“While the [TH defendants] make no admissions as to the merits of the claims and allegations now pleaded against them, they are in principle willing to agree to the proposed amendments to the Particulars of Claim. However, such agreement is subject to: 1.3.1 further clarification from the Claimant regarding the unlawful loans claim; and 1.3.2 confirmation that the Claimant shall pay the Defendants' costs of and occasioned by the amendments to the Particulars of Claim, along with our clients' costs of their strike-out / summary judgment application.”
“§§4-5 (de facto directors). The existing pleading is that “SL did not have separate board meetings, instead, all of its business and legal decisions were taken by the First to Fifth Defendants as part of SGL board meetings” (so they were shadow directors for which a remedy was sought). The new plea adds the alternative text “…all of its business and legal decisions were taken by the First to Fifth Defendants as part of SGL board meetings and/or as part of SL board meetings held simultaneously with SGL board meetings”
“That is why a contested amendment which seeks to introduce a new basis of claim or ground of defence into proceedings, for example a new allegation that there was an implied term in a contract, will not be allowed if the party seeking to amend has no real prospect of success upon it. It would be pointless to allow the amendment if the other party could then obtain summary judgment against that head of claim or that ground of defence or that issue. All that is very different from an application to amend by giving further particulars based on factual material in support of an existing plea. In my judgment the court should not on such an application conduct an assessment of whether each of the various particulars which it is sought to introduce have a real prospect of supporting that plea. Those are matters for trial.”
“8…An application to amend by giving further particulars should not be turned by a side wind into a strike out or reverse summary judgment application…”
“that the courts sometimes had difficulty in deciding whether a new cause of action had arisen in circumstances where different facts were alleged to constitute a breach of an already pleaded duty…”
“The substance and purpose of the exception in subsection (5) is thus based on the assumption that the party against whom the proposed amendment is directed will not be prejudiced because that party will, for the purposes of the pre-existing matters [in] issue, already have had to investigate the same or substantially the same facts.”
“In September and October 2018 the First and Sixth Defendants received funds from SL totalling£105,790 and£20,000 respectively as an unlawful loan or preferential payments.”
“Either the Second Defendant’s above£105,590 payments from SL to the First Defendant were illegal loans to him which the Claimant asks the Court to void and require the First and Second Defendant to repay or they were payments in preference and the Claimants seek repayment.”
“In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Begum[2010] EWHC 1799 (Ch) ; [2011] B.P.I.R. 59 (David Richards J) the judge noted that, whilst this distinction is clear, it might be thought to lead to some tautology when applying the test in s.35(5)(a) as to whether “the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as are already in issue on any claim previously made in the original action”
“As the Court of Appeal emphasised in Lloyds Bank Plc v Rogers (No.2) [1999] 3 E.G.L.R. 83, per Auld LJ at p.85: ” “It is important to note that what makes a new claim as defined in s.35(2) is not the newness of the claim according to the type or quantum of remedy sought, but the newness of the cause of action which it involves. The formula employed in s.35(2)(a) and (5) is ‘a claim involving … the addition or substitution of a new cause of action’.”
“3.3. the Third to Fifth Defendants were non-executive directors of SGL … The Third to Fifth Defendants were also shadow directors of SL; ”
“40. 30. Further or alternatively, in approving and entering into the Assignment for£0 on behalf SL, not for any legitimate purpose but for the purpose of putting AdyptUK beyond the reach of SL’s creditors so that it could continue to be developed and exploited for the benefit of the First to Sixth Defendants as shareholders in SGL, t The First to Fifth Defendants acted in breach of each of theirfollowing duties owed by themto SL as its directors or shadow directors as follows:”
“41. 31. By reason of the First and Second Defendants’ breaches of duty as directors and the Third to Fifth Defendants' as directors or shadow directors, SL suffered loss and damage comprising: (i) the loss of the market value of AdyptUK at30 August 2017 ; (ii) the loss of profits from future licence income that AdyptUK would have generated for SL but for the Assignment; and (iii) and the loss of market value profits from fees that ought to have been charged for development services provided to the Seventh Defendant without payment (see paragraphs 27 above 35 to 37 below).”
“I would interpose at this point by observing that in my judgment an allegation that a defendant acted as de facto or shadow director, without distinguishing between the two, is embarrassing. It suggests—and counsel's submissions to me support the inference—that the liquidator takes the view that de facto or shadow directors are very similar, that their roles overlap, and that it may not be possible to determine in any given case whether a particular person was a de facto or a shadow director. I do not accept that at all. The terms do not overlap. They are alternatives, and in most and perhaps all cases are mutually exclusive. A de facto director is a person who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a director by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, although never actually or validly appointed as such. To establish that a person was a de facto director of a company it is necessary to plead and prove that he undertook functions in relation to the company which could properly be discharged only by a director. It is not sufficient to show that he was concerned in the management of the company's affairs or undertook tasks in relation to its business which can properly be performed by a manager below board level. A de facto director, I repeat, is one who claims to act and purports to act as director, although not validly appointed as such. A shadow director, by contrast, does not claim or purport to act as director. On the contrary, he claims not to be a director. He lurks in the shadows, sheltering behind others who, he claims, are the only directors of the company to the exclusion of himself. He is not held out as a director by the company.”
“The liquidator submitted that where a body corporate is a director of a company, whether it be a de jure, de facto or shadow director, its own directors must ipso facto be shadow directors of the company. In my judgment that simply does not follow. Attendance at board meetings and voting, with others, may in certain limited circumstances expose a director to personal liability to the company of which he is a director or its creditors. But it does not, without more, constitute him a director of any company of which his company is a director.”
“The words “without more” are important. They indicate that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director will not be enough for that individual to become a de facto director of the subject company.”
“31. … Provisionally it seems to me that that term is to be tested against the usual split of powers between shareholders and directors under Table A i.e.. on the basis that the powers of management of the company's business are delegated to the directors and the shareholders cannot intervene except by special resolution. On that basis it means a person who either alone or with others has ultimate control of the management of any part of the company's business. In the usual case, in my judgment, it would not include a purely negative role of giving or receiving permission for some business activity. 32. The role of a de facto or shadow director need not extend over the whole range of a company's activities (…). A person may be both a shadow director and a de facto director at the same time (...) Practical points: what makes a person a de facto director? 33. Lord Collins sensibly held that there was no one definitive test for a de facto director. The question is whether he was part of the corporate governance system of the company and whether he assumed the status and function of a director so as to make himself responsible as if he were a director. However, a number of points arise out of Holland and the previous cases which are of general practical importance in determining who is a de facto director. I note these points in the following paragraphs. 34. The concepts of shadow director and de facto are different but there is some overlap. 35. A person may be de facto director even if there was no invalid appointment. The question is whether he has assumed responsibility to act as a director. 36. To answer that question, the court may have to determine in what capacity the director was acting (as in Holland). 37. The court will in general also have to determine the corporate governance structure of the company so as to decide in relation to the company's business whether the defendant's acts were directorial in nature. 38. The court is required to look at what the director actually did and not any job title actually given to him. 39. A defendant does not avoid liability if he shows that he in good faith thought he was not acting as a director. The question whether or not he acted as a director is to be determined objectively and irrespective of the defendant's motivation or belief. 40. The court must look at the cumulative effect of the activities relied on. The court should look at all the circumstances "in the round" (per Jonathan Parker J in Secretary of State v Jones). 41. It is also important to look at the acts in their context. A single act might lead to liability in an exceptional case. 42. Relevant factors include: i) whether the company considered him to be a director and held him out as such; ii) whether third parties considered that he was a director; 43. The fact that a person is consulted about directorial decisions or his approval does not in general make him a director because he is not making the decision. 44. Acts outside the period when he is said to have been a de facto director may throw light on whether he was a de facto director in the relevant period.”
“SGL board meetings were held for SGL and also acted as a decision making forum also for its subsidiaries. Matters discussed included, inter alia, software development in Hong Kong, UK and Thailand; sales and marketing activities in Hong Kong and Thailand; live production issues of other software in Thailand.”
“40.1 By approving and causing SL to enter into the Assignment, they brought about the transfer of AdyptUK, SL’s only valuable asset for no or no valuable consideration. This was obviously inimical to the promotion of SL’s success and contrary to the interests of SL’s creditors at a time when the company was insolvent, bordering on insolvency or probably destined for insolvent liquidation or administration. 40.2. Having caused the gratuitous transfer of AdyptUK, they then caused or allowed SL to provide services to the Seventh Defendant to further develop it without charge. The free provision of services and the diversion of the developed version of AdyptUK to the Seventh Defendant was also contrary to the successful promotion of SL and to its interests generally including those of its creditors. 40.3 In transferring AdyptUK to the Seventh Defendant, with whom they were connected via SGL, continuing to use the expertise of SL’s employees to develop AdyptUK and diverting the developed version of AdyptUK to the Seventh Defendant for the benefit of SGL and, by extension, themselves, they acted in a conflict of interest and preferred the interests of themselves, SGL and/or the Seventh Defendant over those of SL. 40.4. In approving and/or completing the Assignment, they failed to declare their interest as shareholders of SGL. 40.5. In doing the above, they acted without reasonable care, skill and diligence.”