“When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to “what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean”, to quote Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd[2009] AC 1101 , para 14. And it does so by focusing on the meaning of the relevant words, … in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the lease, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions. ..”
“35 In complex documents of the kind in issue there are bound to be ambiguities, infelicities and inconsistencies. An over-literal interpretation of one provision without regard to the whole may distort or frustrate the commercial purpose. This is one of those too frequent cases where a document has been subjected to the type of textual analysis more appropriate to the interpretation of tax legislation which has been the subject of detailed scrutiny at all committee stages than to an instrument securing commercial obligations … 36 Sigma financed its investments over a 13-year period by debt securities issued or guaranteed by it. It entered into liquidity facilities intended to hedge against market liquidity risks. It entered into financial instruments intended to hedge against currency and interest rate risk. Others provided liquidity facilities, or entered into financial hedging instruments. The security trust deed secures a variety of creditors, who hold different instruments, issued at different times, and in different circumstances. 37 Consequently this is not the type of case where the background or matrix of fact is or ought to be relevant, except in the most generalised way. I do not consider, therefore, that there is much assistance to be derived from the principles of interpretation re-stated by Lord Hoffmann in the familiar passage in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 , 912–913. Where a security document secures a number of creditors who have advanced funds over a long period it would be quite wrong to take account of circumstances which are not known to all of them. In this type of case it is the wording of the instrument which is paramount. The instrument must be interpreted as a whole in the light of the commercial intention which may be inferred from the face of the instrument and from the nature of the debtor's business. Detailed semantic analysis must give way to business common sense…”
“Unless previously redeemed in full and cancelled as provided in this Condition 6, the Issuer shall redeem the Notes at their Principal Amount Outstanding together with accrued interest at the Maturity Date, which is the Payment Date falling in January 2016”
“Upon payment in full of the Principal Amounts Outstanding of all the Notes (other than the Class X notes and the Class V Notes) by redemption pursuant to any provision under this Condition 6 (Redemption and Cancellation) or in the event that the aggregate outstanding principal balance of the Loans has been reduced to zero, any amount that is held in a separate account of the Issuer as security for the Class X Notes only, shall be paid in full as a payment of principal to the holders of the Class X Notes.”
“Subject to Condition 6(h) (Mandatory Redemption in part of the Class X Notes and Class V Notes), while any [Class A-H Notes] are outstanding, the Class X Noteholders and the Class V Noteholders shall not be entitled to any repayment of principal in respect of the Class X Notes and the Class V Notes, respectively.”
“in the event that any payment of principal is not made […] on or before the due date of that class of Notes or on or after accelerated maturity following a Note Event of Default, interest shall continue to accrue (both before and after any judgment or other order of a court of competent jurisdiction) on the Principal Amount Outstanding of the Notes of such class at the rates aforesaid (or, if higher, the rate of interest on judgment debts for the time being provided by law) …”