Stephanie Wills, R (on the application of) v The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman [2025] EWHC 1516 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 1516 (Admin)

Case No AC-2024-LON-003051

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 19/06/2025

Before

MR JUSTICE LINDEN

THE KING

(on the application of)

Between

STEPHANIE WILLSClaimant

THE PARLIAMENTARY AND HEALTH SERVICE OMBUDSMANDefendant

HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVEInterested Party

The Claimant in person for in person

Joseph Thomas (instructed by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman) for Defendant

Hearing Hearing date: 10 June 2025

Judgment Approved by the court for handing down (subject to editorial corrections)

Mr Justice Linden:

Introduction

[1]This was a rolled up hearing ordered by Mr Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 4 February 2025. With the consent of the parties, the hearing was conducted remotely owing to the unavailability of a court room.

[2]Proceedings were filed on 6 September 2024. In her Claim Form, Mrs Wills alleges that the decision of the Defendant dated 6 June 2024, rejecting her application for a review of its earlier substantive decision dated 20 May 2024, was irrational. This is disputed by the Defendant who argues that permission should be refused on the merits.

[3]As will be apparent the Claim Form is, on any view, out of time in relation to the 20 May substantive decision. In relation to the 6 June decision, it was filed on the last day of the 3 month time limit specified under CPR Rule 54.5. Mr Thomas also submits on behalf of the Defendant that the Claim Form was not filed “promptly” as required by Rule 54.5(1)(a) and permission should be refused on this basis and/or pursuant to section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 as well.

Background

[4]This matter has a lengthy history but, in view of the narrow ambit of the challenge in this court, it is only necessary to set out the following.

[5]On 30 May 2017, Mrs Wills’ husband tragically died in his garden at home. The precise details of what happened are in dispute but Mrs Wills told me that he had a metal cable in his hand, on which he was hanging a sunshade, when he was electrocuted by an overhead power line (“OHPL”) near the garden. UK Power Network (“UKPN”), the relevant distribution network operator, notified the Health and Safety Executive (“the HSE”) that day.

[6]On 31 May 2017, a Regulatory Inspector and two Specialist Electrical Inspectors from the HSE visited the scene of the accident for the purposes of considering whether UKPN had complied with its duty to ensure that the high voltage line involved in the incident was compliant with the requirements of the Electrical Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 2002 (“ESQCR 2002”). The evidence which was gathered by them was discussed and reviewed with their line manager, a Principal Specialist Electrical Inspector, and it was concluded that UKPN had taken reasonable steps to control the risks of an electrical incident in the area where Mr Wills was killed, and there had therefore been compliance with ESQCR 2002. The HSE inspectors found that the overhead power line was at a height which was in excess of the legal minimum, warning signs were attached to the poles at either end of the line and, while the area was wooded, the line itself was clear of obstruction. As the evidence did not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there had been a breach by UKPN of the ESQCR 2002 which had led to the death of Mr Wills, the HSE decided not to take the matter further.

[7]On 17 July 2017, Mrs Wills made a written complaint to the HSE about this decision. However, her letter appears to have been mislaid.

[8]Mrs Wills made a further complaint to the HSE nearly 3 years later, in May 2020. That complaint was rejected at stages 1 and 2 and the stage 2 decision was set out in a letter from the HSE dated 3 July 2020. The essential point made in this letter was that the evidence before the HSE did not establish to the criminal standard of proof, as required, that there had been a breach of the ESQCR 2002. The reasons for this conclusion were explained.

[9]On 23 July 2020, Mrs Wills complained to the Defendant about the HSE’s decision and, on 11 May 2021, she was notified by the Defendant, with apologies for the delay, that it had decided not to investigate her complaint further given that she had brought a civil claim against UKPN which was on going. The standard of proof applicable in those proceedings was, of course different to the standard which was being applied by the HSE. Mrs Wills was told that she could revert to the Defendant, if she wished to, following the determination of her civil claim.

[10]This 11 May 2021 decision of the Defendant was the subject of a claim for judicial review by Mrs Wills (CO/2708/2021). However, on 27 June 2022, HHJ Auerbach, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission on the basis that the Defendant had stated that it was willing to consider Mrs Wills’ complaint when her civil claim had been determined.

[11]In the meantime, on 3 March 2022, Mrs Wills’ claim against UKPN was settled. More than a year later, on 1 July 2023, Mrs Wills made a formal complaint to the Defendant about the HSE’s investigation into her late husband’s death. Before that complaint was determined, Mrs Wills provided the HSE with information which had been gathered in the course of the civil proceedings against UKPN. The HSE agreed to review that information, which it did.

[12]On 9 February 2024 the HSE notified Mrs Wills of its decision on the review. In short, it had concluded that no further investigation of the matter was appropriate. The 9 February 2024 letter explained that:

“As part of our review, we identified a discrepancy, between the information supplied by the UKPN engineer and HSE’s specialist inspector, on the distance between the high voltage line and the tree. To understand that discrepancy, we went back to the specialist inspector and, in doing so, identified that HSE held photographs that we had not previously identified as held ie within the organisation. This is because the photographs were not held within HSE’s corporate document repository. In the interests of transparency, having identified these photographs, we are including them now as part of our reply. However, after a careful consideration of the information that you have provided, we remain of the view that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a breach, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the Electrical Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations (ESQCR 2002) in relation to the death of your husband.”

[13]On 20 May 2024, the Defendant notified Mrs Wills of its decision not to uphold her complaint about the HSE’s investigation into her late husband’s death (‘the substantive decision’). I return to this decision below.

[14]On 25 May 2024, Mrs Wills wrote to the Defendant stating that she wished to appeal. Her letter enclosed a 10 page paragraph by paragraph analysis of the Defendant’s substantive decision which set out each paragraph of that decision in turn and her response to that paragraph where there was a point which she wished to make. In short, she challenged a number of the HSE’s findings and conclusions and disagreed with the Defendant’s acceptance of those findings and conclusions.

[15]On 6 June 2024, the Defendant notified Mrs Wills that it had decided not to review its substantive decision. Again, I will come back to this decision below.

[16]The 6 June letter went on to notify Mrs Wills of the option of challenging the Defendant’s decision by way of a claim for judicial review. It provided her with links to the Administrative Court Guide. It informed her that it was usual to set out a proposed claim in a pre-action protocol letter and requested that if she wished to pursue legal action she should send such a letter to postal and email addresses which were provided. The letter also notified Mrs Wills of the requirement to issue claims for judicial review promptly and in any event no later than 3 months after the grounds for the claim arose. It recommended that she seek legal advice if she was considering a claim for judicial review and it drew attention to the risk of an award of costs against her if she was unsuccessful.

Legal framework

[17]In analysing Mrs Wills’ claim for judicial review it is important to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction which the Defendant was exercising in this case, and the limited scope for interference by this Court in the Defendant’s exercise of that jurisdiction. As to the former, section 5 of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 empowers the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, subject to certain caveats and conditions, to “investigate any action taken by or on behalf of a government department or other authority to which [the 1967] Act applies, being action taken in the exercise of administrative functions of that department or authority.”.

[18]Importantly, section 5(5) of the 1967 Act provides that:

“(5) In determining whether to initiate, continue or discontinue an investigation under this Act, the Commissioner shall, subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, act in accordance with his own discretion; and any question whether a complaint is duly made under this Act shall be determined by the Commissioner.”

[19]Section 7(2) also provides that the procedure for conducting an investigation shall be such as the Commissioner considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.

[20]Moreover, section 12(3) of the 1967 Act provides as follows:

“(3) It is hereby declared that nothing in this Act authorises or requires the Commissioner to question the merits of a decision taken without maladministration by a government department or other authority in the exercise of a discretion vested in that department or authority.”

[21]The issue which the Defendant was permitted to consider in this case, and did consider, was therefore whether there was any maladministration by the HSE in coming to its decisions, on 3 July 2020 and 9 February 2024, that it would not investigate the death of Mr Wills further. It was not the Defendant’s function merely to decide whether it agreed with those decisions or whether the decisions could have been made in a better way. Unless it concluded that there was maladministration, the Defendant could not interfere with the decisions of the HSE.

[22]As to what may constitute “maladministration”, in R (Rapp) v Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman

[2015] EWHC 1344 (Admin)

Andrews J (as she then was) said this at [37]:

““Maladministration” is not defined in the 1967 Act. It will cover “bias, neglect, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on”

. The list is open-ended, but the type of behaviour that qualifies concerns the manner in which a decision is reached or a discretion is exercised, rather than the merits of that decision or of the discretion itself…:”

[23]At [38] she went on to extract the following general propositions from the case law:

“i) The Ombudsman has no duty to determine questions of law. He/she is not acting as a surrogate of the court in determining whether there has been unlawful conduct, but rather, investigating a complaint of maladministration under the powers conferred on him/her by statute. ii) Maladministration is a different concept from unlawfulness; consequently in determining whether the conduct complained of amounted to maladministration, the Ombudsman is not constrained by the legal principles which would apply if they were determining whether that conduct was unlawful; iii) Unlawfulness is neither a precondition of, nor concomitant to a finding of maladministration; there may be maladministration without unlawfulness, and vice versa. iv) Even if, with the benefit of hindsight, it may seem obvious that the public body got something wrong, the Ombudsman must look at the question of maladministration on the basis of the information that the public body had at the relevant time, and not with the benefit of hindsight;”

[24]As far as the role of the Administrative Court in relation to the decision of the Ombudsman is concerned, Andrews J went on to say this:

“v) It is for the Ombudsman to decide and explain what standard he or she is going to apply in determining whether there was maladministration, whether there was a failure to adhere to that standard, and what the consequences are; that standard will not be interfered with by a court unless it reflects an unreasonable approach. vi) However the court will interfere if the Ombudsman fails to apply the standard that they say they are applying; vii) The question whether any given set of facts amounts to maladministration or causes injustice to a complainant is a matter for the Ombudsman alone. Whatever it may think about the conclusion reached, and even if it fundamentally disagrees with that conclusion, the Court may not usurp the statutory function of the Ombudsman. It can only interfere if the decision reached was irrational. viii) An Ombudsman’s report should be read fairly, as a whole, and should not be subject to a hypercritical analysis nor construed as if it were a statute or a contract.”

[25]At [39] she added:

“Therefore, even if what the relevant public body (in this case Ofqual) did or said turns out in hindsight to have been based on a misunderstanding of the law, it will not necessarily lead to a finding of maladministration by the Ombudsman, especially if the legal issue is not entirely straightforward and the mistake was an understandable one for a layman to have made.”

[26]I was also referred to authorities including R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Dyer

[1994] WLR 621

at 626E-H where the Divisional Court emphasised that Parliament intended the Ombudsman to have a broad discretion as to how to proceed in relation to a complaint as indicated by, for example, section 5(5) of the 1967 Act. The fact that the exercise of this discretion inevitably involves a high degree of subjective judgment means that it will always be difficult to mount an effective challenge on grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness.

[27]It is also worth noting that the HSE itself had a broad discretion as to how it responded to the incident which led to the death of Mr Wills. There is no dispute that UKPN owed duties to Mr Wills under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 notwithstanding that the incident did not occur in his workplace or during the course of his employment: see section 3. The HSE therefore had powers to investigate under section 14 of the 1974 Act, but the question whether to investigate is a matter for the HSE. The powers arise where the HSE “thinks it necessary or expedient to investigate for any of the general purposes of this Part”. The breadth of this discretion and the reluctance of the courts to interfere with its exercise are well known: see S v Health and Safety Executive

[2010] EWHC 560 (Admin)

at [11] in which Hickinbottom J (as he then was) made a comparison with the powers of the Commissioner of Police or the Chief Constable to make decisions as to the use of the resources of the police for operational purposes.

[28]In addition to this, the health and safety legislation which the HSE polices requires the HSE to assess the evidence, to make findings and to exercise judgment as to the degree of risk inherent in a given arrangement, and the measures which it is appropriate to take to mitigate that risk having regard to the magnitude of the risk and the consequences if it becomes a reality. I also agree with Mr Thomas that the Defendant would therefore be entitled to exercise a degree of caution in second guessing technical and evaluative judgments by the HSE about matters of health and safety given that these were clearly within the HSE’s sphere of expertise and without the Defendant’s. Moreover, the inspectors on whose findings the HSE relied visited the scene and saw the evidence for themselves. The Defendant was not in a good position to second guess the accuracy of their assessment or their judgment as to whether there had been compliance with the relevant regulatory framework.

[29]As would be expected, HSE has policies which it follows in taking decisions about investigation and enforcement. In the case of accidents other than accidents at work, which are not required to be reported under the Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (“RIDDOR”), the relevant policy is the ‘Guidance for Field Operations Directorate’ (“the FOD Guidance”). This provides, so far as material, as follows:

“Fatalities (or serious incidents) not reportable under RIDDOR which should be considered for investigation 9. In these cases, initial enquiries may be necessary, and decisions on whether or not to investigate must be endorsed by a Head of Operations. To proceed to investigation, all the following criteria need to be met: (a) the incident resulted in death (or where the injuries are so serious that death might have resulted); and (b) there are, in relation to the circumstances that caused the incident, expected health and safety standards that are defined and known by the industry/sector in question; and (c) a clear and likely causal link has been established between a failure to achieve those expected standards and the resulting harm (it may be appropriate to wait for a postmortem to confirm causality); and (d) admissible evidence is likely to be available. Admissible evidence may not be available, for example where there is a significant length time delay before HSE is involved, or where witnesses are unlikely to be traceable.”

[30]In this case the view of the HSE was that criterion 9(c) was not satisfied to the criminal standard and the issue for the Defendant was therefore whether there was maladministration by the HSE in coming to that view. The decisions of the Defendant in the present case The substantive decision

The decisions of the Defendant in the present case

[31]In this case, the Defendant’s decision of 20 May 2024 ran to 9 pages and 59 paragraphs. At the beginning, it set out the Defendant’s decision that it had not found any indications of maladministration in the way in which the HSE had made its decision. It then set out the complaint made by Mrs Wills, the background, the evidence and the law, policy, guidance and standards which it had taken into consideration before moving on to set out its reasoning in detail. Its reasons explained the statutory framework and the relevant policy considerations, and the basis for the HSE’s findings. Of particular importance, given the focus on whether there had been maladministration, was paragraph 33 which stated as follows:

“We have looked at how the HSE reached its decision that part C of the FOD was not met. The primary evidence available to the HSE was the condition of the line at the site of the incident, and the HSE says this was assessed by the inspectors. The HSE explained that, following a review of the OHPL, the specialist inspectors and the principal specialist electrical inspector concluded that UKPN had taken reasonable precautions to control the risks of an electrical incident in the specific area where the incident occurred because it had acted in line with the requirements of the ESQCR 2002 cited above.”

[32]The 20 May letter went on to address Mrs Wills’ complaint that HSE had not considered UKPN’s risk assessments in relation to the overhead power line as part of its enquiries. The Defendant confirmed that it had asked the HSE for more information about this issue and the explanation which it had been given. Whilst the HSE acknowledged Mrs Wills’ concern that it should have considered UKPN’s risk assessments in relation to the overhead power line, the HSE considered that it was sufficient to carry out an inspection of the overhead power line as it was at the time of the incident as this would tell the inspectors whether the arrangements met the requisite standards at the material time and whether any failure to comply with those standards had caused the death of Mr Wills. This was the HSE’s general approach under its investigation procedure and consideration of the issue of risk assessments therefore would not have led to a different outcome.

[33]The 20 May letter also dealt with the required standards for the height and accessibility of overhead power lines as set out in the Energy Networks Association (ENA) Technical specifications 43-8 Issue 3, 2004. The Defendant noted that overhead power lines should be a minimum of 3.0m from any object which is ordinarily accessible or any surface of a building, and should be a minimum of 0.8m from a part of a tree which is unable to support a ladder or climber, and 3.0m from the part of a tree which can support a ladder or climber. Moreover, ESQCR 2002 states that overhead lines should be at a minimum height of 5.2 metres and that no overhead line shall (so far as is reasonably practicable) come so close to any building, tree, or structure as to cause danger.

[34]The letter stated that the Defendant had been provided with HSE’s notes of its inquiries shortly after the incident and from the more recent review of the case. The Defendant made clear that it had scrutinised this evidence and asked the HSE further questions about what appeared from the notes. At paras 44-52 the Defendant said this:

“44. We enquired whether the HSE would expect any additional precautions to be in place for an uninsulated cable in a heavily wooded area. The HSE advised that the need for additional precautions depends on the specific location of the line, and the site visit established that there was no reason to expect any additional measures based on those already in place. 45. With regards to the most recent review of the case, Mrs [Wills] provided HSE with the information she had obtained from her civil mediation case. Of particular focus was the differences in opinion between UKPN, HSE, and Mrs [Wills] on the OHPL clearances from the trees. 46. In reviewing this evidence, the HSE held a discussion regarding the distance of the OHPLs from the trees. The HSE says the distance was measured by eye, as no mobile elevating work platform (MEWP) was available. The HSE re-reviewed a collection of photos of the area, which it considers demonstrates that clearance distances were met. 47. The HSE has acknowledged there is some discrepancy of opinion in relation to this distance and puts this down to the lack of MEWP, meaning both HSE and UKPN made an estimate measurement by eye. 48. We asked HSE about the process of measuring the distance of the lines from the trees by eye, and it confirmed that an assessment of this type would be normal practice. The visual inspection conducted at the time reported that the clearances of the trees to the OHPL were sufficient, concluding they were far enough away from the trees that there was no danger. 49. The HSE concluded that the line was not reachable as it was above minimum standards, and a distance away, had the required ‘danger of death’ notices in place, and did not have climbable branches in proximity. 50. It also reflected that the damage to the metal line being thrown from the garden over the tree branches was consistent with electrical arcing. In this context, it concluded that the line likely made loose contact with the OHPL, rather than jumped a distance between the line and the overhead powerline. 51. Therefore, the HSE concluded that the evidence gathered did not show, beyond reasonable doubt, that there was an identifiable breach of the ESQR 2002 standards for OHPLs that led to Mr [Wills’] death and allowed it to take further action. 52. After considering all the relevant evidence available to us, we have not seen any indications of maladministration in the way HSE has applied its guidance and standards in this case. The evidence available indicates the HSE followed the relevant guidance, policy, and requirements of the legislation when determining whether there was a failure to achieve the expected standards for OHPLs set out in the ESQCR 2002.”

The decision on Mrs Wills’ request for a review

[35]The Defendant’s 6 June 2024 letter explained:

“As you may know PHSO is the latest stage in the complaints process and our decisions are final. If someone can show us reasons to think our decision may be wrong, we can use our discretion to carry out a review. But a review is not a further stage in the complaints process. It is something we do on cases where we can see there is a good reason to look at our decision again to be assured it was the right one. PHSO has guidelines which help us decide whether a case should be reviewed. For example, we need to see evidence that our decision may be wrong, and the impact of the events complained about was potentially serious. After I had looked at your letter, I asked our Ombudsman Assurance Team (OAT) to consider whether PHSO should review the decision. OAT considered your complaint about our decision independently. OAT do this by looking at the complaint about our decision, rather than the original complaint, to see whether, under PHSO’s guidelines. It should be reviewed. Following their review, OAT has decided we do not need to review PHSO’s decision because your review request has shown no reason or new evidence that calls into question our decision on your complaint.”

Summary of Mrs Wills’ case

[36]Section 2 of the Claim Form and paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts and Grounds make clear that Mrs Wills’ challenge in this case is to the Defendant’s refusal, on 6 June 2024, to review its earlier substantive decision. However the Statement of Facts and Grounds does not specifically address that particular decision. Rather, the document attacks specified paragraphs of the substantive decision, as was Mrs Wills’ approach in her letter to the Defendant of 25 May 2024.

[37]Notwithstanding Mr Douglas-Jones’s direction, in his Order dated 4 February 2025, that Mrs Wills file and serve her skeleton argument not less than 21 days before the hearing, she did not do so until 2.15pm on the day before the hearing having been chased by the Court. In her 3 page skeleton argument, which she told me was drafted by her solicitor, Mrs Wills says that she has taken 6 June 2024 as “the trigger date”. She states that she believes that it is clear to the Court what she is seeking to challenge and that it is right and just that she be permitted to do so. If she is out of time then she seeks an extension of time.

[38]I therefore sought clarification from Mrs Wills of which decision she is challenging. Although I asked her more than once, her answers were unclear. However, I did not understand her to be seeking to depart from her pleaded case which, in my view, clearly challenges the 6 June decision. There was no application to amend. Notwithstanding this, from an abundance of caution I have considered her claim on the basis that she maintains that both the substantive decision and the refusal to review it were irrational.

[39]In Mrs Wills’ skeleton argument she relies on the matters set out in her Statement of Facts and Grounds and highlights certain points in that document. She also emphasises that her motivation in bringing her claim is to protect the public by ensuring that the circumstances of her husband’s death are fully investigated and the relevant regulatory framework is fully complied with in the future. Her case is that the investigation carried out by the HSE was “flawed and/or inadequate, failing as it did to consider all relevant details with a view to protecting members of the public”.

[40]In her Statement of Facts and Grounds, Mrs Wills puts forward a number of arguments as to why the HSE’s conclusion that paragraph 9(c) of the FOD Guidance is wrong and its investigation and assessment process and its review were, as she puts it, “inadequate and perfunctory”. Her arguments make reference to evidence from her civil claim and other evidence about what happened, albeit only some of this has been put before the Court by her. A key argument Mrs Wills puts forward is that there was the discrepancy between information provided by the PNUKUKPN engineer and the assessment of HSE’s specialist inspector as to the distance between the high voltage line and the tree which was identified by the HSE in its 9 February 2024 letter. She disagrees with the measuring of distances between the line and the tree by visual inspection and she argues that the distances were shorter than the HSE inspectors found.

[41]Mrs Wills also criticises that HSE’s view that there was adequate signage to indicate that danger. She says that there must have been an identifiable risk given that, around 6 weeks after the accident steps were taken by UKPN to increase the safety of the powerlines e.g. by insulating the cables and increasing their height above the ground in certain parts. She also complains that UKPN did not have a valid risk assessment in place.

[42]In her oral submissions Mrs Wills particularly emphasised her view that the HSE had not acted in accordance with its mission statement in that, in her view, it had declined to investigate because this was not a workplace accident. She also reiterated her arguments that the HSE had failed to have regard to what she said was the failure by PNUKUKPN to carry out risk assessments. She developed her argument that the HSE’s assessment of the distance between the overhead power line and the tree on which the cable in Mr Wills’ hand was hanging was directly contradicted by PNUK UKPN’s own evidence in the civil claim. This evidence was to the effect that the distance was 30cm rather than the 3 metres which Mrs Wills argued was required on the basis, she argued, that the cable was on a branch which must have been capable of supporting a ladder.

[43]The relief which Mrs Wills seeks is(a) a “Mandatory order whereby the relevant regulations are complied with and applied appropriately” and

(b) “A Quashing Order quashing the Decision of the Defendant in order that these issues can be ventilated once more transparently and for the benefit of the public at large”. Decision The merits

Decision

[44]Taking the substantive decision first, it is plain that the HSE did not decide not to investigate the death of Mr Wills because it did not occur in the workplace or in the course of his work or employment. The HSE did investigate but decided not to take the matter further because it was not satisfied that “a clear and likely causal link [had] been established between a failure to achieve [the] expected standards and the resulting harm”. It considered that there had not been a failure to achieve the expected standards or, insofar as there had been (e.g. because there had been inadequate risk assessments) that had not been the cause of Mr Wills’ death. The HSE then reviewed the matter in the light of information which became available as a result of Mrs Wills’ civil claim against PNUKUKPN. It identified a discrepancy between the views of the UKPN engineer and the HSE’s specialist inspector in terms of the distance between the tree and the relevant overhead power line. It considered this matter by reference to photographs which the inspector had taken and concluded that this discrepancy did not affect the conclusion which had been reached.

[45]As far as Mrs Wills’ other arguments are concerned, as I have said, the issue for this Court is whether the Defendant’s decision that the HSE was not guilty of maladministration was irrational. I do not consider that it is arguable that it was. As noted above, the Defendant questioned the HSE about the way in which it had carried out its assessment. It specifically asked the HSE about the use of visual inspection to determine the relevant clearances between the tree and the overhead powerline, and about the fact that the HSE had based its conclusion on an inspection of the scene of the accident and not the adequacy or frequency of prior risk assessments. The Defendant also investigated the difference of views as to the distance between the tree and the overhead power line and noted that the HSE had re-reviewed the matter by reference to photographs taken by the inspectors at the time and was satisfied that its original assessment was correct. Having investigated the matter, the Defendant was satisfied that the HSE’s approach was in accordance its normal practice, guidance and policy, and the requirements of the legislation. There had not been maladministration by the HSE.

[46]The HSE’s view is one with which Mrs Wills disagrees. She also relies on evidence which, she argues, points to a different conclusion. And she criticises the process undertaken by the HSE for the purposes of coming to its conclusion. She puts forward legitimate arguments in support of her position but this is not sufficient for her to establish irrationality on the part of the Defendant. Even she was able to establish that a better process could or should have been followed, or that the HSE’s conclusions were wrong, that would not have been sufficient for the purposes of her claim for judicial review: it would not follow from the HSE’s decision being wrong that there had been maladministration, still less that the Defendant had reached an irrational conclusion in finding that there had not been.

[47]What Mrs Wills is unable to do is to identify evidence which establishes that the HSE’s assessments and conclusions were so clearly flawed or wrong that it was irrational for the Defendant to accept them, let alone that it was irrational for the Defendant to find other than that there had been maladministration by HSE. The ‘bottom line’, as it were, is that the Defendant was entitled to find that the HSE gave careful consideration to the matter at the time of the incident. The HSE also reached conclusions as to whether there had been compliance with the relevant regulatory framework which the Defendant was entitled to find were permissible or, at the very least, not the result of maladministration. There were arguments or evidence which pointed to a different conclusion but that did not mean that the Defendant’s conclusion that there had not been maladministration by the HSE was irrational.

[48]So I refuse permission in relation to any challenge to the Defendant’s decision of 20 May 2024 which Mrs Wills makes.

[49]As far as the 6 June 2024 decision is concerned, as I have noted, the standard which the Defendant sets itself in deciding whether to reopen a substantive decision is whether the application discloses reasons or new evidence which suggests that the substantive decision was wrong. That is an approach which the Defendant was entitled to take and a standard which it was entitled to set itself. Mrs Wills did not argue otherwise. I also agree that the Defendant was entitled to conclude that Mrs Wills’ application of 25 May 2024 did not meet this standard. Essentially, that application reargued Mrs Wills’ dispute with the HSE and UKPN and challenged their view that there had been compliance with the required standards for overhead power lines. She expressed disagreement with their view but did not put forward specific reasons or evidence to show that the HSE must have been, or had been, guilty of maladministration in coming to that view. The closest she came to doing so was to suggest that the HSE’s assessment was “substandard” and to assert, without evidence, that the HSE’s overall conclusion was biased. In theory, arguments might have been put forward which were so compelling that the Defendant was bound to conclude that its substantive decision may be wrong and should be reopened, but in practice Mrs Wills did not succeed in doing so in this case.

[50]It seems to me that there was nothing in the materials before the Defendant, including Mrs Wills’ arguments in her complaint of 1 July 2023 and her application for a review dated 25 May 2024, which began to establish a case that it would be irrational for the Defendant to decline to reopen its substantive decision of 20 May 2024. Nor is there anything in Mrs Wills’ arguments in the context of her claim for judicial review which begins to establish this proposition. The Defendant was entitled to conclude that there was no material information or evidence in Mrs Wills’ application for a review which the Defendant had not considered in coming to the substantive decision and there were no reasons put forward by Mrs Wills which demonstrated that this was a case of maladministration as opposed to the HSE simply coming to a view with which Mrs Wills disagreed.

[51]Whether Mrs Wills’ challenge is to the Defendant’s substantive decision of 20 May 2024 or its refusal of a review on 6 June 2024, then, I refuse permission on the merits. Whilst I have sympathy for her wish to leave no stone unturned in relation to her husband’s death the judicial review route in relation to the Defendant’s decision(s) does not avail her.

The time points

[52]As for the Defendant’s time points, this is not Mrs Wills’ first claim for judicial review. Moreover, the Defendant’s letter of 6 June 2024 notified her of the need to file her claim promptly or in any event no later than 3 months after the date of the decision challenged and referred her to the Administrative Court Guide, as I have noted. Mrs Wills also told me that she had been assisted by a solicitor at all material times and that he had charged her for his work, albeit she thought that he had not charged her his full commercial rate. The solicitor had been assisting her since her first claim for judicial review and he had assisted her in the drafting of her current Claim Form and, she believed, had filed it for her. He had also drafted her skeleton argument, as I have noted.

[53]No application for an extension of time was made or even indicated before Mrs Wills’ skeleton argument the day before the hearing. Even then, there was little explanation of the delay. The skeleton stated that Mrs Wills had been under immense pressure pursuing all avenues in a most traumatic period of her life and that it was right and fair that time should only run from the date when the Defendant stated that it would not review the substantive decision. In her oral submissions, Mrs Wills referred to correspondence with the HSE and the Information Commissioner but it was not clear why this prevented her from filing her Claim Form. I asked to see this correspondence and, having considered it, it does not provide any or any adequate reason for the delay. It is clear that Mrs Wills had all of the information which she needed to bring her claim for judicial review at the dates when the decisions of the Defendant were made. Mrs Wills also argued that there had been delays by HSE and the Defendant and that it was therefore unfair to criticise her for delay.

[54]Taking into account considerations of prejudice to others and detriment to good administration (see Maharaj v National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago

[2019] UKPC 5

[2019] 1 WLR 983

) I might not have refused permission to challenge the 6 June 2024 decision on the grounds that the claim was not made promptly, had that challenge had sufficient merit. But I agree with Mr Thomas that that challenge is hopeless. Mrs Will’s real case is in relation to the substantive decision.

[55]On any view, the Claim Form is out of time in relation to any challenge to the substantive decision. Mrs Wills would therefore require an extension of time. No doubt that is why the claim is pleaded as a challenge to the 6 June decision. Even if the claim had been pleaded as a challenge to the substantive decision, and that challenge had been arguable, I would not have granted an extension of time. There was no good or adequate reason for Mrs Wills to wait until 6 September 2024 to file her claim. Moreover, at the heart of her complaint are events which took place just over 9 years ago and which related to the particular situation of the particular overhead power line near Mrs Wills’ garden. Her own position is effectively that any breaches of the relevant regulations were dealt with by measures taken by PNUKUKPN shortly after the incident, and she has now recovered compensation. As I have said, I have sympathy for Mrs Wills on a personal level and I do not doubt her sincerity in wishing to expose what she believes to be failings on the part of PNUKUKPN and the HSE. But a claim for judicial review of the Defendant’s decisions, even if it were to be successful, would not achieve this given the limited ambit of the Court’s role, which I have identified above. This is not a claim where there are compelling reasons of public interest to grant an extension of time to bring the claim. Moreover, even if the claim had been upheld there is every reason to think that, by reason of the delay and the difficulties in carrying out a further or better investigation, relief would have been refused.

[56]For all of these reasons, then, I refuse permission on the merits and in the exercise of my discretion having regard to the time points. I also refuse permission pursuant to section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. In my judgment there has been undue delay in making the claim and the grant of the relief sought by Mrs Wills in this case would be detrimental to good administration.

Costs

[57]I heard arguments on costs at the hearing, albeit on a provisional basis. The Defendant seeks its costs in the sum of £4,035.80. Mrs Wills resisted this application, essentially on the basis that she was seeking to expose injustice in the public interest and to ensure that what happened to her husband did not happen to others. It was clear, from what she said, that she feels passionately that the risks in relation to overhead powerlines are not fully appreciated or investigated by the HSE and others.

[58]As is well known, where permission is refused the Defendant will generally be entitled to the costs of preparing the Acknowledgment of Service. In this case, these are in the sum of £2,218. Other than in exceptional circumstances the Defendant would not be entitled to the costs of resisting permission at a renewal hearing. However, in this case a rolled up hearing was directed which meant that the Defendant was obliged to attend and to prepare its case in full.

[59]I have concluded that Mrs Wills should pay the costs. Apart from the fact that she has been unsuccessful, I have taken into account the fact that the risk of an order for costs was pointed out to her in the Defendant’s letter of 6 June 2024. She was also asked by the Defendant to send a pre action protocol letter in the event that she was minded to take legal action but failed to do so. Instead, she waited until the final day to bring her claim. She also failed to file a skeleton argument in accordance with Mr Douglas-Jones’s Order. Whilst she is sincere, she also accepted that her real issue is with the HSE. Her claim against the Defendant was always unlikely to achieve her objectives, as she must have been advised, and it is in my view right that she should pay the costs which the Defendant has expended in dealing with her claim. I assess these costs in the sum of £3,500.