“I recognised that Dr Massaad had the necessary power to allocate the Shares to me. This was evidenced on the face of the powers of attorney granted to me, all of which were notarised by an independent notary who verified Dr Massaad’s authority to issue them. There was nothing surreptitious about the share transfers, and so far as I am aware they were known to a number of persons within the RAK Government and/or RAK’s professional advisors …,”
“In December 2013, I learned that, in addition to my 73-year-old father’s heart condition, he had been diagnosed with an aggressive form of cancer and that his doctors were not certain how much longer he would live. My mother beseeched me to give back my Shares so that I would be released from jail and could be with my father (this was communicated to me by Mr Gvaramadze). I have always been immensely close to my mother and father, in common with many Georgian families, we have a close-knit relationship and we all live in the same house. In the hugely upsetting and challenging circumstances of my solitary incarceration, and for the benefit of my family, I made a human (and pragmatic) decision to suspend my resistance on the basis that I would fight to get my Shares back as soon as I was released. Accordingly, I sent a message through Mr Gvaramadze that I would agree to their ultimatum.”
“the fact that works were performed is self-evident; the Mall requires a substantial supply of electricity but is currently operational and it is not asserted by the Applicants that anyone else apart from Bellcrown was responsible for the provision of the electricity supply.”
“Like many businessmen from former CIS states, I use overseas companies held via a trust structure in order to protect my assets from the risks posed by latent political instability and corruption in the region. This is entirely lawful and accepted worldwide. There is nothing sinister or inappropriate whatsoever about such safeguarding.”
“a) the identity of the Owner(s) of the Respondent; b) the Identifying Details of any natural person or Entity to whom the Respondent has given or otherwise transferred assets exceeding US$25,000 in value; c) the identity of the Owners of all such Entities; d) the date of every such gift or other transfer of assets; e) the nature and amount or value of the asset transferred on each occasion; f) the consideration (if any) for such transfer; and g) in the case of any transfer of funds, the details of any bank account to which such transfer was made.”
“17. … if, therefore, a Freezing Order does not, of itself, provide adequate protection to a claimant because there is a measurable risk that a defendant may use the structure by which he holds his assets to deal with those assets in breach of the Freezing Order, then a receivership order will normally be justified.”
“The court has always been ready to appoint a receiver over the foreign as well as British assets of an English company, even though it has recognised that in relation to foreign assets the appointment may not prove effective without assistance from a foreign court: In re Maudslay, Sons & Field; Maudslay v. Maudslay, Sons & Field[1900] 1 Ch. 602 . Moreover where a foreign court of the country where the assets are situate refuses to recognise the receiver appointed by the English court, the English court will, in an appropriate case, do what it can to render the appointment effective by orders in personam against persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the English court; see the helpful decision of Neville J in In re Huinac Copper Mines Ltd; Matheson & Co v The Company [1910] W.N. 218.”
“115. As the authorities show, there are five particular considerations which the court should bear in mind, when considering the question whether it is inexpedient to make an order. First, whether the making of the order will interfere with the management of the case in the primary court e.g. where the order is inconsistent with an order in the primary court or overlaps with it. That consideration does not arise in the present case. Second, whether it is the policy in the primary jurisdiction not itself to make worldwide freezing/disclosure orders. Third, whether there is a danger that the orders made will give rise to disharmony or confusion and/or risk of conflicting inconsistent or overlapping orders in other jurisdictions, in particular the courts of the state where the person enjoined resides or where the assets affected are located. If so, then respect for the territorial jurisdiction of that state should discourage the English court from using its unusually wide powers against a foreign defendant. Fourth, whether at the time the order is sought there is likely to be a potential conflict as to jurisdiction rendering it inappropriate and inexpedient to make a worldwide order. Fifth, whether, in a case where jurisdiction is resisted and disobedience to be expected, the court will be making an order which it cannot enforce.”