“Probate proceedings peculiarly pose problems for the court because the protagonist, the testator, is dead and those who wish to challenge the will are often not able to give evidence of the circumstances of the will.”
“The judge approached the issue of knowledge and approval on a two stage basis. He first asked whether Dr Gill had established sufficient facts “to excite the suspicion of the court”, which really amounts to establishing a prima facie case that Mrs Gill did not in fact know of and approve the contents of the will. Secondly, having held that Dr Gill had excited the suspicion of the court, he then turned to consider whether or not those suspicions were allayed by the RSPCA, who were of course supporting the will. This approach accords with Parke B’s analysis in Barry v Butlin 2 Moo PC 480, quoted by Lindley LJ in Terry v Painton[1894] P 151 , 156-157, referred to above, and it is reflected in the approach in a number of other cases.”
“Where a judge has heard evidence of fact and expert opinion over a period of many days relating to the character and state of mind and likely desires of the testatrix and the circumstances in which the will was drafted and executed, and other relevant matters, the value of such a two-stage approach to deciding the issue of the testatrix’s knowledge and approval appears to me to be questionable. In my view, the approach which it would, at least generally, be better to adopt is that summarised by Sachs J in Re Crerar (unreported) but see (1956) 106 LJ 684, 695, cited and followed by Latey J. in In re Morris, decd[1971] P 62 , 78 namely that the court should “consider all the relevant evidence available and then, drawing such inferences as it can from the totality of that material, it has to come to a conclusion whether or not those propounding the will have discharged the burden of establishing that the testatrix knew and approved the contents of the document which is put forward as a valid testamentary disposition. The fact that the testatrix read the document, and the fact that she executed it, must be given the full weight apposite in the circumstances, but in law those facts are not conclusive, nor do they raise a presumption.”” “consider all the relevant evidence available and then, drawing such inferences as it can from the totality of that material, it has to come to a conclusion whether or not those propounding the will have discharged the burden of establishing that the testatrix knew and approved the contents of the document which is put forward as a valid testamentary disposition. The fact that the testatrix read the document, and the fact that she executed it, must be given the full weight apposite in the circumstances, but in law those facts are not conclusive, nor do they raise a presumption.””
“27 The overall burden lies on the claimant to produce evidence sufficient to prove the 2008 Will. Certain evidential presumptions may assist in the discharge of that burden: but the circumstances may indicate that the propounder is required positively to prove what in other circumstances might be presumed or inferred from proof of other facts. 28 The daughters in their Re-Re-Re Amended Defence and Counterclaim assert that Mr Wharton did not know or approve the contents of the 2008 Will. My approach to that issue (informed by the familiar authorities as reviewed and commented on by the Court of Appeal in Gill v Woodall[2010] EWCA Civ 1430 ) is as follows:- (a) The assertion that Mr Wharton did not “know and approve” of the 2008 Will requires the Court, before admitting it to proof, to be satisfied that Mr Wharton understood what he was doing and its effect (that is to say that he was making a will containing certain dispositive provisions) so that the document represents his testamentary intentions. (b) The burden lies on Maureen to show that Mr Wharton knew and approved of the 2008 Will in that sense. (c) The Court can infer knowledge and approval from proof of capacity and proof of due execution (neither of which the Daughters now dispute). (d) It is not in issue that the 2008 Will was read over to Mr Wharton. The Court of Appeal observed in Gill v Woodall at paragraph [14], that, as a matter of common sense and authority, the fact that a will has been properly executed, after being prepared by a solicitor and read over to the testator, raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testator’s intentions at the relevant time. (e) But proof of the reading over of a will does not necessarily establish “knowledge and approval”
“When we move on to knowledge and approval what we are looking for is actual knowledge and approval of the contents of the will. But it is important to bear in mind that it is knowledge and approval of the actual will that count: not knowledge and approval of other potential dispositions. Testamentary capacity includes the ability to make choices, whereas knowledge and approval requires no more than the ability to understand and approve choices that have already been made. That is why knowledge and approval can be found even in a case in which the testator lacks testamentary capacity at the date when the will is executed. The reason for the requirement is the need for evidence to rebut suspicious circumstances: Perrins v Holland[2010] EWCA Civ 840 ;[2011] Ch 270 at [25]. Normally proof of instructions and reading over the will will suffice: ibid at [25]. The correct approach for the trial judge is clearly set out in Gill v Woodall[2010] EWCA Civ 1430 ;[2011] Ch 380 . It is a holistic exercise based on the evaluation of all the evidence both factual and expert.”
“I GIVE MY WILL AND DIRECT MY EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE SHALL BE ENTITLED TO BE PAID FOR ANY TIME EXPENDITURE DONE. MY TRUSTEE SHALL HOLD MY RESIDUARY AND ESTATE UPON TRUST TO PAY THE SAME DIVIDED THREE EQUAL PARTS TO: (1) EVELYN VALERIE HUTCHINS of 3 ADDISON AVENUE, SOUTHGATE, N14 4AL (2) PETER ALAN ROGERS of 233 LONSDALE DRIVE, ENFIELD, MIDDX EN2 7JZ (3) JOYCE GILKERSON of 16 CRANMERE ROAD, HIGHER COMTON, PLYMOUTH, DEVON PL4 5JY”