“30. I consider that the relief sought would affect the right of members of the public – in particular, existing and potential students of the College – to receive information which Ofsted wishes to communicate to them in the exercise of its statutory functions. For that reason, I consider that s.12(3) [of theHuman Rights Act 1988 ] applies. That means that I have no power to grant relief unless satisfied that the College is ‘likely’ to establish at trial that publication should not be allowed. In this context, ‘likely’ usually means ‘more likely than not’, but may mean something less than that, for example in a case where the consequences of publication would be very severe: Cream Holdings v Banerjee[2005] 1 AC 253 , [22] (Lord Nicholls). … 35… Where a public authority has the function of publishing a report, that function will often be conferred for the benefit of a specific section of the public. Ofsted’s reporting powers are conferred primarily for the benefit of pupils and parents (existing and prospective) of the inspected schools. The Advertising Standards Authority’s powers are conferred primarily for the benefit of consumers (existing and potential) of the products or services advertised. In each case there is a specific section of the public with an interest in receiving the information in question. This interest is protected byArticle 10 ECHR , which confers the right not only to express but also to receive information. The right of a section of the public to receive information which a public authority wishes to communicate to them in what it regards as their interest must carry very substantial weight in the balancing exercise. 36. On the other side of the scales, the weight of the Claimant’s and any third party’s interest relied upon to oppose publication will vary. Sometimes, the interest relied upon to restrain publication is limited to the private interest of a corporate entity. In other cases … damage to third party or public interests is also relied upon. But even so, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, if interim relief is refused and the Decision is published, those to whom it is published can be told that the Decision is the subject of legal challenge… I accept that there will be some who will not be prepared to suspend judgement pending the resolution of the claim, but a fair-minded observer learning of a decision critical of the Claimant would factor in the existence of a pending challenge before reacting to it. 37. In these circumstances, and other things being equal, the authorities rightly impose a high hurdle (‘pressing grounds’, ‘the most compelling reasons’ or ‘exceptional circumstances’) for the grant of interim relief to restrain publication of a report by a public authority.”
“Where a claimant seeks to restrain publication of information by a public authority which is obliged or empowered to do so, the Court must consider the rights of those who would otherwise be entitled to receive the information. These rights are protected byArticle 10 of the ECHR andsection 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 . This means that interim relief will only be granted for ‘the most compelling reasons’ or in ‘exceptional circumstances’.”
“36. In summary, based on my many years’ experience of dealing with investors and rating agencies, and for the reasons which I expand on more fully in the remainder of this part of my statement, I consider it very likely that publication of Ofwat’s legally flawed proposed decision, and therefore the detailed findings in the 240-page decision, would seriously damage confidence in SEW among those working in the finance sector with the following very serious adverse consequences for SEW’s business. a. Publication could very well result in a downgrade in SEW’s credit ratings, which would cause SEW to fall below investment grade rating. b. Publication would make it much harder for SEW to secure the additional financing which it requires for the reasons set out above; and/or, even if and to the extent that SEW were able to secure some of that additional financing, publication would mean that the terms of that financing would be much worse for SEW. The effect of this will be felt particularly acutely during the period in which SEW needs to raise additional financing… c. Publication would also threaten SEW’s ability to retain existing sources of investment, particularly from investors who require the issuing entity (i.e., SEW) to hold an investment grade rating. For example, this might arise in a scenario where existing lenders refuse to renew or significantly reduce their exposure to SEW. d. Publication would also threaten SEW’s ability to comply with its regulatory obligations… in terms of both SEW’s Board’s ability to provide the assurance required regarding SEW’s outlook over the following 12 months; and SEW’s ability to satisfy the requirement to have two investment grade ratings. e. Further, these consequences of publication are also likely to compound one another, with a serious risk that they create a ‘doom spiral’ from which SEW is unable to extract itself.” a. Publication could very well result in a downgrade in SEW’s credit ratings, which would cause SEW to fall below investment grade rating. b. Publication would make it much harder for SEW to secure the additional financing which it requires for the reasons set out above; and/or, even if and to the extent that SEW were able to secure some of that additional financing, publication would mean that the terms of that financing would be much worse for SEW. The effect of this will be felt particularly acutely during the period in which SEW needs to raise additional financing… c. Publication would also threaten SEW’s ability to retain existing sources of investment, particularly from investors who require the issuing entity (i.e., SEW) to hold an investment grade rating. For example, this might arise in a scenario where existing lenders refuse to renew or significantly reduce their exposure to SEW. d. Publication would also threaten SEW’s ability to comply with its regulatory obligations… in terms of both SEW’s Board’s ability to provide the assurance required regarding SEW’s outlook over the following 12 months; and SEW’s ability to satisfy the requirement to have two investment grade ratings. e. Further, these consequences of publication are also likely to compound one another, with a serious risk that they create a ‘doom spiral’ from which SEW is unable to extract itself.”
“South East Water has failed to maintain key assets including its boreholes, service reservoirs and trunk mains which meant that its asset base in the Eastern region was not sufficiently resilient to adequately perform when demand increased. Further, it failed to have adequate proactive maintenance plans and to increase storage levels at service reservoirs in the lead up to critical periods. Regarding its systems planning, we found that South East Water failed to manage its supply demand balance and headroom which resulted in the company being with less headroom and less able to respond than we would expect a reasonable company to have be able to in the lead up to, and during periods of high demand. This included failing to effectively use planning tools available to it (such as area plans, peak week production capacity (PWPC), up-to-date hydraulic models, root cause analysis) and to mitigate known risks posed by extreme weather and climate change. This has had a detrimental effect on South East Water’s customers. Compared to its Western region and other companies in the south east of England, South East Water’s Eastern region has been disproportionately affected by supply interruption incidents since 2020 which were attributable to and/or exacerbated by these failures of South East Water. These events affected a total of 286,645 customers, with some customers being affected by repeat incidents. Our investigation makes no findings with respect to the Western region (which was not covered by this investigation). To the extent that specific actions by South East Water are company-wide, we find that it has failed to take appropriate action with respect to the vulnerabilities that existed and were known in its Eastern region. Further, South East Water's operational response to incidents has been poor, it had insufficient incident and emergency response, particularly with respect to availability of bottled water, mutual aid, tankers and for the support for vulnerable sites within its emergency plan. In general, we observed a failure by South East Water to learn relevant lessons from past incidents and implement actions identified following those incidents.”