“(a) The Deceased had commenced a claim against Mr Roman Abramovich in the Commercial Court on1 June 2007 (2007 Folio 942) claiming a sum in excess of US$5.6 billion (the Abramovich Proceedings). The trial took place over 43 days between October 2011 and January 2012. At the date of the Payment, judgment was awaited. Judgment was given on31 August 2012 , shortly after the Payment, dismissing the Deceased's claims in full. A summary of the judgment was delivered in open court, with copies of the full judgment (in draft) being provided to the parties. The Deceased was liable for his own and for Mr Abramovich's very substantial legal costs (ultimately agreed at£35 million as recorded in a consent order dated12 October 2012 ...). At the time of the Payment, the Deceased would have been well aware of the risk of failure in the claim and his exposure. (b) On12 December 2008 , the Deceased had commenced a claim in the Chancery Division (HC08C03549) against the joint interim administrators of the estate of Mr Patarkatsishvili and numerous others, claiming damages/equitable compensation for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and other related matters in connection with a joint venture agreement (the Main Action). The Deceased commenced a further claim in the Chancery Division against many of the same defendants and Vasily Anisimov, a Russian businessman, together with several entities controlled by him on18 February 2009 (HC09C00494) claiming approximately US$585 million in connection with the Deceased's alleged ownership interest in a valuable Russian ore and mining company called Metalloinvest (the Metalloinvest Action). (c) On9 March 2009 , the Deceased had commenced a claim against Mr Patarkatsishvili's estate and others (including a company called Salford Capital Partners Inc), again in the Chancery Division (HC09C00711) for circa US$10 million (the Salford Action and, together with the Main Action and the Metalloinvest Action, the Chancery Actions). (d) There was a common factual background and overlapping factual issues relevant to the Abramovich Proceedings and all of the Chancery Actions. At a joint case management hearing, it was decided that these overlapping issues would be dealt with first in the Abramovich Proceedings, with any findings of fact determined as preliminary issues. The parties to the Chancery Actions would then be bound by the findings of the overlapping issues as determined in the Abramovich Proceedings. (e) As at the date of the Payment, I understand that the Chancery Actions were stayed pending determination of the overlapping issues in the Abramovich Proceedings. Following the judgment in the Abramovich Proceedings, the Chancery Actions were swiftly settled by the Deceased, although some of the actions did still continue between the other parties without the Deceased's involvement.”
“a. Documentation relating to the Claims is, [Ms Besharova] contends, of obvious relevance to the issues in the [Preference Claim] (solvency, and desire); b. The Trustees appear to be in control of that documentation; c. The Trustees (court officers) have refused to waive privilege in those documents; d. Therefore [Ms Besharova] contends that no fair trial of the [Preference Claim] is possible, or will prove to be possible.” and at paragraph [26], that: “the legal basis for the strike out ... is … clear. [Ms Besharova] submits that where X claims relief against Y, and there is a risk that Y will not receive a fair trial by reason of (inter alia) X’s choosing not to disclose documents relevant to the trial, the court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction to strike out or stay the proceedings.”
“20. As at the date of the preference transaction, the Deceased was involved in a substantial legal dispute (as claimant) against Mr Abramovich. At the time of the preference transaction the outcome was not known, therefore no value has been ascribed to this asset under the 'Potential best case' scenario as this is a contingent asset. The 'Potential worst case' scenario assumes the Deceased's claim was unsuccessful and therefore no value is attributable to this asset. 21. As per note 20, the 'Potential best case' does not value any potential asset which may result from the Deceased succeeding in this legal claim. The 'Potential best case' scenario does not assume failure of the claim, and therefore there are no adverse costs consequences for this scenario. The 'Potential worst case' scenario assumes that the Deceased lost the claim and was therefore responsible for the adverse costs of his opponent. These adverse costs have been included in the amount which the Deceased was ultimately obliged to pay the defendant. 22. The Deceased was also involved in a legal claim in which the Anisimov family were defendants. Judgment had not been received by the date of the preference transaction. The 'Potential best case' scenario does not assume failure of the claim, and therefore there are no adverse costs consequences for this scenario. The 'Potential worst case' scenario assumes that the Deceased lost the claim and was therefore responsible for the adverse costs of his opponent. These adverse costs have been included in the amount which the Deceased was ultimately obliged to pay the Anisimov family pursuant to a settlement agreement.”
“2. We note that the Trustees purport to have waived privilege in respect of 6 documents containing or referring to legal advice given to the Deceased between28 October 2011 and15 August 2012 . 3. We note that the only document disclosed which relates directly to the Deceased's perception of the Abramovich (or any other) claim is the file note dated30 October 2011 in which the Deceased is recorded as stating (despite the negative advice he had received on prospects of succeeding in the Abramovich claim) that "he was convinced that he would win." That is, of course, consistent with our client's evidence. 4. We note that your letter expressly states that the Trustees have given only limited disclosure of privileged material. Indeed, it is obvious from what has been disclosed that material documentation has not been included. Nothing has been disclosed relating to the merits or offers of settlement of the "Chancery Actions'' (as defined at paragraph 27(c) of the Thielmann Statement), save in so far as counsels' note dated15 August 2012 refers in various places to a "recent mediation" and to "settlement offers" having been tabled recently by "VA" in (it appears) one of the actions (the Metalloinvest action, it appears); whilst the covering letter refers to further discussions with VA's representative (the content of which does not appear). No material disclosure has been made of any documentation relating to or generated by the Chancery Actions (despite the Thiemann [sic] Statement at paragraph 27(b) - (e) and the SoA recognising the relevance of those proceedings), so that our client and her advisers are wholly unable to understand the documentation which you have disclosed. Further, the disclosure the Trustees have made is expressly acknowledged to be limited, but our client is not given access to documentation (or information) sufficient to allow her to know whether disclosure has been fairly made. 5. This is obviously deeply unsatisfactory. Our letter dated12 November 2021 asked the Trustees to explain how, absent disclosure of all privileged documentation, there could be a fair trial of the preference claim against our client. Your letter provides no explanation. Our client continues to contend that no fair trial is or will prove to be possible.”
".. the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people. The circumstances in which abuse of process can arise are very varied…It would, in my view, be most unwise if this House were to use this occasion to say anything that might be taken as limiting to fixed categories the kinds of circumstances in which the court has a duty (I disavow the word discretion) to exercise this salutary power."
“Immediately following India’s annexation of Hyderabad in 1948, the former finance minister of the Government of Hyderabad transferred a sum slightly in excess of£1m to an account at a United Kingdom bank in the name of the High Commissioner of Pakistan in the United Kingdom, who received it on the instructions of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The transfer was ostensibly made on behalf of the ruler of Hyderabad, the seventh Nizam. Shortly thereafter, the Nizam instructed the bank to reverse the transfer on the ground that it had been made without his authority, but in the absence of the account holder’s agreement, the bank refused to comply with the instruction. Proceedings were brought in 1954 by the Nizam against the High Commissioner and the bank, but were stayed following Pakistan’s assertion of sovereign immunity. In 2013 Pakistan waived that immunity when it commenced proceedings against the bank, through its High Commissioner, asserting that it was absolutely entitled to the fund. The Union of India, the eighth Nizam and the eighth Nizam’s brother, all of whom claimed to be the seventh Nizam’s successor in title, were joined to the proceedings as interpleader claimants. They contended, inter alia, that the fund was held on trust for the seventh Nizam and his successors in title by the High Commissioner; alternatively, that the transfer had been unauthorised, which provided the basis for a claim against Pakistan in restitution. Pakistan contended that the restitution claim was time-barred; and that the act of state doctrine made the proceedings non-justiciable except in so far as they related to the banker/customer relationship between Pakistan and the bank, since the transfer had been of a governmental nature engaged in by two sovereign states in a political context.”
“(1) …. That said, there can plainly be nothing wrong in a party relying upon a defence conferred upon it by statute, and to describe such a course as an abuse of process must require, in my judgment, fairly extreme or unusual circumstances. None of the parties was able to point me to any authority that might assist on the point, save that in Chagos Islanders v Attorney General[2003] EWHC 2222 (QB) at [599], Ouseley J expressed the view that there was no basis upon which a court could decide that a statute could be removed from the arena to which its language made it apply, simply because a court thought that it would be unconscionable to allow a party to rely upon the rights which Parliament had given him. (2) Clearly, there can be nothing wrong in a sovereign state successfully asserting a right to sovereign immunity. Equally clearly, there can be nothing wrong in a sovereign state successfully asserting a defence of limitation. Ordinarily, the combination of these two procedural bars does not arise: that is because sovereign immunity - once successfully asserted - is very rarely waived. I am not surprised that this situation is without precedent, and that none of the parties was able to identify any relevant law to assist me. (3) The question … is whether, having raised one procedural bar, and then waived it, Pakistan is now entitled to raise a second, different, procedural bar, that only exists because of the raising of the first bar or whether Pakistan’s raising of the limitation defence in this context constitutes an abuse of process. I find that this conduct does amount to an abuse of process. The point about the assertion of sovereign immunity is that it operates as a complete bar to the litigation of certain proceedings. It is not open to the state asserting sovereign immunity to pick and choose which points to proceed with and which points to block by asserting sovereign immunity. (4) In a very different context, the Court of Appeal recognised that an ability to pick and choose in this way would be profoundly unjust. In Law Debenture Trust[2019] QB 1121 , the claimant trustee (“Law Debenture”) entered into a trust deed with a sovereign state, Ukraine. The deed was governed by English law. Ukraine defaulted under the notes. The Russian Federation was the sole holder of the notes and - on Russia’s direction - Law Debenture brought a claim against Ukraine for payment of the final repayment amount under the notes, and in due course applied for summary judgment on its claim. Ukraine resisted that application on various grounds, one of which was that the issue of the notes had been procured by unlawful threats made, and pressure exerted, by Russia, so as to render the notes voidable on grounds of duress. Of course, a contract made as a result of illegitimate pressure is unenforceable as a matter of English law: the issue, in this case, was that the acts by Russia which Ukraine relied upon as constituting duress or illegitimate pressure involved acts of high policy by Russia in the sphere of international relations in the exercise of sovereign authority which Law Debenture contended was non-justiciable under the doctrine of foreign act of state. … For present purposes, what is of interest is the Court of Appeal’s statement of what it would have held, had Law Debenture’s contention as to non-justiciability succeeded (at para 183): “The basic point is that Russia, through Law Debenture, is positively seeking to enforce contractual rights in private law against Ukraine. In our view, it can only fairly seek to do so if Ukraine is afforded a fair opportunity to defend itself . . . It would be unjust to permit Law Debenture and Russia to proceed to make good the contract claim without Ukraine being able to defend itself by raising its defence of duress at trial . . .”
“In the field of defamation parliamentary privilege has its main impact in precluding the courts from entertaining a case alleging that a Member of Parliament or other participant in parliamentary proceedings is liable for defamatory statements made in the course of parliamentary proceedings. However, recent experience has shown that the impact of parliamentary privilege is not all favourable to an individual MP. Say, as in the present case, that an MP wishes to sue for defamatory remarks made by a third party outside Parliament, such defamatory remarks alleging breaches by the D MP of his parliamentary duties. If the defendant wishes to justify his defamatory remarks he will be precluded from leading evidence or cross-examining as to matters which form part of the MP's parliamentary functions. As a result in some such cases it might be grossly unfair to let the action proceed in circumstances which would preclude the defendant from putting forward his defence. It was to deal with such a case that the court developed a procedure (“the fair trial stay”) under which, unless the plaintiff could in some way waive the privilege which produced exceptional unfairness, the action by the MP would be stayed.”
“I have said above that, in the normal case involving parliamentary privilege, the court is not asked to make an order staying the whole action: the relief claimed in an action does not normally itself conflict with the authority of the decision reached by Parliament. The normal impact of parliamentary privilege is to prevent the court from entertaining any evidence, cross-examination or submissions which challenge the veracity or propriety of anything done in the course of parliamentary proceedings. Thus, it is not permissible to challenge by cross-examination in a later action the veracity of evidence given to a parliamentary committee. If that approach had been adopted in the present case, there can be no doubt that, apart from section 13, the trial of the action would from the outset have proved completely impossible. All evidence by Mr Hamilton that he had not received money for questions would have conflicted directly with the evidence of Mr Al Fayed which was accepted by the parliamentary committees. Any attempt to cross-examine Mr Al Fayed to the effect that he was lying to the parliamentary committees when he said that he had paid money for questions would have been stopped forthwith as an infringement of parliamentary privilege. Presumably because of the way the case was presented to them, the Court of Appeal never considered the relevant question (viz whether there should be a fair trial stay) …. The only way in which Mr Al Fayed could justify his defamatory statements was by detailed challenge to Mr Hamilton's conduct in Parliament, which challenge would be precluded by parliamentary privilege. That being so it would in my judgment have been impossible for Mr Al Fayed to have had a fair trial in this action if he had been precluded from challenging the evidence produced to the parliamentary committees on behalf of Mr Hamilton.”
“The principle which runs through all these cases, and the many other cases which were cited, is that a man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, since otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The client must be sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never be revealed without his consent. Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests.”
“… [Counsel for the stepfather] submitted that in other related areas of the law, privilege is less sacrosanct than it was. He points to the restrictions recently imposed on the right to silence, and the statutory exceptions to the privilege against self-incrimination in the fields of revenue and bankruptcy. But these examples only serve to illustrate the flaw in [his] thesis. Nobody doubts that legal professional privilege could be modified, or even abrogated, by statute, subject always to the objection that legal professional privilege is a fundamental human right protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969), as to which we did not hear any argument. [His] difficulty is this: whatever inroads may have been made by Parliament in other areas, legal professional privilege is a field which Parliament has so far left untouched.”
“… the approach to implied or consequential waiver is not necessarily a “once and for all” position where the court is required to determine, as a matter of quasi-historical fact, what the scope of waiver was. To the contrary, the law operates an element of consequential procedural control following deployment of a document where the scope of waiver is a function of the contents of the document and the nature of its deployment: “if you are going to rely on privileged document A to contend that it shows X, the scope of waiver is S(A,X); if you are going to rely on A to contend that it shows Y, the scope of waiver is S(A,Y) – which may not be the same”
“If the Secretary of State keeps to [his Counsel’s] word I can see no unfairness to the applicants. The applicants and the court know his stance, that of a party prepared to reveal the legal advice that he received as to his conduct over one period but not over another, with all the suspicion and adverse inference that that may engender. If the Secretary of State does seek to take an unfair advantage of his partial discovery at the trial, whether as a matter of evidence or argument, the applicants would be entitled to invite the trial Judge to reopen the matter and determine whether there should be further disclosure.”