“(2) Action falls within this subsection if it– (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.” (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”
“4. Deproscription: application (1) An application may be made to the Secretary of State for an order under section 3(3) or (8)– (a) removing an organisation from Schedule 2, or (b) providing for a name to cease to be treated as a name for an organisation listed in that Schedule. (2) An application may be made by– (a) the organisation, or (b) any person affected by the organisation's proscription or by the treatment of the name as a name for the organisation. (3) The Secretary of State shall make regulations prescribing the procedure for applications under this section. (4) The regulations shall, in particular– (a) require the Secretary of State to determine an application within a specified period of time, and (b) require an application to state the grounds on which it is made.” (b) providing for a name to cease to be treated as a name for an organisation listed in that Schedule. (b) any person affected by the organisation's proscription or by the treatment of the name as a name for the organisation. (a) require the Secretary of State to determine an application within a specified period of time, and (b) require an application to state the grounds on which it is made.”
“5.— Deproscription: appeal. (1) There shall be a commission, to be known as the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. (2) Where an application under section 4 has been refused, the applicant may appeal to the Commission. (3) The Commission shall allow an appeal against a refusal to deproscribe an organisation or to provide for a name to cease to be treated as a name for an organisation if it considers that the decision to refuse was flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable on an application for judicial review. (4) Where the Commission allows an appeal under this section, it may make an order under this subsection. (5) Where an order is made under subsection (4) in respect of an appeal against a refusal to deproscribe an organisation the Secretary of State shall as soon as is reasonably practicable– (a) lay before Parliament, in accordance with section 123(4), the draft of an order under section 3(3)(b) removing the organisation from the list in Schedule 2, or (b) make an order removing the organisation from the list in Schedule 2 in pursuance of section 123(5).” (a) lay before Parliament, in accordance with section 123(4), the draft of an order under section 3(3)(b) removing the organisation from the list in Schedule 2, or (b) make an order removing the organisation from the list in Schedule 2 in pursuance of section 123(5).”
“ 7.— Appeal: effect on conviction, &c. (1) This section applies where– (a) an appeal under section 5 has been allowed in respect of an organisation, (b) an order has been made under section 3(3)(b) in respect of the organisation in accordance with an order of the Commission under section 5(4) (and, if the order was made in reliance on section 123(5), a resolution has been passed by each House of Parliament under section 123(5)(b)), (c) a person has been convicted of an offence in respect of the organisation under any of sections 11 to 13, 15 to 19 and 56, and (d) the activity to which the charge referred took place on or after the date of the refusal to deproscribe against which the appeal under section 5 was brought.” (a) an appeal under section 5 has been allowed in respect of an organisation, (b) an order has been made under section 3(3)(b) in respect of the organisation in accordance with an order of the Commission under section 5(4) (and, if the order was made in reliance on section 123(5), a resolution has been passed by each House of Parliament under section 123(5)(b)), (c) a person has been convicted of an offence in respect of the organisation under any of sections 11 to 13, 15 to 19 and 56, and (d) the activity to which the charge referred took place on or after the date of the refusal to deproscribe against which the appeal under section 5 was brought.”
“32. The authorities cited by Sir James make clear that the suitability of an alternative remedy depends on whether the remedy is "conveniently and effectively available": see Watch Tower, at [19]. The authorities make clear that the application of this test depends not only on the statutory context, but also on the circumstances of the individual case. Sir James for the Home Secretary did not demur and indeed accepted that, in a case where the illegality of a proscription order was clear, judicial review may well be appropriate. 33. There are five factors that seem to me to be relevant. I consider them in turn, and cumulatively, before considering the impact of the judgment of Richards J in the Kurdistan Workers' Party case.”
“68. For these reasons, the preliminary issue is determined in the claimant's favour. An application to deproscribe, coupled with an appeal to POAC if the application is refused, is not a suitable alternative remedy in the circumstances of this case. The existence of this remedy is therefore not a proper basis for refusing permission or relief in the exercise of the court's discretion, in circumstances where Parliament has not ousted the judicial review jurisdiction in respect of decisions to proscribe under s. 3(3)(a) of the 2000 Act.”
“2. The Court determines as a preliminary issue that an application to the Defendant to deproscribe Palestine Action, coupled with an appeal to the Proscribed Organisation Appeal Commission, is not a suitable remedy. 3. The Defendant’s application for permission to appeal on the preliminary issue is refused. 4. Any application by the Defendant for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the preliminary issue is to be filed by 4 p.m. on6 August 2025 .”
“5. The Claimant’s application for permission to apply for judicial review is: (a) refused on grounds 1,3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and (b) granted on grounds 2 and 8. 6. The Claimant’s renewed application for interim relief is refused.”
“a. The Court diluted the test to be applied when determining whether an individual has an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review. b. The Court erred in relying on the fact that judicial review would be more expeditious than an appeal to POAC [J/§§34-36]. c. The Court erred in relying upon “the detriment” the Respondent and others like her would incur would they to follow the process provided by Parliament [J/§§37-43]. d. The Court adopted a flawed analysis of the implications for those charged with criminal offences based upon the organisation’s proscription and, in particular, erred in concluding that any person facing criminal proceedings for a proscription offence can mount a defence to the prosecution on the basis that the Applicant’s order for proscription was unlawful [J§§44-49]. e. The Court erred in its analysis of the differences between POAC and the High Court when relying upon ‘forum and procedure’ [J/§§50-59]. f. The Court wrongly rejected the Applicant’s submission that the availability of judicial review would render the deproscription / POAC route a dead letter [J/§§60-62]. g. The Judge failed to follow R (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2002] EWHC 644 (Admin) , in which Richards J concluded that an appeal to POAC was a suitable alternative remedy to judicial review [J/§§63-67].”
“19. These principles are not in dispute and can be summarised briefly. If other means of redress are “conveniently and effectively” available to a party, they ought ordinarily to be used before resort to judicial review: per Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council[2006] 2 AC 465 , para 30. It is only in a most exceptional case that a court will entertain an application for judicial review if other means of redress are conveniently and effectively available. This principle applies with particular force where Parliament has enacted a statutory scheme that enables persons against whom decisions are made and actions taken to refer the matter to a specialist tribunal (such as the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (Charity)). To allow a claim for judicial review to proceed in circumstances where there is a statutory procedure for contesting the decision risks undermining the will of Parliament…”
“54. In order to evaluate these submissions, it is necessary to consider the basis for the suitable alternative remedy principle. The principle does not apply as the result of any statutory provision to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court on judicial review. In this case the High Court (and hence this court) has full jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of action by the Designated Officer and by HMRC. The question is whether the court should exercise its discretion to refuse to proceed to judicial review (as the judge did at the permission stage) or to grant relief under judicial review at a substantive hearing according to the established principle governing the exercise of its discretion where there is a suitable alternative remedy. 55. In my view, the principle is based on the fact that judicial review in the High Court is ordinarily a remedy of last resort, to ensure that the rule of law is respected where no other procedure is suitable to achieve that objective. However, since it is a matter of discretion for the court, where it is clear that a public authority is acting in defiance of the rule of law the High Court will be prepared to exercise its jurisdiction then and there without waiting for some other remedial process to take its course. Also, in considering what should be taken to qualify as a suitable alternative remedy, the court should have regard to the provision which Parliament has made to cater for the usual sort of case in terms of the procedures and remedies which have been established to deal with it. If Parliament has made it clear by its legislation that a particular sort of procedure or remedy is in its view appropriate to deal with a standard case, the court should be slow to conclude in its discretion that the public interest is so pressing that it ought to intervene to exercise its judicial review function along with or instead of that statutory procedure. But of course it is possible that instances of unlawfulness will arise which are not of that standard description, in which case the availability of such a statutory procedure will be less significant as a factor. 56. Treating judicial review in ordinary circumstances as a remedy of last resort fulfils a number of objectives. It ensures the courts give priority to statutory procedures as laid down by Parliament, respecting Parliament’s judgment about what procedures are appropriate for particular contexts. It avoids expensive duplication of the effort which may be required if two sets of procedures are followed in relation to the same underlying subject matter. It minimises the potential for judicial review to be used to disrupt the smooth operation of statutory procedures which may be adequate to meet the justice of the case. It promotes proportionate allocation of judicial resources for dispute resolution and saves the High Court from undue pressure of work so that it remains available to provide speedy relief in other judicial review cases in fulfilment of its role as protector of the rule of law, where its intervention really is required. 57. In my judgment the principle is applicable in the present tax context. The basic object of the tax regime is to ensure that tax is properly collected when it is due and the taxpayer is not otherwise obliged to pay sums to the state. The regime for appeals on the merits in tax cases is directed to securing that basic objective and is more effective than judicial review to do so: it ensures that a taxpayer is only ultimately liable to pay tax if the law says so, not because HMRC consider that it should. To allow judicial review to intrude alongside the appeal regime risks disrupting the smooth collection of tax and the efficient functioning of the appeal procedures in a way which is not warranted by the need to protect the fundamental interests of the taxpayer. Those interests are ordinarily sufficiently and appropriately protected by the appeal regime. Since the basic objective of the tax regime is the proper collection of tax which is due, which is directly served by application of the law to the facts on an appeal once the tax collection process has been initiated, the lawfulness of the approach adopted by HMRC when taking the decision to initiate the process is not of central concern. Moreover, by legislating for a full right of appeal on fact and law, Parliament contemplated that there will be cases where there might have been some error of law by HMRC at the initiation stage but also contemplates that the appropriate way to deal with that sort of problem will be by way of appeal. 58. For reasons of this kind it has long been established at the highest level that “Where Parliament has provided by statute appeal procedures, as in the taxing statutes, it will only be very rarely that the courts will allow the collateral process of judicial review to be used to attack an appealable decision”: In re Preston[1985] 1 AC 835 , 852D per Lord Scarman; see also p. 852F (“I accept that the court cannot in the absence of special circumstances decide by way of judicial review to be unfair that which the commissioners by taking action against the taxpayer have determined to be fair”
“51. Where Parliament has enacted a statutory scheme for appeals in respect of certain decisions, an appeal will in ordinary circumstances be regarded as a suitable alternative remedy in relation to such decisions which ought to be pursued rather than having resort to judicial review: Glencore Energy, above, paras 55–58; Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society, above, para 19. Otherwise, use of judicial review would undermine the regime for challenging decisions which Parliament considers to be appropriate in that class of case.”
“82. However, it is well established that judicial review will only be granted if there is no suitable alternative remedy: Sharma v Brown-Antoine, para 14; In re McAleenon[2024] 3 WLR 803 , paras 50–64. Where there is a statutory right of appeal in respect of an order, that is regarded as a suitable alternative remedy (save in exceptional circumstances) and will operate as a defence to a claim in judicial review to challenge the order in issue: McAleenon, para 51; R (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain) v Charity Commission[2016] 1 WLR 2625 , para 19 and R (Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Comrs[2017] 4 WLR 213 , paras 55–58 . Therefore, if the individual wishes to challenge the detention order in circumstances where there is a right of appeal, they are obliged to do so by way of appeal and are precluded from doing so by judicial review. Although not usually described as such, the suitable alternative remedy rule is a form of abuse of process doctrine. It means that the judicial review procedure cannot be used inappropriately, ie where there is another suitable remedy available.”
“…The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the "intention of Parliament" is an objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or other persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is it the subjective intention of the draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual members of either House. These individuals will often have widely varying intentions. Their understanding of the legislation and the words used may be impressively complete or woefully inadequate. Thus, when courts say that such-and-such a meaning "cannot be what Parliament intended", they are saying only that the words under consideration cannot reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning.”
“It is not suggested that byelaw 20 was itself ultra vires the powers which the primary legislation conferred upon the British Railways Board. Objection is, however, made to the administrative decision by which no smoking notices came to be displayed on the trains.”
“(d) ‘appellant’ means a person who brings or seeks to bring an appeal; (e) ‘respondent’ means – (i) a person other than the appellant who was a party to the proceedings in the lower court and who is affected by the appeal; and (ii) a person who is permitted by the appeal court to be a party to the appeal;” (i) a person other than the appellant who was a party to the proceedings in the lower court and who is affected by the appeal; and (ii) a person who is permitted by the appeal court to be a party to the appeal;”