“When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty [the predecessors of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU] which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. They must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings.”
“Where a national court comes to a decision before the Commission does, it must avoid adopting a decision that would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission. To that effect, the national court may ask the Commission whether it has initiated proceedings regarding the same agreements, decisions or practices and if so, about the progress of proceedings and the likelihood of a decision in that case. The national court may, for reasons of legal certainty, also consider staying its proceedings until the Commission has reached a decision. The Commission, for its part, will endeavour to give priority to cases for which it has decided to initiate proceedings within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 and that are the subject of national proceedings stayed in this way, in particular when the outcome of a civil dispute depends on them.”
“In the first instance, I would invite the Commission to provide such information (if any) as it is prepared to release without a confidentiality ring having been established, but on the basis that the information released would be used only for the purposes of the forthcoming case management conference, the relevant part of which would be held in private. None of this information would be disclosed to the public, or referred to in any public judgment, without the consent of the Commission, or unless such disclosure was required by law or a Court order.”
“Reply to question (a) The Commission has investigated behaviour which may infringe Article 101 and/or 102 of the TFEU. The Article 101 aspect of the Commission’s investigation relates to agreements concluded between Servier and a number of generic companies (namely, Niche/Unichem, Matrix, Teva, Krka and Lupin). As to the Article 102 aspect of the Commission’s investigation, we are currently examining the elements to establish a possible abuse of a dominant position (i.e market definition, dominance, abusive practices). The Servier investigation concerns the same product as the claim before this honourable Court (namely, perindopril). It differs however, as to the exact scope of the patent, agreements and parties covered, at the present stage, although there is a significant overlap. Reply to question (b) The claim before this honourable Court (i) includes the Servier-Merck agreement under Article 101 TFEU and (ii) examines the patent abuse system under Article 102 TFEU. Hitherto, the Commission has not investigated these practices as possible separate infringements, although they may fall within the scope of our investigation. Reply to question (c) DG Competition already granted priority status to this case when it opened proceedings against Servier on8 July 2009 as it considers this to be an investigation of importance and the Commission will of course maintain the priority status of the case, consistent with paragraph 12 of the Notice on Co-operation. Reply to question (d) DG Competition is working on a SO [i.e Statement of Objections] within the meaning of Article 27.1 of Council Regulation 1/2003. The priority treatment of the case should permit the adoption of the SO possibly during the first half of this year. This objective assumes however that in formulating the Commission’s objections, no unexpected legal or factual issues emerge that delay finalisation of the SO. Reply to question (e) The Commission’s best estimate at the present time is that it may be possible to take a final decision 1-2 years after the date the SO is issued. The Commission regrets that it cannot be any more precise in this respect. However, a number of procedural steps need to be taken subsequent to the SO and the timing of these steps cannot be predicted with accuracy. With respect to the reply to the SO, and given the breadth and complexity of the issues in the case, as well as the size of the file, we currently consider that the addressees of the SO would be given at least two months to respond. This is without prejudice to Servier’s right to seek a decision of the hearing officer in this regard which may lead to an extension of the deadline. Also, in these kinds of cases, the addressees tend to exercise their right to have an oral hearing which further prolongs the decision-making process. Moreover, the Commission services will need to review, assess and address the addressee’s submissions, in particular as contained in the reply to the SO and also as presented at the oral hearing. It is very difficult to predict exactly how much time this would take in the present case, but previous experience shows that, in a case of this size, considerable time and effort is spent addressing arguments raised in the reply to the SO. If DG Competition decides to prepare a draft decision pursuant to Chapter III of Council Regulation 1/2003, then the draft will have to be submitted to internal consultation within the Commission, which can take some months. At the end of that process, the Commission would also need to consult the Advisory Committee under Article 14 of Regulation 1/2003 before the draft decision could be put before the College of Commissioners for adoption. Therefore, unless unforeseen additional procedural steps prove necessary as stated above, we consider that a final decision could be adopted within 1-2 years from the date the SO is issued.”
“The European Commission has informed the French pharmaceutical company Servier and several of its generic competitors of its objections against practices potentially delaying the generic entry of perindopril, a cardio-vascular medicine. At this stage, the Commission takes the view that the patent settlement agreements concluded by Servier with Niche/Unichem, Matrix (today Mylan Laboratories Limited), Teba, Krka and Lupin, as well as Servier’s acquisition of key competing technologies were aimed at delaying or preventing the market entry of cheap generic versions of perindopril, in violation of EU antitrust rules. The sending of a statement of objections does not prejudge the final outcome of the investigation. In its statement of objections, the Commission takes the preliminary view that Servier and generic competitors had agreed to limit competition to perindopril and that, as part of a comprehensive strategy, Servier had acquired competing technologies. These practices could have aimed at preserving Servier’s position with regard to perindopril, which was about to reach the end of its patent protection. The Commission formed objections against two specific sets of practices by Servier, which appears to be dominant in the market for perindopril. Firstly, Servier acquired scarce competing technologies to produce perindopril, rendering generic market entry more difficult or delayed. Secondly, Servier unduly protected its market exclusivity by inducing its generic challengers to conclude patent settlements. This behaviour, if established, infringes EU Antitrust rules that prohibit restrictive business practices and the abuse of a dominant market position (respectively Articles 102 and 102…TFEU). … A Statement of Objections is a formal step in Commission investigations into suspected violations of EU antitrust rules. The Commission informs the parties concerned in writing of the objections raised against them and the companies can examine the documents on the Commission’s investigation file, reply in writing and request an oral hearing to present their comments on the case before representatives of the Commission and national competition authorities. The duration of antitrust investigations varies according to the complexity of the case, the number of markets and companies involved and whether they cooperate with the Commission. If, after the parties have exercised their rights of defence, the Commission concludes that there is sufficient evidence of an infringement, it can issue a decision prohibiting the conduct and impose a fine of up to 10% of a company’s annual worldwide turnover.”
“In these circumstances the proper balance, in my judgment, requires me to allow this action to proceed at least to the close of pleadings. In addition I consider that it is premature to decide that no disclosure should take place before the conclusion of the applications and appeals to the CFI [the Court of First Instance] and the ECJ. In principle, therefore, I accept the submissions of Counsel for [the claimant] that the action should proceed to the stage of the close of pleadings, the parties’ advisers should meet to consider the scope and basis for proceeding with disclosure and that that topic and the need or desirability for other directions should be reconsidered at a case management conference to be held in October 2009. I reach this conclusion because I consider that in the circumstances of this case, in particular the time which has already elapsed since the occurrence of the relevant events, the need for the follow-on action to be processed so as to be as ready for trial as soon after the conclusion of the proceedings before the CFI and ECJ are concluded as is reasonably possible outweighs the need to avoid expenditure which may be wasted if and to the extent that it is not compensated for by an award of costs. Unless the preparation of the follow on action continues then the parties will not be on an equal footing because [the claimant] will not know what are the relevant issues or what documents relevant to those issues, particularly causation, are available.”
“I have come to the conclusion that the possible burden of division of effort is something which I should recognise in my order. Both parties say that they will be ready for an oral hearing in July. I will grant a stay of proceedings until 1 September. Thereafter the parties’ advisers should be free to concentrate on getting this case ready for trial.”
“Mr Beloff relied on the general undesirability of embroiling a party in parallel proceedings, particularly when the result of one may render the other unnecessary. He relied on that as a reason why the Court of Justice might have wished to rule as he submitted it did rule. There are, in my judgment, two answers to that. First, it is for the national court and not for the Court of Justice to ensure that litigants before it are not unfairly treated; the second answer is that this was essentially a matter for the learned Judge to assess, and he did assess it. He recognised that the defendants’ lawyers could not be in two places at once and hence ordered a stay until1 September 1994 . He, however, judged that the potential injustice of prolonged delay before the plaintiff could recover damages to which (if successful) it was entitled outweighed the potential prejudice to the defendants if they had to do a lot of unnecessary work for which, if they were successful, they could be compensated in costs.”
“Subject to international treaties or agreements and applicable laws and regulations, any individual is prohibited from requesting, seeking or disclosing, in writing, orally, or in any other form, documents or information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature, with a view to establishing evidence in foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in relation thereto.”
“I have never heard in all my career of a case involving litigation in England in which the French law was invoked to avoid complying with an order of an English Court. There are currently many international cases involving French parties before the English courts in which production of evidence located in France is involved and in which discovery orders are being complied with without any difficulty…In my experience litigation is regularly conducted in England according to English rules of civil procedures with French parties involved either as defendants or as plaintiffs who supply before the court the documents and evidence ordered without being in any way prevented from doing so by the French blocking statute.”
“In both the previous cases one of the factors which led the judges to their respective conclusions was that there was no evidence of anyone having been prosecuted for contravention of art.1 bis. That position has now changed. There has been one successful prosecution for a violation of art.1 bis in 2007. The person convicted was a French lawyer. Nevertheless, that is only one prosecution in the 30 years that art.1 bis has been in operation. In addition, in both the previous cases the application for discovery or disclosure was made against a French company, whereas in the present case, as I have said more than once, the PPD is sought from an English company.”
“To counter these persuasive observations, the defendant points to but one prosecution that has ever been brought for violation of the blocking statute, involving a defendant and circumstances readily distinguishable from those before this court. The prosecution, as reported in an opinion by the Criminal Division of the French Superior Court of Appeals, involved a French attorney who sought to obtain testimonial evidence for a case pending in a California court by making false statements to a potential witness in France… Notably, the case did not involve discovery responsive to any requests made by the parties in the California case or ordered by the court there. It thus furnishes little proof that the defendant here, who unlike the prosecuted attorney above has not sought to circumvent the blocking statute through deceptive means, would be prosecuted for complying with a court order compelling disclosure of the documents at issue. That the documents at issue have already been disclosed in American proceedings pursuant to the MLAT request [i.e. a request in parallel criminal proceedings pursuant to the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters]further undercuts any reason to believe that French authorities would seek to prosecute Air France for disclosing the same documents here. The court thus discounts significantly the hardship proposed by the prospect of criminal sanctions.”
“The interest in prohibiting price-fixing of the type alleged here is shared by France, given its membership in the European Economic Community which has also adopted prohibitions against price-fixing.”