“The idea that the fraudster and forgerer can enjoy an enhanced standard of living at his retirement instead of paying the judgment debt would be a very unattractive conclusion. The defendant clearly has the means of paying the 25% to the claimants: all he has to do is to give notice to Canada Life.”
“The Privy Council, at para 59, considered that the powers of revocation were such that in equity, the debtor could be regarded as having rights tantamount to ownership. The same in my view must apply to the defendant’s ability in the present case to elect to take his cash payment from Canada Life.”
“70. The present situation seems to me to be analogous to the situation faced by the Privy Council. There appears to me to be a strong principle and policy of justice to the effect that debtors should not be allowed to hide their assets in pension funds when they had a right to withdraw moneys needed to pay their creditors. 71. Whilst Parliament has seen fit in the area of bankruptcy to create special statutory protections for pensions, no such intervention has taken place in the area of the enforcement of judgments. Mr Weale for the defendant nevertheless suggested that public policy requires pensions to be treated as exceptional when it comes to the execution of judgments on the basis of the special treatment under bankruptcy law. 72. In my judgment, that suggestion is erroneous. A person who files successfully for bankruptcy surrenders all his assets, save those protected by law, to a trustee in bankruptcy for the payment of his debts. Filing for bankruptcy is a relief from the ability of creditors individually to execute upon the debtor’s assets, in favour of collective execution. But this relief comes at a significant price. Bankruptcy carries very important disadvantages in terms of obtaining credit and acting as a director of a limited liability company, such restrictions being designed to protect the public. A judgment debtor in my view cannot have the benefits of bankruptcy without its burdens. If he chooses the advantage of not being bankrupt, for example because he considers himself to be solvent, then he must pay his debts or his assets (including contingent assets subject to some act on his part) will be amenable to the enforcement of judgments by individual creditors.”
“In my judgment, it is not necessary to go to the disproportionate trouble and expense in a case of this kind to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution and then force the defendant to delegate his power of withdrawal to the receiver, as was done in the Privy Council case. The defendant in this case can simply be ordered to delegate the power of election to the claimants’ solicitor and for the court to authorise the solicitor to make the election in his name. Upon the election being made, the sum payable by Canada Life will then become due to the defendant and can be made the subject of the third party debt order.”
“if it were not possible to make such an injunction, then I would appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution and require the delegation of the election to the receiver in the manner set out by the Privy Council”
“The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.”
“The first and, in my opinion, the only really correct sense of the expression that the Court has no jurisdiction is that it has no power to deal with and decide the dispute as to the subject-matter before it, no matter in what form or by whom it is raised. But there is another sense in which it is often used, i.e., that although the Court has power to decide the question it will not according to its settled practice do so except in a certain way and under certain circumstances.”
“although the terms of section 37(1) of the Act of 1981 and its predecessors are very wide, the power conferred by them has been circumscribed by judicial authority dating back many years”
“The powers of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. Injunctions are granted only when to do so accords with equitable principles, but this restriction involves, not a defect of powers, but an adoption of doctrines and practices that change in their application from time to time. Unfortunately there have sometimes been made observations by judges that tend to confuse questions of jurisdiction or of powers with questions of discretions or of practice. The preferable analysis involves a recognition of the great width of equitable powers, an historical appraisal of the categories of injunctions that have been established and an acceptance that pursuant to general equitable principles injunctions may issue in new categories when this course appears appropriate.”
“(1) the demands of justice are the overriding consideration in considering the scope of the jurisdiction under section 37(1); (2) the court has power to grant injunctions and appoint receivers in circumstances where no injunction would have been granted or receiver appointed before 1873; (3) a receiver by way of equitable execution may be appointed over an asset whether or not the asset is presently amenable to execution at law; and (4) the jurisdiction to appoint receivers by way of equitable execution can be developed incrementally to apply old principles to new situations.”
“In my judgment, Parliament has decided to draw the balance between, on the one hand, the interests of the state in encouraging people to save through the medium of private pensions (so that in old age or infirmity they will not be a burden on the resources of the state), and, on the other, the interests of creditors in receiving payment of their debts, by the mechanism of sections 342A to 342C of the 1986 Act which enable a trustee to claw back excessive pension contributions made by the bankrupt where such contributions have unfairly prejudiced the bankrupt’s creditors.”
“In my view, there is no public policy which prevents the s.37(1) jurisdiction from being exercised. On the contrary, the overriding public policy consideration is that contained in s.281(3) of the 1986 Act, which was expressly referred to in the January 2019 Order when granting the Claimants summary judgment. Fraudsters should not prosper.”
“In the exercise of my discretion, I find that it is just, equitable and convenient to make the orders sought by the Claimants, subject to the necessary amendments to take account of the points made by the Trustees and Mrs Green …. There are compelling reasons for the Claimants, who are amongst those who have been defrauded by Mr Green to be able to have access to his money to satisfy the judgment debt. None of the points made on behalf of Mr Green set out at paragraph 55 above detract from this. Indeed, the fact that the revocation of the Enhanced Protection is unlikely to have any practical impact upon him is a point in favour of granting the relief sought, not for declining to make it. I attach little weight to the possible impact on the future contingent event of a compromise with the Claimants.”
“Moreover, the fact that any drawdown by Mr Brake would be subject to tax is in itself of minor importance. For example, if a judgment creditor obtains a charging order on assets owned by the judgment debtor, and thereafter obtains an order for their sale, that sale may involve a liability to capital gains tax on the part of the judgment debtor. But no one suggests that, merely because there is a tax liability arising as a result of the sale, therefore the sale should not have been ordered, or should not take place. Selling assets to raise money to pay debts often involves costs which reduce the value available to pay creditors. (I accept of course that, if the amount of tax would be so great that as a result there was no real benefit to the judgment creditor, the court might well decide not to order the sale.)”
“25. … The power of a judge sitting in the High Court to grant an injunction against a party to proceedings properly served is confirmed by, but does not derive from, section 37 of the Supreme Court [now Senior Courts] Act 1981 and its statutory predecessors. It derives from the pre-Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c 66) powers of the Chancery courts, and other courts, to grant injunctions: … 30. … provided the court has in personam jurisdiction over the person against whom an injunction, whether interlocutory or final, is sought, the court has jurisdiction, in the strict sense, to grant it. …”
“The powers of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. Injunctions are granted only when to do so accords with equitable principles, but this restriction involves, not a defect of powers, but an adoption of doctrines and practices that change in their application from time to time. Unfortunately there have sometimes been made observations by judges that tend to confuse questions of jurisdiction or of powers with questions of discretions or of practice. The preferable analysis involves a recognition of the great width of equitable powers, an historical appraisal of the categories of injunctions that have been established and an acceptance that pursuant to general equitable principles injunctions may issue in new categories when this course appears appropriate.”
“Website blocking orders clearly require more than the mere disclosure of information. But I think that it is clear from the authorities and correct in principle that orders for the disclosure of information [pursuant to Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners[1974] AC 133 ] are only one, admittedly common, category of order which a court may make against a third party to prevent the use of his facilities to commit or facilitate a wrong. I therefore agree … that the website blocking order made in this case could have been made ... on ordinary principles of equity.”
“The correctness of what Spry refers to as ‘the preferable analysis’ must, in the Board’s view, now be regarded as settled.”
“Having regard to its source we would in any event have given [Convoy v Broad Idea] very great weight, but having read and considered the authorities for ourselves, we regard Lord Leggatt's analysis as compelling and unanswerable. It is not necessary to repeat his reasoning. It is sufficient to say that we respectfully agree with it. In these circumstances in our judgment we should follow Broad Idea and decide that it now represents the law of England and Wales as to the circumstances in which the Court may grant an injunction, or in other words what the ‘just and convenient’ test in s.37 of the 1981 Act requires.”