“(a) Master Egan wrongly concluded that 91% of the hours spent preparing the defence to the Crown Court proceedings were false. The Firm [i.e. Neumans] does not accept the conclusion that the lack of contemporaneous notes by Mr Sheik must mean the work was not done. If Master Egan is correct in his conclusion then it would mean that only 38 minutes per working day were spent preparing the defence to the Crown Court proceedings. The Firm considers that to be clearly wrong given this case was deemed to be the biggest worldwide conspiracy ever brought to trial. (b) The Firm does not accept the criticism that Mr Sheik’s attendance notes supporting his work for the 2,783 claimed hours in preparation of the defence to the Crown Court proceedings bear a striking similarity to those supporting his claim for 102 hours in the Court of Appeal proceedings. The Firm accepts as a fact that the attendance notes are similar in style and content. However, the Firm states that fact does not equate to evidence of the work not being done. This fact is reflective of the similar nature of the activities being done, for example, reading and considering documents. (c) The Firm considers that the basis of Master Egan’s allegation that the claim of over£300,000 for a noting brief was required to attend the trial of co-defendants of Mr Patel (the trial of which took place prior to Mr Patel’s trial) in order to better prepare Mr Patel’s defence. The Firm accepts that at the time of this earlier trial Mr Patel did not contemplate having to pay in excess of£300,000 for the noting brief. This was because of the existence of the Capping Agreement. At the point of retrospectively varying the fees (with the Deed of Variation) Mr Patel was then in a position to assess the value of work undertaken by the noting brief and, ultimately, pay for that work. (d) In relation to Master Egan’s conclusion that the submission of the bill of costs and the deliberate non-disclosure of the eight invoices by the Firm was dishonest, the Firm submits that the non-disclosure was not dishonest. Instead, the Firm chose not [to] disclose the invoices in order to avoid confusion. The Firm considered the invoices to be unenforceable due to the retrospective effect of the Deed of Variation so instead treated the payments made against those invoices as payments on account against the final bill. Further, the Firm is of the view that it did disclose the invoices when it was asked for them. (e) Master Egan’s fifth conclusion was in relation to Mr Patel’s affidavit, which the Court of Appeal ordered him to prepare in support of the DCO [i.e. defendant’s costs order]. Master Egan concluded that Mr Patel’s evidence that he was content to pay the final invoice in the full amount and his evidence about the deliberate non-disclosure of the invoices he paid was dishonest. In response to this the Firm repeated its points raised in response to the fourth conclusion. The Firm also directed the Supervisor to a witness statement prepared by Mr Patel to support the Firm’s report to the SRA. Specifically, the Firm provided this statement in relation to Master Egan’s conclusions about the non-disclosure of the eight invoices. As can be seen, Mr Patel’s witness statement does not address this point. (f) Master Egan’s sixth and final conclusion is that the Deed of Variation was designed to facilitate a dishonest claim on Central Funds. In response to this point the Firm stated that it took advice from a highly experienced costs lawyer with specific experience in retrospective variation agreements (Mr Roger Mallalieu). Further, Mr Patel was strongly advised by Mr Sheik to take independent legal advice but he chose not to.”
“(a) intervention into the practice of Mr Sheik and Ms Sabir and into the Firm [i.e. Neumans]; (b) publication of the decision to intervene and referral of the conduct to the SDT [i.e. Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal]; (c) referral of Mr Sheik and Ms Sabir’s conduct to the SDT.”
“I hereby give you notice pursuant to the provisions ofSection 4(3) of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 that I cease to be a member of Neumans LLP with immediate effect. I also give you notice that I resign from my positions as COLP, COFA and head of international sanctions at Neumans LLP with immediate effect.”
“We shall give Ms Sabir the benefit of some considerable doubts that we have about her evidence. We do not say that there are no grounds to suspect dishonesty. We do not make a finding that [Ms] Sabir was honest or not. Simply put, we do not propose to intervene into the practice of Ms Sabir on the ground of reason to suspect dishonesty.”
“9.16 We have carefully considered whether it is necessary to intervene into the individual and former practice of Mr Sheikh and the Firm [i.e. Neumans], and have balanced the need to exercise the powers of intervention in the public interest against the serious consequences of the intervention for him, Ms Sabir, the Firm’s employees and clients. 9.17 We are satisfied that it is necessary to exercise powers of intervention in this case because there is strong evidence which suggests that the misconduct of Mr Sheikh is serious, involves the public at large and large sums of public money. 9.18 The misconduct was intentional and pre-meditated and appears to have been designed to enrich Mr Sheikh and the Firm. 9.19 The misconduct had its origins, it seems, in 2009 when the idea of the Deed of Variation was conceived and then executed. However, the consequences of the misconduct continue to the present, as can be vividly seen from the Court of Appeal’s judgment of19 December 2016 . 9.20 The Firm was slow to self-report matters which ought to have been reported years ago. It seems that it was only after an FI investigation started, in the comparatively recent past, that the Firm self-reported. 9.21 Mr Sheikh has recently resigned as the COFA and COLP. He has also, very recently indeed, resigned as a member of the Firm. This removes some risk to the Firm and to the public, since a person who appears to us to be wholly and obviously unsuited to be a COFA and a COLP is no longer in those roles. His resignation as a member of the Firm also provides an apparent degree of reassurance. 9.22 However, Mr Sheikh is still at large, and he can still influence the way in which the Firm is managed and run, albeit with a degree of less viability, and with less personal liability (as a COLP, COFA and member) than before. He poses a continuing threat to it that is not extinguished by him resigning in the way that he has. 9.23 Moreover, this was, until very recently, a firm with two owners: Mr Sheikh and his wife, Ms Sabir. They ran it together. Mr Sheikh’s relationship with the Firm is so close and their respective interests and history so closely intertwined that no meaningful and realistic distinction can be drawn between him and the Firm. 9.24 We have been asked to accept that (i) Ms Sabir is now in charge of the Firm and she is best placed to continue to do so; (ii) there is no risk any longer because Mr Sheikh is not in any recorded and regulated roles. We do not accept this. For years, and particularly when Ms Sabir has been on maternity leave, Mr Sheikh has run the Firm. Significantly, he has controlled the finances. He has done this without any robust third party oversight. 9.25 Equally significantly, Ms Sabir, when recently describing her role as the Managing Partner in response to the Production Notice, does not mention any financial management role at all. While her list of functions is not prescriptive, the fact that there is no mention of fiscal control at all is telling. 9.26 The fact that Mr Sheikh has now resigned as the COFA does not mean that his ability to exercise control and influence of the Firm’s finances is restrained. It means that he is no longer accountable to the SRA about them as COFA. His legal obligations as a member have ceased. 9.27 We consider that Mr Sheikh’s breaches of the rules, principles and outcomes identified above creates an unacceptable risk to clients and the wider public. On balance, we are satisfied that the need to intervene into the practice to protect clients and the public interest outweighs the serious implications of intervention for Mr Sheikh and Ms Sabir.”
“Ms Sabir has requested that she attends before us for interview to make representations. We have considered whether we have all the information and evidence that we require to enable us to make a decision in respect of this matter. We have extensive and detailed representations from Ms Sabir’s legal representative, in addition to the bundle of evidence. We do not consider it necessary to invite her for interview as we have sufficient evidence and information to make a decision.”
“Subject to sub-paragraph (2), where— (a) the Society [i.e. the Law Society] is satisfied that a recognised body or a manager of such a body has failed to comply with any rules applicable to the body or manager by virtue of section 9 of this Act; or … (d) the Society has reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of any manager or employee of a recognised body in connection with (i) that body’s business, (ii) any trust of which that body is or was a trustee, (iii) any trust of which the manager or employee is or was a trustee in his capacity as such a manager or employee, or (iv) the business of another body in which the manager or employee is or was a manager or employee or the practice (or former practice) of the manager or employee; … … the powers conferred by Part II of Schedule 1 to the 1974 Act shall be exercisable in relation to the recognised body and its business in like manner as they are exercisable in relation to a solicitor and his practice.”
“Within 8 days of the service of a notice under sub-paragraph (3), the person on whom it was served, on giving not less than 48 hours’ notice in writing to the Society and (if the notice gives the name of the solicitor instructed by the Society) to that solicitor, may apply to the High Court for an order directing the Society to withdraw the notice.”
“[T]he court must, indeed, weigh the risks of re-instating the solicitor in his (or her) practice against the potentially catastrophic consequences to the solicitor (and the inconvenience, and perhaps real harm, to his or her existing clients) if the intervention continues. In weighing the risks of re-instatement the court must have regard to the views of the Law Society as the professional body charged by statute with the regulation of solicitors … and as the body whose members are obliged, through the compensation fund, to underwrite those risks …. ”
“The intervention procedure, now contained in theSolicitors Act 1974 , is long-established (dating back to 1941, in its earliest form), and has been reviewed by the court on many occasions. As appears from the cases to which I have referred, it has been recognised as ‘draconian’ in some respects, but necessary for the protection of the public interest; and the courts have repeatedly emphasised the ‘balancing exercise’ which it involves. I see no material difference between this and the ‘fair balance’ which article 1 [of the First Protocol] requires. Nor do I see any reason why theHuman Rights Act 1998 should be thought to have changed anything. There has long been a right of individual petition to the Strasbourg court for breaches of the Convention, but we have not been referred to any questioning of the intervention procedure under article 1. I see no arguable grounds for thinking that the margin allowed to the legislature has been crossed, particularly having regard to the deference which is properly paid to an Act of Parliament, as compared to an administrative decision: see International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2003] QB 728 , 746, 765, paras 26, 83”; ii) The rules of natural justice do not apply as such to an intervention. As Sedley J observed in Giles v Law Society (1995) 8 Admin LR 105, “The manifest purpose of Sch 1 to theSolicitors Act 1974 … is to create an ex parte procedure leading where appropriate to intervention”
“If it is demonstrated to the court that a notice … is fundamentally flawed (for example, because it is based on an ultra vires resolution) it may well be that a direction for withdrawal should be made ex debito justitiae, leaving it to the Law Society to decide whether, in the light of what it then knows, it ought to pass a fresh resolution to intervene”; iv) “In the exercise of its powers of intervention the Law Society must of course comply with the Human Rights Convention” (per Staughton LJ in Holder v Law Society, at paragraph 38). That means that questions of proportionality are capable of arising. It is, however, important to have in mind “the ‘all important’ factor, when considering issues of proportionality, of the ‘margin of appreciation or discretion’ or ‘area of judgment’ allowed to the legislator and the decision-maker” (per Carnwath LJ in Holder, at paragraph 31). The SRA thus “has a ‘margin of discretion’” (Carnwath LJ, at paragraph 33); v) There is room for argument as to whether the Court should always direct withdrawal where the SRA’s decision was not justifiable at the time it was taken. In Giles v Law Society, Sedley J said: “even in a case where it can be shown by the solicitor that the original notice ought not to have been issued because, say, the original evidence prompting the intervention was too exiguous to found a reasonable suspicion, the court need not direct withdrawal if on intervention abundant evidence of dishonesty has been found”
“I should add (by way of parenthesis) that, for my part, I confess to some doubt whether, as Sedley J suggested in Giles v Law Society, the court could refuse to direct withdrawal of a notice which ‘ought not to have been issued’ because the original evidence prompting the intervention ‘was too exiguous to found a reasonable suspicion’ on the basis that abundant evidence of dishonesty had been found on intervention—if he intended to include in that example a case where, on a proper analysis of the position at the time the decision to intervene was taken by the society, the powers of intervention had not become exercisable. As Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed in Buckley v Law Society (No 2)[1984] 3 All ER 313 at 316,[1984] 1 WLR 1101 at 1105: ‘the Law Society ought not to be free to intervene on inadequate grounds in the hope that what will be found will justify the intervention.’ But I recognise that the Vice-Chancellor clearly took the view in that case that it would be open to the court to refuse to direct withdrawal notwithstanding that, on the facts known to the society at the time of the resolution, there was insufficient reason to suspect dishonesty. He said this, by way of example ([1984] 3 All ER 313 at 316,[1984] 1 WLR 1101 at 1105): ‘On the available material the Law Society concludes (wrongly) that there are sufficient reasons for suspecting dishonesty, and passes the resolution. The intervention then reveals that there are other facts, previously unknown to the Law Society, which demonstrate that the solicitor is in fact grossly dishonest. On the hearing, the court must nevertheless direct the Law Society to withdraw the notice (and perhaps pay the costs), and leave the Law Society to begin again. [That] seems to me to be an unjust result that Parliament is unlikely to have intended.’ As I have said, the powers under Pt II of Sch 1 to the 1974 Act are exercisable only in circumstances within Pt I. If, at the time when the society purports to exercise its powers under Pt II, those powers have not become exercisable—because the pre-condition (the existence of circumstances within Pt I) is not met—it seems to me difficult to avoid the conclusion that the exercise of the powers was, indeed, ultra vires in the public law sense. But that is not how it has appeared to other judges in other cases. This is not a case in which it is said—or could be said—that the intervention powers were not exercisable at the time when they were exercised. It is unnecessary to decide the point; and I do not do so”; and vi) The SRA can properly decide to intervene on the basis of risks rather than certainties. In Buckley v Law Society (No 2)[1984] 1 WLR 1101 , Megarry V-C said (at 1106): “The powers of intervention conferred by Schedule 1 are plainly powers that are intended to enable the society to nip in the bud, so far as possible, cases of dishonesty by solicitors. The power to act on suspicion is a strong power, and there must often be a real element of risk in its exercise. But the decision of Parliament that the society is to have power to act on suspicion necessarily involves a decision that the society is to take whatever risks are involved in so acting; and these include risks both to the society and to the solicitors concerned.”
“We are also conscious of the fact that you were recently subject to a Peer Review audit under the terms of the Contract where you received a result of ‘Below Competence’. This clearly gives us significant concerns as this process, undertaken by independent expert criminal lawyers, indicates that the firm represents a risk to clients. In the ordinary course of events we would conduct a further audit approximately six months after the original audit result, however, it appears that this will not now be possible. Whilst this first Peer Review audit result is not a termination event on its own account it does provide context and adds weight to our decision to formally terminate the Contract. Finally, we consider that the Court of Appeal judgment of19 December 2016 constitutes a finding of ‘grave professional misconduct’ under thePublic Contracts Regulations 2015 which you should have disclosed to the LAA’s procurement team during the tender process. As this did not occur we were prevented from undertaking this reassessment to determine, having regard to the judgment, whether it was appropriate to enter into the 2017 Contract with you. This failure to self-report constitutes a breach of clause 18.1 of the Contract Standard Terms. As indicated above, we have not undertaken a reassessment, however we consider this breach is a factor we may consider in determining whether to terminate your Contract following intervention. For the avoidance of doubt, and as confirmed above, we do not consider this or the other background events/considerations to be individually determinative or tipping the balance in favour of termination”; ii) The SRA suggests that, “[i]n reality, leaving an LLP that has been trading for several years involving substantial income requires much more than a simple resignation in terms of the practical position of the members”; and iii) On30 June 2017 , nine days after Mr Sheikh’s resignation, Neumans’ website said merely “Profile to follow” for Ms Sabir, while there was a lengthy entry for Mr Sheikh. After a quote from Chambers UK 2014, the first few paragraphs of the profile read: “Nabeel [Sheikh] enjoyed his reputation as an internationally renowned lawyer and the Former Senior Partner and Founder of Neumans LLP. Nabeel is an expert in litigation with an underlying element of criminal conduct or fraud. He is ranked as a leading individual in litigation, white-collar crime & business crime in the foremost legal directories, including Global Law Experts, Legal Experts Directory and Chambers & Partners UK and has received numerous awards in recognition of his expertise in these areas. After an illustrious career spanning nearly two decades, Nabeel has been fortunate enough to retire to pursue other business interests both here and abroad. He was a supervisory member of the Specialist Fraud Panel, and his expertise extends to both criminal and civil/commercial fraud arising through a wide range of circumstances. He commonly defends those investigated by the highest level UK Government bodies/agencies.”