“A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground- (a) that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or (b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.”
“Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court's order may— (a) regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future; (b) require the company— (i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or (ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do; (c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct; (d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; (e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company's capital accordingly.”
“(1) The concept of unfairness, although objective in its focus, is not to be considered in a vacuum. An assessment that conduct is unfair has to be made against the legal background of the corporate structure under consideration. This will usually take the form of the articles of association and any collateral agreements between shareholders which identify their rights and obligations as members of the company. Both are subject to established equitable principles which may moderate the exercise of strict legal rights when insistence on the enforcement of such rights would be unconscionable; (2) It follows that it will not ordinarily be unfair for the affairs of a company to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its articles or any other relevant and legally enforceable agreement, unless it would be inequitable for those agreements to be enforced in the particular circumstances under consideration. Unfairness may, to use Lord Hoffmann's words, "consist in a breach of the rules or in using rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith": see p.1099A; the conduct need not therefore be unlawful, but it must be inequitable; (3) Although it is impossible to provide an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the application of equitable principles would render it unjust for a party to insist on his strict legal rights, those principles are to be applied according to settled and established equitable rules and not by reference to some indefinite notion of fairness; (4) To be unfair, the conduct complained of need not be such as would have justified the making of a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds as formerly required unders.210 of the Companies Act 1948 ; (5) A useful test is always to ask whether the exercise of the power or rights in question would involve a breach of an agreement or understanding between the parties which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. Such agreements do not have to be contractually binding in order to found the equity; (6) It is not enough merely to show that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. There is no right of unilateral withdrawal for a shareholder when trust and confidence between shareholders no longer exist. It is, however, different if that breakdown in relations then causes the majority to exclude the petitioner from the management of the company or otherwise to cause him prejudice in his capacity as a shareholder.”
“The expression "unfairly prejudicial" has been subject to extensive judicial interpretation. There needs to be both prejudice and unfairness. Prejudice does not mean that there has to be financial loss. It may be enough to show that the rights of the petitioning member have been infringed without showing that that led to any financial loss. In order to show unfairness, Mr McKillen had to demonstrate unfairness stemming from a breach of a legal right conferred by the articles or the shareholders' agreement: see generally O'Neill v Phillips[1999] 2 BCLC 1 . In one category of case, that is where the company is formed on the basis of a personal relationship between the shareholders, the court is able to subject legal rights to equitable considerations. However, the judge held that Coroin did not fall into that category of case and there is no appeal on that point.”
“Moreover, it would be wrong as a matter of principle to impose a requirement of causal connexion before account can be taken of an excluded party's conduct when addressing the fairness or unfairness of an exclusion. The exercise for the court is to determine whether conduct which was prejudicial to the party complaining was unfairly so. In the context of exclusion that involves a determination of whether the exclusion was unfair. That determination is an objective one as I have already explained and is not dependent on the subjective intention with which particular acts were done. The objective nature of this exercise indicates that the court should undertake it in the light of all the circumstances known to the court. Fairness or unfairness is to be determined in the light of those circumstances seen as a whole. Just as a genuine belief by a party that he or she was acting properly in excluding another party is not determinative of the question and does not prevent a finding of unfairness so an exclusion is not to be regarded as having been unfair if circumstances existed warranting the exclusion. This is so even if those circumstances were not known at the time of the exclusion or were not the reason for it. The existence or otherwise of a causal connexion between a petitioner's conduct and his or her exclusion is likely to be a factor relevant to the court's consideration of the fairness of the exclusion. If particular circumstances were not the cause of an exclusion then it is likely to be harder for a respondent to argue that those circumstances justified the exclusion particularly if they were known at the time and even more so when they had occurred some time before the exclusion.”
“...However, a number of authorities establish that, in certain circumstances, the removal of a quasi-partner without making such an offer can be objectively justified. Those circumstances are, essentially, where the quasi-partner has brought his removal on himself by conduct that objectively justified the other members in excluding him in that way: see per Nourse J in Re R.A. Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd[1983] BCLC 273 at 292. 413. Lack or loss of competence in business affairs, a breakdown of the relationship of trust and confidence and even personal misbehaviour do not of themselves justify exclusion without a fair offer. The court does not indulge in what Lord Hoffmann once referred to as a "contest of virtue". Nor can removal without a fair offer be justified solely on the grounds of what the majority consider to be in the best interests of the company: per Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi at p.381. 414. In Re a company No. 002470 of 1988, ex p. Nicholas[1992] BCC 895 , Harman J held that the exclusion of a quasi-partner was not unfair where the partner was responsible for friction and difficulties in the conduct of the company's business such that management relations had broken down. In Woolwich v Milne[2003] EWHC 414 (Ch) , Sir Donald Rattee held that Mr Woolwich was not unfairly excluded where, by doing specific matters that he had previously agreed not to do, he placed the efficient conduct of the business of the Company in jeopardy and posed "a significant threat to the future well-being of the company's business" (p.48). 415. The authorities do not establish any bright line between what does and does not justify exclusion without an offer, but it is clear that the conduct in question must be misconduct in the affairs of the company, not merely personal misconduct. It must be so serious as to undermine the basis for the equitable considerations that bound the parties. The right approach, in my judgment, is to ask whether the exclusion without a fair offer is proportionate and justified by the misconduct in question, but bearing in mind that incompetence, mere misconduct and a breakdown of confidence are not sufficient to justify removal without a fair offer.”
“60. The starting point should in our view be the general proposition stated by Nourse J in In re London School of Electronics Ltd[1986] Ch 211 , 224: “Prima facie an interest in a going concern ought to be valued at the date on which it is ordered to be purchased.”
“I refer to our meeting today at which I explained that you were to be suspended from work pending an investigation into an allegation of gross misconduct, as detailed in the letter dated today that I handed to you. Further to our subsequent discussion, the company acknowledges that your role is integral to its operations. Accordingly, on reflection, rather than suspend you at this time, the company has decided that it would be appropriate to allow you to work from home until further notice.”
“(j) If the shareholders cannot agree a price for a share transfer, the Accountants shall determine the Fair Value of the Sale Shares, with Fair Value meaning “valuing each of the Sale Shares as a proportion of the total value of all the issued Shares without any premium or discount being attributable to the percentage of the issued share capital of Holdings which they represent.”