“These disgusting ghouls are SO excited that a trans person has finally been murdered in the UK, so they can use it to attack [JK] Rowling and “TERFs”
“Brianna Ghey was an incredible young woman who spread joy, love and laughter to those around her. My thoughts are with Brianna’s family and the trans community fighting for safety, dignity and liberation”
“Stu, with regards to intentionally misgendering Brianna Ghey so publicly, so repeatedly, it has clearly affected a lot of people very deeply. What would you say, to those who say what you are doing amounts to Harassment of transgender people and their allies?”
“SHE CARED you utter cretin. Because of the Tory stance on self ID, weaponised by people like you, she’ll be deadnamed and misgendered on her death certificate. She can’t even die as herself and that’s on hateful trolls like yourself that gave the Tories the power to do it”
“Or you’ll do fucking what, mate?”; to which the Claimant replied “I’m not your mate. Do not misgender her ever again. Her name is Brianna Ghey, she was a young trans girl, which was plainly obvious, and you need to learn to show some respect”
“This repeated course of action by Campbell affected me, profoundly. Deeply. I experienced shock, extreme distress and disbelief that Campbell could be so cruel and had specifically set out to harass the trans community this way, given that Brianna’s body was barely cold. I was physically shaking, with a flurry of emotions around fear, shock, disbelief, and deep sadness that Campbell used the death of a trans child this way”
“The MO on this crime report, whilst distressing does not reach the threshold of the offence reported. Further, it would not meet the threshold of any other reportable offence. The information provided is not sufficient to identify a suspect, and should a suspect be identified otherwise, there would not be enough in this report to present a charging rationale sufficient to proceed to a charge through CPS. For this reason, the report will be closed, victim aware via VM as neither phone number provided picks up after repeated attempts. Ins 8488 Bailey aware and authorises closure…. For a crime for malicious communication to take place the content of the communication has to be grossly offensive. Although the content is unacceptable the comments do not read as wildly offensive and in any case, within the realms of free speech and articles 9,10, 11 ECHR, comments can be made to others which shock and disturb without constituting a crime. There is a stated case regarding use of social media and free speech and this is R v SCOTTOW. Scottow was charged and convicted under malicious communications act. The circumstances were that she entered into an argument online wand referred to trans women as male, racist and a pig in a wig. The court of appeal overturned the conviction, rationale from Lord Justice Bean and Justice Warby is that within free speech there is “right to offend”
“I am Inspector 13495 Mason, based at Rochdale Police station. This is a crime finalisation review and rationale, which I have been requested to make an assessment on based on a write up by an officer on my response team. I have read the ARD and the circumstances of this case and have read the rationale and write up for closure by the officer. I agree with the officer that there is insufficient evidence…to do anything else with this crime and it can be closed. The crime of [malicious communications] has to be [indecent] or grossly offensive. I also note the comments [weren’t] directed at a person, but [were] the suspects [opinion]. While I will agree these comments would be upsetting and can [be] perceived as hate for me this would be a hate incident and not crime. I note the stated case, where the conviction was overturned. This was a case of free speech and a [right] to offend. Social media has [mechanisms] for comments to be removed and should monitor [their] own platforms should it breach their policies. It is not for the Police to investigate every comment made on social media. as such I [authorise] closure of this crime.”
“1. Offence of sending letters etc. with intent to cause distress or anxiety (1) Any person who sends to another person— (a) a letter, electronic communication or article of any description which conveys - (i) a message which is indecent or grossly offensive; [or] (b) any article or electronic communication which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive nature, is guilty of an offence if his purpose, or one of his purposes, in sending it is that it should, so far as falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above, cause distress or anxiety to the recipient or to any other person to whom he intends that it or its contents or nature should be communicated.”
“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers… (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial disorder or crime, for the protections of health or maras, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10…it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”
“…by giving a heightened meaning to the words ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘indecent’ or by reading into section 1 a provision to the effect that the section will not apply where to create an offence would be a breach of a person’s Convention rights, i.e. a breach of article 10(1), not justified under article 10(2).”
“47. What could be achieved on the facts here, and what was required, was a Convention-compliant interpretation and application of the language of s 1 to the facts of the case. 48. Drawing on the authorities referred to above, and in this context, we would identify the following considerations: i) Whether a message is “grossly offensive” is a question of fact to be answered objectively by reference to its contents and context, not its actual effect (see in particular Collins at [8]); ii) The question is whether the message goes beyond the limits of what is tolerable in our society (see in particular Collins at [12]); iii) The answer must reflect society’s fundamental values (see in particular Collins at [9]). Those values include the great weight to be given to free speech, the need for tolerance of statements and opinions that some might find offensive or upsetting, and the special need for tolerance on the part of those in public positions (see in particular Redmond-Bate at [12] and Calver at [55] and [58]); iv) The context of the speech must be considered. In a democratic society political speech is to be given particular weight (see in particular Connolly at [14]). The Strasbourg jurisprudence identifies a hierarchy of speech, with political speech at its apex. The greater the value of the speech in question, the weightier must be the justification for interference. The proportionality assessment must include some evaluation of the kind of speech under consideration; v) Accordingly, where freedom of speech in a political context is engaged, and there is a case to answer, it is essential that the offence be defined in terms which reflect the enhanced meaning of “grossly offensive” (see in particular Connolly at [18] (approved in The Colston Statue Case at [51])); vi) In order to establish that at least one of the defendant’s purposes was to cause distress or anxiety, it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that the message was likely to have that effect and that the defendant knew or foresaw this, or that he gave no thought to the matter; the prosecution must prove that at least one of the defendant’s objectives was to bring about that consequence. The offence is committed only if causing distress or anxiety is at least one of the defendant’s “purposes”
“70. The…judge was right to say as he did, that comparatively little official action is needed to constitute an interference for the purposes of Article 10(1) [255]; and was thus able to find that what the police had done (going to his place of work, warning Mr Miller that he would be at risk of criminal prosecution if he continued to tweet etc.) constituted an interference with Mr Miller’s Article 10(1) rights, even though he was not made subject to any formal sanction. The judge went on to say that the police’s submissions impermissibly minimised what occurred and did not properly reflect the value of free speech in a democracy; there was not a shred of evidence that Mr Miller was at risk of committing a criminal offence [259]. It was nothing to the point that Mr Miller continued to tweet afterwards; warning him that in unspecified circumstances he might find himself being prosecuted for exercising his right to freedom of expression on Twitter had the capacity to impede and deter him from expressing himself on transgender issues. It had a chilling effect on his right to freedom of expression [260-1]”