Rafal Mentel v Regional Court of Poznan (Poland) [2025] EWHC 3223 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 3223 (Admin)

Case No AC-2024-LON-001421

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 10/12/2025

Before

MRS JUSTICE BRUNNER

Between

RAFAL MENTELAppellant

REGIONAL COURT OF POZNAN (POLAND)Respondent

Ben Joyes (instructed by Sonn Macmillan Walker Solicitors) for Appellant

Victoria Shehadeh (instructed by CPS) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing dates: 26 November 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 10 December 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

MRS JUSTICE BRUNNER

[1]The appellant submits that extradition would amount to a disproportionate interference with his rights under

Article 8 of the European Convention

of Human Rights and section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 (‘the Act’). He appeals against the decision of District Judge Leake on 23 April 2024 to order extradition. Issues are the approach to delay in this case, the approach to curfew in this case, and the overall balancing of factors.

[2]The appellant was arrested on 28 September 2023 and remanded on conditional bail with a curfew in relation to a conviction warrant (“the extortion warrant”). That warrant, issued by the Regional court of Poznan, Poland on 4 September 2023, relates to two offences: i) Receiving stolen goods. ii) Demanding a material benefit in return for unlawfully acquired item and attempting extortion.

[3]In summary the appellant was said to have assisted another person, in September 2011, to hide away a stolen Arabian horse and demand ransom money, threatening the owner that the horse would be killed and leaving a severed horse’s tail outside the owner’s house. The appellant himself is said to have made the telephone call demanding the payment of ransom money.

[4]A sentence was imposed of one year eight months. The appellant served part of the sentence and was conditionally released. He breached the terms of that release by not keeping in touch with his probation officer, not staying at his place of residence, not informing the state of his whereabouts and not responding to summonses. He was summonsed to serve remainder of the term in November 2017, by which time he could not be found. It is now accepted that he is a fugitive, as the District Judge found. It is agreed that the period remaining to be served is nine months one week.

[5]A previous and separate arrest warrant was issued on 11 April 2023 in relation to an unrelated conviction for swindling (“the swindling warrant”). The appellant was arrested on the swindling warrant on 17 June 2023 and given conditional bail with a curfew. The appellant was discharged at an extradition hearing under section 20(7) of the Act in a judgment dated 29 September 2023.

[6]Sheldon J gave permission to appeal on 22 July 2024 considering it arguable that the District Judge’s Article 8 analysis was wrong in that the balance of factors weighted more heavily against the order for extradition. A stay was subsequently imposed to await the Supreme Court’s judgment in Andrysiewicz v Poland

[2025] UKSC 23

and subsequently lifted; at one stage this case included a point relating to early release, but that is no longer pursued.

The Law

[7]I can only allow the appeal under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003 if I find that(i) the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently which would have led to discharge, or

(ii) if an issue or evidence is in front of me which would have resulted in the District Judge deciding such a question differently if she had that material. Essentially, the question is whether the District Judge made the wrong decision.

[8]The approach to Article 8 in extradition cases was not in dispute and is well-established. The leading trilogy of cases is Norris v USA

; HH v Italy

; Celinski v Poland

[2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin)

[2016] 1 WLR 551

[9]Time spent on a curfew can be relevant to the Article 8 balance, even if the curfew would not qualify for thepurposes of reducing the sentence in this jurisdiction: Brindusa v Romania

[2023] EWHC 3372 (Admin)

, [8]-[9] and [21]. As Lane J held in Hojden v Poland [2022] EWHC (Admin) “the significance of curfew conditions will vary, depending on all the circumstances. Where there is evidence that a curfew has had a material effect on a person’s ability to work or study or maintain a family life, it is likely to be afforded greater weight than when the effect has merely been to prevent late-evening socialising. Even in the latter scenario, a long-standing set of restrictions may make the difference, if the case would otherwise be finely balanced.”

[10]When considering delay in the context of Article 8, it is well established the overall length of the delay is relevant to the Article 8 question and a lack of urgency in bringing an appellant to trial may give “some indication of the importance attached to [the] offending” (Baroness Hale in HH [§45]). Dilatoriness on the part of the requesting state in issuing an extortion warrant can weigh in a requested person’s favour even when he or she is a fugitive although the weight to be given to the interference is attenuated (as summarised in Pabian v Poland

[2024] EWHC 2431

[11]Counsel for the appellant made submissions about a perceived difference between the judgments of Pabian and Georgescu v Romania

[2025] EWHC 864

, particularly in relation to the court’s duty to enquire into the reasons for a requesting state’s delay. That is not a relevant point on the facts of this case.

Fresh Evidence

[12]The appellant asks me to admit fresh evidence. There is a two step approach to admitting fresh evidence as set out in Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi

[2009] EWHC 231 (Admin)

; evidence must have been unavailable below with reasonable diligence and must now be decisive.

[13]The fresh evidence which I am asked to admit would not be decisive. The District Judge knew that the appellant’s wife’s sister was undergoing treatment for cancer, and that the appellant was providing financial support. The further material includes a statement from the appellant’s sister-in-law saying that funding from the appellant means that she can afford medical cannabis. The District Judge also knew that the appellant’s wife had health issues. The further material shows, if anything, some improvement in that she has returned to work. The further material also shows that the appellant has been referred to a psychologist in relation to ‘nervous problems’, and has a benign lump which is being investigated. There is no evidence that treatment, if needed, would not be available in Poland.

[14]I decline to admit that evidence. It would have made no difference to the District Judge’s conclusions.

The District Judge’s Judgment

[15]At a hearing at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, the appellant and his wife gave evidence about the significant difficulties which would be faced if the appellant was extradited, and other evidence was read.

[16]The District

Judge identified the following factors in relation to Article 8:

“93. In my judgment, the factors in favour of extradition in this case are as follows: - The requested person is a fugitive from justice in Poland. - There is a constant and weighty public interest in the UK honouring its Treaty obligations. - The conduct resulting in the conviction is very serious, involving group offending by taking control of a large sentient animal from its owner, and making demands with menaces to extort payment. - An immediate custodial sentence was imposed in respect of that conduct. - The requested person was granted conditional release but failed to comply with the obligations to which he was subject. - Decisions of and requests by the judicial authority of a member state should be afforded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. - In this case, that includes the decision of the judicial authority to revoke the conditional release. - The UK must not be, and must not be seen to be, a safe haven willing to accept and shelter fugitives from justice, including those who wish to avoid proceedings in another country. 94. Factors against extradition are as follows: - The period of the sentence remaining to be served is about 8 months. - The requested person has not been convicted of any offence in the UK and the last offence he committed in Poland was in June 2012. - He has been subject to an electronically monitored curfew in these proceedings for a period of just less than 7 months. - He and his wife have been settled in the UK for seven years. - They have stable accommodation here, they work, and they have both obtained settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme. - The requested person has established a business in the UK and others are reliant on him for work. - He is well regarded in his local community. - Extradition would have financial consequences for his wife - It would also mean that his wife alone could not continue providing financial assistance to her mother and to her sister for treatment for cancer.”

[17]The District Judge determined that, weighing up those factors, extradition was not a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights. The judge noted:

“The extradition offence is serious; and the public interest in the UK not being and not being seen to be a safe haven is extremely important. To an extent, the disruption to the new and positive life that the requested person and his wife have made for himself in the UK arises directly from the requested person’s fugitivity. Had he dealt with the consequences of his conduct in 2017, he would have served the remainder of the sentence imposed and he would then have been able to make his new life in the UK without fear of it being disrupted by unresolved issues from his past.”

Treatment of Delay

[18]The central chronology is as follows: a) 2011: offences committed b) 2017: appellant summonsed to serve remainder of term following breach of conditional release c) March 2023: Polish court aware that appellant was in the UK d) April 2023: swindling warrant issued e) September 2023: extortion warrant issued.

[19]Explanation has been provided for the chronology between 2011 and 2017, a period which involved various investigative, judicial and penal processes in Poland. No explanation has been sought or provided for the gap between 2017 and early 2023 when the appellant had fled Poland, but authorities did not know he was in the UK.

[20]The appellant’s submissions are that delay should be taken into account in a number of ways. First, it is said that the overall time which has passed since the offences is relevant to the Article 8 balancing exercise because the effect of time passing is that family ties and roots in the UK have been forged and strengthened. That is uncontentious.

[21]Second, the appellant points to the six month gap between March 2023, when the Polish authorities were aware that the appellant was in the UK, and September 2023, when the extortion warrant was issued. It is said that the Polish state is culpable for that delay, and that it therefore carries particular weight against the public interest in extraditing. The respondent submits that there is no culpability on the part of the Polish state in relation to the six month gap and that it carries no particular weight.

[22]I accept the respondent’s submissions. There is no basis to infer any culpable delay on the part of the Polish authorities. Six months from finding out that the appellant was in the UK to issuing the extortion warrant is not a significant period of time. The fact that the Polish authorities issued the swindling warrant in that gap is neither here nor there: there has to be an element of realism about the complexities of national systems, and issuing warrants sequentially rather than at the same time does not demonstrate fault.

[23]This case sits within entirely familiar territory where the court considers the effects of the passage of time, the weight of which is significantly lessened by the appellant’s fugitive status. The District Judge took that approach when noting the ways in which the appellant had established a family life in the UK, acknowledging the seven years that had passed since the appellant came to the UK, and also identifying that he had gained the advantage of that new life because he had fled justice in Poland.

Approach to Curfew

[24]The central chronology is as follows: a) 19 June 2023 appellant remanded on bail with curfew in relation to the swindling warrant b) 29 September 2023 swindling warrant discharged and appellant remanded on bail with curfew in relation to the extortion warrant.

[25]It was submitted that the court should take into account the period when the appellant was under curfew in relation to the swindling warrant, when considering the proportionality of extradition under the extortion warrant. The District Judge rejected that argument, quite rightly; it has no basis in logic or law.

[26]The curfew period is recorded as 9pm to 5am on the PNC in relation to the swindling warrant, and it was accepted by counsel at the hearing that a similar overnight period of curfew was imposed in relation to the extortion warrant.

[27]The appellant submits that the curfew, which the appellant has now been subject to for over two years, has been such a significant restriction of liberty that it should weigh heavily in the balance. The respondent submits that the District Judge afforded the curfew proper weight.

[28]It was conceded at the hearing in front of me that there is no evidence in this case that the curfew has had a material effect on the appellant’s Article 8 rights. Indeed, that is precisely the reason that most curfews are night curfews – to allow people to go about their daily work and maintain their private life and family life while ensuring that they remain at a known location. The District Judge’s treatment of the curfew was perfectly proper and I reject the argument that it should have been given more weight.

Balancing the Factors

[29]The District Judge identified the relevant factors. The appellant has a settled life in the UK, and has not committed any offences while in the UK: all of that is to his credit. The effect of wrenching the appellant away from his UK life will be all the more significant because of the years that he has spent here. Plainly, many negative effects would flow from extradition, including hardships for the appellant himself, and financial and emotional hardships for members of the appellant’s family, and those who rely on him for work. The curfew weighs in the balance against extradition, but not to any significant degree for the reasons above; that was the case at the time of the extradition hearing, and that remains the case even now after two years on curfew.

[30]On the other hand, this was not a case where there was evidence of exceptionally severe impact on family life. There was a significant impact, but that is not sufficient. The appellant’s fugitive status reduces the weight to be given to delay. These were serious offences, and there is an outstanding custodial sentence of some considerable length. The UK must not be a safe haven for fugitives.

[31]The District Judge was not wrong to decide that the factors in favour of extradition outweighed those against. I have declined to admit fresh evidence, but even if I was approaching this as a fresh balancing act taking the updated material into account, I would reach the same conclusion. In other words, applying the wording of section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, it cannot be said that the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently which would have led to discharge, and there is no issue or evidence that is in front of me which would have resulted in the District Judge deciding such a question differently.

[32]The appeal is dismissed.