Akhtar Parvez v Court of Imperia, Italy [2025] EWHC 3020 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 3020 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-LON-000258

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 17/11/2025

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Between

Akhtar PARVEZAppellant

Court of Imperia, ITALYRespondent

Amelia Nice (instructed by Sperrin Law) for Appellant

David Ball (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service - Extradition) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing dates: 16 th October 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17.11.2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Introduction

[1]The Appellant, Akhtar Parvez, appeals the order for his extradition made by the District Judge (“the Judge”) on 20 January 2025.

[2]The appeal was lodged on 26 January 2025, with perfected grounds lodged on 25 February 2025. Permission to appeal was granted by Mr Justice Bourne on 20 May 2025. The sole ground of appeal is that the Judge erred in his decision under Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) (whether extradition would be compatible with the Appellant’s Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 right to respect for private and family life).

[3]The Appellant applied to adjourn the appeal hearing due to fresh evidence concerning poor medical care within the Italian prison system. I refused that application in advance of the hearing, giving reasons which are attached to the order. I am not persuaded that an anonymity order, which was requested, is required in this case but I have not referred to the Appellant’s children by their first names.

The Warrant and Offences

[4]The Respondent Judicial Authority (“JA”) seeks the extradition of the Appellant based on a conviction warrant relating to fraud (referred to in the warrant as “extortion”) committed on three occasions between 2010 and 2011 in Ventimiglia, Italy. The Appellant was convicted when represented but in his personal absence. The original sentence was 5 years 4 months, with approximately 4 years 10 months and 2 days remaining to be served.

[5]The Appellant was remanded in pre-trial custody for approximately 6 months, from 18 June 2012 to 15 December 2012. Following his release, he was subject to reporting requirements which were revoked in May 2013. The fraud trial commenced in 2016 and was subject to stays between 2018 and 2020. The Appellant was convicted on 18 November 2021, and his appeal against conviction was dismissed on 16 December 2022.

[6]The Appellant travelled from Italy to the UK on 4 November 2021. He was arrested in the UK on 25 July 2023. He spent a brief period in custody (8 days) before bail was granted on 2 August 2023. The final extradition hearing was conducted on 16 July 2024. The case was, unusually, relisted some 26 times before the judgment was handed down 6 months later, culminating in the extradition order of 20 January 2025.

The Family Background

[7]The Appellant is the co-carer, with his wife, for his three children.

[8]The youngest child is 9 years old. He has severe developmental delays, autism, is almost non-verbal, lacks danger awareness, and requires one-to-one care. He attends school. He recently received an Education and Health Care Plan (“EHCP”). The Appellant is named as the “lead parent” and undertakes liaison with the school.

[9]The middle child is 13 years old. He suffers from nephrotic syndrome (a kidney disease) and oedema, requiring the Appellant to manage his medication and attend medical appointments. He requires daily urine tests.

[10]The eldest child is 16 years old. He has no additional educational or medical needs but was distressed by his father’s arrest and is anxious about “losing” his father.

[11]The Appellant’s wife has fragile mental health, depression, low self-esteem, limited English, and, on her evidence, relies heavily on the Appellant.

[12]The Appellant’s own health involves “multiple medical problems,” including severe osteoarthritis of both knees, diabetes, and shoulder problems, resulting in severe pain and reliance on a walking stick and his wife for assistance.

The Extradition Hearing and Judgment

[13]The evidence before the Judge included the following: i) Oral evidence from the Appellant; ii) Oral evidence from the Appellant’s wife; iii) Oral evidence from a chartered psychologist called Dr Rothermel; iv) Documentary medical evidence concerning the Appellant and various other family members including his son youngest son; v) Documentary evidence concerning the special educational needs of the Appellant’s youngest son; vi) A report written by a social worker at Lancashire County Council pursuant to Section 7 of the Children Act 1989; vii) Further information from the JA.

[14]The Judge discharged the Appellant in relation to an offence of failing to pay child maintenance for which a sentence of 6 months imprisonment had been imposed. That period is not included in the sentence for the fraud offences outlined above.

[15]The Judge found the Appellant to be a fugitive. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s account that he was no longer in contact with his lawyer in 2018 and that he was not aware of the hearing on 18 November 2021. Further, the Judge was sure that the Appellant was aware that the proceedings remained ongoing and that he deliberately sought to evade the proceedings by relocating to the UK.

[16]The Judge carried out a balancing exercise concluding broadly that notwithstanding the significant effect that extradition would have on the family, and the children in particular, the public interest in extradition outweighed other considerations. The Appeal The Appellant’s Arguments

The Appeal

[17]The Appellant originally raised two grounds of appeal relating to Section 20 and 21 of the Act. Bourne J granted permission to appeal in relation to the Section 21 and Article 8 ground only.

[18]The Appellant argues that the Judge made the wrong decision and that extradition would be disproportionate, considering errors in the judgment, new evidence, and delay. Ms Nice, on behalf of the Appellant submitted that the flawed approach in the judgment should, alone, be sufficient for the appeal to be allowed but if not, it should succeed on the basis of the fresh evidence.

[19]The material the Appellant sought to rely on as fresh evidence, included the EHCP for his youngest child and material relating to his own deteriorating health. It was argued that this would permit the court to make an up-to-date assessment and would have been determinative at the extradition hearing.

[20]The Appellant submitted that the fresh material established that his health had “plainly deteriorated” since the extradition hearing. This new evidence, primarily in the form of GP letters, detailed his conditions and their progression: i) He has severe osteoarthritis of both knees. He suffers “severe pain,” uses a walking stick, and cannot walk or stand for long periods. The Appellant has seen an orthopaedic surgeon for a potential knee replacement and has had injections in both knees. His mobility is poor, and the prognosis will not improve without a knee replacement. The Appellant struggles with stairs. ii) He is reliant on his wife for washing and dressing and feels weak. iii) He has Type II diabetes, which is currently described as “uncontrolled” due to his inability to exercise. As a result, he suffers from diabetic retinopathy. The uncontrolled diabetes is also associated with the risk of heart attacks and strokes. iv) He suffers from impingement syndrome of both shoulders. v) He takes medication for pain problems and uses topical pain relief. vi) The Appellant also has poor hearing.

[21]The Appellant submitted that his condition will not improve, and his health is a “properly relevant and pressing factor,” particularly given that he is 68 years old. The impact of extradition on his health, including the link between Type 2 diabetes, depression, and a higher risk of mortality, was emphasised in the expert evidence of Dr Rothermel, a psychologist (called on behalf of the Appellant at the extradition hearing). The Appellant argued that the Judge failed to address the impact of extradition on his own health in the Article 8 balance. The Appellant argues that prison will be very hard for him due to his need for help with dressing and showering. He cited serious concerns regarding the possibility of inadequate medical care and support in Italian prisons, especially given his need for a knee replacement.

[22]The Appellant submitted that the District Judge erred in finding he was a fugitive and in treating this finding as a “trump card” in the balancing exercise. The Appellant contended that he remained in Italy for seven years after being released, living openly and updating the authorities. Furthermore, it was argued the offending occurred 14-15 years ago, a delay which is highly material to any consideration of the public interest. It was asserted that the Judge wrongly inferred that adjournments or stays in the Italian proceedings were at the Appellant’s behest. The resulting delay is causally linked to the current family position, as his youngest son had been born in the period over which the delay occurred.

[23]The Appellant submitted that the Judge was wrong in relation to his assessment of the seriousness of the offence. The JA met the dual criminality requirement by reference to fraud by false representation (i.e. Section 2 Fraud Act 2006). The Judge, however, characterised the offence as “extortion” or “attempted extortion” in the balancing exercise, which was wrong and, it was argued, internally contradictory. The actual conduct was of “modest” seriousness, involving an actual loss of 700 euros and an intended loss of 3,500 euros. In addition, it was submitted, the Judge wrongly inferred that the Appellant had a “leading role”. Applying the domestic sentencing guidelines for fraud, the range would be a fine to 26 weeks’ custody, suggesting that the Italian sentence was disproportionate.

[24]The Appellant contended that the Judge failed to give adequate attention and analysis to the impact on the family. Dr Rothermel’s evidence, which the Judge accepted regarding the children’s conditions, suggested that the children would experience the separation as “traumatic grief,” and the family unit was at risk of breaking apart, potentially leading to the children being taken into foster care. She described the Appellant as “glue that holds the family together”. The Judge, it was said, failed to grasp the intensity of support needed by the children, particularly the youngest, whose developmental window for language acquisition may be closed if extradition proceeds. The Judge, it was argued, wrongly found that Mrs Parvez, with her low self-esteem, depression, and limited English, would be able to “manage”. Furthermore, reliance on the eldest child, “stepping in” to assist was expressly disapproved of in the case law. There is, it was argued, no cogent plan in place for the children’s care, a requirement established in relevant authorities. The likely lack of meaningful contact with the children was also a factor, particularly in the case of the youngest, who would not understand why his father is gone.

[25]The Appellant also raised the risk that, due to his pre-settled status and the length of his sentence (over 12 months), he may not be able to return to the UK or re-join his family promptly under the Immigration Rules, potentially exacerbating the family’s anguish.

[26]Finally, the Appellant pointed out that he has already served 6 months in Italian custody and over 2 years on conditional bail with an 8-hour tagged curfew, which also, it was argued, diminishes the public interest in his extradition.

The Respondent’s Arguments

[27]The Respondent observed that the High Court’s function is one of review, not re-hearing, and the appeal should only be allowed if the Judge was wrong, meaning that crucial factors must have been weighed so significantly differently as to render the outcome wrong. Even errors or omissions in reasoning do not necessarily mean the proportionality decision was wrong.

[28]Mr Ball, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that the Appellant is plainly a fugitive. The Judge made findings of fact, rejecting the Appellant’s assertions as untruthful and concluding that he knowingly relocated to the UK, two weeks before his conviction and sentence, to evade the outcome of the proceedings against him. Those findings could not legitimately be impugned. While fugitivity is not a “trump card,” it is nevertheless a weighty issue in the scales.

[29]While the period since the offence is lengthy, it was submitted that the Judge’s assessment that there was no culpable delay by the JA was reasonably open to him. The delays that occurred were attributed to the Requested Person’s lawyer (and included strikes, other impediments and defence requests).

[30]The seriousness of the offending was established by the lengthy sentence imposed of 5 years 4 months. The Appellant was wrong in law to rely on UK sentencing guidelines for a conviction warrant; the court should rarely substitute its view of the appropriate sentence (see Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski

[2016] 1 WLR 551

). The appropriate comparison is between the Appellant’s conduct (multiple, repeat offences involving planning, aimed at “forcing the persons to pay undue money”) and other criminal behaviour. The characterisation of that offending as “extortion” in Italy is correct and does not contradict the fraud finding for dual criminality purposes.

[31]The Judge properly evaluated the impact on the family, observing he would have “unhesitatingly ordered extradition” but for the severe impact on the children and Mrs Parvez. This level of careful scrutiny means the outcome is not wrong. The Respondent highlighted that Mrs Parvez had coped previously when the Appellant was in prison for six months and the children were much younger (aged three years and six months). The family also benefits from a supportive community where they now live.

[32]The reliance on Dr Rothermel’s conclusion that Mrs Parvez could not manage or that children might enter foster care was also challenged. The Local Authority’s (“LA”) Section 7 of the Children Act 1989 report confirmed that there were no safeguarding concerns and offered support via the Children and Family Wellbeing Service if required. The LA had not concluded that the mother could not manage but merely reported her statement that she thought she would struggle. The evidence indicates that while there will be serious difficulties, it is not likely the children will be taken into care. The children are also full-time at school now, providing respite which was unavailable when they were younger. The Judge explicitly considered the youngest child’s vulnerability and the impact of limited conduct with his father. The case of H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa

[2013] 1 AC 338

, is not authority for the proposition that a cogent care plan must be in place.

[33]The evidence adduced about the Appellant’s health at the hearing was limited, with his diabetes reportedly being managed. The Judge had full regard to the diabetes and knee pain. Anxiety and depression are common when facing extradition to serve a prison sentence.

[34]The argument based on pre-settled status and Brexit was not raised below and, it was agreed is unsound, as the Immigration Rules contain exceptions (for example those relating to a genuine parental relationship with a child who has lived continuously in the UK for at least 7 years).

[35]As far as the fresh evidence, including the EHCP, is concerned whilst it might update matters it largely confirms existing facts and was not decisive or transformative, individually or cumulatively, as required for its admission to mandate discharge.

The Law - Appeals

[36]The test to be applied by the court on appeal is set out in Section 27(2) of the Act. “(2) The court may allow the appeal only if the conditions in subsection (3) or the conditions in subsection (4) are satisfied. (3) The conditions are that—(a) the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;

(b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge. (4) The conditions are that— (a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing; (b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the appropriate judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;

(c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge” (a) the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge. (a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing; (b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the appropriate judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge”

[37]In short, the High Court may only allow an appeal if the first instance judge, ‘ought to have decided a question before him…differently’ and this would have required him to discharge the extradition order. The essence of the test can also be expressed as requiring the court to be satisfied that the decision of the District Judge is wrong if an appeal is to be allowed (see USA v Giese (No 1)

[2015] EWHC 2733 (Admin)

[15]).

[38]In Celinski, in relation to Article 8 appeals the Divisional Court observed that:

“24. The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong... that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge’s reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong.”

[39]The High Court should not interfere simply because it takes a different view overall of the value-judgment. Discussion Fugitivity

Discussion

[40]There was, it was argued, no evidence to indicate that the Appellant had deliberately and knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the legal process, as per De Zorzi v France

[2019] EWHC 2062 (Admin)

; he had left for legitimate reasons with no restriction on doing so. There is no general principle that to be a fugitive a requested person must have left the requesting state territory in breach of an extant restriction on his doing so, or in breach of an extant condition requiring that he notify an address. In this case the Judge’s findings as to why the Appellant left Italy were clear and include conclusions as to his veracity. They include the following:

“107. Having considered the requested person’s evidence with care, I am sure that the account that he provided to me about his awareness of the proceedings for the offence of extortion was not truthful. Part of his account in that respect was based on the proposition that he had lost contact with Avv Luca Ritzu a considering time before the conclusion of the proceedings. His evidence in that request was vague and inconsistent and he contradicted himself a number of times, saying variously that the last contact with Avv Luca Ritzu had been in 2013, 2016, 2018. Indeed at one point he said that he had been in contact with Avv Luca Ritzu in 2020 about coming to the UK to work. I am sure that the requested person was untruthful about losing contact with Avv Luca Ritzu because he knew that more recent contact would establish his awareness of the proceedings against him. […] 110. A further and important concrete fact in this case is that the requested person formally and permanently relocated from Italy to the UK on 4 November 2021. In my judgment, that is a critical date when viewed in the context of the surrounding circumstances and it gives rise to a very strong inference that the requested person was aware of the ongoing proceedings against him and of the date of the evidentiary hearing on 18 November 2021. The surrounding context is that the proceedings had been stayed for four separate times for various periods between December 2018 and 3 October 2021. Importantly, the formal relocation was only a month after the final stay had ended, and 14 days before the trial hearing on 18 November 2021 (at the which the requested person was convicted and sentenced). In my judgment, that timing is so striking that the only inference to be drawn from the formal relocation (irrespective of whether or not the requested person had been travelling between Italy and the UK in 2020 and at other times in 2021) was because the requested person knew that there would be no further stay of the proceedings and that the evidentiary trial hearing would be on 18 November 2021. I am sure that the formal relocation to the UK on that date was because the requested person was seeking to evade the proceedings and the consequences of them.”

[41]There were also findings that the Appellant’s account lacked credibility in relation to crucial details about the proceedings in Italy. Against this background the argument that the Judge made any error in reaching a conclusion that the Appellant was a fugitive was a forlorn one. There can be no question of the Appellant having developed a false sense of security. He left urgently, as the Judge found, in order to avoid the proceedings finally coming to a head. His family followed some time afterwards. Ms Nice did not press this point as strongly as her other arguments.

[42]The Judge was equally entitled to find on the evidence that delay in the Italian proceedings was not the responsibility of the JA. This was based upon the further information given by the JA on the 11 December 2023. The extent to which the appellant can therefore rely on delay as a factor is significantly curtailed, as the Judge concluded.

Sentence and seriousness

[43]The Appellant criticised the Judge for finding that the Appellant had taken a leading role in the offending and also for inflating the value of the fraud. Neither criticism seemed to me to be of any great weight. The Judge gave reasons for the view he reached as to the Appellant’s participation, referring to the narrative in the warrant which described the Appellant as “instigating” his co-accused to take steps in the fraud. That was a rational basis for attributing a greater role. As to the amounts, the mechanism of the fraud appears to have involved the threat of proceedings to recover a larger amount together with legal fees, followed by the acceptance of a smaller sum. It does not seem to me to be wrong in principle for the Judge to have aggregated the entirety of the amounts which were initially demanded to describe, as he put it, the “total values of the false representations”. Equally since the funds were obtained by threats to seek to recover more, “extortion” was not an inapposite term. As the Judge observed [131]:

“It is clear that each of the three phases involved two components. The first was the issuing of the false invoice. The second was the sending of the registered letter, which demanded payment of the false invoice and substantial legal costs, and which threatened to bring legal proceedings if the invoice and costs were not paid.”

[44]The Judge was entitled in the circumstances to describe the frauds as serious and unlikely, in the domestic setting where they would have involved a conspiracy, to have led to non-custodial disposals.

[45]As Celinski makes clear [13]: “Each Member State is entitled to set its own sentencing regime and levels of sentence. Provided it is in accordance with the Convention, it is not for a UK judge to second guess that policy. The prevalence and significance of certain types of offending are matters for the requesting state and judiciary to decide; currency conversions may tell little of the real monetary value of items stolen or of sums defrauded”.

[46]In HH the Supreme Court considered the question of the seriousness of the offending in the context of interests of children [132]:

“The extradition process involves the proper fulfilment of our international obligations rather than domestic sentencing principles. So far as the interests of dependent children are concerned, perhaps the crucial difference between extradition and imprisonment in our own sentencing structures is that extradition involves the removal of a parent or parents out of the jurisdiction and the service of any sentence abroad, whereas, to the extent that with prison overcrowding the prison authorities can manage it, the family links of the defendants are firmly in mind when decisions are made about the establishment where the sentence should be served. Nevertheless, for the reasons explained in Norris the fulfilment of our international obligations remains an imperative. ZH (Tanzania) did not diminish that imperative. When resistance to extradition is advanced, as in effect it is in each of these appeals, on the basis of the article 8 entitlements of dependent children and the interests of society in their welfare, it should only be in very rare cases that extradition may properly be avoided if, given the same broadly similar facts, and after making proportionate allowance as we do for the interests of dependent children, the sentencing courts here would nevertheless be likely to impose an immediate custodial sentence: any other approach would be inconsistent with the principles of international comity. At the same time, we must exercise caution not to impose our views about the seriousness of the offence or offences under consideration or the level of sentences or the arrangements for prisoner release which we are informed are likely to operate in the country seeking extradition. It certainly does not follow that extradition should be refused just because the sentencing court in this country would not order an immediate custodial sentence: however it would become relevant to the decision if the interests of a child or children might tip the sentencing scale here so as to reduce what would otherwise be an immediate custodial sentence in favour of a non-custodial sentence (including a suspended sentence).”

[47]Thus, it will rarely be appropriate for the court in the UK to consider whether the sentence was very significantly different from what a UK court would have imposed, or to substitute its own view of what the appropriate sentence should have been. It may of course be a factor which tips the scales where interests of children are considered but that appears to be the approach that the Judge took in reminding himself that the rights of the children were a primary consideration.

The Family and Article 8

[48]The Judge carried out a detailed balancing exercise in relation to Article 8. He said, in terms, that but for the impact of extradition on the children he would have unhesitatingly ordered extradition. Not surprisingly, his judgment is focused heavily on the position of the three children. The Appellant’s own health issues are set out by the Judge between paragraphs 45 and 50 of the judgment. His complaints were of mainly of knee pain and diabetes, the latter of which was being managed. Notwithstanding these conditions he described himself as providing full time care to the children along with his wife. Given the Appellant’s own evidence as to the significance of his medical conditions and the focus of the judgment it does not surprise me that the Appellant’s health did not feature in the balancing exercise. There appears to have been no submission that, in itself, precluded his extradition.

[49]The argument now is, essentially, that the conditions from which he was noted to be suffering at the time of the hearing and judgment have got worse “over the last few months”. Whilst it was said that the court now had to consider how he would cope in prison, his conditions are not unusual either in the general population or for a man of his age. It is extremely unlikely that the Requesting State cannot meet his needs by providing medical care or making other arrangements to assist him (see Magiera v District Court of Krakow, Poland

[2017] EWHC 2757 (Admin)

. The court is entitled to rely upon an assumption to this effect [34]; “The starting point must be that in the case of an EU member state there is a rebuttable presumption that there will be medical facilities available of a type to be expected in a prison: Kowalski v. Regional Court in Bielsko-Biala, Poland

[2017] EWHC 1044

, para 20. From that starting point it might not be necessary to say very much more...”

[50]The Appellant’s General Practitioner’s letter of 3 September 2025 does not in fact suggest that his health has fallen off a cliff edge:

“I can confirm that this gentleman is registered at this practice with a background of diabetes, low back pain and shoulder pains. He also has osteoarthritis of his knees. He’s currently on insulin and tablets for his diabetes which is poorly controlled and looking at his records it appears to be poorly controlled over the last 4 to 5 years. He has not shown any great improvement to his diabetes which is important in order to reduce risk of any future heart attacks and strokes. He does take medication for pain relief due to his arthritis in his knees. His arthritis is unlikely to improve with time and will probably remain the same all the pain may get worse. I believe he walks with a stick. I don’t expect him to walk without a stick over the next few years. I don’t expect his condition to deteriorate despite being at a high level. Arthritis can deteriorate over a number of years and is more of a gradual decline rather than a sudden decline. His hearing is not great which is why he has hearing aids and it would be better for him to use hearing aids all the time. In summary I do not expect his condition to improve over the next six months or the next couple of years.”

[51]I was taken through the wider medical material (and fresh evidence) in detail to make good the submission that the Judge’s analysis was lacking in rigour and did not fully analyse or grapple with the impact of extradition on the children, in particular given their disparate medical and educational needs. I was also directed to a number of authorities in which similar arguments had succeeded albeit that it was acknowledged that cases of this sort are highly fact sensitive.

[52]I have looked at the judgment and documentary material carefully, but I cannot agree that the Judge has underplayed or minimised the effect of extradition on the family. In particular he considered and analysed the evidence from Dr Rothermel, accepting many of her conclusions but giving reasons for his rejection of her opinion that extradition would cause the breakup of the family. He drew attention, as he was entitled to in weighing her evidence, to the fact that she had given no consideration at all to how Mrs Parvez had cared for the children for a significant time on her own in Italy. All of the evidence was fully considered. This was an evaluative exercise by a Judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was best placed to make an assessment of their evidence.

[53]As far as the middle child is concerned, I note that a letter following his consultation for nephrotic syndrome in January 2023 records:

“He was born in Italy at term weighing 2.98 kilos by a planned caesarean section due to history of similar sections in the past. There were no issues after birth, and he required no special care. His father Parvez’s Aktar is age 66 and is a cook by profession. He reported lack of any health issues. His mother is age 45, housewife who reportedly is in good general health. There is no family history of renal disorders. There is no consanguinity either. His older brother aged 13 is very well but a younger sibling age seven years has learning disabilities.”

[54]It appears from Dr Rothermel’s report that his school had not been informed that he has nephrotic syndrome and that he would be “alright” by the time he was 14. By the summer of 2023 he had been described as “off treatments” and in remission. His weight appeared to be the matter of most concern, and the consultant had taken the opportunity of clarifying “relative responsibilities in managing this problem”.

[55]The eldest child has no identified special educational needs or health issues with a General Practitioner record consisting of two pages (according to Dr Rothermel).

[56]The youngest child is taken to school in a taxi and although he requires a lot of support and has high needs, he is entitled to funding from Lancashire County Council to meet them. Whilst the impact of separation from his father on him is not specifically referred to in the Article 8 balance, it is nevertheless considered in the course of the judgment.

[57]I note Mrs Parvez told Dr Rothermel that she took all three children swimming although she did not go into the water with them. The thrust of her evidence appears to be that she plays a full part in their care and must have done so on her own for long periods in Italy.

[58]In HH Lady Hale observed: [83] “The cases likely to require further investigation are those where the extradition of both parents, or of the sole or primary carer, is sought. Then the court will have to have information about the likely effect upon the individual child or children involved if the extradition is to proceed; about the arrangements which will be made for their care while the parent is away; about the availability of measures to limit the effects of separation in the requesting state, such as mother and baby units, house arrest as an alternative to prison, prison visits, telephone calls and face-time over the telephone or internet; and about the availability of alternative measures, such as prosecution here or early repatriation.”

[59]The court had obtained a Section 7 report (after the date of the report from Dr Rothermel) which identified the risks to the children as a result of extradition. The proposed care arrangements for the children in those circumstances, from the LA’s point of view, did not involve their removal but the offer of support from the family and children wellbeing service. The expert evidence confirmed that Mrs Parvez had said that the UK was better than the family’s position in Italy because “here we have community” and her middle son got the support he needed. Whilst in her oral submissions Ms Nice made reference to A & B v Hungary

[2013] EWHC 3132 (Admin)

, that was a case where the extradition of both parents was sought. The need for “a cogent plan” for care was therefore an obvious one in that case. As Mr Ball observed on behalf of the Respondent, in cases where one parent will remain the court does not need to go into matters of detail as to how, for example, a school run will be organised. These were not the sort of circumstances which Lady Hale had in mind in HH.

[60]In the present case the court had ample evidence on which to assess what the general position would be if extradition of the Appellant was ordered. The family income has been entirely from state benefits for some time so that there is no real risk of significant financial hardship. Their housing needs are supported. This is not a case where the children face an “unmitigated and unameliorated plight” if extradition proceeds. There was also expert evidence as to the mother’s health which confirmed that her complaints were not of physical incapacity. She had looked after the children on her own and worked in Italy after the Appellant had left in 2020 as well as when he was in prison. The family did not move to the UK until 2020. It follows that when the Appellant chose to flee Italy to avoid a prison sentence the children were separated from their father, yet the family coped and there was evidence on which the Judge could properly conclude that they would cope now.

The Judge concluded [172-173]:

[61]“I have reflected carefully on whether the inevitably severe consequences on them would recalibrate the Article 8 balance so that a different conclusion would be arrived at. However, it is important in my judgment that this is not a sole carer case, and I have rejected the pessimistic assessment of Dr Rothermel that extraction would cause a break up of the family resulting in the children being taken into care. It is clear from the section 7 report that support from the local authority would be available and, for reasons I have set out, there is no basis for concluding that the family home would be lost and that there would be a significant reduction in the family’s income. Furthermore, the requested person’s wife was able to look after the children as a sole carer from 2020 to 2022 although I acknowledge that is now more difficult for her to do so now that the children are older (albeit that [the eldest child] can now support her), she is suffering from depression, and she does not speak English. Ultimately, I am driven to the conclusion that the circumstances of the family are not such as would fundamentally recalibrate the Article 8 balance. In my judgment, this is a case where the public interest factors in favour of extradition that I have identified above weigh most heavily in the balance and the balance lies decisively in favour of extradition. There will be a severe impact of extradition on [the children and] Mrs Parvez; but I am not satisfied that the interference with their rights would be disproportionate in this case.” [Amended for anonymity purposes]

Conclusion

[62]Given that there will undoubtedly be a serious impact on the family as a result of extradition I have given much thought to all of the submissions forcefully made at the appeal by Ms Nice, as well as the material she relied on.

[63]I conclude that the District Judge was not wrong in his overall evaluation. He gave anxious scrutiny to the competing factors, specifically acknowledging the “severe impact” of extradition on the Appellant’s vulnerable family.

[64]The admission of the fresh evidence is not automatic but is a matter for the discretion of the Court. The material must comply with 50.20(6)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the principles in Zabolotnyi v Hungary

[2021] UKSC 14

and Hungary v Fenyvesi

[2009] EWHC 231

. Quite a lot of the material in question provided for the hearing before me predates the extradition hearing.

[65]The court must be satisfied that the evidence would have resulted in the Judge deciding the relevant question differently, so that he would have ordered the Appellant’s discharge. In other words, the fresh evidence must be decisive. I have not reached that conclusion. I therefore refuse the applications to admit fresh evidence notwithstanding that I have fully considered the potential impact of that evidence on the issues before the Judge.

[66]While the consequences for the family, particularly the youngest child, are serious, the evidence demonstrates that Mrs Parvez previously managed when the children were younger and currently benefits from community support and respite through the children’s full-time school attendance. The Section 7 report did not conclude that she would be unable to cope, merely noting her expressed concerns, and confirmed that LA support is available as it has been hitherto.

[67]Against the significant difficulties faced by the family, the public interest in extradition remains weighty, given the Appellant is a fugitive from a lawfully imposed and lengthy sentence for non-trivial offences.

[68]Applying the test set out in Celinski and Love v USA

[2018] 1 WLR 2889

, I am satisfied that the Judge’s decision was proportionate. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate an identifiable flaw in reasoning, or that crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to render the ultimate decision wrong.

[69]For these reasons, the appeal against the order for extradition is refused. END