“the timeframe for a formal review of the chargeable amount within the CIL regulations (under regulation 113) is 28 days from the date of the notice and this will remain unchanged as the authority cannot use its discretion with regards to this deadline.”
“This letter is to confirm that HSBC have previously occupied the above premises [The Forum, Marlborough Road, Swindon], the lease commenced on25/12/1998 . HSBC ceased trading from the branch on23/10/2020 and subsequently disposed of the property on27/11/2020 .”
“I can confirm that the safe and the ATMs were in daily use up to the closure.”
“Do you think we have made a mistake in our calculations? You can ask us to review our calculation. If you are unhappy with the calculation following this review, you can appeal to the Valuation Office Agency. Please see the Planning Portal note on the Appeals Procedure for further information. ... New Liability Notices may be issued Any change in the details contained in this notice which affect the calculation of the chargeable amount will lead to the Council issuing a new liability notice. Changes requiring a new calculation of the chargeable amount may arise from: New Liability Notices may be issued [bullet point] A change to the liable party. [bullet point] Granting of a Community Infrastructure Levy relief. [bullet point] Any existing buildings deducted from the CIL-liable floorspace are subsequently found not to have qualified as being ‘In use’ (defined above) for a continuous period of at least six months within the period of three years ending on the day planning permission first permits the chargeable development. Please note it is your responsibility to notify us if: 90. [bullet point] There is a change in the liable party... 91. [bullet point] The liable party’s contact details change. 92. [bullet point] There are any changes in the floorspace details involved in the chargeable development...”
“47 The general principles bearing on the construction of the statutory provisions are not controversial between the parties, nor could they be. They are well established at the highest level. The judge was clearly conscious of them. She referred, in particular, to the decision of the House of Lords in Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson[2005] 1 AC 684 in the sphere of tax, which confirmed that a taxing statute was to be construed in the light of the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, giving the provision in question a purposive construction to identify its requirements (see the speech of Lord Nicholls at paras 32 and 33). 48 More recently, the process of statutory interpretation has received further consideration by the Supreme Court in R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens v Secretary of State for the Home Department)[2022] 2 WLR 343 (see the judgment of Lord Hodge DPSC, with whom Lord Briggs, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose JJSC agreed, at paras 28–31). In undertaking that process, the court is seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament has used. It should endeavour to identify the meaning of the language used in its particular statutory context. Other provisions in the statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context. As Lord Hodge DPSC put it (in para 29), “[they] are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are therefore the primary source by which meaning is ascertained”, and (in para 30) “[external] aids to interpretation therefore must play a secondary role”, capable though they may be of “assisting a purposive interpretation of a particular statutory provision”
“… [In] a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.””
“37 Although the regulation 113 review is conducted by the collecting authority and would not on its own amount to a suitable alternative remedy, the appeal available under regulation 114 is (by virtue of section 215 of the 2008 Act) an appeal to either to a valuation officer appointed by HMRC undersection 61 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 , or to a district valuer as defined bysection 662 of the Housing Act 1985 . A district valuer must be an HMRC officer appointed by the commissioners for that purpose. A right of appeal of this nature ought in the vast majority of situations, to provide a suitable alternative remedy. I accept that any decision on appeal by the appointed person would itself be susceptible to judicial review. But that possibility is not of itself, a sufficient reason for ignoring the regulation 114 appeal procedure. An application for judicial review should be pursued only after the statutory right to appeal that is provided has been exhausted. 38 In this case, there is nothing in the substance of the issue in dispute that renders pursuit of this alternative remedy inappropriate. The substantive point raised by Oval in this application for judicial review is that the amount of CIL payable has been miscalculated by the Council because it wrongly thought that the March 2016 planning permission was not a phased planning permission. An error of that sort, a miscalculation of the amount payable because of a mistake of fact, is a situation that falls squarely within the statutory right of appeal; if not, it is difficult to see what is meant to be within the scope of that right. The error alleged by Oval could have been considered on appeal and subject to the view taken on the merits, corrected on appeal.”
“46 Under Part 54.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, a claim for judicial review must be filed both “(a) promptly” and “(b) in any event not later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose”