“a. whether a mental health crisis moratorium was validly initiated under the [Regulations]; b. whether the Defendant's debt to the Claimant falls within the scope of the [Regulations] c. the Claimant's application dated18 April 2022 , pursuant to Regulation 10 of [the Regulations]”
“6. A “moratorium debt” is any qualifying debt— (a) that was incurred by a debtor in relation to whom a moratorium is in place, (b) that was owed by the debtor at the point at which the application for the moratorium was made, and (c) about which information has been provided to the Secretary of State by a debt advice provider under these Regulations.” (a) that was incurred by a debtor in relation to whom a moratorium is in place, (b) that was owed by the debtor at the point at which the application for the moratorium was made, and (c) about which information has been provided to the Secretary of State by a debt advice provider under these Regulations.”
“(1) A “qualifying debt” means any debt or liability other than non-eligible debt.” 12. Paragraph (3) identifies certain particular debts which are to be included; they do not matter here. From there one goes to the definition of “non-eligible debt” in Reg 5(4). That is defined as including a whole raft of debts, including: “(a) secured debt which does not amount to arrears in respect of secured debt …”
“(a) assess whether the debts included in the application are qualifying debts”
“(a) is an individual, (b) owes a qualifying debt to a creditor, (c) is domiciled or ordinarily resident in England or Wales, (d) is not subject to a debt relief order, (e) is not subject to an interim order or individual voluntary arrangement, (f) is not an undischarged bankrupt, and (g) is not subject to a breathing space moratorium or a mental health crisis moratorium.”
“(1) … then the creditor may make an application to the county court on one or both of the grounds in regulation 17(1).”
“In more modern times, many examples can be found of judicial recognition of the constitutional right of unimpeded access to the courts (as Lord Diplock described it in Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd[1974] AC 273 , 310, and again in Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corpn Ltd[1981] AC 909 , 977), which can only be curtailed by clear statutory enactment. Thus, in In re Boaler[1915] 1 KB 21 , where the question was whether a statutory prohibition on vexatious litigants instituting legal proceedings extended to criminal proceedings, the Court of Appeal held that it did not. Scrutton J said at p 36 that although a statute might deprive a subject of the right to appeal to the courts, “the language of any such statute should be jealously watched by the courts, and should not be extended beyond its least onerous meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension.”
“It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject’s recourse to Her Majesty’s courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words.”
“(1) It is a principle of legal policy any interference with established rights and principles recognised by the common law should be expressed in clear terms. This principle forms part of the context against which legislation is enacted and, when interpreting legislation, a court should take it into account. (2) This gives rise to a more specific presumption that ‘fundamental’ common law rights cannot be overridden by general words but only by express words or necessary implication.”
“35. Drawing some threads together: (a) The question is one of statutory construction: what did Parliament intend? As in other cases this will be determined by the words used, read in their context and having regard to the purpose of the provision. (b) Bearing in mind that remedies may be excluded even if they have not yet been established, I find it more helpful to frame the enquiry as being whether Parliament intended the statutory provision in question to provide the exclusive or sole remedy, rather than asking whether an alternative remedy (or at least a particular alternative remedy) was intended to be ousted. (c) Put very shortly, the question can be formulated as whether Parliament intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive, or whether it intended that remedy to co-exist with any other remedy. (d) In the absence of an express exclusion, Hickinbottom LJ’s judgment in Southern Gas sets out some helpful indicators that assist in determining the answer to that question. Ultimately the answer is likely to depend on whether the statutory scheme is incompatible or inconsistent with the availability of other remedies.” (a) The question is one of statutory construction: what did Parliament intend? As in other cases this will be determined by the words used, read in their context and having regard to the purpose of the provision. (b) Bearing in mind that remedies may be excluded even if they have not yet been established, I find it more helpful to frame the enquiry as being whether Parliament intended the statutory provision in question to provide the exclusive or sole remedy, rather than asking whether an alternative remedy (or at least a particular alternative remedy) was intended to be ousted. (c) Put very shortly, the question can be formulated as whether Parliament intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive, or whether it intended that remedy to co-exist with any other remedy. (d) In the absence of an express exclusion, Hickinbottom LJ’s judgment in Southern Gas sets out some helpful indicators that assist in determining the answer to that question. Ultimately the answer is likely to depend on whether the statutory scheme is incompatible or inconsistent with the availability of other remedies.”
“It is unnecessary to quote at length from the cases to which I have already referred. The following propositions can be drawn from them. (i) Where Parliament has legislated for a statutory remedy to apply in certain circumstances, whether that remedy ousts any common law remedy which would or might have arisen on the same facts depends upon whether, on the true construction of the particular statutory provisions, Parliament intended that provision to oust, or co-exist with, the common law remedy. The courts will not maintain a common law remedy in the case of an evident intention of Parliament to displace it (see, eg, Johnson v Unisys Ltd[2003] 1 AC 518 at para 58, per Lord Hoffmann, and para 80, per Lord Millett, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners[2007] 1 AC 558 , para 19 per Lord Hoffmann, and CPAG[2011] 2 AC 15 , para 27, per Dyson JSC). . (ii) Where that intention is not express, the threshold for inferring ouster of common law rights is high; but it is not helpful to approach the question on the basis that there is a presumption against ouster. Nor, before common law rights are displaced, does ouster have to be a necessary implication, in the sense that the common law remedy is only displaced if, as a matter of logic, it cannot co-exist with the statutory regime (although, of course, common law remedies can be ousted by such necessary implication) (CPAG, para 31, per Dyson JSC). (iii) Whether common law remedies are ousted is dependent upon the true construction of the particular statutory provisions. However, where the statutory remedy covers precisely the same ground as the common law remedy, the latter will almost certainly have been excluded by necessary implication (above, at para 33). Furthermore, where the statutory regime provides a special or qualified remedy, it may (although not necessarily will) be inferred that Parliament intended to exclude any common law remedy that would or might arise on the same facts (see, e g, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell at para 19 per Lord Hoffmann, and at para 135 per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). (iv) The identification of some differences between the statutory scheme and the common law remedy will not necessarily lead to an inference that Parliament intended the former to oust the latter. As Dyson JSC put it in CPAG[2011] 2 AC 15 , para 34: “The question is not whether there are any differences between the common law remedy and the statutory scheme. There may well be differences. The question is whether the differences are so substantial that they demonstrate that Parliament could not have intended the common law remedy to survive the introduction of the statutory scheme. The court should not be too ready to find that a common law remedy has been displaced by a statutory one, not least because it is always open to Parliament to make the position clear by stating explicitly whether the statute is intended to be exhaustive. The mere fact that there are some differences between the common law and the statutory positions is unlikely to be sufficient unless they are substantial … The question is whether, looked at as a whole, a common law remedy would be incompatible with the statutory scheme and therefore could not have been intended by [sic] coexist with it.” (Emphasis in the original.)
“The question is not whether there are any differences between the common law remedy and the statutory scheme. There may well be differences. The question is whether the differences are so substantial that they demonstrate that Parliament could not have intended the common law remedy to survive the introduction of the statutory scheme. The court should not be too ready to find that a common law remedy has been displaced by a statutory one, not least because it is always open to Parliament to make the position clear by stating explicitly whether the statute is intended to be exhaustive. The mere fact that there are some differences between the common law and the statutory positions is unlikely to be sufficient unless they are substantial … The question is whether, looked at as a whole, a common law remedy would be incompatible with the statutory scheme and therefore could not have been intended by [sic] coexist with it.” (Emphasis in the original.)
“24 …The 2020 Regulations establish a scheme for the time within which review proceedings may be initiated, may be determined by the debt advice provider, and for any subsequent application to a court. The language used is prescriptive. I can see no reason to go behind the ordinary and clear meaning of those words. As made, the timetable the Regulations set serves a clear and obvious purpose – to ensure that any review is conducted promptly following the decision to make the moratorium … The court has no power to extend time to allow an application to be made, and since that is the position, there is no need to consider the further submission made, that there was good reason to exercise the power to extend time.”
“45. I have considerable sympathy for Mr Kaye but on reflection it seems to me that, on this basis, his application for an injunction has to be dismissed. Parliament has given debtors an unfettered right to apply to a debt advisor for a BSM or a MHCM and, even where a moratorium is set aside by the court, have not placed constraints on debtors applying for a new moratorium. On each occasion on which an application is made, the debt advisor undertakes a quasi-judicial decision-making process in order to decide (a) whether the statutory criteria are met and (b) whether it is appropriate to grant the requested moratorium. The primary decision maker on this matter under the Regulations is the debt advisor, not the court. If a moratorium is granted, the Regulations provide that, as a consequence, it will affect the right of the creditor to take enforcement action. 46. In my judgment, given that parliament has given these unfettered rights to a debtor and has allocated primary decision making to the debt advisor, it would not be right to grant an injunction which sets up a different decision-making structure. I consider that a creditor cannot properly ask the court to remove these statutory rights from the debtor for a period of time or to subject the exercise of those rights to judicial supervision when that is not part of the statutory scheme ….”
“62. The Brakes however object to my reaching this conclusion, for a number of reasons. First, they say that, as the Guy Parties have not applied under regulation 7(2)(b) , it is procedurally wrong for the Guy Parties to be able to argue that moratorium debts do not include debts incurred after the moratorium begins. Second, they rely on the opinion given to them by their debt advice provider, who has told them in letters dated 11 and12 August 2021 that the later costs orders were notified on17 May 2021 and4 June 2021 , and therefore by implication that future debts are included in the concept of moratorium debt.”
“63. As to the first objection , I do not consider that regulation 7(2)(b) (the terms of which I quoted above) has anything to do with the matter. That provision is concerned with giving permission to a creditor to take one of the prohibited steps. Asking the court to decide whether a particular debt is a moratorium debt is not a prohibited step. More importantly, the arguments which the Guy Parties put forward, both in their application under regulation 19 and in their application for an unless order, as well as the arguments put forward by the Brakes in resisting those applications, depend upon the relevant debts being moratorium debts. The court therefore necessarily has to decide whether they are such debts, and for that purpose it is necessary to consider whether the way in which future debts are dealt with is through the provision for “additional debts”
“70. Accordingly, I reach the conclusion that moratorium debts cannot include future debts. Applied to the present case, I am satisfied on the material before me that the debts constituted by the costs orders of13 April 2021 and21 April 2021 are covered by the moratorium. Indeed, at the hearing the Guy Parties accepted as much. On the other hand, it is equally clear to me that the debts constituted by the costs orders of17 May 2021 and4 June 2021 are not covered by the moratorium, because neither of them was incurred before the moratorium came into effect. Although it appears that an additional debt was notified to the Guy Parties by a letter of2 June 2021 , which might have been meant to include the first of these two costs orders (but the letter does not specify the debts concerned), in any event they are both future debts, and future debts cannot be additional debts. Accordingly, regulation 7(2) does not apply to the debts constituted by the costs orders of17 May 2021 and4 June 2021 , and cannot prohibit the Guy Parties from applying for an “unless” order in respect of them.”
“12. Clearly the purpose intended to be achieved by this elaborate, long established statutory scheme would be defeated if it were open to a taxpayer to leave undisturbed an assessment with which he is dissatisfied and adopt the expedient of applying to the High Court for a declaration of how much tax he owes and, if he has already paid the tax, an order for repayment of the amount he claims was wrongly assessed. In substance, although not in form, that would be an appeal against an assessment. In such a case the effect of the relief sought in the High Court, if granted, would be to negative an assessment otherwise than in accordance with the statutory code. Thus in such a case the High Court proceedings will be struck out as an abuse of the court's process. The proceedings would be an abuse because the dispute presented to the court for decision would be a dispute Parliament has assigned for resolution exclusively to a specialist tribunal. The dissatisfied taxpayer should have recourse to the appeal procedure provided by Parliament. He should follow the statutory route. 13. I question whether in this straightforward type of case the court has any real discretion to exercise. Rather, the conclusion that the proceedings are an abuse follows automatically once the court is satisfied the taxpayer's court claim is an indirect way of seeking to achieve the same result as it would be open to the taxpayer to achieve directly by appealing to the appeal commissioners. The taxpayer must use the remedies provided by the tax legislation. This approach accords with the views expressed in authorities such as Argosam Finance Co Ltd v Oxby[1965] Ch 390 , In re Vandervell's Trusts[1971] AC 912 and, more widely, Barraclough v Brown[1897] AC 615 .”
“26. The mere fact, however, that, as a matter of statutory construction, it cannot be seen that Parliament intended a statutory regime to be exclusive does not necessarily mean that it is always proper to resort to common law remedies instead …”
“27. Company law provides an illustration. Chapter 1 of Part 11 of theCompanies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) sets out a procedure to be followed where a shareholder wishes to bring a “derivative claim”, ie one “(a) in respect of a cause of action vested in the company, and (b) seeking relief on behalf of the company”: see section 260. The provisions do not produce a statutory bar on shareholders including claims for relief in favour of their companies in “unfair prejudice” petitions under section 994 of CA 2006 , and it can be perfectly proper to do so. However, it could potentially be an abuse of process to seek relief in favour of a company by way of an unfair prejudice petition if that were the only relief sought or if, although the petition also contained a claim for relief which was available exclusively in unfair prejudice proceedings (such as an order for the purchase of shares), it could be discerned that the petitioner was not genuinely interested in obtaining such relief and was, instead, trying to bypass the filter for which Part 11 of CA 2006 provides: see Ntzegkoutanis v Kimionis [2024] Bus LR 339 at para 55.”
“(b) the court or tribunal must deal with any other action or proceeding in relation to a moratorium debt in accordance with this regulation.”
“(3) Subject to paragraph (5), if at the start of a moratorium any action or proceeding that relates to a moratorium debt is pending in a court or tribunal then such action or proceeding may continue until the court or tribunal makes an order or judgment in conclusion of such action or proceeding.”
“(8) This regulation is subject to regulation 7(2)(b)”
“47. In my view the use of the word ‘may’ indicates the proceedings may continue until the court or tribunal makes an order or a judgment. I agree with Miss Monk that Mr Morris’s primary argument was the correct one, namely that he needs permission from the court. If I am wrong and somehow Regulation 7(2)(b) has the effect Mr Morris argues then I consider, taking a step to collect a moratorium debt from a debtor would, and must include, obtaining a judgment otherwise it would make a nonsense of the other provisions which are clearly designed by the Parliamentary draftsman to think of every conceivable other form of action which somebody could take while a moratorium was in place, including for instance installing a prepayment meter. Whilst there is no express reference to a judgment in Regulation 7(7), I am satisfied that it would include a judgment because that would be a step in the process of collecting a moratorium debt. I am therefore satisfied that discretion applies.”
“(2) Subject to paragraph (3), during a moratorium period a creditor may not, in relation to any moratorium debt, take any of the steps specified in paragraph (6) in respect of the debt unless— i. these Regulations specify otherwise, or ii. the county court or any other court or tribunal where legal proceedings concerning the debt have been or could be issued or started has given permission for the creditor to take the step.” i. these Regulations specify otherwise, or ii. the county court or any other court or tribunal where legal proceedings concerning the debt have been or could be issued or started has given permission for the creditor to take the step.”
“(6) The steps mentioned in paragraph (2) that a creditor is prevented from taking are any steps to— … (c) take any enforcement action in respect of a moratorium debt (whether the right to take such action arises under a contract, by virtue of an enactment or otherwise) …” (c) take any enforcement action in respect of a moratorium debt (whether the right to take such action arises under a contract, by virtue of an enactment or otherwise) …”