“3… In 2020, I co-founded Palestine Action, a direct-action protest group aimed at preventing military targets in the UK from facilitating gross abuses of international law. The aim of terrorists is to take lives and hurt people: that is the opposite of what Palestine Action is about. … 30. Palestine Action’s aim is to take direct action against Israel’s arms trade in Britain. Our aims have never included, and we have never encouraged, harm to any person at all. The goal is simple: to put our bodies in the way of military machine perpetrating genocide. The main target has been stopping Elbit Systems [a defence company which is said to supply the Israeli government]. 31. I am not the leader. We are a horizontal movement and everyone is the same. We have different working groups for different things and all work together. I sometimes do more of the public speaking. We encourage people to have their own ideas and take their own actions. These do involve damage to property contributing to the arms industry, but also have involved demonstrations, talks, sit ins, posters/banners and sieges. For example, supporters of Palestine Action from the local community in Leicester hold a demonstration outside an Elbit factory there weekly.”
“45. At the time I write this statement, Palestinians in Gaza are trapped in a nightmare. A population has been pushed into a tiny space, starved, killed, maimed, tormented and is at the verge of destruction. Our movement seeks to end this suffering: not through hurting people or fighting but through direct action, like many protestors before us. We are not the terrorists.”
“While there is no binding definition of terrorism in international law, best practice international standards limit terrorism to criminal acts intended to cause death, serious personal injury or hostage taking, in order to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.”
“9. Though I am based in Ireland, my work is published in the UK. My novels regularly appear in bestseller lists and I often travel to Britain to speak in public about my work. I am and will continue to be a committed supporter of Palestine Action. If it that support is criminalised, I will effectively be prevented from speaking at any future public events in the UK, since I could not in good conscience disguise or lie about my principles in public. If I continue to voice support for Palestine Action from my home in Ireland, what are the likely consequences? Will I be denounced publicly by the Prime Minister? Will bookshops go on stocking the work of an author the Home Secretary has branded a ‘terrorist’ simply for supporting a protest group? 10. The BBC has adapted two of my books for television; both series are presently promoted on the iPlayer service. Normal People, which I co-wrote and produced, was the BBC’s most-streamed series in 2020, with over 62 million views. My beliefs have not changed since the making of that series, and I have done nothing but continue to express them. If the expression of those beliefs becomes a terror offence under UK law, would the BBC continue to screen and promote my work? Is it likely that I could ever again collaborate with British public institutions like the BBC as I have done in the past? 11. The cultural effects of proscription could not be easily mended, even if the Home Secretary later changed her mind. For any public figure to be labelled a ‘supporter of terrorism’ by the state would have serious consequences. It would likely end or severely restrict the careers of many emerging artists. ‘Terrorism’ is not a trivial word.”
“27. Proscription of Palestine Action would set a precedent for the proscription of other robust protest and ‘direct action’ movements hitherto regarded as unruly but never as terrorist, such as certain climate change activism. It would also be out of step with comparable liberal democracies, including in Europe and various common law States, where mere property damage has seldom been a sufficient basis for designating groups as terrorist. 28. Most responsible States globally have limited terrorism designations to extremist actors engaged in grave large scale atrocities, such as Al Qaeda or ISIL and their associates, groups involved in intense armed conflict against State authorities (e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, PKK, LTTE and so on), or other organized campaigns of intense violence by separatist, socialist, far-right, religious or other causes. Protest movements claiming to defend human rights, that are an irritant to property rights or affect certain national security interests, but which do not engage in sustained campaigns of murder, are not typically treated as ‘terrorist’, even where they could technically come within a national terrorism definition. Definitions are frequently over-inclusive, but good judgment and restraint also need to be exercised in a democracy committed to human rights and a substantive not merely procedural conception of the rule of law.”
“…The disgraceful attack on Brize Norton in the early hours of the morning on Friday 20 June is the latest in a long history of unacceptable criminal damage committed by Palestine Action. The UK’s defence enterprise is vital to the nation’s national security and this Government will not tolerate those who put that security at risk… Since its inception in 2020, Palestine Action has orchestrated a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms that provide services and supplies to support Ukraine, NATO, Five Eyes allies and the UK defence enterprise. Its activity has increased in frequency and severity since the start of 2024 and its methods have become more aggressive, with its members demonstrating a willingness to use violence. Palestine Action has also broadened its targets from the defence industry to include financial firms, charities, universities and Government buildings. Its activities meet the threshold set out in the statutory tests established under theTerrorism Act 2000 . This has been assessed through a robust, evidence-based process, by a wide range of experts from across Government, the police and the security services. In several attacks, Palestine Action has committed acts of serious damage to property with the aim of progressing its political cause and influencing the Government. These include attacks at Thales in Glasgow in 2022; and last year at Instro Precision in Kent and Elbit Systems UK in Bristol. The seriousness of these attacks includes the extent and nature of damage caused, including to targets affecting UK national security, and the impact on innocent members of the public fleeing for safety and subjected to violence. The extent of damage across these three attacks alone, spreading the length and breadth of the UK, runs into the millions of pounds. ... I have considered carefully the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activity. Proscription represents a legitimate response to the threat posed by Palestine Action. The first duty of Government is to keep our country safe, which is the foundation of our plan for change. Given significant public concern over recent activities by this group, including the incident in Brize Norton last week, and balancing the relevant considerations, I have decided to confirm this decision to proscribe to the House in advance of laying the relevant order.”
“5.2 Palestine Action is a pro-Palestinian group with the stated aim to support Palestinian sovereignty by using direct criminal action tactics to halt the sale and export of military equipment to Israel. Since its inception in 2020, Palestine Action has orchestrated a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms that provide services and supplies to support Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘Five Eyes’ allies and the UK defence enterprise. Palestine Action has also broadened its targets from the defence industry to include financial firms, charities, universities and government buildings. Its activity has increased in frequency and severity since the start of 2024 and its methods have become more aggressive, with its members demonstrating a willingness to use violence. Its activities meet the threshold of being concerned in terrorism as set out in theTerrorism Act 2000 . 5.3 The UK Government assesses that Palestine Action commits and participates in acts of terrorism. In several attacks, Palestine Action has committed acts of serious damage to property with the aim of progressing its political cause and influencing the Government. These include attacks at Thales in Glasgow in 2022, and in 2024 at Instro Precision in Kent and Elbit Systems UK in Bristol. The seriousness of these attacks includes the extent and nature of damage caused, including to targets affecting UK national security, and the impact on innocent members of the public. 5.4 Palestine Action prepares for terrorism. The organisation has provided practical advice to assist its members with conducting attacks that have resulted in serious damage to property at targets across the UK to further its cause. In late 2023, Palestine Action released the ‘The Underground Manual’ which can be accessed via its website. The guide encourages the creation of cells and provides practical guidance about how to carry out activity against private companies and government buildings on behalf of Palestine Action, including how to evade arrest. The document provides a link to a website also created by Palestine Action which contains a map of specific targets across the UK. The manual encourages members to undertake a number of operational security measures to protect the covert nature of their activity. 5.5 Palestine Action promotes and encourages terrorism. Through its media output, Palestine Action publicises and promotes its attacks involving serious property damage, as well as celebrating the perpetrators. Palestine Action activists often record footage of their activity and Palestine Action publicises this imagery and other details on its media channels. Palestine Action encourages its followers to support the perpetrators of such attacks and to send messages of support to those who are imprisoned as a result of their activity, demonstrating a sympathetic and celebratory posture. 5.6 Since 2020, Palestine Action’s campaign has resulted in hundreds of millions of pounds worth of criminal damage and lost revenue. Members of Palestine Action have been charged with serious offences for activity carried out during attacks, including offences involving violence and weapons. Attackers caused over a million pounds worth of damage at the Thales defence factory in Glasgow in 2022. The Sheriff, in passing custodial sentences for the attacker’s violent crimes, spoke of the panic among staff who feared for their safety as pyrotechnics and smoke bombs were thrown. 5.7 Palestine Action has a considerable online presence that has enabled the organisation to galvanise popular support; recruit and train members across the UK; and raise considerable funds through online donations. Palestine Action has a footprint in all 45 policing regions in the UK. 5.8 Proscription will enable law enforcement to effectively disrupt Palestine Action. It will help undermine the convert [sic] methods that Palestine Action uses and help reduce the risk that Palestine Action radicalises people wishing to demonstrate legitimate support for the Palestinian cause into becoming members or supporters of the organisation.”
“11.1… any significant delay between the laying and coming into force of the Order would alert the organisation to its impending proscription and may result in pre-emptive action by the organisation’s members designed to circumvent the provisions of the Act and/or the criminal law.”
“(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”
“The position is orthodox—if secondary legislation can be quashed by way of final relief by the court, it necessarily follows that its effect can be suspended pending the determination of an application for judicial review.”
“15. We do not consider that the appellate authorities support the proposition that a uniform, higher merits threshold applies in every public law case. Even in R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p. Factortame (No. 2)[1991] 1 AC 603 , a case about the potential disapplication of primary legislation, Lord Goff of Chieveley was careful to say, at 674A, that ‘the discretion conferred upon the court cannot be fettered by a rule’. Rather, the importance of the public law context came in at the balance of convenience stage, when the court would accord great weight to the public interest in the enforcement of an apparently valid law and a claimant seeking to enjoin such enforcement would have to show that his challenge was ‘prima facie so firmly based as to justify so exceptional a course being taken’. 16. This seems to us to be consistent with what was said by Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in the Privy Council in Belize Alliance v Department of the Environment of Belize[2003] 1 WLR 2839 , at [39]: ‘(because the range of public law cases is so wide) the court has a discretion to take the course which seems most likely to produce a just result’. Similarly, in R (Governing Body of X) v Office of Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills[2020] EWCA Civ 594 , [2020] EMLR 22, Lindblom LJ (with whom Sir Geoffrey Vos MR and Henderson LJ agreed) held at [66] that there was no separate ‘threshold’ or ‘gateway’ in public law cases. Rather, ‘the underlying strength of the substantive challenge is likely to be a significant factor in the balance of considerations weighing for or against the granting of an injunction’. 17. In our judgment, this is an accurate and sufficient statement of the law as regards interim relief in public law cases. The special feature of such cases is that, other things being equal, it is likely to be in the public interest to allow a defendant public authority to enforce the law (as it understands it), or exercise powers in what it considers to be a lawful manner. The weight to be accorded to this public interest will vary from context to context, but may be considerable. In many cases, the claimant would need to point to something very compelling to outweigh it. In deciding whether a claimant has done so, the court will consider both the prima facie strength of the claim and the gravity of the consequences that would follow if interim relief were not granted. It is not possible, and would not be desirable, to lay down anything more prescriptive than that.”
“It is the court, not the executive, which holds the scales, deciding where the balance falls between the competing public and private interests. However, where one of the interests is national security, the court must show great respect to the judgment of the executive about whether the relevant risk is made out and about the weight to be attached to it. This means that, subject to review on rationality or other public law grounds, both the existence of a risk to national security and the weight to be ascribed to it are matters for the executive. In many cases it may be difficult to find interests sufficiently weighty to outweigh the public interest in national security.”
“The action resulted in the mainstream domestic and international media reporting on ongoing British military assistance being provided to Israel in its military assaults on Gaza and the West Bank, including the use of the RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus, and the sending of almost daily spy flights over Gaza, gathering intelligence for the Israeli military. This is a matter of clear public interest which has been significantly underreported.”
“…The statutory definition contains no such requirements for such formal mechanisms of ‘centralised command’ and/or ‘hierarchy’. Parliament has used deliberately loose language to ensure that the net is wide enough to catch entities where the links and interactions between the component individuals may be little more than the sharing of the common purpose to be ‘concerned in terrorism’, as defined in section 3(5), and some degree of interaction between them.”