“Whenever litigation exists, somebody must go on with it; the plaintiff is the first to begin; if he does nothing, he fails; if he makes a prima facie case, and nothing is done to answer it, the defendant fails. The test, therefore, as to the burden of proof … is simply this: to ask oneself which party will be successful if no evidence is given, or if no more evidence is given than has been given at a particular point of the case, for it is obvious that as the controversy involved in the litigation travels on, the parties from moment to moment may reach points at which the onus of proof shifts, and at which the tribunal will have to say that if the case stops there, it must be decided in a particular manner.”
“[1] Where there is a sale by a mortgagee to a connected company, the burden is on the mortgagee to prove that the price paid was the best price reasonably obtainable… [2] The same principle should apply to sales by receivers given that in the exercise of the power of sale receivers owe the same equitable duty to the mortgagor as is owed by the mortgagee…”
“22. There is binding authority for the proposition that (again in default of agreement to the contrary) in the exercise of the power of sale receivers owe the same equitable duty to the mortgagor and others interested in the equity of redemption as is owned by the mortgagee: they are both obliged to take care to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable… The critical issue however is whether the receiver (unlike the mortgagee) is under a duty of care in regard to the date of sale and to ensure that steps are taken (in particular in respect of planning and the grant of leases) to realise the full potential of the secured property before sale by obtaining permission or granting the leases. 23. In a number of respects it is clear that a receiver is in a very different position from a mortgagee. Whilst the mortgagee has no duty at any time to exercise his powers to enforce his security, a receiver has no right to remain passive if that course would be damaging to the interests of the mortgagor or mortgagee. In the absence of a provision to the contrary in the mortgage or his appointment, the receiver must be active in the protection and preservation of the charged property over which he is appointed… Thus if the mortgaged property is let, the receiver is duty bound to inspect the lease and, if the lease contains an upwards only rent review, to trigger that rent review in due time… His management duties will ordinarily impose on him no general duty to exercise the power of sale… But a duty may arise if e.g. the goods are perishable and a failure to do so would cause loss to the mortgagee and mortgagor. 24. The critical issue raised is whether (as contended by the claimants) the wider management duties imposed on a receiver (but not on a mortgagee) may require a receiver (and in particular a receiver appointed the agent of the mortgagor) to postpone a sale until after steps have been taken (in this case proceeding with an application for planning permission and with the grant of the lease) calculated to increase the price obtainable in some greater than the cost of taking those steps plus the sum representing accrued interest over the period whilst those steps are being taken. [ … ] 28. In the context of a relationship such as the present, which is no ordinary agency and is primarily a device to protect the mortgagee, general agency principles are of limited assistance in identifying the duties owed by the receiver to the mortgagor… The core duty of the receiver to account to the mortgagor subsists, but (for example) the mortgagor has no unrestricted rights of access to receivership documents. The mortgage confers upon the mortgagee a direct and indirect means of securing a sale in order to achieve repayment of his secured debt. The mortgagee can sell as mortgagee and the mortgagee can appoint a receiver who likewise can sell in the name of the mortgagor. Having regard to the fact that the receiver’s primary duty is to bring about a situation where the secured debt is repaid, as a matter of principle the receiver must be entitled (like the mortgagee) to sell the property in the condition in which it is in the same way as the mortgagee can and in particular without awaiting or affecting any increase in value or improvement in the property. This accords with the repeated statements in the authorities that the duties in respect of the exercise of the power of sale by mortgagees and receivers are the same and with the holding in a series of decisions at first instance that receivers are not obliged before sale to spend money on repairs…, to make the property more attractive before marketing it…, or to ‘work’ an estate by refurbishing it… 29. In summary, by accepting office as receivers of the claimants properties the receivers assumed a fiduciary duty of care to the bank, the claimants and all (if any) others interested in the equity of redemption… The appointment of the receivers as agents of the claimants having regard to the special character of the agency does not affect the scope or the content of the fiduciary duty. The scope or content of the duty must depend on and reflect the special nature of the relationship between the bank, the claimants and the receivers arising under the terms of the mortgages and the appointments of the receivers, and in particular the role of the receivers in securing repayment of the secured debt and the primacy of their obligations in this regard to the bank. These circumstances preclude the assumption by, or imposition on, the receivers of the obligation to take the pre-marketing steps for which the claimants contend in this action. Further no such obligation could arise in their case (any more than in the case of the bank) from the steps which they took to investigate and (for a period) to proceed with applications for planning permission. The receivers were at all times free (as was the bank) to halt those steps and exercise their right to proceed with an immediate sale of the mortgaged properties as they were.”
“13-047 … A receiver is subject to a like duty [as applies to trustees] and is accordingly disqualified from purchasing charged property from the mortgagee and (in the case of a receiver appointed by trustees for debentureholders) from purchasing debentures from debenture-holders without the leave of the court. Mortgagees are, however, subject to less severe restrictions: (a) a strict but very limited “self-dealing” rule whereby a mortgagee may not sell to himself or to a trustee for himself; and (b) a “fair dealing” rule whereby a conflict of interest makes a sale voidable (or the subject of a claim to damages) unless it can be shown (the onus being on the mortgagee or purchaser) that the sale was at full market value. 13-048 It is considered that where a receiver sells as agent of the mortgagor to a company in which the mortgagee has an interest: (i) the self-dealing rule does not apply, since there are two real parties to the transaction; and (ii) the fair dealing rule is applicable on the basis that the receivership sale involves the exercise of the mortgagee’s remedies. To be absolutely safe in such a case, the mortgagee can seek a sale by the court.”
“In the light of these considerations [about the unreliability of memory], the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on witnesses' recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts. This does not mean that oral testimony serves no useful purpose – though its utility is often disproportionate to its length. But its value lies largely, as I see it, in the opportunity which cross-examination affords to subject the documentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge the personality, motivations and working practices of a witness, rather than in testimony of what the witness recalls of particular conversations and events. Above all, it is important to avoid the fallacy of supposing that, because a witness has confidence in his or her recollection and is honest, evidence based on that recollection provides any reliable guide to the truth.”
“The Receivers owed the following duties: (1) a duty to those interested in the property over which he is appointed to act in good faith, including in particular DCP; and (2) in the context of the sale of the Property, that duty of good faith required (a) their powers to be exercised for the purpose of securing repayment of the debt owed to the mortgagee and (b) for that purpose alone and no other purpose or independent and conflicting interest of the mortgagee and (c) the Receivers not to place themselves in a position of conflict or potential conflict; and (3) a duty, including to DCP, to take reasonable steps to obtain a proper price; and (4) in the context of the sale of the Property, “proper price” meant (a) the best price reasonably obtainable at the material time and (b) taking proper steps to market the Property.”
“The Receivers were in breach of the above-mentioned equitable and/or common law duties as follows: (1) The Receivers knew or ought to have known that Aston Manor was a special purchaser by no later than17 February 2010 ; (2) The best price reasonably obtainable from in or about17 February 2010 was by giving notice to Aston Manor of their eviction and/or marketing the Property with vacant possession and with the ability to evict at short notice; (3) Further in any event it strengthened Aston Manor’s negotiating position, weakened that of the Receivers, to surrender the Lease and grant the New Lease on the terms stated on 20 –24 February 2010 : before the grant of the New Lease, on24 February 2010 , Aston Manor would have been required to pay£370,000 per annum and could have been removed from the Property at any time and/or in any event by no later than23 June 2010 . After the grant of the New Lease Aston Manor had the chance to break the New Lease on 6 months’ notice, but could not be required to vacate for 3 years; (4) At the time when the Emvic Offer was received, on17 February 2010 , the Receivers would have been able to secure vacant possession to enable the Emvic Offer to be accepted; (5) The Receivers received the Emvic offer of£4.25 million for the Property on17 February 2010 , on the basis of vacant possession and subject to contract. The Receivers had sufficient time before then to assess the value of the Property, both as to open market value and also on the basis that one interested party, Aston Manor, was a special purchaser, and decide whether to accept or reject this offer; (6) If the Receivers had obtained the informal valuation advice they received subsequently from Mr Hobbs of GVA Grimley, by5 March 2010 , and if they had received it before they decided to reject the Emvic offer on 18 February and enter into the New Lease on 24 February, they would have known that the best price reasonably obtainable was not going to be achieved by rejecting the Emvic offer and entering into new tenure arrangements which removed their ability to accept that offer and/or preserve its value as an offer against which Aston Manor would have to bid against; (7) Alternatively, if, which is denied, the Receivers ought not to have reasonably obtained valuation advice by18 February 2010 , then they ought to have taken it at this time, before rejecting the Emvic Offer and/or taking the steps in granting the New Lease to Aston Manor on the terms they did; (8) Ultimately the Property was sold for£2.75 million to Aston about a year after the Receivers’ appointment. As a result DCP, the mortgagor, received nothing from the sale. Ostensibly the mortgagee, Aston Manor, may also have suffered a shortfall, but given it (via its subsidiary company) was also the buyer, it was not negatively affected by that shortfall. This demonstrates the conflict the Receivers have placed themselves in: having granted the New Lease the only way the Receivers could improve on the offer was to secure vacant possession, and to do so by evicting their appointor, but they could not do that having granted the New Lease; (9) DCP will rely on the events leading up to what occurred on 17 –24 February 2010 , and after into 2011, as set out above, to support the inference that the Receivers were in a position of conflict and/or potential conflict and not acting for a proper purpose during the period 17 –24 February 2010 and thereafter, and instead were acting under the direction or control of Aston Manor, who had an ulterior and co-lateral improper purpose as occupier and prospective buyer in getting the Property for a small sum as possible; (10) In all the circumstances, the Receivers failed to act in good faith and obtain the best price reasonably obtainable.”
“(a) to act in good faith and for a proper purpose, namely the realisation of the assets comprised in the security and obtaining repayment of the sum secured; and (b) to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable at the time that the power of sale was exercised. This duty does not extend to awaiting or affecting any increase in value or improvement of the property.”
“on this basis I am of the opinion that, following grant of the new lease, they might have been prepared to pay a sum in the range£5 –£7m .”
“(1) A receiver managing mortgaged property owes duties to the mortgagor and anyone else with an interest in the equity of redemption. (2) The duties include, but are not necessarily confined to, a duty of good faith.”
“In my judgment, the breach of a duty of good faith should, in this area as in all others, require some dishonesty or improper motive, some element of bad faith, to be established.”
“I do not think that it is desirable to attempt to define the limits of good faith; it is a broad concept, the definition of which, insofar as it is capable of definition at all, will have to be worked out through the cases. In my view it is capable of embracing failure to act in a commercially acceptable way and sharp practice of a kind that falls short of outright dishonesty as well as dishonesty itself.”
“Even if a fiduciary is properly acting for two principals with potentially conflicting interests he must act in good faith in the interests of each and must not act with the intention of furthering the interests of one principal to the prejudice of those of the other… I shall call this ‘the duty of good faith’. But it goes further than this. He must not allow the performance of his obligations to one principal to be influenced by his relationship with the other. He must serve each as faithfully and loyally as if he were his only principal. Conduct which is in breach of this duty need not be dishonest but it must be intentional. An unconscious omission which happens to benefit one principal at the expense of the other does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, though it may constitute a breach of the duty of skill and care…”
“I need to talk to you about another option (which you will not like) which we may have to consider if we are put under pressure: 6 Remarket inviting bids on the basis that [Aston Manor] will vacate (on say 6 months notice) if an unconditional sale can be achieved which repays the mortgage and all costs in full. I think it very unlikely that such a bid will be made with such a negative planning situation, but if we do this and the best bid is only say£3m then we are all bullet-proof. If someone offers£4m then you can bid£4m +£1 and you buy it into an SPV yourself so [Aston Manor] can stay in the factory.”
“A purchaser to whom a particular asset has Special Value because of advantages arising from its ownership that would not be available to general purchasers in a market. (Special Purchaser).”
“Issue 4. There was a relatively buoyant beer and particularly cider production market at the relevant time which the [defendants] ought to have exploited. Issue 5. A trade-related approach to valuation is appropriate for the reasons explained by Mr Neeson at paragraphs 11.14-11.33 of his main report. Issue 6. The market value of the Property as a general industrial property (excluding any special purchaser value) at the date of sale was£3.25 million before the New Lease. Issue 7. The grant of the New Lease had a substantial depressive effect on the valuation of the Property. Issue 8 & 9. The market rent of the Property was£335,000 p.a. Issue 10. The special value which should have been obtained from Aston Manor was£7.5 million -£10 million . Issue 11. A process of obtaining formal tenders or sealed bids should have been undertaken. Issue 12. The [defendants] placed undue weight on the Edward Symmons11 February 2011 report which was after a decision had been made to sell to Aston Manor and did not specifically contemplate a potential sale to Aston Manor as a special purchaser. Issue 13. The [defendants] bear the burden of proof, applying settled legal principles. Issue 14. The experts agree that the amount of special value cannot be assessed with any degree of accuracy. This is therefore a case in which the Court can and should apply the ‘highest value’ principle of law explained above. It is also a case in which on his own admission [the first defendant’s] “day books” were destroyed sometime after he had been sent the letter of claim in April 2010. Those books may well have contained reference to conversations with Aston Manor which were otherwise unrecorded (such as the important pre-receivership meeting). In those circumstances, it is submitted that any doubt as to what interest would have been generated from other buyers if the [defendants] had generated genuine competition is properly resolved against them. It cannot be assumed that had the job been done properly there would not have been a speculator with knowledge of Aston Manor’s interest willing to bid up the price. Accordingly, the best price reasonably obtainable for the Property was£10 million . The best price reasonably obtainable for release was the rent then prevailing, of£370,000 pa, which did not need replacement or renegotiation before a sale could be effect[ed], alternatively, if the lease was to be renegotiated, at£335,000 p.a.”