“[B7] In summary, the following general propositions can, in my judgment, be derived from the authorities to which I was referred in relation to the duties of directors: (i) Directors have, both collectively and individually, a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as directors. (ii) Whilst directors are entitled (subject to the articles of association of the company) to delegate particular functions to those below them in the management chain, and to trust their competence and integrity to a reasonable extent, the exercise of the power of delegation does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated functions. (iii) No rule of universal application can be formulated as to the duty referred to in (ii) above. The extent of the duty, and the question whether it has been discharged, must depend on the facts of each particular case, including the director’s role in the management of the company.”
“[16] The approach of the judge in this case was to seek to test the evidence by reference to both the contemporary documentary evidence and its absence. In my judgment, this was an approach that he was entitled to take. The evidence of the liquidator established a prima facie case and, given that the books and papers had been in the custody and control of the respondents to the proceedings, it was open to the judge to infer that the liquidator’s case would have been borne out by those books and papers. [17] Put another way, it was not open to the respondents to the proceedings in the circumstances of this case to escape liability by asserting that, if the books and papers or other evidence had been available, they would have shown that they were not liable in the amount claimed by the liquidator. Moreover, persons who have conducted the affairs of limited companies with a high degree of informality, as in this case, cannot seek to avoid liability or to be judged by some lower standard than that which applies to other directors, simply because the necessary documentation is not available.”
“(1) If in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against– (a) an officer of a company, … it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case … he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit.”
“Status 5.1 The Consultant shall at all times up to the End Date be the employee of the [Company]. Neither the [Company] nor the Consultant is the employee, worker, agent, partner or servant of the [Agency] or the Client and the [Company] shall not hold itself out as such and shall procure that the Consultant shall not hold himself out as such.”
“I became more reliant on Shahid to help me with SJ Pay ... We would speak every day, and all key decisions would be run past me. I trusted him with running the business properly.”
“[76] I accept that what was said by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Target applies to the assessment of the equitable compensation payable by Mr Raja for breaches of the fiduciary duties which he owed to the Company as its director during the Relevant Period. So far as the claim is one for damages at common law it seems to me that ordinary principles of compensation apply. In both cases the essential factual question is what sum is required to put the Company into the position in which it would have been if Mr Raja’s breaches of duty had not occurred. [77] The answer to this question, on the evidence before me, seems to me to be straightforward. The business of the Company, as explained by Ms Brittain in her evidence, was to trade as an umbrella company, as such companies are known, providing staff to staffing agencies in the medical field. The Company acted as the employer of these staff. As the employer the Company administered the payroll function of the staff provided to the agencies. These staff were the employees of the Company. The Company received from its clients the gross wages payable to these staff, and also charged VAT on these payments. If therefore the Company had been properly run by its directors, including Mr Raja, it would have had the funds available both to account to the Revenue for the PAYE and NIC elements of the gross wages of its employees, and to account to the Revenue for the VAT charged to its customers. Instead virtually all of these funds, which should have been used to account to the Revenue for the Company’s tax liabilities, were unlawfully diverted out of the Company in the form of the UCL Funds, by the Known Transfers and the Unknown Transfers. The result is that the Company has been left with a substantial liability to the Revenue which, save for what can be realised in respect of the Company’s assets, the Company has no means of discharging. I accept that this situation would not have occurred but for Mr Raja’s breaches of his duties, as a de jure and de facto director of the Company, during the Relevant Period.”