“I only became aware of this a few days ago. Need to discuss in the morning if possible.”
‘As your employment has concluded with Greendealexpress … we expect that you cease in any way to promote Greendealexpress or any companies that the Directors of Greendealexpress are involved with. This includes contacting Greendealexpress clients regarding Greendealexpress related matters. We are happy for you to attend shareholders meetings held from time to time but request that you do not visit the Beverley offices for any other reason or attempt to manage the Greendealexpress employees. … The next shareholders meeting is to be held Monday 9th March 8am -10am we look forward to seeing you then.’
‘For clarity please do not conduct any activity that may be deemed as promoting Greendealexpress or companies associated with the directors. This means no external meetings, conversations with clients, meetings at the office or general promoting of Greendealexpress. Please do not hold or attend any meetings at the Beverly office other than shareholders meetings.’
“61. From Lord Hoffmann's speech [in O’Neill v Phillips[1999] 1 WLR 1092 ] one can deduce the following principles: (1) The concept of unfairness, although objective in its focus, is not to be considered in a vacuum. An assessment that conduct is unfair has to be made against the legal background of the corporate structure under consideration. This will usually take the form of the articles of association and any collateral agreements between shareholders which identify their rights and obligations as members of the company. Both are subject to established equitable principles which may moderate the exercise of strict legal rights when insistence on the enforcement of such rights would be unconscionable; (2) It follows that it will not ordinarily be unfair for the affairs of a company to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its articles or any other relevant and legally enforceable agreement, unless it would be inequitable for those agreements to be enforced in the particular circumstances under consideration. Unfairness may, to use Lord Hoffmann's words, "consist in a breach of the rules or in using rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith": see p.1099A; the conduct need not therefore be unlawful, but it must be inequitable; (3) Although it is impossible to provide an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the application of equitable principles would render it unjust for a party to insist on his strict legal rights, those principles are to be applied according to settled and established equitable rules and not by reference to some indefinite notion of fairness; (4) To be unfair, the conduct complained of need not be such as would have justified the making of a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds as formerly required unders.210 of the Companies Act 1948 ; (5) A useful test is always to ask whether the exercise of the power or rights in question would involve a breach of an agreement or understanding between the parties which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. Such agreements do not have to be contractually binding in order to found the equity; (6) It is not enough merely to show that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. There is no right of unilateral withdrawal for a shareholder when trust and confidence between shareholders no longer exist. It is, however, different if that breakdown in relations then causes the majority to exclude the petitioner from the management of the company or otherwise to cause him prejudice in his capacity as a shareholder.”
“A lot of the jurisprudence refers to the applicability of the jurisdiction where there is a “quasi-partnership”
“45. In my view, neither equity nor the jurisdiction under section 994 sweeps away contractual arrangements; at most, the exercise of contractual rights is subjected to equitable restraint if it would be unconscionable, or unfairly prejudicial. If the exercise of the legal right would not be unconscionable, the consequences of its exercise must be permitted to follow. 46. Furthermore, in the particular circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded that there is anything inconsistent between the understandings invoked by Mr Collingwood and the provisions of the contractual documentation: Mr Moxon’s real complaint (so it seems to me) is not so much as to the provisions but as to the harshness of their effect. … 52. More particularly, the provisions for removal of a director and the deemed transfer of his shares at a price depending on the circumstances of his removal, do not seem to me to be offensive to the nature of the Company as a small body corporate based on personal relationships, nor indeed inconsistent with the understandings which Mr Moxon asserts. That is especially so where, as in this case, there has been provision made and satisfied for distributions of distributable profit in each year, so that it is not a situation where the deemed transferor loses all the intermediate benefit of his participation. 53. I have not been persuaded that Mr Moxon was entitled, or even can reasonably have expected to be entitled, to remain in executive office even if in good faith found guilty of gross misconduct; and I am not persuaded either that there was any intention or understanding (whether express or implicit) that the contractually agreed consequences should not follow. 54. I do not see the need to determine whether or not there was a “quasi-partnership”
“It is established that wrongdoing on the part of a petitioner seeking relief under section 994 can be relevant in two ways. The first way is that the petitioner's wrongdoing may make the prejudicial conduct of the respondent not unfair. The second way is that the petitioner's wrongdoing may justify the court in refusing to grant relief to the petitioner or may influence the choice of any relief which is granted. These propositions are established by Re London School of Electronics Ltd[1986] Ch 211 at 222 B-C, Richardson v Blackmore[2006] BCC 276 and Grace v Biagioli[2006] BCC 85 .”
“51.1.To act in accordance with the Companies’ respectiveArticles (as provided by s.171(a) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”)); 51.2. To exercise their powers for proper purposes (as provided bys.171(b) of the Act ); 51.3. To exercise their powers in good faith to promote the success of the Companies for the benefit of their respective members, including having regard to the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, the need to foster the Companies’ business relationships with suppliers, customers and others and the need to act fairly as between members (as provided bys.172 of the Act ); 51.4. To exercise their independent judgment (as provided bys.173 of the Act ); 51.5. To act with reasonable care and skill (as provided bys.174 of the Act ); and 51.6. To avoid situations in which they had, or could have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicted, or might conflict, with the interests of the Companies (as provided bys.175 of the Act ).”
“ … a party owes a duty to the other negotiating parties to disclose all material facts of which he has knowledge and of which the other negotiating parties may not be aware.” … 7-179 Analogous Agreements A duty of disclosure may arise as an implied term of an agreement which is not a partnership but which has “elements of joint enterprise or joint venture”, but: “… wider duties will not lightly be implied, in particular in commercial contracts negotiated at arms' length between parties with comparable bargaining power, and all the more so where the contract in question sets out in detail the extent, for example, of a party's disclosure obligations.”
“[Counsel for the claimant] submitted that the relationship between Dr Dewji and Mr Banwaitt was such that Dr Dewji owed Mr Banwaitt a duty of disclosure like that owed in a contract uberrimae fidei. He referred me to Chitty on Contracts, 31st edition, paragraphs 6-170,171 and to the judgment of Briggs J in Ross River Ltd v Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2008] 1 All E R 1004 commencing at paragraphs 196 and 197. [Counsel for the defendant] did not accept that a duty of disclosure arose in the facts here, but neither did he dispute it. I accept that a duty of disclosure arose because Dr Dewji was the orchestrator of the venture, was inviting Mr Banwaitt to join and persuading him to do so, and he knew that Mr Banwaitt was totally reliant on him ....”
“I was also reluctant to raise the subject as I did not consider it to be my place, given that Mark and Simon were the directors in charge of the company”