"As some business activities in Dubai are limited to UAE nationals only, therefore if any companies or establishments are needed to legally execute the activities of "
"What is meant is (i) that the claimant must supply a plausible evidential basis for the application of a relevant jurisdictional gateway; (ii) that if there is an issue of fact about it, or some other reason for doubting whether it applies, the court must take a view on the material available if it can reliably do so; but (iii) the nature of the issue and the limitations of the material available at the interlocutory stage may be such that no reliable assessment can be made, in which case there is a good arguable case for the application of the gateway if there is a plausible (albeit contested) evidential basis for it. I do not believe that anything is gained by the word "much", which suggests a superior standard of conviction that is both uncertain and unwarranted in this context."
"…on 22-1-2009 he [Dr Haddad] filed a complaint against [Ms Khulood] – the director of [KMP Dubai] – stating that he has been a shareholder with her since 2003 in a group of companies and sole proprietorships with a percentage of 50%, including [KMP Dubai], and that she prevented him from entering the company and misappropriated the partnership contracts signed by both of them…"
"It is well established that a defendant, shown to have been subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, cannot seek to persuade our court to examine the correctness of the judgment whether on the facts, or as to the application by the foreign court of its own law or, when relevant, of the law of this country. A foreign judgment is not impeachable merely because it is "manifestly wrong:"
"The right to own Real Property in the Emirate shall be restricted to UAE and GCC nationals and to companies owned in full by them and to public joint stock companies. Subject to the Ruler 's approval and in specific areas in the Emirate as determined by him, non-national persons may be granted the following rights: A. The right to freehold ownership without time restrictions; or B. Usufruct right or leasehold right over a Real Property for a period not exceeding 99 years."
"…I am clearly of opinion that a partnership formed for the main purpose of deriving profit from the commission of a criminal offence in a foreign and friendly country is illegal, even although the parties have not succeeded in carrying out their enterprise, and no such criminal offence has in fact been committed…"
"So how is the court to determine the matter if not by some mechanistic process? In answer to that question I would say that one cannot judge whether allowing a claim which is in some way tainted by illegality would be contrary to the public interest, because it would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system, without (a) considering the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed, (b) considering conversely any other relevant public policies which may be rendered ineffective or less effective by denial of the claim, and (c) keeping in mind the possibility of overkill unless the law is applied with a due sense of proportionality. We are, after all, in the area of public policy."
"Having said that I do not consider that this involves (as Mr Robins suggested) a perverse dichotomy with a flexible rule in one context and a rigid and inflexible rule in another. Patel v Mirza does provide a guide in this sense. Surely it is right in both cases that a balancing exercise has to be performed, though the elements in the balancing exercise will at least in part be different because the public policy which underpins the question in the foreign illegality cases is different to that which affects Patel v Mirza type cases. One does not go to the questions at which Lord Toulson arrived via a consideration of the caselaw and academic thinking on domestic illegality. One does not specifically invoke proportionality, because that assumes an understanding of the questions of weight and gravity which may not be available in respect of a foreign court's or foreign judicature's priorities. But where the clear answer is not given by either of the main principles, one balances the relevant factors discernible from the case law in the light of the underpinning principle. It is thus that one gets to the factors which Lord Collins set out in Ryder . These are the kind of factors which are relevant to the particular public policy."
"To my mind the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" damage is virtually meaningless in the present context when one is asking the proper question whether a claimant has suffered "significant damage" in the jurisdiction. Even in cases of economic loss, moreover, I can see no reason why the suffering of "significant damage" in this country might not amount to a proper "connecting factor" between this country and a foreign defendant, even if other such damage is suffered elsewhere, justifying the assumption of jurisdiction in a proper case. There is no need to import the legalistic niceties inherent in the concepts of direct and indirect damage. Such jurisdiction may not necessarily be exclusive. It may be that other "significant damage" is inflicted in the defendant's country also and the rules of that country may give its courts jurisdiction also. It is then a question of balance for the court to decide whether this country's jurisdiction should be asserted in the face of a parallel jurisdiction of the courts of the country abroad."
"we the under signed, declare and undertake that the legal heirs of the late Mr Abdulla Hassan Al Rostamani, do not own any shares in KM Properties LLC…"
"(1) If the court finds that there have been breaches of the duty of full and fair disclosure on the ex parte application, the general rule is that it should discharge the order obtained in breach and refuse to renew the order until trial. (2) Notwithstanding that general rule, the court has jurisdiction to continue or re-grant the order. (3) That jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly, and should take account of the need to protect the administration of justice and uphold the public interest in requiring full and fair disclosure. (4) The court should assess the degree and extent of the culpability with regard to non-disclosure. It is relevant that the breach was innocent, but there is no general rule that an innocent breach will not attract the sanction of discharge of the order. Equally, there is no general rule that a deliberate breach will attract that sanction. (5) The court should assess the importance and significance to the outcome of the application for an injunction of the matters which were not disclosed to the court. In making this assessment, the fact that the judge might have made the order anyway is of little if any importance. (6) The court can weigh the merits of the plaintiff's claim, but should not conduct a simple balancing exercise in which the strength of the plaintiff's case is allowed to undermine the policy objective of the principle. (7) The application of the principle should not be carried to extreme lengths or be allowed to become the instrument of injustice. (8) The jurisdiction is penal in nature and the court should therefore have regard to the proportionality between the punishment and the offence. (9) There are no hard and fast rules as to whether the discretion to continue or re-grant the order should be exercised, and the court should take into account all relevant circumstances."