Sangeeta Mittal v Barclays Bank Plc & Ors [2026] EWHC 1029 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1029 (Ch)Case No PT-2024-000886
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PROPERTY, TRUSTS & PROBATE LIST (ChD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 1 May 2026
Before
DEPUTY MASTER HOLDEN
Between
SANGEETA MITTALClaimant(1) BARCLAYS BANK PLCDefendants(2) ALEXANDRA WARDDefendant(3) VICTORIA LIDDELLDefendant(4) TAMMY WILKINSDefendant
Ian Chai (instructed by Healys LLP) for ClaimantDavid Mohyuddin KC and Jonathan Edwards (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing date: 12 March 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 1 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Deputy Master Holden:

[1]This is my judgment in relation to the Claimant’s application dated 14 April 2025: i) for permission to re-amend her claim form and to amend her particulars of claim; ii) to join Meadswell Estates Limited (‘Meadswell’), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, as an additional party to her claim; and iii) for permission to serve her re-amended claim form and amended particulars of claim on Meadswell out of the jurisdiction.

Factual background

[2]The Claimant is married to Pramod Mittal, who is the son of the late Mohan Lal Mittal (‘Mr Mittal’). Mr Mittal died earlier this year.[3]The Claimant was born in Kolkata in 1961. Her evidence is that, when she and her husband married, they moved into a substantial property in Kolkata.[4]In 1998, a long lease of a valuable property in London – Renaissance Court, 3-5 Woods Mews, London W1 (the ‘Property’) – was purchased by a company called Global Infrastructure Holdings Limited (‘GIHL’) for the sum of £8.8 million. In her witness statement in support of her amendment application, the Claimant wrongly states that the lease was purchased by Global Steel Holdings Limited (‘GSHL’), but the purchaser was in fact GIHL.[5]The Claimant relocated from Kolkata to London. She moved into the Property with her furniture and belongings, and she has been in occupation of the Property ever since. She lives there with her husband and children.[6]In 2002, the lease of the Property was acquired from GIHL by Meadswell using a mortgage provided by Barclays Private Bank & Trust Limited (‘Barclays PBTL’). Barclays PBTL was granted a first registered charge over the leasehold estate (the ‘2002 Charge’).[7]Significantly, on 8 March 2002 the Claimant executed by deed a Letter of Consent consenting to the loan and the charge, and agreeing and undertaking not to assert any right against the mortgagee by way of overriding interest or otherwise (the ‘Letter of Consent’). Mr Chai, appearing for the Claimant, accepted that the Claimant signed the Letter of Consent, and the Letter of Consent is not impugned in any version of the Claimant’s claim.[8]In 2007, Meadswell bought the freehold of the Property. The effect of that was to merge the leasehold and freehold estates. The freehold was purchased with a loan from Barclays PBTL, with some of the proceeds of the loan being used to discharge the original facility. Barclays PBTL was granted a first registered charge over the freehold estate (the ‘2007 Charge’).[9]On 30 November 2007, Meadswell and the Claimant executed a Licence Agreement (the ‘Licence’). On its face the Licence is a licence for the Claimant to occupy the Property, terminable on notice by Meadswell. The Claimant now wishes to amend her claim to seek a declaration “that the Licence has been validly rescinded and is void and of no effect” on the grounds that her execution of the Licence was procured by alleged misrepresentations made to her by the servants or agents of Meadswell.[10]In 2016, the benefit of the 2007 Charge was assigned to the First Defendant, Barclays Bank plc (‘Barclays’). Barclays is therefore the current mortgagee.[11]It is common ground that Meadswell has defaulted on its repayment obligations. On 19 April 2023, Barclays appointed the Second – Fourth Defendants (the ‘Receivers’) as LPA receivers of the Property. The Receivers want to obtain possession of the Property and sell it to discharge the debt owed to Barclays.[12]In November 2023 the Claimant’s solicitors wrote to the Receivers’ solicitors. In that letter, it was said that the Claimant is the “ultimate beneficiary of Meadswell” on the basis that “[t]he shareholder structure of Meadswell Estates Limited is that the shareholder is Prasan PTC Limited (Trustee of Trust Prasan PTC Trust) holding on behalf of the Trust. Mrs Mittal, our client, is the beneficiary of the Trust.” That letter indicated that the Claimant was “keen to purchase the Property” and made some proposals to that end.[13]The same month, the Claimant’s solicitors wrote again to assert that the Property should not be subject to a freezing injunction (with which I am not concerned), and that “Mr Pramod Mittal’s lawyers will soon challenge the same on the basis that the beneficial interest in Meadswell Estates Limited and Renaissance Court lies with the Prasan Trust.” That letter enclosed, and relied upon, a copy of the Licence that the Claimant now wants to rescind.[14]In December 2023, the Claimant’s solicitors wrote again asserting that it had come to their attention that the Receivers were about to sell the Property. That letter said that “this Property was purchased for the residential use of the Mittal family under the family Trust (the Prasan Trust)” and referred to a decision said to have been taken by Meadswell in May 2023 (i.e. after the appointment of the Receivers) to transfer the Property to her, such that the Claimant would (upon that transfer) “benefit from the equity of redemption.” Ultimately, however, the Property was not sold in 2023.

Procedural history

[15]The present proceedings were issued on 11 October 2024.[16]In her original claim form, the Claimant sought relief against Barclays PBTL, Barclays (albeit the Claimant gave an address for Barclays in the Isle of Man), and the Receivers.[17]The Claimant’s claim form was then amended prior to service pursuant to CPR r.17.1(1) (although the amended claim form erroneously records that it was amended pursuant to an Order of Master Kaye dated 20 November 2024). The amendment effectively removed Barclays PBTL as a defendant to the claim, and removed any reference to the Manx address for Barclays. That amended claim form is the current version of the Claimant’s claim form. I refer to it below as the ‘Current Claim Form’.[18]In the Current Claim Form, the Claimant claims to be “the beneficial owner of” the Property. However, in her original (and indeed current) particulars of claim, which were supported by a statement of truth signed by the Claimant on 8 October 2024, and which I refer to below as the ‘Current Particulars of Claim’, the Claimant does not provide any coherent explanation as to how her beneficial ownership of the Property is said to arise.[19]On the contrary: the Claimant avers (at paragraph 20 of the Current Particulars of Claim) that GSHL (this is another incorrect reference to the original purchaser, which as I have said was in fact GIHL) held the lease of the Property acquired in 1998 on a resulting or constructive trust for a BVI incorporated company called Direct Investments Limited, (‘DIL’) or for another BVI incorporated company called Prasan PTC Limited (‘Prasan’), or both, who in turn held their interest for, or on, a trust called the ABC Trust, which is said to have been settled in 1995, and subsequently for, or on, another trust called the Prasan Trust, and ultimately for the beneficiaries of those trusts. DIL, Prasan, the ABC Trust, and the Prasan Trust are all companies or trusts associated with the Claimant’s family. This resulting or constructive trust is said to bind Meadswell as successor in title.[20]The pleading of this alleged resulting or constructive trust is obscure, but for present purposes the important point is that the Claimant alleges in the Current Particulars of Claim that Meadswell holds the Property on trust for corporate entities, which holds it for, or on, the trusts of one or more trusts, of which trusts the Claimant is a member of the class of beneficiaries. That is not a pleading that the Claimant is the beneficial owner of the Property in her own right.[21]The Claimant also avers in the Current Claim Form that her beneficial interest in the Property is an interest which overrides Barclays’ interest, on the basis that “[w]henD1approved the loan they failed to obtain the consent of the Claimant and did not enquire about the Claimant’s basis of occupation accordingly pursuant to section 28 and/or 30 of, and paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Land Registration Act 2002 the Claimant has an overriding interest by virtue of her occupation. The Claimant seeks a declaration that she has an overriding interest, a declaration that the charge is void and an order removing the charge from the Land Registry.”[22]In this context, it seems that “the loan” means the current loan (which was originally made in 2007 by Barclays PBTL, the benefit of which was assigned to Barclays in 2016, and pursuant to which the Receivers have been appointed) and “the charge” is a reference to the 2007 Charge. However, that loan and that charge were originally “approved”, not by Barclays, but by Barclays PBTL. Endeavouring to construe this in a manner favourable to the Claimant, her current case seems to be that: i) she is the beneficial owner of the Property because Meadswell holds the Property on a constructive or resulting trust for certain BVI companies, which hold their interest for certain trusts, of which the Claimant is one of the beneficiaries; and that ii) her beneficial interest overrides Meadswell’s legal interest and overrides Barclays’ interest because the Claimant was in actual occupation when the 2007 Charge was granted, and Barclays PBTL (which was the entity that made the loan secured by that charge) failed to obtain the Claimant’s consent or to enquire as to the basis of her occupation of the Property.[23]Barclays then filed and served a defence, and the Receivers filed and served a defence and counterclaim seeking possession of the Property. In their respective defences, the Defendants rely on the Claimant’s execution of the Letter of Consent. Further, the Receivers aver thatBarclays is entitled to be subrogated to rights under prior securities that were discharged by the 2007 Charge, including in respect of the 2002 Charge to which the Claimant consented.[24]On 14 April 2025, the Claimant issued the present amendment application. The amendment application was accompanied by draft amended particulars of claim. By paragraph 6 of those draft amended particulars of claim, the Claimant sought to allege that the purchase of the Property “was funded by the Claimant’s father-in-law, Mr M L Mittal, and various entities owned directly or indirectly by Mr M L Mittal or other family members. For tax reasons, Renaissance Court was purchased by [GIHL] but it was intended from the outset by the Claimant and those controlling the entities which financed the purchase that6.1 The Claimant was to have exclusive possession of Renaissance Court (albeit it was expected that the Claimant would decide to share Renaissance Court with her husband and children, and allow other family members to stay as and when required);6.2 Renaissance Court would provide a home for the Claimant for life (unless she decided to move elsewhere); and6.3 The Claimant and/or her husband would pay for the utilities and arrange any necessary maintenance and repairs.” I will refer to these alleged intentions below as the ‘Alleged Intentions’.[25]The Claimant sought to aver that: i) representations made to her that these Alleged Intentions would be carried into effect amounted to an implied contract to grant her a tenancy for life of the Property which, by operation of law, would take effect as a contract of lease for a 90 year term terminable on death, and which would therefore give rise to an equitable lease in her favour; and that ii) this equitable lease survived the merger of the leasehold and freehold estates, and constituted an interest in the Property that would override Barclays’ interest, on the basis that the Claimant was in actual occupation of the Property.[26]The Defendants opposed the application, and a hearing was listed before Master Kaye on 28 July 2025. However, in the skeleton argument filed shortly before that hearing, the Claimant’s counsel indicated that the Claimant would seek to amend the amendment application. On 25 July 2025, new draft amended particulars of claim were provided by the Claimant. For obvious reasons, the hearing listed for 28 July 2025 could not proceed effectively. Accordingly, the hearing was vacated and the amendment application was adjourned.[27]On 28 August 2025, the Claimant then provided yet further draft amended particulars of claim. Those are the draft amended particulars of claim in respect of which the Claimant now seeks permission to amend, and I refer to them below as the ‘Draft Amended Particulars of Claim’.[28]In broad summary, the Claimant now seeks to plead as follows: i) Proprietary estoppel claim: a) Mr Mittal, acting as a director of GIHL (or with GIHL’s knowledge) represented to the Claimant that the Alleged Intentions would be carried into effect, with the result that she would have exclusive possession of the Property, and that it would be her home for life, or until she no longer wished to reside there. b) As a result of those alleged representations, and her alleged reliance on them in relocating from Kolkata to London, it would be unconscionable for GIHL to deny her entitlement to live in the Property for the rest of her life. c) Accordingly, the Claimant is said to have acquired an equity by estoppel. d) The Claimant’s equity is said to bind Meadswell as GIHL’s successor in title because the Claimant was in evident actual occupation of the Property at the date that Meadswell acquired the Property, and it is averred that no enquiry was made by Meadswell of her occupation of the Property. ii) Common intention constructive trust claim: a) The Alleged Intentions are also said to have been the common intention of the Claimant and GIHL (acting via Mr Mittal as its director). b) The Claimant is said to have relied to her detriment on that common intention by relocating from Kolkata to London. c) As a result, GIHL is said to have held the Property on a common intention constructive trust for the Claimant on the terms of the Alleged Intentions. d) Again, it is said that this interest under a constructive trust is an interest that overrides Meadswell’s interest in the Property, because the Claimant was in evident actual occupation of the Property at the time that Meadswell acquired its interest, and no enquiry of the Claimant’s interest was made. iii) Declaration that the Claimant’s interest overrides Barclays’ interest: As I have mentioned, in her Current Claim Form, the Claimant avers that her beneficial interest in the Property overrides the interest of Barclays as mortgagee, on the basis that she was in evident actual occupation of the Property at the time that the 2007 Charge was granted and no enquiry was made of her as to the basis of her occupation of the Property. In respect of the Letter of Consent, the Claimant now seeks to aver that “the letter of consent dated 8 March 2002 specifically related (on its true construction) only to the Legal Charge, over the now-extinct legal estate.” iv) Rescission of the Licence: The Claimant also seeks to aver that the Licence should be rescinded on the grounds that her execution of it was procured by the misrepresentation of Meadswell’s servants or agents (that the Licence Agreement would “strengthen her position” in respect of the Property, whereas in fact it is inconsistent with the interest which the Claimant now seeks to allege she has in the Property). v) Determination as to the validity of the Receivers’ appointment: Finally, the Claimant wishes to aver that the Receivers’ appointment is a “purported” appointment, the validity of which she does not admit. She wishes to seek a determination as to the validity of the Receivers’ appointment.[29]The Claimant also seeks to join Meadswell as an additional defendant to the claim and permission to serve the amended claim on Meadswell out of the jurisdiction. The parties agree that, if I give permission to amend the claim, the orders for joinder and service out would follow on the basis that Meadswell, as the legal owner of the Property, would clearly be a necessary party to the amended claim, and on the basis that this court has jurisdiction to determine that claim against Meadswell.

Legal principles

[30]Subject only to certain differences of emphasis, the applicable legal principles were largely common ground between the parties.[31]Pursuant to CPR r.17.1(2)(b), the Claimant requires the court’s permission to amend her claim. The court has a broad discretion whether to grant permission to amend: CPR r.17.3. In the exercise of that discretion, the court will apply well-established principles, which were very helpfully summarised by Nicklin J in Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB), at [140]:
“(1) The threshold test for permission to amend is the same as that applied in summary judgment applications: Elite Property Holdings Ltd -v- Barclays Bank plc [2019] EWCA Civ 204 [40]-[42] per Asplin LJ (“the merits test”). (2) Amendments sought to be made to a statement of case must contain sufficient detail to enable the other party and the Court to understand the case that is being advanced, and they must disclose reasonable grounds upon which to bring or defend the claim: Habibsons Bank Ltd -v- Standard Chartered Bank (HK) Ltd [2011] QB 943 [12] per Moore-Bick LJ. (3) The court is entitled to reject a version of the facts which is implausible, self-contradictory, or not supported by the contemporaneous documents. It is appropriate for the court to consider whether the proposed pleading is coherent and contains the properly particularised elements of the cause of action or defence relied upon: Elite Property Holdings Ltd [42] per Asplin LJ. (4) In addition to being coherent and properly particularised, the pleading must be supported by evidence which establishes a proper factual basis which meets the merits test: Zu Sayn-Wittgenstein -v- Borbón y Borbón [2023] 1 WLR 1162 [65] per Simler LJ. (5) In an area of law which is developing, and where its boundaries are drawn incrementally based on decided cases, it is not normally appropriate summarily to dispose of the claim or defence. In such areas, development of the law should proceed on the basis of actual facts found at trial and not on the basis of hypothetical facts assumed to be true on an application to strike out: Farah -v- British Airways plc [1999] EWCA Civ 3052 [42]-[43] per Chadwick LJ.”
[32]The merits test for granting amendments is the same as that for summary judgment, in respect of which Nicklin J provided an equally helpful summary in Amersi v Leslie, supra, at [142] (which I bear in mind, but do not set out in full in this judgment). Referring to Elite Property Holdings, at [42], Mr Mohyuddin KC on behalf of the Defendants submitted that the burden of satisfying the merits test is on the Claimant. I agree.[33]I was also referred to the judgment of the Master of the Rolls and Newey LJ in CNM Estates (Tolworth Tower) Limited v Carvill-Biggs [2023] EWCA Civ 480, in which their Lordships said, at [75] – [76], as follows:
“[A]n application for permission to amend particulars of claim will be refused if the amendments put forward a new case which would have “no real prospect of succeeding” within the meaning of CPR Part 24. Beyond that, the Court has to strike a balance between the interests of the applicant and those of other parties and litigants more generally: “[i]n essence, the court must, taking account of the overriding objective, balance the injustice to the party seeking to amend if it is refused permission, against the need for finality in litigation and the injustice to the other parties and other litigants, if the amendment is permitted” (Nesbit Law Group LLP v. Acasta European Insurance Company Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 268, at [41] per Vos LJ). Aside from very late amendments, we do not think the perceived strength of the case is normally a factor to be taken into account when undertaking that balancing exercise.

(d) ]: “lateness is not an absolute, but a relative concept”

. There will therefore perhaps be cases where the quality of the delay is unclear. In such cases, it may be necessary to consider, as Carr J suggested:
“a review of the nature of the proposed amendment, the quality of the explanation for its timing, and a fair appreciation of the consequences in terms of work wasted and consequential work to be done”
. But even if it is necessary to adopt that approach when the amendment is on the cusp of being “late” and “very late”, it will never be appropriate to attempt to conduct a mini-trial.”[34]It will be seen that their Lordships applied the merits test to amendments which “put forward a new case.” At paragraph [77] of their judgment, they also referred with approval to the decision of HH Judge Eyre QC (as he then was) in Scott v Singh [2020] EWHC 1714 (Comm), at [19], that, in the context of an application for permission to amend a statement of case, the merits test applies to a “new case set out in the proposed pleading.”[35]Thus, the application of the merits test is limited to any new case advanced in, or by, the proposed amendments. In his oral submissions, Mr Mohyuddin KC agreed with that proposition, which also seems to me to be right in principle: in the context of an application for permission to amend a statement of case, the true purpose of the merits test is to separate the wheat of viable amendments from the chaff of incoherent, inadequate, or hopeless amendments. Evidently, identifying and isolating the extent to which a proposed amended pleading puts forward a new case itself requires an exercise of judgment on the court’s part.[36]In my judgment, where an opposing party contends that the applicant's original case contains a fatal flaw that would in any event require the claim to be struck out or to be the subject of reverse summary judgment, the proper course is to apply directly for that relief. It is not to resist amendments that are themselves adequately pleaded, coherent, and (to the extent they introduce a new case) satisfy the merits test.[37]Finally, even if proposed amendments satisfy the merits test, the court retains a discretion to refuse permission to amend.

The parties’ submissions

[38]The Claimant was represented at the hearing by Mr Chai. In his candid submissions, Mr Chai accepted that the amendments now proposed by the Claimant were intended to cure issues with the Claimant’s Current Particulars of Claim. He also accepted that the amendments could have been made sooner, although he submitted that the amendments do not constitute “very late” amendments, such that, so long as the amendments pass the merits test, the strength of the Claimant’s case is not a factor to be taken into account in determining whether to grant permission to amend.[39]Mr Chai submitted that the case the Claimant now seeks to advance is plausible, not self-contradictory, and not contradicted by any of the contemporaneous documents.[40]In respect of the proposed amendments to the Claimant’s case in respect of her alleged beneficial interest in the Property, Mr Chai submitted that the basic elements of both a proprietary estoppel claim and a common intention constructive trust claim are now pleaded. He submitted that the Claimant’s evidence is that Mr Mittal, who is said to have been a director of GIHL at the relevant time, gave her assurances that the Property would be “her home… for life”. On the basis of those assurances, which are said to have been the common intention of both the original purchaser of the leasehold estate in the Property (GIHL) and of the Claimant, the Claimant acted to her detriment in relocating herself and her family from Kolkata to London. The Claimant is therefore entitled to an equity in the Property by estoppel, or is the beneficial owner of the Property via the imposition of a constructive trust. Mr Chai characterised the Claimant’s interest under this trust as being a life interest, as opposed to an absolute interest.[41]As to the Claimant’s case as to how this interest is said to have endured and now to bind Barclays, the Claimant’s case remains broadly as set out in her Current Claim Form, namely that her interest is an overriding interest because she was in evident actual occupation of the Property at the time that the 2007 Charge was granted. Her case is that she did not consent to the postponement of her interest to that charge, and no enquiries were made as to the basis of her occupation at that time.[42]In respect of the Letter of Consent executed by the Claimant, Mr Chai submitted that, once Meadswell purchased the freehold of the Property, the leasehold estate, along with the original 2002 Charge over it, was extinguished.[43]In that regard, I asked Mr Chai what the Claimant’s position was in respect of the Bank’s case that it is entitled to be subrogated to the extinguished charge to which the Claimant explicitly consented via the Letter of Consent. Mr Chai acknowledged that, as a matter of general principle, the Bank is entitled to be subrogated to the rights under the charge that was extinguished via its loan, but submitted that the court should not “put the cart before the horse” by determining that issue at this stage.[44]As to the Claimant’s proposed claim to rescind the Licence, Mr Chai referred me to the Claimant’s evidence in support of this application, in which she alleges that she executed the Licence on the basis of representations made to her by Messrs Ashok Agrawal and Umesh Somani, who are said to have “managed the family office”, and are alleged to have been Meadswell’s agents, that the Licence would record the terms of her occupation of the Property as originally explained to her by Mr Mittal, whereas in fact the Licence is inconsistent with that alleged explanation. Mr Chai submitted that this gave rise to an arguable claim that the Claimant’s execution of the 2007 Licence had been procured by a misrepresentation by Meadswell’s servants or agents.[45]The Defendants were represented at the hearing by Mr Mohyuddin KC and Mr Edwards. Opening his submissions, Mr Mohyuddin KC characterised the Claimant’s claim as “audacious”, on the basis that the Claimant seeks effectively to take free of a multi-million pound mortgage secured against the Property in favour of a third-party lender.[46]Mr Mohyuddin KC criticised the Current Particulars of Claim as hopelessly confused and incoherent. He took the court through the various iterations of the Claimant’s case as to the beneficial ownership of the Property, beginning with the way in which it was articulated in the correspondence I refer to at paragraphs 11 - 13 above, and traversing the Current Particulars of Claim and the various earlier versions of draft amended particulars of claim provided by the Claimant. Mr Mohyuddin KC submitted that the Claimant’s earlier articulations of her case as to the beneficial ownership of the Property were inconsistent with the case now set out in the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim.[47]In respect of the Claimant’s proposed proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trust claims, Mr Mohyuddin KC submitted that the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim have no real prospects of success. He submitted that, even as pleaded in the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim, the Alleged Intentions, and the alleged representations/assurances to the Claimant that they would be carried into effect, are at their highest no more than an intention that the Claimant be entitled to the use of the Property, as opposed to an intention that she obtain beneficial ownership of the Property.[48]As to the Claimant’s alleged detrimental reliance, Mr Mohyuddin KC submitted that there is “no case on detriment” pleaded. He submitted that the reliance pleaded – that the Claimant relocated from Kolkata to London with her family and her possessions – is insufficient to found an equity in the Property in her favour.[49]Mr Mohyuddin KC naturally placed heavy reliance on the Letter of Consent. He submitted that the Claimant’s execution of the Letter of Consent defeats her claim. When she was asked to sign it, she did not assert any overriding interest when she could be expected to have done so. That was the Claimant’s opportunity to assert her alleged beneficial interest in the Property, and she failed to do so.[50]In respect of subrogation, Mr Mohyuddin KC submitted that this is also a complete answer to the Claimant’s case that her beneficial interest in the Property overrides the bank’s interest. I asked Mr Mohyuddin KC whether Barclays’ right to be subrogated to the rights under the securities that were discharged by the 2007 Charge is limited to the quantum of the earlier loans (perhaps plus interest). He submitted that it was not because the earlier 2002 Charge was an “all moneys” charge, although I was not referred to any authority on the issue and the point was not developed in submissions.[51]As to the Claimant’s proposed claim to rescind the Licence, Mr Mohyuddin KC referred to the fact that the Claimant previously relied on the document which she now seeks to rescind. He observed that the proposed claim is based on an alleged misrepresentation by Mr Agrawal and Mr Somani as Meadswell’s servants or agents, but that neither was a director of Meadswell at the relevant time. He submitted that their authority to act on behalf of Meadswell is a necessary ingredient of the claim, and that it is missing in the proposed pleading.[52]Finally, in respect of the Claimant’s proposed claim to put in issue the validity of the Receivers’ appointment, Mr Mohyuddin KC characterised this as an attempt by the Claimant to withdraw her previous admission (paragraph 3 of the Current Particulars of Claim avers in terms that the Receivers have been appointed as LPA receivers of the Property). He submitted that the Claimant has not articulated any basis to put the validity of the Receivers’ appointment in issue, and her bare attempt to do so stands no real prospects of success.

Disposal of the application

(a) The amendment application

[53]In my judgment, the Claimant should be permitted to amend her claim to plead her proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trust claims.[54]I consider that the bare essentials of a coherent claim by the Claimant to a beneficial interest in the Property have been articulated: i) The Draft Amended Particulars of Claim articulate a comprehensible case that the Claimant and (via Mr Mittal) the original purchaser of the long lease of the Property shared, as their common intention, the Alleged Intentions, and that assurances were made to the Claimant that these Alleged Intentions would be carried into effect. In circumstances in which the Property appears to have been acquired via a sophisticated offshore trust and corporate structure, the court’s starting point at trial may well be one of scepticism as to whether the Claimant was really led to believe, or could in fact have believed, that she would obtain an interest in the Property personally. That scepticism is likely to be reinforced by the way in which the Claimant’s position has shifted over time. However, without conducting an (impermissible) mini-trial, it is impossible for me to conclude on a summary basis that the Claimant’s case as to the Alleged Intentions and the assurances said to have been made to her is untrue. ii) There is also a comprehensible allegation that the Claimant relied to her detriment on the Alleged Intentions by relocating herself and her family from Kolkata to London. Mr Mohyuddin KC submits that the Claimant does not have a viable case that the detriment she has allegedly suffered in this regard is proportional to the equity she seeks to assert in the Property. Again, without conducting a mini-trial it seems to me to be impossible to reach any final conclusion as to the significance of the detriment (if any) suffered by the Claimant, and the effect of this on any equity in her favour. In that regard, I bear in mind that the court’s jurisdiction to grant relief to give effect to an equity by estoppel is flexible and will be exercised taking into account all the circumstances of the case. iii) As to Mr Mohyuddin KC’s submission that the Alleged Intentions relate to the use, as opposed to the beneficial ownership of, the Property: while I was referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776 as to the general requirements for the imposition of a common intention constructive trust, I was not referred to any authority that a common intention that a property would be a “home… for life” is incapable as a matter of law of founding an interest under a constructive trust. The point was not developed any further before me, and it does not seem to me that I can conclude at this stage that the claim stands no prospects of success on that basis. iv) There is nothing in the contemporaneous documents that is inconsistent with the Claimant’s assertion of a beneficial interest in the Property per se. In particular, the Letter of Consent is not inconsistent with the Claimant having obtained an equity in the Property capable of being asserted against the original purchaser, or against Meadswell. Rather, the effect of the Letter of Consent is to postpone that interest (if any) to the security under the 2002 Charge.[55]Evidently this is all very far from being a ringing endorsement of the proposed claim. However, it seems to me that it is impossible at this stage to characterise the Claimant’s proposed new case as to her beneficial interest in the Property as either misconceived in law or so fanciful as to be capable of being summarily dismissed. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the low bar of the merits test for the grant of permission to amend is surmounted. As the amendments are not “very late” amendments, I should not therefore reject the amendments on the basis that the proposed claim is implausible, weak, or thin. In my judgment, the proper forum for the determination of this case is not on the application for permission to amend, but at trial.[56]As to the Defendants’ reliance on the Letter of Consent and the doctrine of subrogation: i) This relates to an aspect of the Claimant’s case – the assertion that her beneficial interest in the Property is an interest which overrides the bank’s interest – which in my judgment is already a feature of the Claimant’s case. While it is developed by the proposed amendments, the fundamental assertion that the Claimant’s beneficial interest in the Property (such as it is) overrides Barclays’ interest is already set out in her Current Claim Form. ii) It therefore seems to me that the Claimant’s assertion that her interest in the Property is an overriding interest is not the assertion of a new case to which the merits test should be applied. Rather, it is an aspect of the Claimant’s case as originally formulated, which is largely unaffected by the proposed amendments. iii) Accordingly, and if the Defendants are correct that this represents a fatal flaw in the Claimant’s case, it is a flaw that is already present in the Current Claim Form, in respect of which (applying the principles I set out at 34 - 36 above) the appropriate course of action would be for the Defendants to apply for reverse summary judgment on the claim. In this regard, Mr Mohyuddin KC suggested that he might make an oral application for reverse summary judgment. I did not permit such an application to be made, because I considered that it would be unfair to the Claimant to do so. For the avoidance of doubt, this does not bar the Defendants from making any application they see fit to make in the future.[57]In any event, based on the submissions made to me, I have not reached the conclusion that subrogation represents a fatal flaw to the Claimant’s case. Mr Chai accepted that, as a matter of general principle, Barclays would be entitled to be subrogated to earlier securities that were discharged by the 2007 Charge. However, beyond that, the potential legal arguments available to the parties in relation to subrogation (for example, in respect of my question to Mr Mohyuddin KC whether Barclays’ rights via subrogation were limited by the quantum of the discharged loans) were not developed before me in any detail. That only serves to reinforce my view that the Claimant’s amendment application is not the appropriate forum in which to determine this issue.[58]As to the Claimant’s proposed claim to rescind the Licence, the Claimant’s case is that her execution of the Licence was induced by the misrepresentation of Mr Agrawal and Mr Somani, who are said to have been Meadswell’s servants or agents. However, Mr Mohyuddin KC is right to submit that the Claimant has not provided proper particulars as to how it is said that Mr Agrawal and Mr Somani were appointed or authorised to act as Meadswell’s servants or agents. In the circumstances, I will defer my determination of this aspect of the amendment application, and I will direct the Claimant to provide proper particulars of the basis on which it is said that Mr Agrawal and Mr Somani were authorised to act on behalf of Meadswell.[59]Finally, as to the Claimant’s proposed amendment to place in issue the validity of the Receivers’ appointment, I agree with Mr Mohyuddin KC that the Claimant has articulated no sustainable basis on which the appointment might be challenged or questioned. On the contrary, the validity of the Receivers’ appointment is apparent on the face of the documents. I therefore refuse permission to amend the claim to put the validity of the Receivers’ appointment in issue.

(b) Joinder of Meadswell and service out of the jurisdiction

[60]It was common ground that, if and to the extent that I gave permission to amend, I should join Meadswell as an additional party to the claim and give the Claimant permission to serve the amended claim out of the jurisdiction on Meadswell. I agree that those are appropriate orders to make, and I will make those orders.

Conclusion

[61]At the outset of the hearing, I observed to Mr Chai that the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim are formally defective, in that they purport to show amendments (and re-amendments) to an earlier version of the draft amended particulars of claim. In fact, pursuant to CPR PD 17 paragraph 2.2-2.4, the amendments should be shown as ‘track changes’ to the Current Particulars of Claim. Mr Chai agreed and undertook to provide the court with a version of the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim showing the amendments to the Current Particulars of Claim.[62]I therefore intend to direct the Claimant to file and serve a further version of the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim setting out, in the correct format, the amendments for which I have given permission. This should include the proposed amendments in respect of the Claimant’s claim to rescind the Licence, which should set out proper particulars of the Claimant’s case as to how it is said that Mr Agrawal and Mr Somani were appointed or authorised to act as Meadswell’s servants or agents. In light of the extent of the amendments, the Claimant should also file and serve a ‘clean’ version of the Draft Amended Particulars of Claim that does not show the original text.[63]Subject to that, I will hear the parties on the deferred issue (whether I should grant permission to amend to bring a claim to rescind the Licence) and on the appropriate form of order consequential on this judgment, including in respect of costs.