“A Bad Leaver is defined as, unless otherwise determined by the Board with Investor consent, a leaver whose reason for ceasing employment or appointment with the Company is…. that their employment or appointment is terminated by the Group due to circumstances which would entitle any Group Company to summarily dismiss him.”
“(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company's employees, (c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. (2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes. (3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.”
“As Lord Greene MR points out, it is now a well-established practice for articles of private companies to contain severe restrictions on the transfer of the shares of the company. Such companies are more in the nature of a private partnership than of a public corporation. The greater part of the shareholding is usually vested in the principal director or directors, and powers are taken in the articles to control the beneficial interest in the remainder of the shares. These powers are, however, fiduciary powers which must be exercised in the interest of the company, but it is assumed that they are being so exercised unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Each article, of course, falls to be construed according to its terms, and it may, by its very wording, show how the interest of the company is to be safeguarded. A common form of article permits transfers to named persons only, unless the transfer to some other transferee is approved by the directors and in the latter case the transfer is often made subject to rights of pre-emption. The article here considered gave the directors a much wider discretion, and it is held to be controlled only by the principle that, being a fiduciary power, it must be exercised for the benefit of the company. If the directors state upon oath that they have so exercised their discretion, that statement must prevail unless it is shown to be wrong by cross-examination of the deponents or by evidence establishing a substantive case showing how the discretion has been wrongly exercised, though, in some cases, the affidavit may show on its face that the discretion has been wrongly exercised.”
“Section 172: the duty to act in good faith and in the Club’s best interests. They said that the duty involved directors exercising their discretion bona fide in what they consider, not what a court may consider, to be in the interests of the company: Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd,[1942] Ch 304 , 306, per Lord Greene MR. The test is a subjective one and the relevant question is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the company. The issue is as to the director’s state of mind: see Regentcrest Plc v Cohen[2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 120, per Jonathan Parker J. Counsel said it follows that a director can act unreasonably and mistakenly, and will not be liable for a breach of his fiduciary duty to the company, so long as he was honest in his mistaken belief. They cited the decision of Mr Jonathan Crow, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, in Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood[2003] 1 BCLC 598 , at [89], who said that fiduciary duties are concerned with concepts of honesty and loyalty, not with competence. They further said that risk is an inherent part of any commercial activity and, as Popplewell J observed in Madoff v Raven, “Corporate management often requires the exercise of judgment on which opinions may legitimately differ, and requires some give and take....”
“(2) Although the duty under section 172 is expressed in subjective terms and not so as to impose an objective standard of managerial competence (which is covered by the separate duty under section 174) that does not mean that the court will not be prepared to doubt the director’s honesty and professed support for the company’s best interests where substantial detriment has resulted from his act or omission: see Regentcrest at [120]. The fact that his actions have caused harm to the company, and may objectively be said to have been unreasonable, might support the conclusion that in fact his alleged belief that he was acting to promote the interests of the company was not one honestly held at the time. (3) The legal burden of establishing a breach of that duty (under section 172) is upon the party asserting the breach and, allowing for any shift in the evidential burden, it is not for the director to vindicate his own position: see Charles Forte Investments v Amanda[1964] Ch 240 , 260-1. However, where his decision is one that no reasonable director could have considered to be in the best interests of the company then reliance upon his own suggested contrary belief will not avoid a finding of breach: compare Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd[2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) , [53], per Warren J.”
“Counsel recognised that the authorities upon which they had relied supported these further observations. Mr Sims QC correctly observed that the second and third did not detract from the fundamentally subjective nature of the duty under section 172 and really served to highlight the point that it is an evidential question as to whether or not a director who has caused loss to the company, or who appears to have acted irrationally, can nevertheless defend his actions on the basis that he acted in accordance with it.”
“The definition in section 174(2) of the 2006 Act builds on the formulation insection 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 which Hoffmann LJ stated in In re D’Jan of London Ltd accurately stated the common law duty. It is in two parts. The first part, in section 174(2)(a), is that a director must exercise the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with “the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company”
“I ventured a summary of the resultant approach in Re Euro Accessories Limited[2021] EWHC 47 (Ch) at [34] in a passage that was adopted by the Judge and not disputed by the parties on this appeal, ‘The result is that the process of interpretation to arrive at the true meaning of a provision in a company's articles of association must concentrate on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, when viewed in light of the scheme and purpose of the articles in general, any extrinsic facts about the company or its membership that would reasonably be ascertainable by any reader of the company's constitution and public filings at Companies House, and commercial common sense.’”
“(1) Relations between an employer and an employee are governed by the contract of employment that subsists between the employer and the employee plus a significant statutory overlay. However, the right summarily to dismiss an employee (on the part of an employer) and the right of an employee to treat him- or herself as constructively dismissed are both, in essence, contractual. …. (7) A good test for whether summary dismissal is justifiable was stated in Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd[1959] 1 WLR 698 , as follows: ”…whether the conduct complained of is such as to show the servant to have disregarded the essential conditions of the contract of service…One act of disobedience or misconduct can justify dismissal only if it is of a nature which goes to show (in effect) that the servant is repudiating the contract or one of its essential conditions; and for that reason, therefore, I think you find…that the disobedience must at least have the quality that it is “wilful”; it does (in other words) connote a deliberate flouting of the essential contractual conditions…”
“The test involves a fact-specific inquiry in the context of the particular contract of employment concerned. It is necessary to take account of the nuances of the relationship between the employer and employee in question when determining whether the relevant conduct breached the trust and confidence in that relationship.”
“lnvenio, in very brief terms, provides both SAP consultancy and SAP product delivery as a single offering. Our focus on specific industry solutions made lnvenio distinct in the SAP market. SAP itself refers to the software developed by the German software company SAP SE and lnvenio would advise on and implement its deployment to specific business processes. Those business processes could range from warehouse management to state tax and revenue collection. One of lnvenio's biggest and most complex projects was for the Saudi General Authority of Zakat and Tax (referred to as GAZT), when Saudi Arabia replaced their tax collection system and later also introduced VAT on the new SAP system. One of the projects that helped drive lnvenio's growth was a project for the government of Mauritius to develop SAP Tax & Revenue Management (TRM) based tax systems for their federal tax authority. That opportunity came about almost by mistake as we engaged with the tax authority thinking they were looking for another SAP-TRM shared acronym solution which stands for Treasury & Risk Management but once we had completed it successfully it helped make lnvenio's name in SAP Tax & Revenue Management consultancy, and we were offered another distressed project in Maldives by SAP Singapore. This was followed by lnvenio winning the Saudi Arabian GAZT project and many more in the following years. lnvenio was run by hands-on directors who wore multiple hats to keep the company nimble and agile. A lot of board level decisions were taken through discussions standing across the table in the office or on calls. These aspects of running the business, where decisions could be taken quickly, helped us grow the business rapidly and win business against much bigger and more established players. The focus of the business was growth and dealing with the challenges of rapid growth especially attracting good talent and retaining them even when there were poaching efforts from competitors. Starting from scratch in 2006, the company was valued at£68 million in 2019, all through organic growth and zero debt.”
“It has never been my intention to retain any funds as a result of the loan to Mr Awootar. The position for me was meant to be entirely neutral. I was only involved because the loan was not repaid in full as agreed, that is within the financial year it was made. The solution was to remove it as the loan to an employee from lnvenio's books, which I believed was in the interests of the company. I accept that it appears not to have been entered onto my current account at lnvenio, reflecting the change. However, this does not mean I would not have repaid the loan itself. There was a loan between myself and lnvenio and a loan between me and Mr Awootar, with my loan from lnvenio to be repaid once Mr Awootar had settled his loan from me. Mr Awootar has not yet repaid the full loan to me. I have previously asked, through my solicitors, whether lnvenio has spoken with Mr Awootar about this matter, but they have not responded to that request or provided any details of any discussions they had with him, if they have spoken with him.”
“In Murad at [57] Arden LJ cited with approval the following passage from the judgment of Morritt LJ in United Pan-Europe Communications NV v Deutsche Bank AG[2000] 2 BCLC 461 : ‘If there is a fiduciary duty of loyalty and if the conduct complained of falls within the scope of that fiduciary duty …then I see no justification for any further requirement that the profit shall have been obtained by the fiduciary `by virtue of his position'. Such a condition suggests an element of causation which neither principle nor the authorities require. Likewise it is not in doubt that the object of the equitable remedies of an account or the imposition of a constructive trust is to ensure that the defaulting fiduciary does not retain the profit; it is not to compensate the beneficiary for any loss. Accordingly comparison with the remedy in damages is unhelpful.’”
“Jonathan Parker LJ made the same point at [110], contrasting a claim for equitable compensation with one for disgorgement of an unauthorised profit. I do not, therefore, accept Mr Mason’s argument that the breach of fiduciary duty must be a cause of the profit. There must, of course, be a sufficient degree of connection between the breach of fiduciary duty and the receipt of the secret profit. In Murad Jonathan Parker LJ said at [112] that the fiduciary is liable to account “only for profits which he has made within the scope and ambit of the duty which conflicts or may conflict with his personal interest”
“For policy reasons, the courts decline to investigate hypothetical situations as to what would have happened if the fiduciary had performed his duty.” [20] In the same case, Jonathan Parker LJ cited a number of authorities to the same effect, including the following passage from the judgment of Mummery LJ in Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy[2004] BCLC 131 : “In considering whether the director should account for unauthorised profits, what would have happened, if the required disclosure had been made, is irrelevant.” [21]. The factual difficulty is that, on my reading of the judgment, the judge found at [149] that if Mr Parr had disclosed his wrongdoing he would have been removed as a director and also as a shareholder under the bad leaver provisions, which would have entitled Keystone to acquire his shares. The judge recorded at [146] that it was not suggested that Keystone would have been disabled from acquiring those shares. [22] It was for these reasons that the judge held at [150] that there was a “sufficient nexus” between the breach of fiduciary duty and the enhanced price that Mr Parr received for his shares. In my judgment he was entitled so to hold. [23] Mr Mason argued that there was no evidence to suggest that the value of Mr Parr’s shares was enhanced by his breach of duty. It may well be the case that the intrinsic value of the shares was unaffected by the breach (although since the effect of the fraud must have been to reduce Keystone’s profitability that is in itself doubtful). But that misses the point. Whatever was the value of Mr Parr’s shares, he was only entitled to receive half of that value under the terms of the articles of association and the shareholders’ agreement. His concealment of his breach of duty (which was itself a breach of duty) led to his receipt of twice as much as he was entitled to. In my judgment, that is a sufficient connection between the breach and the profit to bring the equitable principle into play.”