“’Paper’ decisions made by single member panels of the board are provisional. The right of the prisoner to request an oral hearing is not correctly characterised as a right of appeal. [T]o justify the holding of an oral hearing, the prisoner does not have to demonstrate that the paper decision was wrong, or even that it may have been wrong: what he has to persuade the board is that an oral hearing is appropriate”
“[T]he purpose of..an oral hearing is not only to assist…in..decision-making, but also to reflect the prisoner’s legitimate interest in being able to participate in a decision with important implications for him, where he has something useful to contribute”
‘if it appears to be highly likely the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred’
“In my professional opinion, I do not assess that it is currently safe to re-release Mr Deakin into the community at this juncture. Mr Deakin was recalled on 01/08/22 after he absconded from the Approved Premises (AP) after only 9 days following his prison release. This followed an alleged further DV offence which has now been filed by Police with no further action. He then remained unlawfully at large for 26 months before he handed himself in to the Police. Mental health concerns have been evidenced since he was returned to prison. He is expected to engage in core risk reduction work including programmes interventions to improve on his thinking skills and awareness of healthy relationships whilst serving his recall. This is a prerequisite prior to any future release which will need to be facilitated through an AP to ensure additional risk management measures are in place. Mr Deakin is [under supervision] and until 23/10/24, he was being monitored by prison staff on a constant watch due to M/H issues including him being found with a ligature and after he swallowed a battery on 22/10/24. His COM also notified the prison of a concerning phone call received from Mr Deakin's Sister on 22/10/24 in which she disclosed he had attempted suicide. This information was passed to the POM and the prison were already aware of his M/H issues.”
“In making this decision the panel has considered this case against the principles set out in [Osborn] concerning oral hearings. The panel does not find that there are any reasons for an oral hearing. However, if it is believed that this case should proceed to an oral hearing, further representations should be submitted to the Parole Board within 28 days of receipt of this decision outlining why it should proceed to a hearing.” “[The Claimant needs to] engage with work to address his areas of risk and until that has been completed, the panel would be concerned about his risk of serious harm, especially if he were to enter into a new intimate relationship. Therefore, while core risk reduction work remains outstanding, the panel was satisfied it remains necessary for the protection of the public he should be confined so it did not direct his release.”
“[W]hen this case was considered on the papers, Mr Brockie was not represented and no representations were submitted either by himself or a legal representative. We note that there are reported issues in relation to Mr Brockie’s learning style and his ability to understand documents. In fairness to him, he was not in a position to submit representations for a paper review, and as such has not been able to have a fair risk assessment in the absence of being represented at that time. The only recourse now is to seek an oral hearing. It is also evident there is a history of mental health concerns in relation to this case and following recall, it is reported that he was on ACCT review. In our submission, an oral hearing will allow further exploration as to the relevance of his mental health and the impact this may have on his assessment of risk of serious harm. And in fairness to Mr Brockie, this can only now be concluded by means of an oral hearing. The benefit of an oral hearing will allow Mr Brockie to provide evidence directly to the panel which will undoubtedly assist in their decision making. An oral hearing will allow Mr Brockie to take part in a risk assessment process and will allow the Parole Board to uphold his legitimate interest in the proceedings. There is also merit in allowing his legal representative to challenge the professionals managing him, not only to explore the issues regarding potential sentence pathway, but the management of Mr Brockie in the community. While there have been some concerns regarding mental health since returning to custody, Mr Brockie has otherwise demonstrated compliant behaviour and we are advised he is now an enhanced prisoner…He is working closely with his prison offender manager to complete any core risk reduction work, we also advise the targets set for him are unobtainable in his current establishment….”
“We refer to the provisional decision of your parole review recently issued by a single member panel dated10 February 2025 as set out in the decision you are allowed 28 days in which to consider whether to accept the decision or request an oral hearing. We confirm that you have requested an oral hearing, legal representation is dated26 February 2025 . The basis for this request is that Mr Brockie had not submitted representations. However, it is clear from the dossier that he was advised of his right to do. The representations raise an issue regarding an allegation; however the paper panel decision maker did not place particular weight on this matter, focusing on Mr Brockie’s absconding from his approved premises and being unlawfully at large despite encouragement to hand himself in. The anticipated offending behaviour work relates to the index offence and was a licence condition that remained unfulfilled. The duty member did not find the important factor in dispute that an oral hearing is needed properly to make an assessment of risk or that you can put your views across effectively. The representations submitted have been considered and the request has been refused for the reasons stated above. The paper decision is therefore final, and your current review is now concluded in accordance with the Parole Board rules, not applicable for reconsideration eligible cases. The duty member did not find that important facts are in dispute, or that an oral hearing is needed to properly make an assessment of risk, or so that you can put your views across effectively. The representations submitted have been considered and the request has been refused for the reasons stated above.”
“18 Representations by and evidence of the parties (1) A party who wishes to make representations to the Board must serve them on the Board and the other party….(b) at the time of referral if the case relates to [recall] 19 Consideration on the papers (1) Where a panel is…consider[ing] the release of a prisoner, the panel must decide on the papers either that: (a) the prisoner is suitable for release; (b) the prisoner is unsuitable for release, or (c) the case should be directed to an oral hearing…. (5) Any decision made under paragraph (1)(a) which is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28 is final. (6) Any decision made under paragraph (1)(b) is provisional…. 20 Procedure after a provisional decision on the papers (1) Where a panel… has made a decision that a prisoner is unsuitable for release under rule 19(1)(b), the prisoner may apply in writing for a panel at an oral hearing… (2) A prisoner who makes an application under paragraph (1) must serve the application, together with reasons for making an application, on the Board and the Secretary of State, within 28 days of the decision….being sent (5) If an application is served in accordance with paragraph (2), the decision about whether the case should be determined at an oral hearing must be taken by a member of the Board who (a) is a duty member, and (b) was not part of the constituted panel appointed under rule 5(1) who made the provisional decision. (6) If the decision taken under paragraph (5) is that the case should not be determined at an oral hearing, a provisional decision under rule 19(1)(b)—(a) remains provisional if it is eligible for reconsideration under rule 28 and becomes final if no application for reconsideration is received within the period specified by that rule or, (b) becomes final if it is not eligible for reconsideration under rule.28. (7) Where the decision…is that the case should not be determined at an oral hearing, that decision must (a) be provided to the parties by the Board within 14 days of the application….under paragraph (2); and (b) include the reasons for that decision…. 21 Decision on the papers after a direction for an oral hearing (1)…[W]here … a panel have directed that a case should be determined at an oral hearing under rule 19(1)(c) or 20(5), a panel…may direct that the case should be decided on the papers if an oral hearing is no longer necessary (a) in the interests of justice; (b) to effectively manage the case; or (c) such..reason as [thought appropriate] 28 Reconsideration of Decisions (1) Subject to para.(2), where a decision has been made under rule 19(1)(a) or (b)… a party may apply to the Board for the case to be reconsidered on the grounds that the decision (za) contains an error of law; (a) is irrational; or (b) is procedurally unfair. (2) Decisions are eligible for reconsideration only where the prisoner is serving: (a) an indeterminate sentence; (b) an extended sentence; (c) a determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Board… or (d) a serious terrorism sentence.” 28A Setting Aside Final Decisions (1) The Board may set aside a final decision made under rule 19(1)(a) or (b)… (3) A final decision may be set aside under paragraph (1) by a decision maker if (a) it is in the interests of justice to do so; and (b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (4) are satisfied. (4) The conditions are: (a) the decision maker is satisfied that a direction given by the Board for, or a decision made by it not to direct, the release of a prisoner would not have been given or made but for an error of law or fact…”
“In order to justify the holding of an oral hearing, the prisoner does not have to demonstrate that the paper decision was wrong, or even that it may have been wrong: what he has to persuade the board is that an oral hearing is appropriate.”
“I would go further and infer his position as a post-tariff lifer has not been considered, because this Decision has been taken on a results-led approach….[It] is clearly focused on the possible outcome of an oral hearing. [It] refers to there being no merit in an oral hearing ‘at this stage’, as once the 1:1 work has been concluded an updated Psychological Risk Assessment will be required to determine if further interventions are required, or if there is support for progression. The Member, therefore, concluded ‘that directing an oral hearing at this time would be premature’. In my judgment this approach fails to address the correct issue as identified in Osborn at [29(x)]. The Claimant did not have to demonstrate that the paper decision was wrong, or even that it may have been wrong. The issue is whether an oral hearing was appropriate. By considering, indeed focusing on the potential outcome of an oral hearing, in my judgment the Decision fails to specifically address the relevant issues…in Osborn.”
“[I]t is important to understand the provisional nature of a decision made by the single member panel the prisoner is unsuitable for release. The right conferred on the prisoner, following that decision, to request an oral hearing is not a right of appeal. The prisoner does not have to demonstrate that the decision was (or may have been) wrong, what he has to persuade the board is simply that an oral hearing is appropriate”
“22. [T]he Board applied the wrong test in determining the request for an oral hearing. The decision-maker found that the paper decision had clearly laid out the facts, had correctly identified the review and conclusion and had found the Claimant had made limited progress in relevant respects. The decision-maker stated ‘legal representations were considered at the time of the MCA review’ (the paper decision)…[which] considered those submissions’ continu[ing] ‘The legal representations do not raise any issues which cause the Duty Member to put the paper decision into serious question’. 23. It is apparent from the above that the decision-maker wrongly approached the request as turning on whether the paper decision was correct. This was contrary to the principle at para.2(x) of…Osborn that the prisoner does not need to demonstrate that the paper decision, which is provisional, was wrong; the question is whether an oral hearing is appropriate. The decision did not address that key question. Instead, it approached its task as being one of review of or appeal against the paper decision.”
“(1) where an Act…confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. (2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. (3) The[y.. are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects… (4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken. (5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both. (6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests, fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer.”
“’Paper’ decisions [under Rule 19] by single member[s]… are provisional. The right of the prisoner [under Rule 20] to request an oral hearing is not correctly characterised as a right of appeal. [T]o justify the holding of an oral hearing, the prisoner does not have to demonstrate the [Rule 19] decision was wrong, or even that it may have been wrong: what he has to persuade the board is that an oral hearing is appropriate.”
‘The legal representations do not raise any issues which cause the Duty Member to put the paper decision into serious question’
“The unfairness which results from the board’s treatment of the request for an oral hearing as an appeal is illustrated by the case of the appellant Booth, in which the [second-stage] assessor identified the critical question as being ‘whether the grounds of the appeal are justified and if an oral hearing would make any material difference to the paper decision’. The request for an oral hearing was thus decided on the basis that the earlier decision was presumptively correct. This is to put the cart before the horse. If fairness requires an oral hearing, then a decision arrived at without such a hearing is unfair and cannot stand. The question whether an oral hearing is required cannot…be decided on..a presumption that a decision taken without such a hearing is correct.”
“Where, in the light of the representations by…the prisoner, it would be unfair for a [Rule 19] ‘paper’ decision…by a single member panel of the board to become final without allowing an oral hearing: for example, if the representations raise issues which place in serious question anything in the paper decision which may in practice have a significant impact on the prisoner’s future management in prison or on future reviews”
“[D]icta…. suggesting that the question whether procedural fairness requires an oral hearing is a matter of judgment for the Board, reviewable by the Court only on Wednesbury grounds [are] not correct. The court must determine for itself whether a fair procedure was followed…. Its function is not merely to review the reasonableness of the decision-maker’s judgment of what fairness required.”
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved…The[y] must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds.”
“a) Where facts which appear to the board to be important are in dispute, or where a significant explanation or mitigation is advanced which needs to be heard orally in order fairly to determine its credibility…. b) Where the board cannot otherwise properly or fairly make an independent assessment of risk, or of the means by which it should be managed and addressed. That is likely to be the position in cases where such an assessment may depend upon the view formed by the Board…of characteristics of the prisoner which can best be judged by seeing or questioning him in person, or where a psychological assessment…is disputed on tenable grounds, or where the board may be materially assisted by hearing evidence, for example from a psychologist or psychiatrist….”
“59. [With] deprivation of liberty, where questions arise which involve…assessment of the applicant’s character or mental state, it has held that it may be essential to the fairness of the proceedings that the applicant be present at an oral hearing. 60. [I]n a situation such as that of the applicant, where a substantial term of imprisonment may be at stake and where characteristics pertaining to his personality and level of maturity are of importance in deciding on his dangerousness, article 5.4 requires an oral hearing in the context of an adversarial procedure involving legal representation and the possibility of calling and questioning witnesses.”
“[S]ince the effect of the refusal of an oral hearing is that the provisional decision becomes final, it follows an oral hearing should be granted in any case where it would be unfair to the prisoner for that to happen. For example, if the representations made in support of the prisoner’s request for an oral hearing raise issues which place in question anything in the provisional decision which may in practice have a significant impact on the prisoner’s future management in prison or on his future reviews, such as reports of poor behaviour or recommendations that particular courses should be undertaken to reduce risk, it will usually follow an oral hearing should be allowed for that reason alone, even if there is no doubt that the prisoner should remain in custody or closed conditions.”
“82..[T]he purpose of holding an oral hearing is not only to assist it in its decision-making, but also to reflect the prisoner’s legitimate interest in being able to participate in a decision with important implications for him, where he has something useful to contribute. An oral hearing should therefore be allowed where it is maintained on tenable grounds that a face-to-face encounter with the board, or the questioning of those who have dealt with the prisoner, is necessary to enable him or his representatives to put their case effectively or to test the views of those who have dealt with him…. 83 When dealing with cases concerning recalled prisoners, the board should bear in mind that the prisoner has been deprived of his freedom, albeit conditional: a factor on which Lord Bingham placed emphasis in West [where Lord Bingham said at [30]: “[A] short-term prisoner who has served half his sentence…[has] a statutory right to be free: a conditional right, but none the less a right, breach of which gives an enforceable right to redress..” [Lord Reed continued in Osborn: 84 It also has to be borne in mind that the issues which are considered by the board are not in practice confined to the question whether the prisoner should or should not be released or transferred. As I have explained, the statutory directions given to the board require it to consider numerous matters. The board’s findings in relation to these matters may in practice affect the prisoner’s future progress in prison, for example in relation to the courses which he is required to undertake and his future reviews….. 88 Whether a prisoner’s right to a fair hearing requires the holding of an oral hearing does not depend on his establishing that his application for release or transfer stands any particular chance of success: that approach would not allow for the possibility that an oral hearing may be necessary in order for the prisoner to have a fair opportunity of establishing his prospects of success, and thus involves circular reasoning. 89 The point can be illustrated by the example of a prisoner who is unable to participate effectively in a written procedure due to learning difficulties. To decide whether he should be allowed an oral hearing on the basis of his prospects of success as they appeared on the basis of the official dossier and his written representations, if any, would plainly be unfair. The problem with reliance on the prospects of success, as they appear from the written material, as the touchstone of what fairness requires is not however confined to prisoners who are manifestly disadvantaged by a written procedure….”
“68. [J]ustice is intuitively understood to require a procedure which pays due respect to persons whose rights are significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of administrative or judicial functions. Respect entails that such persons ought to be able to participate in the procedure by which the decision is made, provided they have something to say which is relevant to the decision to be taken…. 70..[R]esearch has established the importance attached by prisoners to a process of risk assessment which provides for their contribution…..[and] reveals the frustration, anger and despair felt by prisoners who perceive the board’s procedures as unfair and the impact of those feelings on their motivation and respect for authority …Potential implications for…rehabilitation, and ultimately for public safety, are evident.”
“Whether a prisoner’s right to a fair hearing requires the holding of an oral hearing does not depend on his establishing that his application for release or transfer stands any particular chance of success: that approach would not allow for the possibility that an oral hearing may be necessary in order for the prisoner to have a fair opportunity of establishing his prospects of success and thus involves circular reasoning.”
“[A Court has] to consider whether there was any realistic possibility of the…decision being different but for the error of law: see Lord Carnwath’s judgment[s] in Walton v Scottish Ministers[2013] PTSR 51 [111]-[112]…R(Champion) v North Norfolk DC[2015] 1 WLR 3710 [54]-[66] and De Smith’s Judicial Review, 8th ed (2018), paras 18-047-050..”
“272. The new statutory test modifies the Simplex test in three ways. First, the matter is not simply one of discretion, but rather…of duty provided the statutory criteria are satisfied. This is subject to a discretion…nevertheless to grant a remedy on grounds of ‘exceptional public interest’. Secondly, the outcome does not inevitably have to be the same; it will suffice if it is merely ‘highly likely’. And thirdly, it does not have to be shown the outcome would have been exactly the same; it will suffice that it is highly likely the outcome would not have been ‘substantially different’ for the claimant. 273. It would not be appropriate to give any exhaustive guidance on how these provisions should be applied. Much will depend on the particular facts of the case before the court. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the court should still bear in mind that Parliament has not altered the fundamental relationship between the courts and the executive. In particular, courts should still be cautious about straying, even subconsciously, into the forbidden territory of assessing the merits of a public decision under challenge by way of judicial review. If there has been an error of law, for example in the approach the executive has taken to its decision-making process, it will often be difficult or impossible for a court to conclude that it is ‘highly likely’ that the outcome would not have been ‘substantially different’ if the executive had gone about the decision-making process in accordance with the law. Courts should also not lose sight of their fundamental function, which is to maintain the rule of law. Furthermore, although there is undoubtedly a difference between the old Simplex test and the new statutory test, ‘the threshold remains a high one’…” ii. In R(Goring), the Court of Appeal held s.31(2A) (and Simplex) applied to a planning authority’s failure to consider environment assessment and said at [47] and [55]: “47. In our view…the proposition the s.31(2A) duty applies only to ‘conduct’ of a merely ‘procedural’ or ‘technical’ kind, and not also to ‘conduct’ that goes to the substantive decision-making itself, is a surprising concept. The duty has regularly been applied to substantive decision-making across the whole spectrum of administrative action, including in the sphere of planning, both at first instance and in decisions of this court…‘[C]onduct’ in s.31(2A) is a broad one and apt to include both the making of substantive decisions and the procedural steps taken in the course of decision-making. It is not expressly limited to ‘procedural’ conduct. Nor, in our view, is such a qualification implied. But this, we must stress, is not a necessary conclusion for the purposes of our decision on the application to reopen. 55. It is axiomatic that, when performing that duty, or, equally, when exercising its discretion as to relief, the court must not cast itself in the role of the planning decision-maker… If, however, the court is to consider whether a particular outcome was ‘highly likely’ not to have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, it must necessarily undertake its own objective assessment of the decision-making process, and what its result would have been if the decision-maker had not erred in law.” iii. In Gathercole v Suffolk CC[2021] PTSR 359 (CA), another case where s.31(2A) rescued a technical deficiency in a planning decision, Coulson LJ said at [38]: “It is important a court faced with an application for judicial review does not shirk the obligation imposed by s.31(2A). The provision is designed to ensure that, even if there has been some flaw in the decision-making process which might render the decision unlawful, where the other circumstances mean that quashing the decision would be a waste of time and public money (because, even when adjustment was made for the error, it is highly likely that the same decision would be reached), the decision must not be quashed and the application should instead be rejected. The provision is designed to ensure that the judicial review process remains flexible and realistic.” iv. In R(Bradbury) v Brecon Beacons Park[2025] 4 WLR 58 (CA) Lewis LJ held once again that s.31(2A) saved a technical failure in a planning decision which made no difference to the decision. He observed: “70. [s.31(2A)] provides a court must refuse to grant a remedy on a claim for judicial review if it appears to the court that (1) it is highly likely (2) that the outcome for the claimant would not be substantially different (3) if the conduct complained of had not occurred. The outcome for the claimant is, usually, the decision or other measure that the public authority has taken. The ‘conduct complained of’… is the legal error or flaw which would justify the grant of a remedy in judicial review (unless a remedy was refused by reason of s. 31(2A) or for some other discretionary reason). 71. [With] s.31(2A) the court is concerned with evaluating the significance of the error on the decision-making process. It is considering the decision the public body has reached and assessing the impact of the error on that decision in order to ascertain if it is highly likely that the outcome (the decision) would not have been substantially different even if the decision-maker had not made that error. It is not for the court to try and predict what the public authority might have done if it had not made the error. If the court cannot tell how the decision-maker would have approached matters, or what decision it would have reached, if it had not made the error in question, the requirements of s.31(2A) are unlikely to be satisfied…. 74 [s.31(2A)]emphatically does not require the court to embark on exercise where the error is left out of account and the court tries to predict what the public body would have done if the error had not been made. Approaching s.31(2A) in that way would run the risk of the court forming a view on the merits and deciding if it thinks that the public body would reach that view if it had not made the error. Rather, the focus should be on the impact of the error on the decision-making process the decision-maker undertook, to ascertain whether it is highly likely that the decision the public body took would not have been substantially different if the error had not occurred.” v. Finally, on the same day, in R(Greenfields) v IoW Council[2025] EWCA Civ 488 , Singh LJ (sitting with Lewis LJ) held there was inadequate evidence in that case to enable s.31(2A) to save a failure in a planning decision. He said at [105]-[106]: “105. If [s.31(2A)] was to be made good it was incumbent upon the respondent to give a full and clear explanation of how certain figures were arrived at… 106. The Court should…in a witness statement) be given a full, accurate and clear explanation of the decision-making process used by the public authority concerned and should not have to depend upon submissions…”
“36….[A]s explained by Bingham LJ in [Cotton] at 352, courts should be reluctant to conclude that the same result would have occurred if a person had not been deprived of an adequate opportunity to put his case. The reasons…include that: (i) experience shows that which is confidently expected is by no means always that which happens; (ii) the court should avoid straying from its proper province of reviewing the propriety of the decision-making process into the forbidden territory of reviewing the merits of a decision, (iii) this is a field in which appearances are generally thought to matter, and (iv) a right to be heard is not to be lightly denied. 37. Applying the principles in Osborn and in the light of my reasoning above, it was unfair to refuse an oral hearing. [It] is of itself an important right, even if it could not change the outcome (see…paras.68 to 70 of Osborn) and so this is a materially different outcome for the Claimant. In any event, to the extent that it is relevant to consider what the outcome of the parole review would have been following an oral hearing, I cannot say that it is ‘highly likely’ that the ultimate outcome of the parole review would have been the same. Given the disputed facts, the range and complexity of the issues to be decided and the assessment to be made, it is impossible to predict.”
“His licence was revoked on31 July 2022 after he absconded from approved premises. The police disclosed there had been an alleged domestic violence incident on30 July 2022 after a female reported having been assaulted by him. No further action was taken but he remained unlawfully at large until14 October 2024 . It was said that he was encouraged by family members to attend the police station to hand himself in due to the impact of being at large on his mental health.”
“Mr [Brockie] denied any involvement in the alleged domestic violence incident and maintains he did not have contact with the victim of his offence.”
“The community offender manager did not consider that Mr Deakin’s risk could be safely managed in the community until he has completed further work to address his areas of risk, which should include work to address mental health, thinking skills and behaviour within relationships. The community offender manager does not assess he is likely to comply with a further period on licence until he has improved his thinking skills. An assessment of independence has therefore been recommended…Although no further action was taken, he appears to have disengaged at the same time a report was made to the police from a female who alleged he had assaulted her. He has not completed work to address healthy relationships and emotional regulation within relationships, which appears from his history to be his main area of risk and directly linked to his risk of serious harm to the public, especially intimate partners. At the present time the panel concluded there would be a high risk of non-compliance if he were released on licence. If he is not complying with licence conditions his risk of serious harm cannot be safely managed in the community. If he were to enter into a new intimate relationship without having addressed his risks in this area, there may be an increase in risk of serious harm to an intimate partner. Given the need for work to address his thinking skills and behaviour within relationships as well as the risk of non-compliance, the panel could not justify a release decision or referral to oral hearing. He is therefore appropriately located in custody…to protect the public.”
“In making this decision the panel has considered this case against the principles set out in the case of Osborn…concerning oral hearings. The panel does not find that there are any reasons for an oral hearing. However, if it is believed that this case should proceed to an oral hearing, further representations should be submitted to the Parole Board within 28 days of receipt of this decision outlining why it should proceed to a hearing.”