LMN v Health and Care Professions Council [2026] EWHC 1860 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1860 (Admin)Case No AC-2026-LON-001611
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate 21 st July 2026
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before
TOM LITTLE KC(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Between
HEALTH AND CARE PROFESSIONS COUNCILRespondent/ Defendant
Miss V Shehadeh (instructed by DAC Beachcroft) for Applicant/ClaimantMiss J Bass (instructed by Capsticks LLP) for Respondent/DefendantHearing Hearing date: 9 th June 2026
APPROVED JUDGMENT
[1]This is an application made by the Applicant/Claimant [“Applicant”], in accordance with Article 31(12)(a) of the Health and Care Professions Order 2001 [“the Order”], to terminate a 16 month Interim Suspension Order [“ISO”].

Parties

[2]The Applicant, LMN, is a registered Practitioner Psychologist.[3]The Respondent/Defendant [“the Respondent”] is the Health and Care Professions Council and is the statutory regulator for a total of 15 healthcare professions. Practitioner Psychologists are one of those 15 healthcare professions. The Respondent is therefore the regulatory body responsible for the Applicant.[4]It was the Respondent’s Investigations Committee [“the Committee”] that imposed the ISO on the Applicant on 6th March 2026 and which is the subject matter of this application. The written reasons for that decision were sent to the parties on 10th March 2026.

Documentation and the hearing before me

[5]I have been provided with a Hearing Bundle that includes the decision of the Committee that is the subject matter of the claim, the pleadings in the claim as well as various application notices and the underlying material that was before the Committee when it made its decision. This includes witness evidence from the Applicant and testimonials in support of the Applicant that were before the Committee. I have also been provided with a Family Court judgment that relates to the conduct of the Applicant in a non-professional capacity.[6]Both parties provided detailed Skeleton Arguments and oral submissions at the hearing to assist the Court, as well as the provision of an authorities bundle. No oral evidence was called before me.

Preliminary matters

[7]There are a number of preliminary matters to be addressed.[8]First, as can be seen from the judgment, the name of the Applicant has been anonymised. This followed an application made by the Applicant, pursuant to CPR 39.2(4). This application was supported by the Respondent. I addressed this at the start of the hearing and indicated that I would give reasons for granting the application in this judgment.[9]CPR 39.2(1) provides that “The general rule is that a hearing is to be in public …. ".[10]CPR 39.2(4) provides that “The court must order that the identity of any person shall not be disclosed if, and only if, it considers non-disclosure necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and in order to protect the interests of that person.”[11]This claim directly involves findings in ongoing private law Family proceedings. The findings in a specific judgment were before the Committee and lie at the heart of their decision making. The private law Family proceedings involve and include allegations of domestic abuse made by the Applicant against the father of their children and which led to the breakdown of the marriage. The identity of the parties in those private law Family proceedings and the identity of the children cannot be published and it would obviously be counter to the proper administration of justice were the content of the hearing before me and this judgment to go behind that strict position in those Family law proceedings.[12]The judgment of the High Court in the Family proceedings makes clear that Mrs Justice Lieven had given leave for the judgment to be published but on the condition that the anonymity of the children and members of their family was strictly preserved. In addition the hearing before the Committee, that is the subject matter of this application, was conducted in private. Whilst the hearing before me was conducted in public I made the anonymity order at the outset of the hearing to preserve and protect the position of the terms on which the Family Court judgment was published.[13]Further the Applicant is understandably concerned about the wider public sharing and discussion of confidential court documents about her children, and the impact that would have on them currently and in the longer-term.[14]In determining this application I have, of course, considered the important principle of open justice. However, in these circumstances an order for anonymity is, in my judgement, plainly necessary to protect the Article 8 rights of the Applicant and her children and importantly and additionally to further the interests of the proper administration of justice of the Family Courts. The granting of this application is therefore a necessary and proportionate interference with the Article 10 rights of freedom of expression (see XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 and Re S (A child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593[§17].[15]Second and allied to, but distinct from, anonymity the Respondent has applied for an order in accordance with CPR 5.4D(2) that the Court will give the parties 7 days’ notice before any application under CPR 5.4C(2) is considered. An application under CPR 5.4C(2) is an application for permission by a non-party to obtain a document pertaining to this application other than the claim form, the judgment or Order. Given the underlying circumstances and evidence this is a case in which it is appropriate for me to grant the Respondent’s application therefore allowing submissions to be made about the appropriateness of the release of documents and to raise the possibility of appropriate redactions being made before they are released, thereby ensuring that the various Article 8 rights in play are protected as well as ensuring that it is not realistically possible for there to be any form of jigsaw identification.[16]Third there were various applications for permission to rely on evidence that was served out of time. Those applications are made in accordance with CPR Part 8.6(1) but are not controversial.[17]As far as the Applicant is concerned it is to rely on evidence not filed with the claim form by the Applicant which was the material which was before the Committee and a further witness statement from the Applicant. The latter addresses in part rebuttal evidence in respect of part of the Respondent’s Skeleton Argument and therefore correcting something relied upon by the Respondent which was factually incorrect by producing an e-mail dated 29th July 2025 in which the Applicant first contacted the Defendant about the Family judgment. This was not before the Committee as the Applicant has only now located the e-mail, being faced with this submission. The new witness statement also outlines the financial challenges now faced by the Applicant as a result of the ISO, including difficulties paying for her children’s school fees and funds for legal representation in the ongoing Family Court proceedings and it addresses what has happened in the ensuing months in order to allow me to assess properly proportionality.[18]The Defendant’s application was to rely on the Family Court judgment. I will address later the terms of that judgment and the extent to which the Committee considered it or not. But the Applicant realistically accepts that I can consider material additional to that before the Committee (to the extent that the Committee only considered its conclusions rather that the whole of the judgment).[19]It follows that both parties seek to rely out of time on additional but important material. Realistically no objection was taken to any of these applications and I granted each of them at the start of the hearing and I need say no more about them. Factual background Generally

Factual background

[20]The factual basis for the referral to the Respondent and the decision are somewhat unusual but nonetheless serious. The referral did not relate directly to the Applicant’s clinical practice but instead arises out of her conduct in and related to private law Family proceedings (which I address in more detail below).[21]There are inevitably some limitations on what I can set out as factual background without creating a risk of identifying the Applicant. My factual summary should be read with that fact in mind.[22]The Applicant was referred to the Respondent on 8th August 2025 by an employee of the local County Council. The allegations within the referral related to the Applicant’s personal and family life, and arose out of those ongoing proceedings in the Family Court in which seriously adverse findings and conclusions were made about the Applicant.[23]Allied to those findings at the hearing before the Committee the Respondent relied upon a failure to inform the Health Service where she saw patients for therapy about the adverse findings of the Family Court in accordance with the company handbook. Also included in the bundle before the Committee was an adverse decision by the Local Authority Designated Officer [‘LADO’] based on the same Family Court finding.[24]The Family Court judgment was handed down on 20th June 2025. On 15th July 2025 the Applicant filed grounds of appeal against the judgment. Those have not been resolved in her favour. On 25th July 2025 the Applicant states that she received a sealed order from the Court in respect of the judgment of 20th June 2025.[25]The Applicant was suspended from working initially in March 2025, then access was restored ‘with supervision’ but it was then suspended again on 29th July 2025 as a result of the matters relating to the Family court proceedings.[26]The Applicant emailed the Respondent’s registrations department and administration department at 10.09am on 29th July 2025. The email stated:
“Further to my telephone call and explanation, I left my ex partner due to DV in 2018, and have managed to protect them via the courts since then. However most recently we have had a new judge and cafcass officer this year, and the new Judge suggests that I have caused 'harm' to my children. I am obviously appealing this, as this is definitely not true.”
[27]The Applicant received an automatic email in response. An identical email to that sent on 29th July 2025 by the Applicant (referred to at paragraph 26 above) was sent on 30th July 2025 at 2.45pm to the same recipients.[28]There were no allegations relating to the Applicant’s clinical judgment, skill or experience before the Committee when it imposed the ISO. There are no complaints relating to her interactions with any patients.[29]On 27th February 2026 the Respondent sent notice to the Applicant that a hearing would be held on 6th March 2026 to decide whether to impose an interim order pending the investigation into the concerns raised by the referral.[30]The hearing before the Committee was held on 6th March 2026. I have seen both a transcript of the hearing and the written decision itself. The Applicant was represented by counsel who appeared also on her behalf before me. It is clear that the Committee were referred to relevant authorities as a number of them have also been cited to me.

The private law Family proceedings in more detail

[31]The judgment of Mrs Justice Lieven was handed down on 20th June 2025, followed a hearing that took place on 11th and 12th June 2025 in which a number of witnesses gave evidence. They were the Applicant, her ex-husband, two social workers, a psychologist and the Guardian. The judgment states that it should be read in conjunction with an earlier judgment that she had given and a judgment of Recorder Coles. For my purposes I have not found it necessary, or fair to the Applicant, to do so. However, Mrs Justice Lieven does in the judgment of 20th June 2025 [§7] refer to an extract from Recorder Coles’ judgment and which is not to the Applicant’s benefit. That other Judge had found the Applicant in breach of orders of the Court such that she imposed a punishment of 40 hours of unpaid work on the Applicant suspended for 12 months.[32]Whilst there were a number of matters over a number of years that concerned Mrs Justice Lieven about the conduct of the Applicant it is clear that there is one specific issue that she addresses in some detail in her judgment. It related to evidence that cumulatively established that the Applicant had attempted to influence the children against their Father during the extant proceedings. In so concluding the Judge also and significantly concluded that the Applicant had lied on oath when denying the conduct.[33]Mrs Justice Lieven also stated in her judgment [§41] by reference to the Applicant’s occupation that ”…… she is a professional psychologist. The fact that she is prepared to harm her own children in this way and to lie on oath is a matter of considerable professional concern”. The judgment made clear that the Judge had as a result, given permission for her judgment to be provided to the Respondent. Mrs Justice Lieven has also confirmed that the effect of doing so must also allow me to consider the terms of the judgment.[34]The relevant paragraphs of Mrs Justice Lieven’s conclusion in the judgment were as follows: [§§43 – 48] (M is a reference to the Applicant and F to her ex-husband):
“This has been an extremely long-running case, and at one point appeared to be a very intractable one. There has been a consistent story of the M seeking to prevent contact with the F and to exclude him from the children’s lives. The evidence that she has not supported contact, prevented the children from seeing their father and ignored court orders is overwhelming. I do not accept that the M has been following what the children wanted. The evidence to the contrary is clear. There has been consistent evidence of the children telling professionals that they wanted to see their father. I find that the M has caused the children both emotional and educational harm. She deliberately kept them off school when they were not unwell in order to prevent the F having contact. This led the children to be expelled from their school. I do not think that the M has now genuinely changed and will support the F’s relationship with the children. I am very sceptical that she will do so until she has not just undergone therapy, but also fully engaged with it and accepted her need for it. I am very pleased to record that all the children have settled extremely well into their father’s care. They are all doing well at school and there is no concern about their current wellbeing. It should be noted that, particularly for the younger children, the move to their father’s care was not necessarily going to be a smooth one. It is to the F’s credit that they have moved so easily and settled into their new home with relative ease. In the circumstances I have no doubt that the children should remain living with their father. I appreciate that the two younger children have said they would rather live with their mother. However, that is hardly surprising given that they had previously lived with her their entire lives, and had very limited contact with the F. I have no confidence that if I moved their residence the M would now promote contact. Most importantly, the children have a very strong sibling bond, and all professionals agree that to separate them would cause them harm. I therefore take the view that their best interests are served by all remaining living with the F, and having contact with the M.”

Post Family Court Judgment

[35]Following the handing down of the judgment a number of matters arose at the end of July 2025, in addition to the notification to the Respondent about the fact of the judgment. In particular it is alleged that there was a failure on the Applicant’s part to return her children to their father following a supervised contact visit and the Applicant made an allegation of harassment which the Police concluded was false.

The Committee’s decision

[36]The written decision of the Committee includes a lengthy summary of the arguments put before it. However, the most relevant parts of the decision, as far as I am concerned, are as follows: 38. The Panel recognised the need to apply the principle of proportionality by balancing the Registrant’s interests with the interests of the public when conducting a risk assessment of the issues before it. It was mindful of the need to assess the overall strength of the available information, whether the allegation is serious and credible and the likelihood of harm or further harm occurring if an Interim Order is not made. It was conscious that its purpose was not to make findings of fact but rather to consider whether any of the three statutory grounds, as set out at Article 31 of the Order, were met:a. necessary for the protection of members of the public;b. otherwise in the public interest; andc. in the interests of the Registrant. 39. The Panel was conscious that it should give careful regard to the cogency of the evidence before it when assessing whether to make an Interim Order. If it finds an interim order is necessary, that order must be for as long as the Panel considers necessary, and in any event for no more than 18 months. The decision reached by the Panel must be proportionate, striking a fair balance between interfering with the Registrant’s ability to practise (including the financial and other impacts which an Interim Order may have on her) and the overarching objective of public protection. 40. The Panel first considered whether it had been presented with any basis upon which it could determine that a restriction on the Registrant’s practice is required, mindful that interim orders are utilised to ensure that the public is safeguarded while concerns about a registrant’s fitness to practise are investigated. Such orders are a temporary measure to restrict a registrant’s ability to practise and usually apply until a final decision is made in relation to an allegation. 41. The Panel noted that the HCPC investigation into the concerns is at an early stage. It was satisfied that the information supplied …., whilst not complete, was cogent evidence of the concerns. Further the Registrant did not dispute the existence of the private law proceedings, or the judgements made, though she did confirm that her appeals against the judgements were progressing. 42. Having listened carefully to the submissions of the Presenting Officer and the Registrant’s Representative, considered the information provided in writing, and taken into account the advice provided by the Legal Assessor, the Panel was content that it had sufficient information upon which it could make a determination as to whether an interim order is required. 43. The Panel concluded that, in all the circumstances, it was appropriate for an interim order to be made to protect the public. 44. It was mindful of the pressures which result from relationship breakdowns, particularly when domestic violence is involved, and a parent’s desire to look after her children. However, the Panel could not ignore the findings of the Family Court, and other professionals who work in child protection, that the Registrant had pressured her children to lie to those professionals and that she herself had been found to have lied to the Court under oath. This was compounded by her then allegedly lying to the Police by making a false report. Whilst appreciating the stress and trauma that arises from domestic abuse and relationship breakdown, the Panel did not consider that the Registrant had engaged with the crux of the concerns, which relate to her honesty and integrity, as a registered professional, in reporting adverse judgements against her and allegedly failing to comply with them. 45. Psychologists are trusted medical professionals and the Panel determined there is a potential risk to the public if the Registrant is allowed to practise without restriction given the failure to comply with the orders of the court, or the contractual obligations imposed on her ……. Medical professionals are expected to be honest and maintain integrity in their personal and professional lives. The Panel noted that proceedings were ongoing for a considerable period of time but that the situation appeared to have deteriorated in early 2025. Its attention had not been drawn to any earlier adverse findings against the Registrant however. 46. The Panel was mindful that the Registrant asserts that “my ex-partner and others were quick to send all the confidential court information ….. in March 2025, and repeatedly e-mail / call him, with vexatious intent. This led to my work being ‘paused’. In an email to the HCPC on 30 July 2025 she stated “most recently we have had a new judge and cafcass officer this year, and the new Judge suggests that I have caused 'harm' to my children. I am obviously appealing this, as this is definitely not true”. However, she has not addressed the allegation that she: a. failed to comply with Family Court orders; b. encouraged her children to lie to professionals; c. lied to the Court and the Police;d. failed to inform her regulator of adverse judgements against her in a timely manner. believing that the Family Court restrictions prevent her from responding. This therefore constrains the Panel to balancing the reported findings of the Court, which the Registrant is appealing, against the Registrant’s position that she cannot comment further. 47. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s lack of timely candour …. effectively reinforced the concerns identified by the Court as to her honesty and integrity. It concluded that on balance, it could not go behind the findings of the Court and ….. and must take at face value the finding that the registrant had harmed her children emotionally and educationally. There therefore must be a real risk that the Registrant could act in a similar vein in her professional role. It determined that an order was required to protect the public. 48. The Panel was also satisfied that an order is required in the public interest – a reasonable member of the public, knowing all of the circumstances of the case, would be troubled if, having identified a need to protect the public, an interim order was not imposed pending the outcome of the regulatory proceedings. Failing to impose an order in the public interest would, in the Panel’s view, undermine the trust and confidence of the public, and registered professionals, in the regulator and in the profession. It therefore considered that an interim order is also in the public interest. ……. 50. Given that the Panel was satisfied that an order is required for the protection of the public and in the public interest, it then proceeded to consider what order should be made. ……. . 55. In the circumstances, the Panel was satisfied that the appropriate duration of the order is 16 months. Legal framework Relevant parts of the Order

Legal framework

[37]The power of the Committee to impose interim orders is set out in Article 31(2) of the Order and is in the following terms: (2) Subject to paragraph (4), if the Committee is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of the person concerned, for the registration of that person to be suspended or to be made subject to conditions, it may—(a) make an order directing the Registrar to suspend the person’s registration (an “interim suspension order”); or(b) make an order imposing conditions with which the person must comply (an “interim conditions of practice order”), during such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in the order.’[38]The power available to the High Court upon an application by the Applicant are set out in Article 31(12) of the Order in the following terms: (12) Where an order has effect under paragraph (2), (7) or (9), the court may, on an application being made by the person concerned—(a) in the case of an interim suspension order, terminate the suspension;(b) in the case of an interim conditions of practice order, revoke or vary any condition imposed by the order;(c) in either case, substitute for the period specified in the order (or in the order extending it) some other period which could have been specified in the order when it was made (or in the order extending it), and the decision of the court under any application under this paragraph shall be final.’

Relevant principles in considering an Article 31(12) application:

[39]There was no discernible difference between the submissions that the parties made about the applicable principles for me to apply in my consideration of the application. I summarise them as follows:(a) The Court will grant the application if it considers that the Committee’s decision was wrong (Sandler v GMC [2010] EWHC 1029 (Admin)). That requires considering whether the Committee was or was not justified in concluding that the order made was necessary and proportionate by reference to the relevant test to be applied in that particular regulatory regime (Abdullahv GMC [2012] EWHC 2506 [§87])(b) The application is not therefore limited to the Court taking a judicial-review type approach (see MXM v General Medical Council [2022] EWHC 817 (Admin) [§§35, 36], Sandler [§12]and Abdullah at [§87](c) It will be a ‘relatively rare’ case where a suspension order will be made on an interim basis alone on the ground that it is in the public interest to suspend (see Shiekh v General Dental Council [2007] EWHC 2972 [§16]).(d) The Court must be mindful of the fact that the decision was made by a specialist disciplinary tribunal. The weight to be given to that fact and the opinion of a Committee is for the Court to decide on the facts of the case. (See GMC v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369; [2007] 1 WLR 2007 [§32] and GMC v Anyuam-Osigwe [2012] EWHC 3884 (Admin) [§§13 - 15]).(e) Where matters of public interest rather than public protection are concerned, less weight may be given to the expertise of a regulatory committee because issues of clinical knowledge, skill and competence are not fundamental to such decision and the Court is also well placed to make those assessments (see MXM [§§ 37, 84])(f) Imposing suspension on public interest grounds carries with it an implication of necessity and it means more than desirable (see Sheikh [§16] and Hussain v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council [2017] EWHC 1641 (Admin) [§230].(g) When considering whether to impose an interim order on public interest grounds one way to approach the question is whether an average member of the public would be shocked or troubled to learn that there had not been a suspension (NH v GMC [2016] EWHC 2348 (Admin) [§12]). There must, however, be far more than just a concern by such a member of the public (NMC v Persand [2023] EWHC 3356 (Admin) [§22]).(h) It is not for me in this application to be making findings of fact or attempting to resolve factual disputes paragraph 87, Abdullah v General Medical Council [2012] EWHC 2506 (Admi) [§87](i) Inadequate or opaque reasons given by a Committee are capable of diminishing the weight which a Court attaches to the opinion of that Committee (MXM [§33]), Hussain v GMC [2012] EWHC 2991 (Admin) [§12])(j) The issue of proportionality applied to the Committee at two stages. First whether an Interim Order should be made either for suspension or with conditions. Second the length of any interim order (MXM [§24])(k) Little is to be gained from by comparing the circumstances of one regulatory case with another (Abdullah [§69]). A decision must therefore be made on an application of what are well-established principles to the individual facts.

The Grounds of application and the submissions

[40]The Applicant’s claim is based on five grounds. I will set them out with a short summary of the submissions that are made about them and the Respondent’s response.[41]Ground 1 is that the Committee mischaracterised and/or misunderstood the material before it. It is submitted that the Committee were wrong to conclude that the Applicant had not been transparent with the Respondent. Also that it was not fair to rely on the fact that the Applicant had not made clear whether she disputed the allegations against her because there were limitations as to what she was able to put before the Committee due to Family Court confidentiality. The caution relating to providing any detailed engagement with the allegations relating to the Family Courts was entirely proper given that it is contempt of court to share information relating to family proceedings without permission. In any event it is submitted that the Applicant did make clear that all the allegations were disputed and the absence of a detailed response to each allegation is not relevant to the ‘risk’ assessment undertaken by the Committee.[42]The Respondent submits that the Applicant has still not explained the chronology sufficiently. The judgment was handed down on 12th June 2025 and she only told the provider where she worked on 29th July 2025. It is submitted that it was open to the Committee to have addressed the submission made on behalf of the Applicant at the interim order application hearing and to have drawn a conclusion that the email was not, in their view, an indication of honesty, but rather another example which reinforced the Family Court’s concerns around honesty and integrity. In circumstances where it remains unclear which of the allegations the Applicant denies it was also submitted that it was appropriate for the Committee to have concluded that it was unclear, in their view.[43]Ground 2 is that the Committee was wrong to find that an interim order was necessary for public protection. The Applicant submits that on proper analysis this is a purely public confidence type case and the Committee was wrong to find that a public protection concern arose at all. It is also submitted that the decision does not articulate why or in what circumstances the Applicant might harm patients in her care and there was evidence that she would not.[44]The Respondent submitted that it was open to the Committee to decide that an interim order was necessary to protect the public because the Applicant has caused harm to her own children and has access to vulnerable service users in her professional life. Further that she has repeatedly demonstrated an absence of respect for lawful authority or fellow professionals and that the risk of repetition remains high in light of the past repetition and the lack of insight or any commitment to change. It was submitted that the written decision of the Committee as a whole provided sufficient information to understand the link between her personal and professional life and cannot be confined to one paragraph as contended for by the Applicant.[45]Ground 3 alleges that the Committee failed to apply the higher bar required for ‘public confidence’ cases, only finding that a reasonable member of the public would be ‘troubled’ if no interim order was imposed and that there was no/insufficient ‘exacting inquiry’ carried out by the Committee. It was submitted that this is not a case in which an interim order was in fact ‘necessary’ in the public interest, given that the matters referred to the Respondent relate entirely to intensely personal matters and to ongoing litigation in the Family Courts.[46]The Respondent maintains that an interim order was necessary to protect the public. It accepts that there is a high bar before an interim order can be imposed on public interest grounds alone and that it is relatively rare but this was an appropriate case in which to do it. It was submitted that these matters are grave and represent a significant departure from the standards expected of a registered Practitioner Psychologist. In these circumstances, it was submitted that it was open to the Committee to impose an interim order on public interest grounds alone even if the Committee had decided that an interim order was not necessary to protect the public.[47]Ground 4 is an argument that the Committee erred in its assessment of proportionality by totally disregarding the impact on her children, family life, and current patient load. It was submitted thatthe interim suspension order is not a proportionate response in this case. Proportionality must be assessed as against the impact of a suspension order on each individual practitioner who comes before the tribunal. In this case there are far-reaching consequences and the further Witness Statement prepared in advance of the hearing before me sets those out.[48]The Respondent submits that the Committee clearly identified proportionality to be in issue (see for example paragraphs 34 and 52 of the decision of the Committee). The Respondent submits that given the conclusion that an ISO was necessary to protect the public that the Committee have inevitably conducted a proportionality assessment.[49]Ground 5 is a challenge to the Committee’s conclusion that interim conditions of practise were unworkable. It is also said that this is further evidence of the Committee not taking into account proportionality.The Committee had been invited to consider imposing restrictions only on the Applicant’s ability to treat children and young people. It was submitted that the Committee failed to give proper account to a fellow psychologist’s readiness to act as a supervisor and facilitate an interim conditions of practice order for the Applicant.[50]The Respondent submitted that given the very serious dishonesty and lack of integrity as found by a High Court Judge and which included lying to the Court on oath and to the Police, that the matters were of such cumulative gravity that an interim conditions of practice order was not realistic.

Discussion

[51]As I indicated at the end of the hearing I wanted to reflect carefully upon the issues and I have done so. I am aware of the significant impact that the ISO has had and continues to have on the Applicant. In particular therefore I have re-read all of the Claimant’s witness statements and the documentation that she relies on including the material supporting her professional judgement and ability and the impact that the ISO has had and is going to have, as well as all of the authorities placed before me.[52]The decision that I have to make is whether the Applicant has established that the decision of the Committee was wrong. That means that I have to decide if the Committee was wrong to conclude, in accordance with Article 31(2) of the Order, that it was necessary (and proportionate) to impose an ISO for the protection of the public and that they were also wrong to conclude that it was necessary (and proportionate) to impose an ISO on public interest/confidence grounds. On one view of the authorities my imposition of a necessity test in relation to the public interest is in the Applicant’s favour as opposed to it being ‘akin to necessity’. It seems to me that that is a distinction without a difference but to the extent that there is a difference I will proceed on the basis that I do have to consider whether it is necessary to impose an ISO on the basis of the public interest.[53]Given the importance of the Family Court judgment to the Committee’s decision and ultimately to my decision it is sensible to start with that judgment. On any reading of the judgment it is clear that Mrs Justice Lieven made a number of important findings of fact and in doing so she does not mince her words. It is instructive to consider the judgment in its proper context. It followed a hearing at which the Applicant gave evidence and then refused to be recalled to answer questions about evidence that was cumulatively incriminating. The findings of the High Court Judge are not based on an isolated event or events but are sustained and numerous and they relate to matters which the Judge was conspicuously well-placed to determine. They also relate to events over a number of years when a consistent position of disinformation and breach of orders on the Applicant’s part had persisted. It should be noted that the proceedings in which Mrs Justice Lieven gave judgment in the summer of 2025 were commenced in 2022 but there had also been proceedings before this and which were all part of the overall factual matrix of which the Judge would have been aware.[54]In my judgement, it is necessary to consider the findings of Mrs Justice Lieven on a cumulative basis. They are as follows:(a) The Judge did not think that any reliance could be placed on the evidence of the Applicant [§29].(b) The Judge concluded that the evidence showed “beyond doubt” that the Applicant had been seeking to influence her children and also to persuade them to lie to professionals [§29].(c) The Judge concluded that the Applicant had lied on oath about not being responsible for the sending of two specific messages [§41]. Those messages were part of the evidence in support of her conclusion at (b) above.(d) The Judge concluded that she had “no doubt” that the Applicant had done her utmost to prevent the children from having a meaningful relationship with their Father [§30]. This was done by preventing them from having contact with him [§43], by trying to exclude the Father from the children’s lives [§43] and by ignoring orders of the Court [§43].(e) The Judge concluded that the Applicant had caused her children both emotional and educational harm [§45].(f) The Judge found that at the time of her judgment the Applicant had no capacity to change [§32]. The Judge did not think that the Applicant would support the Father’s relationship with the children and the Judge was “very sceptical” that the Applicant will do so until she has not just undergone therapy, but also fully engaged with it and accepted her need for it.[55]The terms of the Family Court judgment are striking and a matter of the most significant concern. The gravamen of the Family Court judgment is that it clearly set out findings of dishonesty by the Applicant directly to the Court and also to professionals and which is further and significantly aggravated by the manipulation of her own children in order to do so. If that was not bad enough there were breaches of Court orders that led to punishment by another Judge and evidence of resistance to change or to put it another way a marked lack of insight. These are not matters based upon suspicion at this stage. They are matters that are established in a judgment by a High Court Judge. In addition it is important to emphasise that a number of Mrs Justice Lieven’s findings are made to a standard approaching or akin to a criminal standard of proof. The findings are obviously not convictions but on any view these are matters upon which significant weight could properly be placed by the Committee and by myself.[56]It is not clear whether the Committee considered the terms of the judgment itself as opposed to its conclusions. I understand that the Committee were given a link to the judgment. However, given that I am permitted to consider more material than was before the Committee I do not think that anything turns on this. What is clear though is that the Committee knew of the core conclusions of Mrs Justice Lieven.[57]I have not found a factual comparison with a number of the authorities particularly helpful. Each case turns on its own facts. None of them are of any particular similarity to the instant position. What I regard as important is that there are a number of grave judicial findings of fact, expressed in clear and robust terms. This is a critical and substantive distinguishing feature from most of the other cases.[58]In addition to this and consistent with the terms of the Family Court judgment is an allegation that the Applicant lied to the Police in July 2025 and breached a Court order. I, of course, take into account that this is denied. But these other matters do not stand alone. They provide some and relatively recent additional support for the findings of Mrs Justice Lieven. Not least also as those events were after the Family Court judgment and which it might have been thought should have had a salutary effect on the Applicant. All of that was relevant for the consideration of the Committee and myself.[59]The effect of the matters set out above is, in my judgement, sufficient to establish that it was necessary to impose an ISO on the Applicant for the protection of members of the public. In so concluding I have very much had in mind the fact that there is no clinical practice criticism of the Applicant. But the dishonesty and reprehensible conduct of the Applicant was of such a serious nature and duration and involving her own children that I am satisfied that there is a clear risk to members of the public arising from her employment. Further I am satisfied, given that level of risk, that no lesser measure was and is appropriate. That may change in the future but it could only do so when the Applicant takes the steps forward that the Family judgment reveals her to be resistant to.[60]Similarly I am also satisfied that it was necessary to impose an ISO on the basis of the public interest. In so concluding I have adopted a necessity test and applied the high threshold required. In my judgement, this is one of those relatively rare cases that Davis J was referring to in Sheikh. The terms of the Family judgment allied to the events of July 2025 establish that high threshold. Further such an order is proportionate on the facts, as the Committee decided. In reaching that conclusion I have included consideration of the Applicant’s children and the Applicant’s patients.[61]I will now address each of the grounds but I can do so more summarily given my analysis above. Ground 1 -Mischaracterisations or misunderstandings by the Committee[62]I do not accept that the position in relation to any misunderstanding or mischaracterisation is quite as straightforward as the Applicant submits. The Applicant complains about two matters. First the finding that the Applicant had not been sufficiently transparent with the Respondent. Second that it was wrong to criticise her for not making her position on the allegations clear(er).[63]I acknowledge that the Applicant had to be careful what she could and could not say about the Family proceedings. It is correct that the Applicant did inform both the business where she practiced and the Respondent about the judgment but she did not so immediately. I can see how there is probative force in the concern that the Applicant did not do so sufficiently timeously, given the date of the hand down judgment and that the emails sent on 29th and 30th July 2025 to the Respondent only refer to one aspect of the Family Court judgment. In addition it is not clear to me why the Applicant sent two identical emails to the Respondent on 29th and 30th July 2025. It may well be that the Respondent in due course wishes to consider those emails. However, I am prepared to proceed in this Application on the basis that care and caution needed to be exercised by the Committee before drawing any adverse conclusion about the timing of her disclosure(s). I am also willing to proceed on the basis that this aspect of the decision of the Committee was not correct. The Committee concluded that it reinforced the other matters of concern. However, the fact of an incorrect approach by the Committee begs the question as to what, if any, relevance that has to my decision making, other than to consider the facts carefully and not to accord too much weight or deference to the findings of the Committee.[64]In my judgement, the answer to the question what relevance this has to my decision is - ‘none’. This is well-illustrated by the fact that I have not taken this issue into account in coming to my conclusions set out above. It follows that, to the extent that this does amount to a deficiency in the reasoning of the Committee, it does not begin to impinge on the soundness of the ultimate conclusion that the Committee reached. Further I have conducted an intense review of the facts and circumstances of the case in considering the application.[65]I am also willing to proceed on the basis that the Committee should, at this stage, not have taken into account any lack of clarity as to what the Applicant’s position was on the allegations. But again any such deficiency does not undermine the soundness of the ultimate conclusion. It is important also to remember that whilst these matters are allegations in the regulatory context – they are, in light of the Family Court judgment, findings of fact by a High Court Judge. I can and do proceed on the basis, it seems to me, that they are correct.[66]It follows that to the extent there is merit in this ground it does not lead to the success of the application. Ground 2 - The Committee was wrong to find that an interim order is necessary for public protection[67]I have already addressed this issue in some detail above. In short, the Committee were not wrong to find that it was necessary to impose an ISO for public protection. Indeed they were right to do so given the nature of the work that the Applicant undertakes and the gravamen, extent and duration of the underlying matters that are implicit to the findings of Mrs Justice Lieven and which was reinforced by the events of July 2025 in terms of the allegation of breaching an order and having been disbelieved by the Police when making an allegation. This ground of the application therefore fails. Ground 3 - The Committee should have applied the higher bar applicable to public confidence cases, and would have concluded that bar was not met[68]This ground presupposes that the Committee applied the wrong threshold for a public interest case. That too is not as clear as the Applicant submits. This was addressed at paragraph 48 of the decision. The Committee concluded that ‘a reasonable member of the public would be troubled if an interim order was not imposed’. That partially follows the test in NH (see paragraph 39(g) above) but with no reference to such a member of the public being shocked. However, NH does not say that they must be troubled and shocked. NH is a case where there were serious criminal allegations. Again it is important to remember that this was not a situation where there was an ongoing criminal investigation with a set of allegations. Instead here the fundamental part (albeit not the entirety) of the consideration of suspension in the public interest related to judicial findings. This is an issue which has not been considered in the authorities.[69]Applying an analogous test such as - would a reasonable member of the public be significantly troubled or shocked that the Applicant was allowed to remain practicing in light of the findings of the Mrs Justice Lieven and the additional events in July 2025 then, in my judgement, the answer to that question must be ‘yes’, given the gravity and duration of the matters. However, to the extent that the Committee did apply too low a bar then that does not undermine the fact that on the material before them and before me there was more than sufficient to establish that an ISO was necessary in the public interest for reasons of public confidence. The Applicant was willing over a sustained period of time to manipulate her own children and to lie including when on oath and therefore prima facie to commit perjury and to breach Court orders. It follows that the high bar was met and this ground fails. Ground 4 – The Committee erred in its assessment of proportionality by totally disregarding the impact on her children, family life, and current patient load[70]I have given very careful consideration to the assessment of proportionality as a whole and have already set out my conclusions in that regard. It follows that I do not accept that the Committee erred in its assessment of proportionality. It is clear from the decision that they considered this issue carefully. I do not accept that the failure to mention the children or patients in one paragraph means that they did not take that into account. The decision needs to be read as a whole alongside the arguments put before them.[71]Given the gravamen of the established findings by the High Court Judge and the allegations relating to July 2025 and even taking into account all of the arguments that the Applicant has made on the issue of proportionality it is my assessment that the order made was necessary and that the Committee decision on proportionality was not wrong. Indeed I have already gone further and made clear that my own stand-alone assessment is that the ISO was both necessary and proportionate on the particular facts of this case and on both bases. This ground therefore must fail. Ground 5 - The Committee was wrong to find that interim conditions of practise were not workable[72]Given my conclusions set out above I do not accept that the Committee was wrong to conclude that an interim conditions of practice was not workable. But in any event this is only one aspect of the overall considerations. The question for me is whether the Committee was wrong to conclude that an ISO was necessary and proportionate. I have come to the conclusion that it was not wrong.[73]It therefore follows that this ground must also fail.

Conclusion

[74]For the reasons set out above I refuse this application.[75]I would invite the parties to draw up a draft order reflecting the terms of this judgment. Given the terms of the judgment of Mrs Justice Lieven I would expect the Respondent to be able to make progress expeditiously with this investigation and well in advance of the expiry of the ISO.