and sold in the UK by the holder of a UK marketing authorisation (which, in the case of semaglutide, to date only NN has ever possessed), unlicensed products sold(a) under the same or deceptively similar get-up as NN’s genuine medicines, and/or(b) as “semaglutide” are likely to deceive the relevant public into thinking that such medicines: i) Are those of the holder of a valid UK marketing authorisation, when they are not; or ii) Are those of NN itself; and/or iii) Are linked in the course of trade with NN, as the holder of the only MA for semaglutide permitting such medicines to be sold (e.g. under licence from NN).[28]Scenario i) involves straightforward deception as to origin, reflecting the counterfeit nature of the relevant goods. Scenario ii) falls within the concept of ‘extended’ passing off (as summarised by Arnold LJ in Glaxo Wellcome UK Ltd v Sandoz Ltd [2021] RPC 27 at [174]-[181]) i.e.: i) As a description of equivalence with NN’s genuine semaglutide or liraglutide medicines, when the unlicensed product is not in truth equivalent because(1) has not been made by the holder of a valid marketing authorisation, does not comply with UK medicines regulations (as to which see below) and therefore is not legally licensed semaglutide or liraglutide; and(2) does not have the same chemical impurity composition as the genuine product; ii) As a claim to be members of the class of traders entitled to manufacture and sell semaglutide and liraglutide-containing medicines – a class which is, for now, limited to a single entity (NN); and iii) Because, as matters stand, the indicium semaglutide, in relation to a regulated medicinal product, can only refer to NN and must therefore be distinctive of it in trade; and iv) Because, again as matters stand, the indicium liraglutide refers to the class of traders entitled to manufacture and sell liraglutide pursuant to a valid MA, and none of the Target Websites qualify.[29]The evidence also established that large numbers of UK consumers are being deceived into thinking that they are purchasing a licensed and genuine source of semaglutide when they are not. Such deception is enhanced by further statements made by the website operators to the effect that they are a “pharmaceutical company you can trust” (Viogen website home page) and whose products are “certified by the WHO-GMP, and fully compliant with … UKMHRA (UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency [sic]” (Viogen website FAQ page). In these circumstances, I agree that the Target Websites are passing off their unlicensed forms of semaglutide and liraglutide as and for products made and/or authorised by the Applicants.[30]On the evidence I was entirely satisfied of NN’s allegations of infringement of their registered trade marks and passing off by the use of the INNs semaglutide, liraglutide and cagrilintide. However I will outline in more detail the wrongdoing relied upon under the Regulations.

Wrongdoing under the Regulations and the attempts to stop it

[31]NN submitted (and I accept) that each of the Target Websites is committing a number of criminal offences under the 2012 Regulations wherever they advertise, offer to sell and sell unauthorised medicinal products (e.g. CagriSema) and prescription-only medicines (e.g. Ozempic, Saxenda, Rybelsus and Victoza). The evidence established the following offences: i) Contrary to regulation 46, each such website is selling, supplying and/or offering to sell or supply, an unauthorised medicinal product, namely ‘lookalike’ semaglutide which has been synthesised by a third party (e.g. Viogen, Leo Lab) or products which have not been granted a marketing authorisation at all (e.g. CagriSema); ii) Contrary to regulations 214 and 220, each website is selling or supplying a prescription-only medicine otherwise than in accordance with a valid prescription; iii) Contrary to regulations 17, 18 and 44(5), each website is importing, selling, supplying and/or offering for sale or supply, prescription-only medicines without being authorised to dispense such medicines as they are not GPhC-registered pharmacies or licensed wholesalers/manufacturers; and iv) Contrary to regulations 279 and 284, each website is publishing an advertisement for a medicinal product for which no marketing authorisation or other relevant authorisation is in force (in the case of cagrilintide-containing products) or in circumstances likely to lead to the use of a prescription only medicine.[32]Contraventions of the above obligations are statutory offences under related provisions of the 2012 Regulations: see regulations 34(1) (breach of regulations 17 and 18), 47 (breach of regulation 46), 255(1) (breach of regulations 214 and 220), and 303 (breach of regulations 279 and 284).[33]For this purpose, “medicinal product” is relevantly defined in reg 2 of the 2012 Regulations as any substance or combination of substances(a) “presented as having properties of preventing or treating disease in human beings” or(b) “administered to human beings with a view to ... restoring, correcting or modifying a physiological function by exerting a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action”. Semaglutide, tirzepatide, and liraglutide are presented by the Target Websites as suitable for preventing or treating disease (e.g. obesity) and are administered for their beneficial pharmacological effects on physiological and metabolic functions.[34]In addition, the other products advertised on the Target Websites are all or substantially all “medicinal products”, for the reasons identified in the evidence, applying the relevant MHRA Guidance (on this point the evidence included lists of products for each of the Target Websites). A handful of edge cases or where it was unclear precisely what substance was used were identified, but I was satisfied that all these are presented in terms of treating, preventing or curing disease by reason of being injectables, or make medicinal claims; and the remainder are, on their face, squarely within the definition of “medicinal products”. Of those, the vast majority are prescription-only medicines (as defined in Schedule 1 of the 2012 Regulations) or simply controlled substances whose sale is illegal.

The MHRA

[35]It is clear that MHRA also regards the sale of unlicensed medicinal products in these circumstances as “criminal activity” contrary to the 2012 Regulations. For example, in February 2025, it wrote to Viogen’s domain name registrar seeking (unsuccessfully) to suspend the website for its role in facilitating criminal offences. The MHRA’s view was that “targeting of UK individuals in this way is illegal and presents a real risk of harm to the public in the UK”.[36]In June 2025, the MHRA contacted NN, noting its failed attempts to take down the Viogen website and that it was “not happy with the situation that the website continues to be actively selling falsified products”. The MHRA asked for NN’s assistance in taking down or blocking access to Viogen in the UK (a request which ultimately prompted NN to make this application). In July 2025, it provided supportive comments in relation to three of the other Target Websites.[37]In short, I was entirely satisfied that the Target Websites are engaged in systematic contraventions of the 2012 Regulations by advertising, offering and selling prescription-only medicinal products, falsified versions of those products that are not licensed for sale in the UK, and products which have not been granted any authorisation at all or which are controlled substances whose sale in the UK is categorically illegal. The UK regulator agrees but has been unable to take meaningful steps to take the websites offline. Such contraventions apply to substantially all of the products being advertised and sold, and which the ISPs’ services enable to be accessed and purchased by UK consumers.

Some additional points

[38]There are three further points to add.[39]First, the evidence before me clearly established the harms and dangers posed by falsified semaglutide products of the kind promulgated and offered for sale by the Target Websites: i) Falsified products may not have been manufactured to the same laboratory standards of quality control as those manufactured by NN, with resulting impurities, the presence of allergens, or differences in concentration. All the sample products purchased from the Target Websites show that they contain impurities. ii) NN has given evidence to a US Senate Committee which identifies from US FDA data over 300 serious health issues, 100 hospitalisations and 10 deaths in the US that have been linked to the use of falsified semaglutide products, a phenomenon which cannot be confined to the US. The WHO has warned that substandard and falsified products sold online may cause as many as 1 million excess deaths annually, and that 50 per cent of medicines sold online are not genuine. iii) The extent of the problem is such that the European Medicines Agency, MHRA and other national regulators have issued repeated warnings about unlicensed counterfeit versions of semaglutide and liraglutide; in Austria, adverse patient reactions and hospitalisations have also been reported. iv) Any adverse reactions to unlicensed semaglutide risk contaminating NN’s pharmacovigilance system by wrongly attributing those events to NN’s products.[40]Furthermore UK and international news coverage has focussed on the dangers of “fake weight loss medication pens” and NN suggest this has led to a significant reduction in public trust in the UK. For example: i) The Guardian has reported on hospitalisations for “serious side effects ranging from hypoglycaemic shock to coma” and seizures of hundreds of Ozempic and Saxenda injector pens obtained through “non-legitimate routes, such as unregulated websites”; ii) The Independent has warned of fake pens filled with insulin and noted the role of organised crime in circulating counterfeit medicine; iii) The Daily Mail has reported on seizures of fake injector pens “found to contain rat poison, cement, mercury and arsenic”, “too little of the active ingredient, or none at all” and the MHRA’s observation that falsified Ozempic is “flooding the online market”; iv) The Telegraph has covered specific risks to teenagers “lying about their weight to obtain the injections from online pharmacies” and fake batches of Ozempic; and v) LBC reports the MHRA’s assessment that “people have suffered ‘tremendous harm’ as a result of taking counterfeit goods bought on the black market”, citing the example of a 24-year-old healthcare worker who was hospitalised after injecting fake Ozempic she bought online.[41]I accept that there are very serious risks to patients from these falsified products and it was made clear that preventing the UK public from being exposed to falsified and dangerous medicinal products was the Applicants’ primary aim in bringing this claim.[42]The further point is that NN is the only supplier of semaglutide products in the UK and EU; any adverse patient reaction to a falsified product will be likely to damage NN’s goodwill and reputation, and could lead to calls for product recalls. Accordingly, I agree that NN stands to suffer commercial and reputational damage if sales of falsified products continue to be made to the UK public. This also harms UK retailers and pharmacies selling legitimate forms of NN’s products.[43]Second, the evidence satisfied me that each of the Target Websites was targeting UK consumers.[44]Third, some or all of the Target Websites offer other products for sale (i.e. products with no association with NN). However, the evidence established that all these other products appeared to be unlicensed prescription only medicines, controlled substances (e.g. anabolic steroids) or infringements of the rights of third parties, whose marketing and sale is similarly unlawful. This point goes particularly to proportionality and discretion (see below).

Jurisdiction to grant the Order Sought

[45]Drawing the threads together, I address the four threshold requirements. i) First, it was clear that the Respondent ISPs are clearly service providers within the meaning of regulation 2 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013). ii) Second and Third, the services of the Respondent ISPs and each of them have been used to infringe the NN Marks, commit passing off, and commit serious violations of the 2012 Regulations. iii) Fourth, the ISPs have actual knowledge of the infringing use of their services, at least through service of the evidence filed in support of the application.

Proportionality and Discretion

[46]The authorities make it plain that I have a discretion to exercise, and that the proportionality of the Order sought is a key consideration. In this regard, NN relied on the following points, all of which I accept: i) The Target Websites advertise and sell illegal, unlicensed and counterfeit medicines; they “are profiting from infringement on an industrial scale” (as in EMI at [107]); their operators have no legitimate interest in making available such material, for profit, at the expense of right-holders and the public – the more so where their falsified products pose substantial risks to public health. ii) There is a real and pressing need for ongoing remedies of this kind, given the wider commercial and public health context of counterfeiting of semaglutide products (see above). Blocking will protect the public from dangerous medicinal products and assist in protecting the value of NN’s rights and its considerable investment in developing and promoting useful medicines. iii) The order sought is therefore necessary both to protect the public and to prevent infringements of NN’s intellectual property rights, which the Target Websites are infringing on a large scale. iv) Blocking is likely to be highly effective to reduce the level of access by UK consumers to the Target Websites. This is consistent with the experience of other right-holders in the previous cases cited above, which indicate average reductions of UK visitors of 98%, notwithstanding attempts to circumvent those orders: see Capitol Records at [79]. There is therefore every reason to suppose that the order sought will have a material impact on the public’s ability to obtain unlawful medicines from four popular sources. v) ‘Over-blocking’ is not a material risk here, as an extensive review has identified no lawful products being advertised and sold on any Target Website (again, see above); it is highly unlikely that there will be any significant attempt to sell lawful products in the future (see Capitol Records at [77]). The risk of interfering with legitimate commercial activity is therefore negligible. vi) NN has attempted to engage with the operators of the Target Websites to secure their removal, including by sending take-down notices and engaging with the MHRA, who even with its remedial armoury as the UK medicines regulator has similarly been unsuccessful in removing these websites and the threat they pose to the UK public. None of these steps has been effective, in large part because the websites are operated anonymously and use hosts and other service providers located abroad. vii) Even if the websites were temporarily taken offline (as appeared to have happened with Pharma Labs), in the longer term this is likely to lead to a game of “whack a mole” as the sites move to mirror or replacement locations, and resume operation. This can only be avoided with a more dynamic and responsive remedy like website blocking. viii) The proposed order is narrow and targeted, being limited to the specified URLs and domain names of the Target Websites, and any successor or mirror sites thereto. There is no material risk of “over-blocking” lawful content or trade. ix) The draft order includes substantially the same safeguards as previous orders, including notification provisions, liberty to apply to the Target Website operator and anyone affected by the order, as well as the Cartier safeguards (e.g. a sunset clause of 2 years). x) The ISPs do not oppose the order, which can be implemented using their existing systems; it can therefore be taken to be proportionate as between the parties (as in Capitol Records at [73]). xi) The costs of implementation to the ISPs will be “modest and proportionate” (EMI at [107]) and will be met by the Applicants in accordance with the principles in Cartier SC.[47]In all the circumstances I was satisfied that the interests of the public and UK medicines regulator in ensuring a high level of public health, and those of NN in enforcing its rights in the NN Marks and goodwill, clearly outweighed any conceivable interest of the Target Website operators.[48]Accordingly, while this application sought to address a new form of online wrongdoing, I was entirely satisfied that the Order was proportionate for essentially similar reasons to those accepted by the Court in Cartier, Nintendo and the other s97A cases. I therefore found that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion to make an order in the terms proposed.

Postscript

[49]I happened to mention the making of this Order when speaking extra-judicially at a conference recently. A representative of NN was in the audience and reported that the Order had proved very successful. This was welcome feedback as to operation of this type of Order.

Cited in 1 later judgment