David Porcal v District Court in Most (Czech Republic) [2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 2932 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-002673
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
IN THE MATTER of an appeal pursuant to s.26 of the Extradition Act 2003
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 10/11/2025
Before
THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE
Between
DAVID PORCALAppellantDISTRICT COURT IN MOST (CZECH REPUBLIC)Respondent
Dr Muin Boase (instructed by Hollingsworth Edwards Solicitors) for AppellantAdam Squibbs (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 5 November 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 10 November 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE
[1]This is an appeal against the decision of District Judge Zani (‘the Judge’) dated 2 August 2024 (“the Decision”) to order the extradition of David Porcal (‘the Appellant’) to the Czech Republic. Permission to appeal was granted by Mrs Justice Foster on 12 March 2025. The Respondent is the District Court in Most, Czech Republic.[2]There is one ground of appeal. Extradition is said to be incompatible with the Appellant’s rights under Article 8 ECHR and so under section 21 Extradition Act 2003 (‘the 2003 Act’).

The factual background

[3]The Respondent seeks the extradition of the Appellant pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the Respondent on 22 January 2024. The warrant was certified by the National Crime Agency on 2 March 2024.[4]The warrant is a conviction warrant. The Appellant was convicted of stealing cash and goods to a total sum of 18,930CZK (approximately £602.81) on 14 November 2016. The two offences at Box E of the warrant are theft and unauthorised arrangement, forgery and alteration of a means of payment. The Appellant was sentenced on 23 March 2017 to 16 months’ imprisonment in a high security prison, which was originally a conditionally suspended sentence. Due to the Appellant’s failure to comply with the conditions on which the sentence was suspended, the sentence was activated at a hearing on 14 September 2017. The whole of the term of 16 months’ imprisonment is yet to be served.[5]The Appellant was born on 24 June 1988 in the Czech Republic. He lived in a children’s home in the city of Most until he was 20 years old. After he left the children’s home, his uncle and his sister (to whom he is close) provided him with support, including somewhere to live, although for a time he lived on the streets.[6]Prior to the conviction which is the subject of the arrest warrant, the Appellant had three previous convictions for theft. In his statement, he said those offences were committed when he was in his 20s, after he had left the children’s home. Custodial sentences were imposed and he served approximately 3 years in custody, in total.[7]The Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offences committed on 14 November 2016. He was tried and, having been found guilty, sentenced on the same day. The Appellant attended the trial and sentencing hearing.[8]Following the imposition of the suspended sentence, in 2017, the Appellant came to the UK. He failed to comply with the probation requirements.[9]The Appellant met his partner, Simona Vlckova, in 2015. Their son, David, was born in the Czech Republic. He was 7 years old at the time of the extradition hearing. Shortly after the Appellant moved to the UK, Ms Vlckova and their son joined him.[10]Ms Vlckova has two daughters, Alexandra and Michaela, who were 12 and 16 years old, respectively, at the time of the extradition hearing. The Appellant’s stepdaughters had been living in the UK with their grandmother before the Appellant or their mother came to the UK. From 2017 until 2021, the Appellant, Ms Vlckova and their son lived with her mother and her daughters. From 2021 the Appellant, Ms Vlckova and their son moved to a separate home where they lived together. The Appellant’s stepdaughters continued to live with their grandmother.[11]At the extradition hearing, the Appellant said that his stepdaughters regard him as their father, as they have never met their biological father. He said that while Ms Vlckova works part-time, he supports the family financially. Until he lost his job following his arrest and release on bail, he had been working for two years in a factory. Ms Vlckova said that if the Appellant were extradited it would be particularly hard for her son, with whom he has a “very strong bond”, and “who is very dependent on him”. Ms Vlckova said that without the Appellant’s financial contribution, she and her son would have to move in with her mother. She said that would be an immense burden on her mother as she already had her own mother, as well as her two granddaughters, living with her.

The Judgment

[12]The extradition hearing took place on 12 July 2024. The Appellant gave written and oral evidence. Ms Vlckova’s witness statement was unchallenged. In his judgment dated 2 August 2024 (‘the Judgment’), the Judge set out in detail the evidence regarding the Appellant’s family, and in particular regarding his son and two stepdaughters, at paragraphs 14, 17 and 20-22.

The Judge was entirely satisfied that the Appellant is a fugitive from justice:

[13]paragraphs 36-37. On the evidence, that was an inevitable and unimpeachable finding, and it is not challenged.[14]The Judge addressed the law in respect of the article 8 challenge at paragraphs 39-50, directing himself by reference to Norris v Government of the USA (No.2) [2010] UKSC 9, [2010] 2 AC 487 (‘Norris’), H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338 (‘HH v Italy’) and Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 551 (‘Celinksi’). The Judge noted that he was required to consider the specific facts of the case and “carefully weigh the requested person’s Article 8 rights (and those of his partner and any dependent children) against the important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligation” (para 49).[15]At paragraph 51,

the Judge set out the factors in favour of granting extradition as follows:

“(i) There is a strong and continuing important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations. (ii) The seriousness of the criminal conduct in respect of which he has been convicted and sentenced. There remains a sentence of circa 16 months outstanding. (iii) The assertion by the Judicial Authority and the finding by this court that the requested person is a fugitive from Justice.”
[16]At paragraph 52,

the Judge set out the factors in favour of refusing extradition as follows:

“(i) The RP says that he arrived in the UK in 2007 [sic] and that he wishes to remain. (ii) He adds that, until recently, he had been in employment. He lives in fixed accommodation where he resides with his partner and their son. He says that he has made considerable efforts to turn his life around and has completely cut his ties to the Czech republic. He fears returning to his old ways if extradited. (iii) The RP states that he has led a law-abiding life since settling in the UK. (iv) He asserts that he is not a classic refugee from justice.”

The Judge then made his assessment of the relevant factors at paragraph 53:

“I find that it will not be a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 Rights of the requested person for extradition to be ordered. My reasons and findings are as follows: (i) It is very important for the UK to be seen to be upholding its international extradition obligations. The UK is not to be considered a ‘safe haven’ for those sought by other Convention countries either to stand trial or to serve a prison sentence. (ii) In my opinion, the criminal conduct set out in the AW is serious and, in the event of a conviction in the UK for like criminal conduct, a prison sentence may be imposed, particularly in view of the RP’s previous convictions for acts of dishonesty. (iii) This court finds that the requested person is a fugitive from justice. The reasons for this finding are set out above. (iv) It is appreciated that there will be hardship caused to the RP and to his partner, and the children of the family. However, that of itself is not sufficient to prevent an order for extradition from being made. (vi) [sic] I am satisfied that the RP’s partner and their child will, if necessary, be able to move to live with her mother (who lives nearby and who presently cares for the two other children of RP’s partner). It may be that RP’s partner will have to apply to access State benefits to assist her financially. (vii) The court also notes that the RP says that the £3,000 security lodged for bail purposes, are his funds and there would appear to be no reason why that could not be returned to him (in the event that he surrenders for surrender as required). Those funds could then be made available to the RP’s partner to assist her financially. (viii) The RP’s credibility was tested during his oral testimony. He had no answer when it was pointed out to him that in his proof of evidence he had firmly denied committing the crime in question, whereas in evidence he had openly admitted having been the author of the offence (but that he regarded it as a ‘minor’ crime which would not bother the Czech authorities). (ix) He agrees that he is not a man of previous good character and … he acknowledges that he had previously committed a number of thefts which had resulted in him serving circa 3 years imprisonment. He adds that those crimes were committed when he was much younger and was living in a Children’s home Compare paragraph 6 above. and this court appreciates that he may well have had a difficult upbringing and that he has made efforts to change his life in recent times. (x) As this court has found as a fact that the RP is a fugitive from justice, this finding brings paragraph 39 of the decision in Celinski above into consideration. I do not find that there are such strong counter-balancing factors as would render extradition Article 8 disproportionate in this case. (xi) I take into account that there may be some Brexit uncertainty for this requested person, were extradition to be ordered. In relation thereto I bear in mind the High Court rulings in Antochi v Germany [2021] EWHC [3092] (Admin) and Pink v Poland [2021] EWHC [1238] (Admin). (x) I also take into account, in an Article 8 context, the time that has passed to date since the RP was convicted of having committed the criminal conduct complained of, but I do not find that this period of time tips the balance in the RP’s favour. (xii) [sic] I also taken into account, as part of the Article 8 balancing exercise, the fact that the RP has been required to abide by a 4 hour curfew as part of his bail conditions – and that this has been recognised by the UK courts as a restriction on his liberty. However, whether on its own or allied to the other points referred to heretofore, this does not render extradition Article 8 disproportionate.”
My reasons and findings are as follows:

The parties’ submissions

[18]The Appellant submits that the Judge failed to apply the “best interests of the child test”. He contends that this required the Judge to give the greatest weight to the best interests of the child, as a primary consideration in the balancing exercise. Instead, the greatest weight was given to the public interest in abiding by international extradition obligations.[19]The Appellant points out that there is no reference to the “best interests of the child” in the Judgment. It would offend the principle of legality to infer from silence that he gave the greatest weight to the best interests of the children. At paragraph 49 the Judge noted that the court was required to “carefully weigh the requested person’s Article 8 rights (and those of his partner and any dependent children) against the important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligation”. But when considering as a factor in favour of refusing extradition that the father resides with his partner and son, the Appellant contends that the focus was on the father’s article 8 rights rather than the rights of the children.[20]The Appellant contends that the Judge wrongly applied a generalised test of “hardship” caused to the Appellant, his partner and the children, rather than considering each child’s best interests. Reference was made to the financial impact, but not to the emotional impact on each child of losing their father or stepfather. As a consequence of the failure to consider the close ties between the Appellant and each child, and the centrality of those ties to the wellbeing of each child, the Appellant submits the relevant factors have been incorrectly weighed.[21]The Appellant contends that the Judge was required to consider the best interests of each child first and treat that as the starting point. He erred in treating the important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations as the starting point.[22]He submits that in repeatedly describing the public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations as “important” or “very important” the Judge treated this consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of the child, without due consideration of those interests, and thereby erred in law. The Appellant contends that it cannot be inferred from the Judge’s recitation of the evidence that the law has been correctly applied to those facts.[23]The Appellant contends that if the best interests of the child test had been properly applied, the consequences for his son, and the effect on his stepdaughters, would have led to a different decision. The Appellant submits that given his son’s young age, and the fact that they live together, his extradition will have an exceptionally severe impact on his son. In view of the Appellant’s transformation since coming to the UK, the value of the money and goods stolen, the fact that he was initially given a suspended sentence, and the time he has spent subject to a curfew, this was a borderline case. If the best interests of the children had been properly assessed and weighed, they would have tipped the balance.[24]The Respondent submits, first, that the Judge made no error: he properly considered the best interests of the children and, second, that in any event this is not a borderline case: the balance falls decisively in favour of extradition.[25]In relation to the first submission, the Respondent notes that the Judge expressly cited HH v Italy, observing, with respect to article 8 challenges, that in that case the Supreme Court “gave important guidance in relation to the rights of dependent children”. The Respondent contends that it is inconceivable the Judge did not have in mind the key point to be derived from HH v Italy that “in considering article 8 in any case in which the rights of a child are involved, the best interest of the child must be a primary consideration” ([15]). The impact on the children of the Appellant’s extradition, together with the impact on himself and his partner, was the first factor against extradition that the Judge considered in his analysis (at [53(iv)]). It is plain that, against the background of the evidence relating to the children that he had set out, he was treating their interests as a primary consideration. The way in which he expressed his findings on impact was consistent with Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23, [81]. The relevant legal background Article 8 and the best interests of the child

The relevant legal background

[26]Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 required the Judge to decide whether the Applicant’s extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. The only Convention right relied on was article 8. The role of article 8 in extradition cases was addressed in detail in Norris, HH v Italy and Celinski, and most recently by the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz at [31]-[43] and [81].[27]In a conviction case, such as the present, the purpose of extradition arrangements is to restore the Appellant into the control of the requesting State, whose laws the Appellant has been found to have broken, in order to serve a sentence lawfully imposed in that State (Andrysiewicz, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Stephens JJSC, [31]). The requirement that any interference with the right to respect for private and family life under article 8 should be in accordance with law is met where extradition is pursuant to the 2003 Act. The critical issue is whether the interference is “necessary in a democratic society … for the prevention of disorder or crime” (article 8(2)). Resolving this issue involves a test of proportionality: “the interference must fulfil a pressing social need and it must also be proportionate to the legitimate aim relied upon to justify the interference”: Andrysiewicz, [33], Norris, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers PSC, [9]. In the extradition context, the courts have equated the pressing social need and the legitimate aim: HH v Italy, Lord Wilson JSC, [152].[28]Detention while serving a sentence following conviction, whether following extradition or a domestic court process, “will necessarily interfere drastically with family and private life” (Andrysiewicz, [33(2)]). There is no “absolute rule” that any interference with article 8 rights as a consequence of extradition will be proportionate (Andrysiewicz, [33(1)]. The court has to “examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with family life” (HH v Italy, Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC, [8(1)].[29]There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that those convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the United Kingdom should honour its treaty obligations; and that the UK should not be a safe haven for fugitives from justice, to which those accused or convicted of crimes abroad can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back (HH v Italy, [8]; Andrysiewicz, [37]). The public interest in extradition “weighs very heavily indeed” (Andrysiewicz, [33(1)]). It always carries “great” and “special weight”, but the weight to be attached to in the particular case varies according to the nature and seriousness of the crime, and may be diminished by delay (Andrysiewicz, [33(1)], [37], HH v Italy, [8(4)-(6)]).[30]For the public interest in favour of extradition to be outweighed “the interference with human rights will have to be extremely serious” (Andrysiewicz, [33(3)]). As Lord Phillips observed in Norris at [56]and the Supreme Court reiterated in Andrysiewicz: “The reality is that only if some quite exceptionally compelling feature, or combination of features, is present that interference with family life consequent upon extradition will be other than proportionate to the objective that extradition serves”.[31]In Andrysiewicz, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Stephens noted at [43]:
“Cases in which a submission founded on article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an article ECHR ‘defence’ will have any prospect of success.”
The likelihood that, save in rare cases, extradition will be a proportionate interference with article 8 rights is a prediction, not the criterion by which the issue should be resolved. There is no test of exceptionality: (HH v Italy, [8], [32], [124], [161]; Andrysiewicz, [37]). The question is whether the interference with the private and family lives of the requested person and other members of his family, which would occur if he is extradited, is outweighed by the public interest in extradition.[32]In Andrysiewicz, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Stephens observed at [33(5)]:
“Deciding whether extradition will be compatible with Convention rights is a fact-specific exercise. ‘[A]t this point … it is legitimate for the judge to consider whether there are any relevant features that are unusually or exceptionally compelling. In the absence of such features, the consideration is likely to be relatively brief. If, however, the nature or extent of the interference with article 8 rights is exceptionally serious, careful consideration must be given to whether such interference is justified’ ([Norris,] para 62).” (Emphasis added.)
The effect of extradition on innocent members of the requested person’s family may well be a particularly cogent consideration (Andrysiewicz, [33(7)]).[33]In ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 AC 166 (an immigration case concerning removal) and HH v Italy, the Supreme Court considered the approach to be adopted when assessing the proportionality of an interference with the article 8 right to family life of a child. In Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74, [2013] 1 WLR 3690 (another removal case), Lord Hodge JSC speaking for the Supreme Court summarised the principles to be derived from these cases at [10]:
“(1) The best interests of a child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under article 8 of the Convention; (2) in making that assessment, the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration; and the child’s best interests do not of themselves have the status of the paramount consideration; (3) although the best interests of a child can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant; (4) while different judges might approach the question of the best interests of a child in different ways, it is important to ask oneself the right questions in an orderly manner in order to avoid the risk that the best interests of a child might be undervalued when other important considerations were in play; (5) it is important to have a clear idea of a child’s circumstances and of what is in a child’s best interests before one asks whether those interest are outweighed by the force of other considerations; (6) to that end there is no substitute for a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved in an article 8 assessment; and (7) a child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent.”
[34]The Appellant sought to rely on Baroness Hale’s assertion in ZH (Tanzania) that the best interests of the child “must be considered first” ([33]), and its endorsement by Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC in HH v Italy ([144]). However, it is clear that the majority of the seven Justices in HH v Italy took the view that the order in which a judge chooses to express him or herself is a matter for the judge, so long as the issue has, in substance, been addressed: [98] and [100] (Lord Mance JSC), [125]-[126] (Lord Judge CJ), [153] (Lord Wilson)). In HH v Italy,Baroness Hale acknowledged this disagreement about “the order in which the judge should approach the task” and said, “I agree entirely that different judges may approach it in different ways. However, it is important always to ask oneself the right questions and in an orderly manner” ([33]). That is reflected in the guidance given in Zoumbas ([10(4)]). There is no requirement that the child’s interests must be considered earlier in the analysis than any other matter.[35]The Appellant contends that, while the child’s best interests are not “the paramount consideration”, adopting the words of Lord Kerr in HH v Italy, the “primacy” of the child’s best interests means that “no factor must be given greater weight than the interests of the child” ([145]). However, Lord Kerr took a stronger position than the other Justices and his analysis is not the law (cf HH v Italy, [11] (Baroness Hale), [98] (Lord Mance), [130] (Lord Judge), [155] (Lord Wilson)). The requirement that “no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant” has the effect that court cannot treat the public interest in extradition as automatically outweighing the child’s interests. A careful, fact-specific analysis is required. But it does not follow that, on examination of the individual case, no other factor can earn greater weight than that accorded to the child’s best interests. As the Supreme Court forcefully emphasised in Andrysiewicz, the strength of the public interest in extradition is such that it will rarely be outweighed by the article 8 rights of the requested person or members of his family.

Electronically monitored curfew

[36]In Leszczynski v Regional Court in Warsaw, Poland [2025] EWHC 1024 (Admin), having considered a substantial number of cases where the issue of time spent on an electronically monitored curfew had been considered (including two authorities on which the Appellant relies: Prusianu v Romania [2022] EWHC 1929, [2023] 1 WLR 495 and Toma v Moreni Court (Romania) [2024] EWHC 183 (Admin)), Morris J held at [47]:
“From these authorities, I derive the following principles: (1) For the purposes of domestic law on sentencing, ‘qualifying curfew’ is an electronically monitored curfew of at least 9 hours duration a day. However, it is clear that, in an extradition case, both qualifying curfew and non-qualifying curfew (i.e. less than 9 hours duration per day) in the UK is capable of being a factor properly to be taken into account in the Article 8 balancing exercise: Hojden [[2022] EWHC 2725 (Admin)] §49. (2) What falls to be assessed is the degree of the deprivation of liberty or restriction on freedom of movement and autonomy: Prusianu §49. This might arise both from an electronically monitored curfew and from an obligation to report to a police station (Einikis [2014] EWHC 2325 (Admin)]) (or perhaps other bail conditions) or a combination of these elements. The court will consider whether the curfew has had a material effect on a person's ability to work, study or maintain family life, in which case the curfew will be afforded greater weight (than, for example, merely preventing late-evening socialising): Hojden §50. (3) Each case turns on its own facts. The assessment of a curfew as a relevant factor and the overall balance is an intensely fact-specific exercise: Polom [2024] EWHC 2708 (Admin)] §44. Little is to be gained by comparing the facts of previous cases. The cases vary as regards the seriousness of the underlying offence, the length of sentence to be served, the number of hours of the daily curfew and the amount of time that the requested person has been subject to that curfew. (4) In the cited cases where curfew was considered, in some cases, extradition was ordered; in others it was taken into account as a factor which led to extradition being discharged. As a matter of fact, the shortest curfew duration which has been taken into account in the cases referred to above, was a curfew of 4 hours in the case of Prusianu. (5) Amongst the factors relevant to the court considering the issue is whether or not it has before it evidence as to how the requesting state will deal with the time spent under UK curfew: see, for example, Polom §44. (6) As a matter of general principle, where the public interest in extradition is otherwise very strong, time spent on curfew is unlikely to tip the balance against extradition. On the other hand, in a case which is otherwise marginal, time spent on curfew might tip the balance against extradition.”

The approach on appeal

[37]An appeal against the decision of a district judge may be brought on a question of law or fact: s.26(3) of the 2003 Act. The court may allow the appeal if the district judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently: s.27(3)(a). In the present case, the question is whether the Judge ought to have found that extradition would be a disproportionate interference with the right to family life of the Appellant, his partner and, particularly, his son and two step-daughters. The approach on appeal in an article 8 case is set out in Celinski at [20]-[24]. Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ held at [24]:
“The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong, applying what Lord Neuberger PSC said, as set out above, that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge’s reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong.”

Decision

[38]The Appellant’s submission that the Judge made an error of law in failing to give “the greatest weight” to the best interests of his son and step-daughters is based on a misconception as to the law. As Counsel for the Appellant, Dr Muin Boase acknowledged in his oral submissions, the law does not require the best interests of a child to be treated as “the paramount consideration”; and as I have explained above (para 35), the court is not precluded from finding, on examination, that another factor (here, the public interest in extradition) is weightier than the best interests of the child.[39]The Appellant’s contention that the Judge erred in not treating the best interests of each child as “the starting point”, is also based on a misconception as to the law. As I have said (para 34), the law does not impose a requirement that the child’s interests must be considered first.[40]I reject the contention that in assessing whether the Appellant’s extradition would be a proportionate interference with the relevant article 8 rights, the Judge failed properly to consider the best interests of each child for the following reasons.[41]The Judge made no error of law in his legal directions, correctly drawing his own attention to the “important guidance” in relation to the rights of dependant children given by the Supreme Court in HH v Italy.[42]In paragraph 52, the Judge did not refer to the interests of each child as a factor in favour of refusing extradition. That was an omission. But it is inconsequential in light of the fact that he had set out the evidence regarding each of the children, correctly directed himself to carefully weigh the article 8 rights of “any dependant children” (as well as of the Appellant and his partner), and then in his assessment at paragraph 53 he expressly addressed the impact on “the children of the family”, and the financial impact on the Appellant’s son.[43]The Judge did not state in terms that it was in “the best interests” of David, Alexandra and Michaela, given their attachment to the Appellant, that he remains in the UK. But in my view that is obviously implicit in his finding that the Appellant’s extradition would cause “hardship” to “the children of the family”. In paragraph 53(vi), the Judge separately addressed the impact on the living arrangements and financial security of his son (and his partner), those being matters which did not affect his stepdaughters. It is plain that in paragraph 53(iv) the Judge was addressing the emotional rather than practical impact on each of the children.[44]I do not consider that the Judge can fairly be criticised for addressing the interests of the children in relatively brief terms (see paragraph 32 above). In a case such as this, the Judge was entitled to swiftly reject the suggested incompatibility. There were no unusually or exceptionally compelling features: i) The Appellant’s son was (as of 16 months ago) 7 years old. Given his son’s age and circumstances, the emotional impact on him of the extradition of his father, with whom he had a strong bond, although an important feature, was no more than the normal consequence of extradition. On the Appellant’s extradition, his son would continue to live with and remain in the care of his mother, Ms Vlckova. The Appellant’s extradition would have an adverse financial impact on his son and partner, but Ms Vlckova worked part-time, would potentially be able to access state benefits, and if necessary she and her son would have a home with her mother, grandmother and daughters (where they had previously lived for several years). ii) The Appellant’s stepdaughters were (as of 16 months ago) 12 and 16 years old. They did not live with the Appellant and they were not financially dependent on him. On his extradition, their primary caregiver would continue to be their grandmother, with whom they had been living since before the Appellant came to the UK in 2017. Their ability to have regular contact with their mother (and great-grandmother and step-brother) would be unaffected. They had an emotional attachment to the Appellant, but given their ages and circumstances, the adverse impact on them of the Appellant’s extradition was substantially more limited than in the case of their step-brother.[45]In any event, it is important to focus on the question whether the Judge’s decision was wrong. I have no hesitation in concluding that the Judge was not wrong (indeed, in my view, he was clearly correct) to find that the factors militating against the Appellant’s extradition were substantially outweighed by the factors in favour of his extradition.[46]The most important factor in favour of discharge was the best interests of the Appellant’s son. That was bolstered to some extent by the interests of his stepdaughters, and his own and his partner’s rights to private and family life, in circumstances where he had led a law-abiding and settled life, living and working in the UK since 2017. The Judge also considered in the Appellant’s favour that there was some “Brexit uncertainty” and that he had been required to abide by a four-hour curfew as part of his bail conditions. But neither is a weighty factor, and in particular the curfew (which Dr Boase emphasised) was short and so would have had little impact on the Appellant’s ability to live his life, save to prevent late-evening socialising outside his home.[47]On the other side of the scales was first, and most significantly in this case, the high public importance of the UK not being a safe haven for the Appellant, who was a fugitive from justice, having fled the Czech Republic following his trial and sentencing hearing, and breached the probation conditions on which the suspended sentence was imposed. Secondly, the public interest in the UK honouring its treaty obligations, and the Appellant being extradited to serve the sentence for the crimes of which he was convicted carries great weight. This is not a case where it is diminished by delay or the nature of the criminal conduct. The Judge made no error in assessing that, particularly in view of his previous convictions for dishonesty, the criminal conduct in respect of which his extradition is sought is serious. The fact that a suspended sentence was initially imposed does not assist him in circumstances where he breached the terms of his sentence, resulting in the activation of the sentence.[48]I do not underestimate the impact of the Appellant’s extradition on him and his family, especially his young son. But contrary to Mr Boase’s submission, this was not a borderline case. Whether considered individually or cumulatively, the consequences of the Appellant’s extradition for each of the children, for his partner, and for the Appellant, were far from “unusually or exceptionally compelling”. And they were heavily outweighed by the public interest in extradition of a fugitive to serve the sentence for the crimes of which he was convicted.[49]Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.