Dzintars Jezdauckis v Prosecutor General's Office of The Republic of Latvia [2026] EWHC 1756 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1756 (Admin)

Case No AC-2024-LON-002283

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 15 th July 2026

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN

Between

DZINTARS JEZDAUCKISAppellant

PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIARespondent

Ms L Herbert (instructed by Bryson's Solicitors) for Appellant (via video link from HMP Wandsworth)

Ms A Bostock (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service Extradition Unit) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing dates: 17 th March 2026; 9 th July 2026

APPROVED JUDGMENT

MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN

Introduction

[1]The Appellant has permission on one ground to appeal the order of District Judge Law to extradite him to Latvia on an accusation warrant, which alleges conspiracy to produce and sell large quantities of drugs. He renews his application for permission to argue a further ground as to compatibility of extradition with his rights under

Article 8 ECHR

[2]The Appellant also has permission to rely upon the expert evidence of Dr Cohen as to mistreatment while the Appellant served an eight-year custodial sentence at Daugavgriva prison in Latvia. That evidence was not before the District Judge.

[3]The issues are now:(i) Whether it would be incompatible with

Article 3 ECHR

and, therefore, contrary to Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 to extradite the Appellant to Latvia.

(ii) Whether the court should grant permission to argue whether it would be incompatible with

Article 8 ECHR

and, therefore, contrary to Section 21 of the 2003 Act, to extradite him to Latvia and, if that is arguable, whether that ground should succeed. The facts and the Latvia cases The arrest

The facts and the Latvia cases

[4]The Appellant's witness statement before the District Judge explained that he had received a prison sentence in Latvia. During 2010, he had been convicted of supplying drugs. He served a sentence of eight years in custody and, subsequently, was subject to police supervision. When that was complete, he left Latvia on 28th September 2021 to join that part of his family which lives in the UK.

[5]When he was in prison, the police accused him of, as he put it, ‘being involved in drugs’ and he was interviewed, but he denied being involved.

[6]On 13th December 2023, a European arrest warrant was issued for the arrest of the Appellant in respect of a decision made by the Riga City Court on 28th May 2023 that he be arrested (a domestic warrant). The warrant provides extensive details of a single offence of being part of an organised group which allegedly bought, stored, transported and resold large quantities of narcotic substances. The offences were said to have taken place on specified dates between May and July 2017. That was a period of time when the Appellant was in prison. The warrant states that the offences carry sentences of imprisonment between five and fifteen years.

Extradition proceedings

[7]The Appellant was arrested on 30th January 2024 in Accrington and appeared before an appropriate judge the following day. His extradition hearing took place before District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) Law on 5th June 2024 and he handed down his judgment on 28th June 2024. He rejected the Appellant’s Article 3 and Article 8 cases for reasons to which I shall come.

[8]The Appellant appealed to this court in time. Choudhury J gave prior authority for a medico-legal report from Dr Juliet Cohen. Eady J granted permission to appeal on ground 1, in respect of Article 3, and refused permission on ground 2, in respect of Article 8 and rolled up any renewal of the Article 8 ground with a substantive hearing. She admitted Dr Cohen’s report.

[9]Eady J had regard to the fact that permission to appeal had been granted in cases called Sostacks v Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Latvia and Igonins v Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Latvia and invited the parties to consider whether this case should be stayed behind those two cases. Cheema-Grubb J stayed this case, accordingly, on 31st July 2025.

Sostacks and Igonins

[10]Sostacks andIgonins’ cases were heard by Kerr J in October 2025:

[2025] EWHC 2795 (Admin)

. I borrow gratefully from his chronological account of the case law which records the state of Latvian prisons. Kerr J stated at paragraphs 8 and 9 of his judgment as follows: “8. The issue of prison conditions in Latvia has been considered in several cases including DF v. Latvia (app. no. 11160/07). The European Court of Human Rights decided in October 2013 that DF’s article 3 rights had been violated during his imprisonment which started in 2005. He claimed to be a police informer and had suffered violence from other prisoners. It was common ground that sex offenders and police informers were at heightened risk of violence from other prisoners. His transfer to a different prison was delayed, a matter in respect of which he had no effective domestic remedy, the court found. 9.When the Strasbourg court decided DF, article 3 arguments were also being raised in this country in numerous cases concerning Latvian prison conditions. Three appeals listed together were heard by Moses LJ and Collins J in March 2014. In their judgment in April 2014 they rejected any article 3 challenge, dismissed all three appeals and made clear that seven similar challenges then pending before the magistrates’ court were doomed to fail: see Brazuks v. Prosecutor General’s Office, Republic of Latvia

[2014] EWHC 1021 (Admin)

[11]The outcome was the same in Danfelds v. General Prosecutor’s Office, Latvia

[2020] EWHC 3199 (Admin)

where Popplewell LJ and Johnson J heard two appeals together. Certain assurances had been sought at permission stage. Information in response was provided in August 2020. At the substantive stage, the court considered that material and other evidence, including a 2019 report from the Committee on Prevention of Torture (the CPT) but upheld the decisions below, adding at [65] that evidence “falls far short of what would be required to rebut the presumption that Latvia complies with its obligations under Article 3 ...”

[12]Having set out the findings and responses of the 2023 CPT report, Kerr J turned to the next case, Vascenkovs, and paragraphs 19 and 20 read as follows:

“19. On 14 November 2023, Swift J gave judgment in Vascenkovs v Prosecutor General’s Office, Republic of Latvia [2023] EWHC 2830 (Admin). The appeal concerned an accusation warrant relating to alleged benefit fraud. At the substantive hearing of an appeal on two grounds, the Appellant sought permission to add ECHR article 3 as an additional third ground. Swift J refused to allow the amendment for reasons he gave at [32]-[36]. He referred to Danfelds, cited passages from the 2023 CPT report on interprisoner violence and some passages on the same subject in the Latvian government’s response. 20. Swift J rejected in short order ([35]-[36]) the submission that “matters have moved on” since an earlier 2017 CPT report considered in Danfelds. He referred to the strong presumption of compliance which “will prevail save where exceptional circumstances are demonstrated”

. He referred to the Latvian government’s response and to “the specific steps being taken to re-socialise prisoners” and “to increase the number of prison officers”. While the slow progress since 2016 was of concern, the situation had not deteriorated since then and the authorities remained committed to addressing the shortcomings identified by the CPT and appeared to have made some progress at Riga prison.”

[13]Kerr J then turned to the cases from Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. It issued its judgment on 11th January 2024 in a further case about prison conditions in Latvia: D. v. Latvia (app. no. 76680/17). This was on facts of a Latvian prisoner who had served a sentence in three Latvian prisons from 2008 to 2017. The complainant, D, had exhausted national remedies in May 2017 without success and then filed his complaint to the Strasbourg court in October 2017.

[14]It is important to recall and keep in mind that the Strasbourg Court was concerned with conditions some ten years ago. Nevertheless, they form an important part of the chronology of the state of Latvian prisons. In D’s case, he was in a prison with an informal hierarchy in which he was at the lowest level. His use of communal facilities was restricted, as was his access to other prisoners. He was made to undertake demeaning tasks and was physically and symbolically separated which sent a potent message of inferiority. That was ill-treatment which exceeded the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of

Article 3 of the Convention

. That level of severity is not limited to acts of physical ill-treatment, but includes psychological suffering, including humiliation or lack of respect for human dignity, which is capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance.

The CPT Report of 26th February 2025

[15]The CPT has reported on prison conditions in Latvia from time to time. The purpose of its recent and ad hoc visit in 2024 was to follow up on the situation as found in 2022, which was a periodic visit. As a result of that visit, the CPT had expressed grave concern that its long-standing recommendations remained unimplemented. A particular concern was the informal prisoner hierarchy. It described this as a 'malignant influence'.

[16]Upon entering a cell, every prisoner would be asked the key question “who are you in life?”, the answer to which then determined their caste. Trying to hide any relevant information was not only futile but also very dangerous, potentially leading to severe punishment by other prisoners. The informal prisoner hierarchy continues to be deeply embedded in almost every aspect of daily prison life in Latvia as every inmate must belong to one of the three castes: the highest caste, who are known as “the thieves, the cool ones”, the most numerous middle caste; “the men”, or the prisoners belonging to the lowest caste; “the wrong/left ones”. In every prison, there is a ‘top prisoner’ and deputies in each block or unit.

[17]The CPT made efforts to evaluate the nature and extent of violence between prisoners. It expressed significant concerns about its ability to investigate properly because of the paucity of recording of injuries and investigation. Where medical examination revealed injury, which might be consistent with violence between prisoners, there was never any adequate indication or follow-up on the cause. Many of the injuries, which were suggestive of violence, were said to be the result of accidents. The CPT described this as unacceptable and in need of immediate remedy.

[18]The Government of Latvia responded on 26th February 2025. It highlighted its reform of the prison system, as set out in the amendments to the Code of Execution of Sentences of Latvia, which came into force on 1st September 2024. It included a two-tier system of closed and open prisons. The Government of Latvia also responded to the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in D, on 8th October 2024, by approving specific measures to reduce the informal prisoner hierarchy. The new Liepāja Prison will provide additional capacity which will, in turn, enable an increase in the number of low-capacity cells. This will overcome one of the drivers of the informal prisoner hierarchy, namely large occupancy accommodation.

[19]These materials were before Kerr J in Sostacks. He concluded at [69/70] that the informal prisoner hierarchy is persistent and longstanding but the pressure to bring it to an end is slowly bringing change. Kerr J held that Latvia had not lost the presumption of compliance with Article 3. This was in the context of the previous case law on Latvian prison conditions and because of the measures taken during 2024 and 2025: see [75] of Kerr J's judgment.

Dr Cohen’s evidence

[20]Dr Cohen describes herself as a forensic physician and has long experience in the assessment of those who have been ill-treated. She was not called to give evidence, nor did the Respondent apply to cross-examine. The Respondent did not seek permission to produce a report of a similar type nor any rebuttal. The result is that I have Dr Cohen’s report, the underlying medical records and some previous statements from the Appellant against which to assess the credibility of what is now being said. The District Judge had none of this material, nor the associated submissions of the parties.

[21]The part of Dr Cohen’s report which records observations made during her physical examination of the Appellant is a mixture of fact and opinion. She records some 22 lesions, which she examined, described and indicated on a plan of the Appellant’s body. In each case, she asked the Appellant to attribute the lesion to an event, to which the replies included knife and other stab wounds. In each case, Dr Cohen agreed that the Appellant’s attribution was likely. In addition, she records the Appellant’s disclosure of two wounds near his left buttock and left thigh, which she was unable to examine because the examination was not in a sufficiently private space. The Appellant said that they were sustained when there was an attempt to rape him, which attempt was interrupted and so did not happen.

[22]Dr Cohen undertook a mental health examination and diagnosed the Appellant with moderately-severe depression and moderate anxiety. She considers that suicide is a significant future risk.

[23]Dr Cohen’s conclusions are that the Appellant has physical evidence of the assaults described with three lesions ‘consistent’ with his account, eleven lesions ‘highly consistent’, and four lesions ‘typical’ of his account. He has residual physical symptoms relating to the beatings described, including severe headaches, intermittent jaw pain and recurrent severe low-back pain. These symptoms are all consistent with the account of the injuries causing or exacerbating them. She also considered the scars on intimate body parts are a strong indicator for sexual violence having occurred. She concludes that she finds his account of injuries and symptoms clinically plausible and overall, consistent. I then set out an excerpt from Dr Cohen's report:

“…. would have a very serious impact on his health, particularly his mental health. He described a very serious attempt to kill himself when in prison in Latvia and expressed the intention to die rather than return there. He has very serious risk factors for future suicide including his past attempt, diagnoses of moderate anxiety and moderately-severe depression, experiences of imprisonment and experiences of severe physical abuse and of sexual assault I am concerned, as discussed in the main part of this report, that there are elements of the attempted rape he has not been able to disclose as yet. Despite having some protective factors- in this case his children and supportive family and partner- the above factors make him vulnerable to impulsive suicidal action in the event of return to prison in Latvia.”

Article 3 – analysis The Article 3 rights

Article 3 – analysis

[24]Article 3 is absolute and provides that no one should be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In short summary, to rely upon Article 3 successfully, the Appellant must show, based on substantial grounds, that there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. If the Appellant does so, then it is for the requesting state to dispel any doubts. As I shall come to, there is a presumption that parties to the Convention are willing and able to fulfil their obligations: see for example the summary in Visha v Italy

[2019] EWHC 400 (Admin)

per Carr J, as she then was, and with whom Rafferty LJ agreed.

Submissions

[25]There are two inter-related aspects of the Appellant’s Article 3 case. The first derives from his evidence, supported by Dr Cohen, as to his own experience at Daugavgriva Prison, to which he is likely to be sent if extradited. The second and allied aspect is the treatment of lower-caste inmates, of which he says he is one.

[26]Ms Herbert submitted that the Appellant’s case can be distinguished from Sostacks and its predecessor cases because there is cogent evidence that the Appellant has already been the subject of inhuman and degrading treatment. If he was extradited, he would be at a real risk of the same treatment which resulted in the findings made by Dr Cohen. Further, she submits that the measures, which satisfied Kerr J in Sostacks, were addressing the availability of treatment for drug addictions and for first-time offenders, whereas the Appellant would be neither of those. In this case, the specific is consistent with the general: the CPT reports are critical of the prison conditions in Latvian prisons, including as to violence perpetrated by prisoners on other prisoners, and the Appellant’s experience is specific evidence of that general finding and concern. His evidence is corroborative of the CPT findings, noting that his experience and the CPT inspections were contemporaneous.

[27]Ms Herbert submitted that the response of the Latvian Government was aspirational and mere improvement is not a sufficient answer if the minimum to be Article 3 compliant is not achieved.

[28]An analogy was drawn with XY v Public Prosecutors Office of Oost Nederland

[2019] EWHC 624 (Admin)

in which Elisabeth Laing J, as she then was, allowed an Article 8 appeal in which the requested person had been raped while in custody in the Netherlands. She accepted that it would not be compliant with Article 8 to return the requested person to the environment which was the cause of the mental illnesses which he suffered as a result of the failure of the prison in Holland to protect him.

[29]Ms Bostock does not accept Dr Cohen’s report at face value. She submits that Dr Cohen has failed to undertake any comparison as between the Appellant’s evidence before the District Judge and the account given during her examinations. She makes the same point in respect of the medical records. If Dr Cohen had done so, she would have appreciated that the Appellant had never before referred to knife wounds arising from prison violence. The new case only came about when the Appellant was facing between five and fifteen years in custody in Latvia. This is a serious omission. Medical records show that the Appellant suffered injuries during a fight in Russia, but this was not picked up and addressed. Further, the medical records say nothing about mental health problems.

[30]On the impact of the informal prison hierarchy, the District Judge was correct not to accept the Appellant’s evidence of the caste system in Latvian prisons or his alleged status within it. He found it exaggerated and self-serving. The allegations on the arrest warrant, appreciating that they are just that, cast serious doubt on his assertions as to his lowly status.

[31]The District Judge found no objective evidence to support the Appellant’s position on his position in the caste system. Ms Bostock relied on these points to submit that Dr Cohen’s report should not carry very much weight, relative to the contemporaneous evidence and the allegation on the arrest warrant, and the high hurdle of Article 3 breach was not met.

The nature of the appeal

[32]The 2003 Act contains a scheme of appeals in which the court may allow an appeal if one of the conditions in s. 27(3) or (4) is satisfied. The condition at s. 27(4)(b) is that the issue or evidence would have resulted in the judge deciding a question before him differently. Given that the medical evidence was not before the District Judge, and its absence was a matter of adverse comments by him, this court is in a substantially different position to that of the Magistrates’ Court. The evidential position has moved on such that this court has to reach its own view on the Article 3 issue because of the fresh medical evidence. Moreover, and to the same effect, this court has the benefit of the judgment of Kerr J in Sostacks and the 2025 CPT report. Taken together, the features of the landscape are distinctly different to those before the District Judge in June 2024.

The evidence

[33]I take as my starting point the recent report of the CPT, as summarised and integrated into the holding in Sostacks. It is a background to this case which I find to be supportive of the Appellant’s central case: he has eight years’ experience of the informal prison hierarchy in Latvia and it is consistent with the independent observations of the CPT. The Appellant bears scars. I am unable to make findings as to the cause of each of those scars, but I can be sure that they exist by reason of Dr Cohen’s examination. That is a part of her examination which cannot be questioned. I accept Ms Bostock’s submissions that at least some of those scars are highly likely to have been acquired outside prison, such as during a fight in Russia. It also damages the Appellant’s credibility that he waited so long to make reference to what he now says is the source of his injuries. However, in his favour, it is plain from the CPT reports that there is a strong culture of not voicing complaint or explaining, truthfully and frankly, how an injury is acquired.

[34]Dr Cohen’s evaluative judgments require more care. I have not had the opportunity to hear her evidence nor the benefit of cross-examination. The Respondent did not apply to cross-examine and I took the view that it would have been disruptive to the conclusion of these proceedings if I initiated the calling of live evidence. Extradition should, if at all possible, be undertaken promptly. This case is already two years old.

[35]I have given Dr Cohen’s evaluative judgment as to the Appellant’s mental health and suicidal intentions only moderate weight. This is because her assessments appeared to me to go largely one way – in the Appellant’s favour – and with little cross-checking against other available sources of evidence. I find that the Appellant is both anxious and depressed and that such is contributed to by the prospect of his extradition to circumstances which were challenging for him. I have noted Dr Cohen’s opinion that these factors constitute a significant future risk, including as to suicidal intention, but I have not found that expression of the nature of the risk to be helpful because any risk of suicide can be said to be significant because of the magnitude of the consequence. The totality of the evidence does not help me understand likelihood.

[36]I accept Miss Herbert’s submission that the Appellant’s case differs from Sostacks in that it is founded in risk of violence and is not a drug treatment and rehabilitation case. That submission does not, in my judgment, make Sostacks distinguishable, so far as its holding on general compliance with Article 3 in Latvia is concerned. I respectfully agree with Kerr J at [75] that the risk to prisoners generally in Latvia does not breach Article 3.

[37]The facts of this case do, however, require that this court engages with the circumstances of a man who is to be returned to a prison in which there is clear evidence from an independent source of inter-prisoner violence, which continues to exist in the context of an informal prison hierarchy. I am unable to eliminate a real risk that the Appellant is a member of the lowest part of such a caste system.

[38]There is a strong presumption in favour of finding such compliance for a Part 1 country, such as Latvia. There is now a time-series of CPT reports and related judgments of this court which find there to be significant problems in Latvian prisons which fall short of breach of Article 3. So, in Vascenkovs, Swift J found compliance, notwithstanding the 2023 report, as summarised by Kerr J at [20] of his judgment which I have cited above.

[39]The reliance on planned improvements in periodic and ad hoc reports from 2017 to 2025 and the repeated finding of under-reported violence arising from the informal prisoner hierarchy is a factor which, in my judgment, can only go so far. There comes a point at which the assertion of change and improvement loses some of its credibility and I have, accordingly, attached little weight to what is set out in the Latvian Government response to the 2025 report.

[40]The Appellant’s case does not depend on a finding that prison conditions, generally, are not Article 3 compliant in Latvia and I have not and do not make such a finding. The Appellant's circumstances and the Appellant's case are particular in that he has already experienced eight years in custody in a Latvian prison. That particular feature of his circumstances and of his case are, in my judgment, relevant to the specific assessment of his return to custody, either, or both of, on remand and after conviction, in what may well be the same prison. That analysis is analogous to that of Elisabeth Laing J in XY, albeit in the different context of a case under s. 25(2) of the 2003 Act and Article 8. There is a real risk that the return of this particular requested person to the prison conditions which he previously experienced would be degrading treatment of a sort which is not compatible with Article 3. To avoid that result, he would need to know that he would be returned to prison conditions which reduced the scope for, and controlled the degrading impacts of the informal prisoner hierarchy, including the avoidance of use of inappropriate cell accommodation.

[41]I have therefore concluded that, in order to be assured that there is no real risk of degrading treatment on return of this particular appellant to prison in Latvia, that some further and specific information is required of the requesting authorities. As was submitted by Ms Herbert, this need only comprise a small number of short questions. I will ask counsel to provide a draft order for consideration.

Article 8

[42]Miss Herbert made an admirable attempt to distinguish or distance this case from what is now the leading case on Article 8 and extradition, Andrysiewicz v Poland

[2025] UKSC 23

reported at

[2025] 1 WLR 2733

[43]The main submission was that it would be exceptionally severe to return the Appellant to the prison in which he had previously experienced treatment, per his account. To that is to be added:(1) the Appellant is not a fugitive;

(2) the alleged offence is now nine years old;

(3) he has a girlfriend or partner and an attachment to her children, and he wants to be with them.

[44]In my judgment, these submissions fail for the reasons given by the District Judge and the Article 3 factors do not yield a different result. The District Judge balanced these factors and I include here paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgment below:

“31. In favour of extradition, I find that there are the following factors: (a) The constant and weighty public interest in extradition that those accused of serious offending should be returned to face their trial and that the UK should honour its international obligations to ensure these interests are respected. (b) The decision of the JA to make an extradition request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. (c) The offences are serious involving matters of global concern and in which the RP is accused of playing a leading role. (d) A significant custodial sentence is likely if convicted. (e) The RP has a relevant previous conviction in Latvia for the same type of offending for which he received an eight year sentence. 32. Against extradition, I find the following factors: (a) The RP has lived in the UK since 2021 and has started a new work and private life in the UK living with his partner and her children. (b) He is not alleged to be a fugitive. (c) The RP has a number of siblings living in the UK and while his parents live in Latvia they are planning to relocate to the UK. (d) The RP has no other convictions or cautions and has not committed any offences since his arrival in the UK. (e) The RP reports poor mental health and has been prescribed medication since being in custody.”

[45]The District Judge did not have medical evidence before him and made this observation clear in his reasons. The Appellant has now put this omission right. However, the District Judge’s analysis remains intact by reference to the factors which he listed. As he observed, there is an overwhelming public interest in ensuring that those accused of serious offences should be required to face their trial and the UK should not become known as a safe haven for them. Subject to the further evidence to be provided on prison accommodation, I agree with the District Judge that the balance falls decisively in favour of extradition of the Appellant. I therefore refuse permission to appeal.

Response to Questions of the Respondent

[46]My judgment to this point was given at the hearing in March 2026. I then ordered enquiries to be made of the Respondent, namely: i. In which prison would the Appellant be detained before and during his trial? ii. To what extent would the prison accommodation therein address the risks of inter-prisoner violence? iii. In which prison would the Appellant be detained if he were convicted and sentenced to custody after trial? iv. To what extent would this prison accommodation address the risk of inter-prisoner violence?

[47]A reply was received dated 13th April 2026, from Colonel D. Kaļins (‘the April information’). The parties each provided written submissions. I heard the parties at an adjourned hearing on 9th June 2026.

[48]The April information explained the legal basis for decisions on where to place prisoners. There is a Code and a procedure for holding prisoners. It is not explained in detail. However, it is explained that the Appellant would be placed in the remand section of Riga Central Prison where his future placement will be determined on the basis of the availability of cells, psychological compatibility, health, attitude to smoking and criminal record.

[49]There is capacity in all Latvian prisons. Liepāja Prison is a new prison with a capacity for 1200 prisoners. It is said to ensure the most effective enforcement of sentences. The Respondent emphasises that there are single, or individual, cells rather than dormitory-type rooms. This, along with new technology to improve security and supervision assists with the greater emphasis on changing prisoner behaviour and eliminating the informal hierarchy.

[50]The Respondent further explains that in recent years action has been taken to reduce the risk of prison violence. The measures include:(1) uninterrupted supervision at all times, including unscheduled inspections, which is said to significantly reduce the likelihood of violence;

(2) allocation on the basis of the criteria in paragraph 46 above;

(3) reactive response to threat, including transfer of a prisoner at risk;

(4) training of staff;

(5) improved living conditions;

(6) improved opportunities to communicate with staff.

[51]Ms Herbert has criticised these responses in a number of respects. The issue in this case is not one of over-crowding in the sense that it is said that the living conditions are restricted in terms of their area. The fact of available capacity does not assist greatly in this case. Uninterrupted supervision of a prison is a given, and the alternative would be surprising. The criteria in paragraph ‎48 are not detailed nor is there any indication as to how they will be applied. Measures to improve safety are those which were identified in the CPT report and are not new or additional to the material which the Court already has to hand. So far as those measures relate to video surveillance, those measures do not assist in respect of dormitory cells which are not common areas.

[52]Ms Herbert contrasted the April information with the CPT report. By way of example, she referred to the CPT’s findings on staff numbers. It described staff numbers as grossly insufficient. It also found that the failure to provide sufficient staff has the effect of making measures such as re-socialisation an ‘imitation’ of what is needed. That, Ms Herbert submits, undermines the April information so far as it explains that staff undertake a range of monitoring and inspection duties to ensure that inter-prisoner violence is identified and dealt with.

[53]Similarly, the material in respect of response to threats does not address the data from the CPT reports which indicate that cases are often closed as mere accidents when it is reasonably clear that such is not the case.

[54]A significant element of the April information and the Respondent’s case is the fact of new, single cell, accommodation at Liepāja Prison. Counsel agreed that 43% of the prison estate would be single cell accommodation. However, the elements of provision which are for juveniles or for those with addictions, would not be available to the Appellant. Ms Herbert notes that the April information does not state that the Appellant would be accommodated in Liepāja Prison, either when on remand or if he were to be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

[55]Ms Bostock relied on Urbonas & Others v Lithuania

[2024] EWHC 33 (Admin)

for the propositions that the following were relevant to the Court’s assessment:(i) whilst there is evidence of a continued persistent problem, there is no evidence of deterioration and it is a recognised problem for which steps are being taken;

(ii) steps include allowing individuals to be removed from the general population if unsafe;

(iii) there is no pilot judgment by the ECtHR or public statement by the CPT indicating a refusal to cooperate/improve the situation.

[56]It would have been of direct assistance to this Court to have a clear indication that the Appellant would be accommodated in a single occupancy cell. That would be a clear means of mitigating and addressing the risk which the Court has found to be apparent in the Appellant’s particular case. However, after careful consideration, I have formed the view that the April information is a sufficient basis to find that there is no real risk of degrading treatment on return of this particular appellant to prison in Latvia. My reasons are as follows.

[57]Single cell occupancy was described during the course of the July hearing as the gold standard for addressing or at least mitigating the effects of inter-prisoner violence of the type which has troubled Latvia. From the evidence which I have read, I agree that it is of such importance. Given that the Respondent has confirmed the availability of such accommodation and the use of a process and procedure, according to law, to decide whether the Appellant should be accommodated in that way, the Court can be reassured as to the feasibility and genuine opportunity for the Appellant’s rights to be protected by that means.

[58]The April information also disclosed an evident awareness of the serious issues which have existed and which continue to exist in Latvian prisons which has resulted in concrete action in the form of new prison accommodation. That awareness and active addition of facilities also reassures the Court.

[59]Moreover, as Ms Bostock submitted, it is open to this Court to request that a copy of this judgment be made available to the Respondent authorities in Latvia, and that is an action which I shall incorporate into the Court’s final order. Having regard to the comity between the states, the Appellant can be confident that the findings in his case will be considered and respected.

[60]These reassuring features are to be seen by the Court against the presumption which arises from the fact of Latvia’s membership of the Council of Europe and its status as a signatory to the Convention: Jane v Prosecutor General’s Office, Lithuania

[2018] EWHC 1122 (Admin)

, as cited in Visha v Italy (ibid). The principle of mutual trust between member states arising from membership of the Council of Europe is a highly relevant factor in deciding whether an extradited person would, in fact, be likely to suffer treatment which was contrary to

Article 3 of the Convention

. In the same way that the Divisional Court in Urbonas attached weight to the absence of any pilot judgment from the Strasbourg Court, so do I.

[61]The key question in this case is about provision for the particular circumstances of the Appellant’s case. In my judgment, the April information and the presumption that the Respondent will comply with its international obligations in the Appellant’s particular circumstances, as articulated in this judgment, will ensure the Appellant’s Article 3 rights are protected.

[62]For these reasons I shall dismiss the appeal.

[63]I record my thanks for the conspicuous fairness and efficiency of both Counsel. _________