“(1) DELAY: no properly constituted application for an extension of time has been made and no satisfactory explanation for the delay has in any event been advanced. The Claimant’s case was always grounded on l/e and that had to be advanced by way of JR rather than before the Tribunal. (2) THE MERITS: the Claimant cannot point to a clear and unambiguous representation in these circumstances, particularly when the facts are in dispute. Grounds 2 and 3 add nothing”
“The notes in this booklet reflect the law and practice at October 1999. They are not binding in law and do not affect rights of appeal about your own tax. You should bear in mind that the booklet offers general guidance on how the rules apply, but whether the guidance is appropriate in a particular case will depend on all the facts of that case. If you have any difficulty in applying the rules in your own case, you should consult an Inland Revenue Tax Office.”
“The terms ‘residence’ and ‘ordinary residence’ are not defined in the Taxes Acts. The guidelines to their meaning in this Chapter and in Chapters 2 (residence status of those leaving the UK) and 3 (those coming to the UK) are largely based on rulings of the Courts. This booklet sets out the main factors that are taken into account, but we can only make a decision on your residence status on the facts in your particular case.”
“CPR 3.1 (2)(a) allows the Court to extend or shorten the time limit even if the time for compliance has already expired. Where the time limit has already expired, the claimant must apply for an extension of time. The application must be set out in section 9 of the Claim Form (Form N461). The application for an extension of time will be considered by the judge at the same time as deciding whether to grant permission to apply for judicial review.” b. In this case, section 9 was not completed, but the Claim Form was accompanied by the Statement of Grounds which did seek an extension of time. c. There is no provision in the CPR which requires an extension of time application to be made in section 9 of the Claim Form, rather than in a document which accompanies the Claim Form. d. By contrast, paragraph 4.3 ofPractice Direction 54A provides that an application to extend time “should be included in or contained in a document that accompanies the Claim Form”. e. Finally, paragraph 7.3.1.5 of the Administrative Court Guide provides: “Any application for an extension of time for filing the Claim Form (which can be made in section 9 of the Claim Form or in an attached document).”
“In considering whether to grant an extension of time, the Court must first determine the date from which the relevant time period started to run so that the period of delay can be calculated correctly. The Court will then consider all the circumstances, including whether an adequate explanation has been given for the delay, the importance of the issues, the prospects of success and whether an extension will cause substantial hardship or prejudice to the defendant or any other party or be detrimental to good administration.”
“Here it is important to emphasise that the statutory test is not one of good reason for delay but the broader test of good reason for extending time. This will be likely to bring in many considerations beyond those relevant to an objectively good reason for the delay, including the importance of the issues, the prospect of success, the presence or absence of prejudice or detriment to good administration, and the public interest.”
“The authorities show that, although the time limit inCPR 54.5 (1) is indeed strict, it is not applied unthinkingly, and in a suitable context the courts are willing to adopt a flexible and pragmatic approach … Where Parliament has provided a potential alternative remedy, such as that in section 222 , the court will if necessary ensure that the taxpayer is not prejudiced by taking advantage of it … As the guidance in Cowl emphasises, both sides are under a duty to act responsibly and to take all reasonable steps to ensure that judicial review proceedings are not prematurely pursued while other forms of dispute resolution are in progress.”
“It became clear from decisions like Combe that, if a taxpayer left the UK in order to pursue employment abroad which was full-time, it was likely not only that he would cease to be a UK resident but also that he would escape being deemed still to be a UK resident under the statutory provision. For, from the fact that the employment was full-time, it was likely to follow that he had made a distinct break in the pattern of his life in the UK. Bysection 11 of the Finance Act 1956 the position of the full-time employee or other worker abroad was strengthened by a provision (now in effect contained in section 830 of the 2007 Act) that, in determining whether he remained resident in the UK, regard should not be had to any place of abode in the UK which he maintained for his use. As I will demonstrate in para 36 below, the revenue also sought to eliminate any remaining element of doubt about the proper treatment of the full-time employee abroad by providing in the booklet that, subject to specified conditions of ostensibly simple application, he would—definitely—be treated as not resident, nor ordinarily resident, in the UK. In his case, therefore, the revenue was dispensing with the need for the multifactorial inquiry.”