“(a) The Defendants, as Cartelists, (and each of them) breached the statutory duty imposed by Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC) and/or s.2(1) of the European Communities Act 197[2]. (b) Further or alternatively, the Defendants, as Cartelists, (and each of them) participated in a conspiracy to use unlawful means, namely the agreed entry into arrangements contravening Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC). (c) Further or alternatively, each company in IMI (and unknown directors or controllers thereof to be particularised upon disclosure herein), including specifically the First and Second Defendants, participated in a conspiracy to use unlawful means when they agreed and/or combined with the other IMI companies named in the Decision to effect IMI’s participation in arrangements with the other Cartelists contravening Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC).”
“…The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is therefore limited to determining what are commonly referred to as follow-on claims for damages based on a finding of infringement of the Chapter II prohibition or Article 82 which has been made by the OFT or one of the sectoral regulators such as the ORR who enjoy concurrent powers of enforcement in respect of the Chapter II prohibitions … The existence of such a finding is not only a pre-condition to the making of a claim under s.47A(1). It also operates to determine and define the limits of that claim and the Tribunal's jurisdiction in respect of it…. For there to be such a claim (and, with it, the jurisdiction of theTribunal to adjudicate upon it) the regulator must have made a decision of the kind described in s.47A(6). The use of the word "decision" makes it clear that s.47A is differentiating between findings of fact as to the conduct of the defendant made as part of the overall decision and a determination by the regulator that particular conduct amounts to an infringement of the Chapter II prohibition. It is not open to a claimant such as ECSL to seek to recover damages through the medium of s.47A simply by identifying findings of fact which could arguably amount to such an infringement. No right of action exists unless the regulator has actually decided that such conduct constitutes an infringement of the relevant prohibition as defined. The corollary to this is that the Tribunal (whose jurisdiction depends upon the existence of such a decision) must satisfy itself that the regulator has made a relevant and definitive finding of infringement. The purpose of section 47A is to obviate the necessity for a trial of the question of infringement only where the regulator has in fact ruled on that very issue...”
“…the need for a determination by the regulator of an infringement as a foundation for liability under section 47A. It is not enough to be able to point to findings in the decision from which an infringement might arguably be inferred…”
“The right to bring a follow-on claim before the Tribunal does not affect the right of a party to bring the sort of proceedings in court that were already possible, so a party which considers itself to have been the victim of anti-competitive behaviour, and to have suffered loss as a result, has a choice: it may bring ordinary proceedings in the High Court (I speak only of England, even though the 1998 Act applies throughout the UK), or, if a relevant regulator has held there to have been an infringement, it may bring proceedings in the Tribunal. If it proceeds in court, it can allege, and must prove, whatever infringements it wishes to rely on as having caused loss. If a regulator has found there to have been an infringement, before or during the course of the proceedings, it will have the benefit of section 58 [of the 1998 Act] under which it can rely on the regulator's findings of fact. On the other hand, it may proceed in the Tribunal, in which case it is limited to the infringements found by the regulator, but the question of infringement is concluded by the regulator's decision, leaving only the issues of causation and quantification of loss to be decided by the Tribunal.”
“Liability for infringement has already been established in the Commission Decision and is binding on the parties and the Tribunal. Only issues of causation and quantum are left to be determined by the Tribunal. ”
“more about the allocation and distribution of judicial business within the system of domestic courts and specialist tribunals by allowing, presumably for reasons of convenience and case management, monetary claims for breaches of competition law to be brought, in specified circumstances, in the specialist Tribunal, instead of by ordinary action in a court of law.”
“Caution, as well as a patient and practical intelligence, is highly desirable in s.47A cases. The Tribunal and the courts should steer well clear of "the hazards of commitment" to narrow preconceived attitudes conditioned by domestic law, but they must not be overawed by the panoramic view of a new legal landscape that includes dominating EU legal doctrines, such as the powerful principles of effectiveness and legal certainty. They must not lose sight of the basic elements of fair procedure or of the root principles of the rule of law, though they may be modified in their application to cases originating in the EU context.”
“This form of the tort is committed where two or more persons combine and take action which is unlawful in itself with the intention of causing damage to a third party who does incur the intended damage. It is not necessary for the injured party to prove that causing him damage was the main or predominant purpose of the combination but that purpose must be part of the combiners’ intentions.”
“164. …A defendant may intend to harm the claimant's business either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. A defendant may intend to harm the claimant as an end in itself where, for instance, he has a grudge against the claimant. More usually a defendant intentionally inflicts harm on a claimant's business as a means to an end. He inflicts damage as the means whereby to protect or promote his own economic interests. 165. Intentional harm inflicted against a claimant in either of these circumstances satisfies the mental ingredient of this tort. This is so even if the defendant does not wish to harm the claimant, in the sense that he would prefer that the claimant were not standing in his way. 166. Lesser states of mind do not suffice. A high degree of blameworthiness is called for, because intention serves as the factor which justifies imposing liability on the defendant for loss caused by a wrong otherwise not actionable by the claimant against the defendant. The defendant's conduct in relation to the loss must be deliberate. In particular, a defendant's foresight that his unlawful conduct may or will probably damage the claimant cannot be equated with intention for this purpose. The defendant must intend to injure the claimant. This intent must be a cause of the defendant's conduct, in the words of Cooke J in Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v Aulsebrooks Ltd[1984] 1 NZLR 354 , 360…. 167. I add one explanatory gloss to the above. Take a case where a defendant seeks to advance his own business by pursuing a course of conduct which he knows will, in the very nature of things, necessarily be injurious to the claimant. In other words, a case where loss to the claimant is the obverse side of the coin from gain to the defendant. The defendant's gain and the claimant's loss are, to the defendant's knowledge, inseparably linked. The defendant cannot obtain the one without bringing about the other. If the defendant goes ahead in such a case in order to obtain the gain he seeks, his state of mind will satisfy the mental ingredient of the unlawful interference tort. This accords with the approach adopted by Lord Sumner in Sorrell v Smith[1925] AC 700 , 742: “When the whole object of the defendants' action is to capture the plaintiff's business, their gain must be his loss. How stands the matter then? The difference disappears. The defendants' success is the plaintiff's extinction, and they cannot seek the one without ensuing the other.”” “When the whole object of the defendants' action is to capture the plaintiff's business, their gain must be his loss. How stands the matter then? The difference disappears. The defendants' success is the plaintiff's extinction, and they cannot seek the one without ensuing the other.””