"(i) to enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of his father or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, (ii) to enter the European Union in order to participate as a full or reserve driver in Formula 1 championships of the FIA or in other championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super License, (iii) to enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team, (iv) to enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors, (v) to open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses, benefits from his race team and financial contributions from the sponsors accepted by his team can be paid to him and, (vi) to use the bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors and to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union." 14). In coming to his decision the President accepted, without prejudging the matter, that the Claimant's case appeared "prima facie not unfounded" and went on to find that: "78. The resulting damage to the applicant, in the absence of the suspension sought, may be characterised as particularly serious because it would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver in view of his age, the fact that he would not be able to train regularly in Formula 1 cars in the meantime and the likelihood that he would not be able to renew his Super License after an interruption of more than three years, should the Court annul the contested measures at the end of the dispute in the main proceedings. 79. Thus, in the absence of the suspension sought and having regard to the potential duration of the proceedings in the main action, the possibility of the applicant resuming, at the end of the main proceedings, his career as a Formula 1 driver, which very often requires his presence in the European Union, in particular in order to participate in Grand Prix, appears to be remote or, in any event, severely limited.” (emphasis added) 15). The President went on to find: "97. Furthermore, the applicant claimed, without being challenged by the Council on that point, that he is not involved in any Russian business, has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional athlete, raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 season of Formula 1 and is ready to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.” 16). Proceedings under section 38 of the 2018 Act were issued by the Claimant in the Administrative Court on20 April 2023 . As part of this Claim, the Claimant sought interim relief which mirrors the interim measures ordered by the EU General Court, set out above, in that it would allow him to do in the United Kingdom that which he is permitted to do in the European Union. 17). Swift J gave directions on24 April 2023 and there was a further directions hearing before Chamberlain J on3 May 2023 at which it was directed, amongst other things, that the Claim would be listed on 19 and 20 July. 18). The consequence of the termination of his contract by Haas and the application of the sanctions regime has been that the Claimant missed the 2022 and the 2023 Formula 1 seasons. He says that this effectively ended his racing career. His case in relation to his application for interim relief is that if he is prevented from competing in the 2024 season beginning in March 2024, his prospects of a career as a Formula 1 driver will suffer irremediable harm. Mr Keith submitted that his career would be over. The Claimant says that in order to have any chance of competing in the 2024 season he needs to begin the process of competing for a contract with a Formula 1 team immediately, and in order to do this he needs the sanctions regime to be modified by the United Kingdom on the same terms as they were modified by the European Union. Since the process of competing for a contract begins in May/June, he cannot wait until the third week of July when it is anticipated that the outcome of his claim will be known, or at least the judge dealing with the substantive issues in the Claim will be able to consider whether modification of the sanctions regime is appropriate. The statutory framework 19). For present purposes, it is not necessary to set out the statutory framework in detail. In summary, however, the 2019 Regulations were made under section 1 of the 2018 Act and they came into force on31 December 2020 . Regulation 4 provides that designations under the 2019 Regulations are "for the purposes of encouraging Russia to cease actions destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine." 20). Regulation 5 confers a power on the Secretary of State to designate persons for the purposes of imposing financial or immigration controls. Under Regulation 6, the criteria to be applied in deciding whether to designate a person are set out. This regulation provides, so far as material, as follows, with emphasis added: “(1) The Secretary of State may not designate a person under regulation 5 unless the Secretary of State – a. has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is an involved person, and b. considers that the designation of that person is appropriate, having regard to – i. the purposes stated in regulation 4, and ii. the likely significant effects of the designation on that person (as they appear to the Secretary of State to be on the basis of the information that the Secretary of State has). (2) In this regulation an ‘involved person’ means a person who – (a) is or has been involved in - (i) destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine;, or (ii) obtaining a benefit from or support the Government of Russia. (b) is owned or controlled directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7) by a person who is or has been so involved; (c) is acting on behalf of or at the direction of a person who is or has been so involved; or (d) is a member of, or associate with, a person who is or has been so involved. […] (4) For the purposes of this regulation, being ‘involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia’ means – a. carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity; b. carrying on business of economic significance to the Government of Russia; c. carrying on business in a sector of strategic significance to the Government of Russia; d. owning or controlling directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7), or working as a director (whether executive or non-executive), trustee, or other manage or equivalent, of – (i) a Government of Russia-affiliated entity; (ii) a person, other than an individual, which falls within sub-paragraph (b) or (c), a. has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is an involved person, and b. considers that the designation of that person is appropriate, having regard to – i. the purposes stated in regulation 4, and ii. the likely significant effects of the designation on that person (as they appear to the Secretary of State to be on the basis of the information that the Secretary of State has). (2) In this regulation an ‘involved person’ means a person who – (a) is or has been involved in - (i) destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine;, or (ii) obtaining a benefit from or support the Government of Russia. (b) is owned or controlled directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7) by a person who is or has been so involved; (c) is acting on behalf of or at the direction of a person who is or has been so involved; or (d) is a member of, or associate with, a person who is or has been so involved. […] (4) For the purposes of this regulation, being ‘involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia’ means – a. carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity; b. carrying on business of economic significance to the Government of Russia; c. carrying on business in a sector of strategic significance to the Government of Russia; d. owning or controlling directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7), or working as a director (whether executive or non-executive), trustee, or other manage or equivalent, of – (i) a Government of Russia-affiliated entity; (ii) a person, other than an individual, which falls within sub-paragraph (b) or (c), (6) In paragraph (2)(d), being ‘associated with’ a person includes – (a) obtaining a financial benefit or other material benefit from that person (b) being an immediate family member of that person. (7) In this regulation – […] ‘immediate family member’ means – […] (d) a child or step-child; […] ‘sector of strategic significance to the Government of Russia means – (a) the Russian chemicals sector'." 21). As the Claimant points out, he was designated on the basis of his association with his father. Mr Pobjoy told me, however, that the Defendant's position was and is that the basis for the finding of association was both Regulation 6(6)(a) and 6(6)(b), i.e. it was that there was both a financial relationship and a familial relationship between the Claimant and his father. 22). Section 22(3) of the 2018 Act provides that "if at any time the Minister considers that the required conditions are not met in respect of a relevant designation, the Minister must revoke the designation." 23). Section 23(1) of the 2018 Act provides that a person who has been designated under a power contained in regulations made under section 1 has a right to request that the designation be varied or revoked. Subsection (3) provides that on receipt of such a request, the Minister "must decide whether to vary or revoke the designation or to take no action with respect to it" subject to the requirements set out in section 22(3). 24). Sections 38(1) and (2) of the 2018 Act provide that the designated person has a right to apply to the High Court for a review of any decision under section 23(3) for that decision to be set aside. In considering such an application the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review: see section 38(4). In making an order to set aside the decision, subject to section 39 which deals with damages, the court may make any order or give any such relief as could otherwise be given in judicial review proceedings: see section 38(5). 25). There are six grounds of challenge. a) Under Ground 1, it is contended by the Claimant that the criteria for designation in Regulation 6(2)(d) (that is, the power to designate on the basis of association with an "involved person”) are unlawful at common law because they are insufficiently clear, coherent and accessible, and are liable to produce arbitrary and capricious outcomes. b) Under Ground 2, the Claimant says that the 2019 Regulations are unlawful as the Secretary of State breached the public sector equality duty undersection 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when introducing the Regulations, and when amending them from time to time. Furthermore, he argues that the decisions in his particular case to designate under the Urgent Procedure, to certify under the Standard Procedure and to decide to take no action under section 23 of the 2018 Act were unlawful on the grounds that they breached the public sector equality duty. c) Under Ground 3, it is contended that the decisions to certify under the Standard Procedure and to take no action under section 23 of the 2018 Act were ultra vires the 2019 Regulations as they were contrary to the policy and objects of the statute by which the discretion was conferred. The Claimant relies on Padfield v Minister of Agriculture Fisheries & Food.[1968] AC 997 , and argues that there is no rational connection between the designation of the Claimant and the purposes of the 2019 Regulations. d) Under Ground 4, the Claimant argues that the decisions to certify under the Standard Procedure and to take no action under section 23 of the 2018 Act were unlawful as they were not considered by the Secretary of State personally; the decisions were made by his officials. e) Under Ground 5, it is alleged that the decision to designate the Claimant constitutes an unlawful interference with his rights pursuant to Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the ECHR"). f) Under Ground 6, it is said that the decisions to designate under the Urgent Procedure, to certify under the Standard Procedure and/or to take no action under section 23 of the 2018 Act unlawfully discriminated against the Claimant on the grounds of his Russian nationality in breach ofArticle 14 of the ECHR read with Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 and/or theEquality Act 2010 . 26). Mr Keith did not address each of these grounds in turn given the nature of the application before me. It was not necessary for him to do so as the grounds are developed fully in writing in the Particulars of Claim and then helpfully summarised in the skeleton argument prepared by Mr Keith and his team. Instead, Mr Keith added a series of broad submissions on the overall merits of the case, all of which he said showed that sanctioning the Claimant was fundamentally unfair. a) He submitted – and this was uncontroversial – that the application of sanctions to an individual is a draconian measure. b) He took me to documents which showed that the Urgent Procedure undertaken at the first stage of the series of decisions in relation to the Claimant involved making decisions about batches of individuals, and doing so urgently. He pointed out that therefore at that stage of the process there was no individual consideration of the Claimant's case. c) He suggested that the only basis for the finding of association in this case is that the Claimant, as he put it, “is his father's son”. He also referred to this as being “an accident of his birth”. He submitted that there is no evidence of financial support being provided by the Claimant's father. d) Mr Keith argued, as he does in Ground 1, that the concept of “association” is a vague one and he pointed out that it was necessary for it to be clarified by amendments made to the 2019 Regulations in July 2022. e) He pointed out, in relation to the arguments about the Caltona principle, that the decisions in this case were made by officials rather than by the Minister. He said that arguments that there would be practical difficulties with the Minister considering each designation case in turn were unfounded given that the decisions in this case had been considered by the Minister, albeit the decision had ultimately been left to his officials. f) Mr Keith took me to documents in relation to the public sector equality duty assessment which was carried out and argued that they showed that the assessment was only made in relation to the Regulations generally rather than in relation to the individual impact on the Claimant. He also argued that, in any event, those assessments were flawed for various reasons. g) Finally, he submitted that there is no evidence of any personal association between the Claimant and the Russian regime, nor of any public support for the Russian regime by the Claimant, nor indeed any support from him for the actions of Russia in the Ukraine. The principles applicable to applications for interim relief 27). Although there is no specific provision for interim relief under the 2018 Act, it was not in dispute that the court has jurisdiction to order such relief undersection 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 , applyingCPR Part 25 . Nor were the principles applicable to the determination of any such application in dispute. These principles were helpfully summarised in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R (Public and Commercial Services Union & Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2022] EWCA Civ 840 ("the Rwanda case"). 28). In summary, the American Cyanamid principles are modified in recognition of the public law context. As is well known these principles require the court to ask as a threshold question whether there is a serious issue to be tried. If there is, the court considers whether damages would be an adequate remedy in the event that the injunction was wrongly granted or wrongly refused. If damages would not be an adequate remedy in either of these events, the Court considers whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of the relief sought or any other relief as an interim measure, pending the determination of the substantive issues in the claim. This is a question of the balance of justice, or the relative risk of injustice. As Lord Hoffmann put it in National Commercial Bank Ltd v Olint Corporation Ltd[2009] UKPC 15 ;[2009] 1 WLR 1405 [16-17]: "16. … The purpose of such an injunction is to improve the chances of the court being able to do justice after a determination of the merits at the trial. At the interlocutory stage, the court must therefore assess whether granting or withholding an injunction is more likely to produce a just result. … 17. … the court has to engage in trying to predict whether granting or withholding an injunction is more or less likely to cause irremediable prejudice (and to what extent) if it turns out that the injunction should not have been granted or withheld, as the case may be. The basic principle is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other.” 29). The principal relevance of the public law context includes the point that, as Sir Clive Lewis said in his book Judicial Remedies in Public Law Para.8-24: "
"' 66. There is support at first instance for the proposition that, in a public law claim, the court will generally be reluctant to grant interim relief in the absence of a 'strong prima facie case' to justify the granting of an interim injunction … This is not to say that the relevant case law at first instance supports the concept of a 'strong prima facie case' being deployed as a 'threshold' or 'gateway' test in such cases, but rather that the underlying strength of the substantive challenge is likely to be a significant factor in the balance of considerations weighing for or against the granting of an injunction.'” 32). Importantly, in the context of the Claimant's application in the present case, in the Rwanda case the Court of Appeal agreed with Swift J that, in assessing the balance of convenience, the relevant period is the period between the hearing of the application for interim relief and the determination of the substantive claim. At para.93 Singh LJ said this: "93. The starting point for the judge’s assessment was that the interim period would be relatively short, about six or seven weeks, until around the end of July. He was right to take that view. We do not accept the submission that the judge was obliged to take into account the possibility of appeals and further delay after the judgment of the High Court has been given after the substantive hearing. The hypothesis for the Appellants' case must be that they will succeed at the substantive hearing…” 33). It follows from this that the starting point for my assessment must be the question what difference the relief applied for by the Claimant would make if granted today as compared with the position as at the end of the hearing in July, a period of approximately six weeks? 34). I also take on board the Claimant's points that it may take two to three weeks to obtain a visa if his claim is successful. Arguably this is a neutral factor, given that there would be the same period of delay whilst a visa was obtained, whether relief was granted today or in the third week of July. However, I take the point that the timing of the delay may matter given the evidence that negotiations in relation to Formula 1 contracts intensify from July onwards. The Claimant's submissions in outline 35). The draft order seeks the following relief: "1. It is ordered that the Claimant be allowed: a) To enter the UK to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of his father, DM, or to persons designated in the UK; b) To enter the UK to participate as a full or reserve driver in Formula 1 championships of the FIA, or in other racing championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super License; c) To enter the UK to undergo medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team; d) To enter the UK to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors; e) To open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses, benefits from his race team and financial contributions from the sponsors accepted by his team can be paid to him; f) To use the bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel to, from and in the UK." 36). In outline Mr Keith's arguments were as follows. 37). He submitted that what the Claimant seeks by way of interim relief is a modest variation for a time limited period. The activities which he seeks to be permitted to carry on in the United Kingdom pending the substantive hearing in July are specific activities and they would only be permitted to be carried out for specific purposes. There would therefore merely be a modification to the sanctions regime rather than a wholesale lifting of that regime in so far as it applied to the Claimant. Moreover, submitted Mr Keith, that modification will come to an end should the Claimant's claim be unsuccessful in due course. 38). Secondly, Mr Keith argued that the Claimant was merely seeking an opportunity to see if he could salvage his racing career. This opportunity would be irremediably lost if he were not granted the relief sought whereas if it were granted this would not in any way prejudice the position of the Defendant. More generally, if the opportunity were not given, Mr Keith the position would be irretrievable as far as the Claimant's Formula 1 career is concerned. 39). Thirdly, Mr Keith gave significantly greater emphasis to the relief sought at paras.1(a) and 1(f) of the draft order. He stressed the evidence that the majority of Formula 1 teams are based in the United Kingdom; that the contractual negotiation cycle for the 2024 season has begun or will begin very shortly; and the evidence to the effect that the Claimant needs to attend meetings in the United Kingdom in person. For this purpose, submitted Mr Keith, the Claimant needed the relief set out at para.1(a) of the draft order. Mr Keith also submitted that he would need the ability to spend money whilst in this country, albeit the relief necessary in order to achieve that would not be as currently drafted in limbs (e) and (f) of para.1. It would need to be formulated if I were minded to grant relief. 40). Next, Mr Keith accepted that the relief sought in sub-paras 1(b) to (e) of the draft order did not describe activities which the Claimant was likely to undertake before the outcome of the substantive hearing. But, in answer to the questions from court, he confirmed that he nevertheless sought this relief. He explained that this was important in terms of confidence in the Claimant on the part of prospective hirers in Formula 1 teams, negotiators or others who were dealing with him. An order which merely gave him permission to come to the United Kingdom and an ability to spend money whilst here would not give sufficient comfort as to his prospects of ultimately serving as a Formula 1 driver in their team. On the contrary, such an order would potentially increase their misgivings. 41). Finally, Mr Keith submitted that there would be no prejudice to the Defendant's position if the relief sought were granted. There was no sense in which the public interest weighed against the grant of the Claimant's application. In relation to the concern on the part of the Defendant about the Claimant's perception or the perception of the public, domestically or abroad, in the event that the court were to grant such relief, Mr Keith's principal answer was that I should approach the matter on the basis that the Claimant and the public would reach an informed view about the making of any such order. They would recognise that this was a decision of the court. They would therefore appreciate that the order in no sense undermined or called into question the sanctions regime. No harm to that regime, or undermining of it, would therefore be occasioned. Discussion and conclusions 42). As far as the merits of the challenge under section 38 of the 2018 Act are concerned, Mr Keith submitted that this is the first such challenge to come before the courts and that the Claim raises novel and important issues of principle. He also submitted that the Defendant has not come close to demonstrating that the Claim is unarguable or has no real prospects of success. However, he did not submit that at this stage he has established a strong prima facie case, and in my view rightly so, given that the Defendant places a number of highly respectable arguments in his way. In summary these arguments are as follows. 43). By way of preliminary, Mr Pobjoy observed, accurately in my view, that the thrust of the points made by Mr Keith in his oral submissions had been focused on the Urgent Procedure implemented in March 2022 whereas the matter had been fully considered by the Secretary of State in May 2022 under the Standard Procedure and, said Mr Pobjoy, fully reconsidered in February/March 2023 pursuant to the Claimant's application under section 23 of the 2018 Act. 44). Turning briefly to Mr Pobjoy's arguments in relation to the specific grounds of challenge: a) As far as Ground 1 is concerned the Defendant's case is that the making of regulations permitting designation on the basis of association is required by section 11(3) of the 2018 Act and, in any event, the fact that the Claimant is associated with his father for the purposes of the 2019 Regulations is clear, given the terms of Regulation 6(6) and 6(7). b) As to Ground 2, the Defendant says that a full public sector equality duty assessment was conducted in relation to the 2019 Regulations and the relevant amendments to them, albeit the Claimant contends that they were flawed in various respects. As far as the suggestion that there should have been public sector equality duty assessments for each individual decision under the 2019 Regulations is concerned, this is highly debatable as a general proposition and, indeed is disputed by the Defendant. In any event, the Defendant contends that the Claimant was beyond the territorial reach of theEquality Act 2010 given that he was not in the United Kingdoms at any of the material times. In this connection, the Defendant relies on Turani & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2021] 1 WLR 5793 in which arguments to this effect were successfully deployed by the Defendant, albeit Mr Pobjoy recognises that an appeal to the Supreme Court in Turani was heard earlier this year and judgment is awaited. In addition to this, Mr Pobjoy showed me documents which he said confirmed, and I do not doubt it, that for the purposes of the application under section 23 made by the Claimant and considered in February/March 2023, detailed submissions were made on his behalf as to the Equality Act implications of his designation. Thus, submits Mr Pobjoy, there is no real prospect of the Claimant succeeding in an argument that the court should grant him relief on the basis that section 149 was not complied with in relation to the decisions in his individual case. c) As to Ground 3, the Defendant contends that sanctioning the Claimant was in accordance with the aims of the 2018 Act and the 2019 Regulations. Given that the Defendant was satisfied that the criteria under the 2019 Regulations were made out, the contrary proposition, submits the Mr Pobjoy, is surprising. As to whether the Defendant's exercise of discretion in the Claimant's case was rational, the Defendant submits that it was because part of the aims of the legislation, which I will touch upon further in due course, is to deter and to incentivise Russian citizens and those who associate with them, to take actions which will discourage Russia in pursuing its actions in the Ukraine. d) As for Ground 4, the Defendant says that the Claimant's case is flatly contrary to the Carltona principle and that the Claimant is not assisted by the decision in R v Adams[2021] WLR 2077 on which he relies. e) In relation to Grounds 5 and 6, the Defendant says that the European Convention on Human Rights is not engaged in this case, given that the Claimant is Russian citizen who was not resident or even present here at the material times and who, it is said, has no material connections with the United Kingdom. The decisions to designate, therefore, was not an exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to him. Nor do the relevant decisions fall within any of the exceptions to this principle. The Claimant, submits the Defendant, therefore is not a “victim” for the purposes of theHuman Rights Act 1998 and cannot therefore bring a claim under that Act. f) In respect of Ground 5, the Defendant also argues in the alternative that any interference with the Claimant's rights under Articles 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol was proportionate. In this regard reliance is placed on the fact that the decisions were taken within the sphere of foreign relations i.e. a sphere in which the courts will typically accord the Defendant a wide margin of appreciation. g) In relation to Ground 6, the Defendant also argues that the decision was not taken on grounds of nationality. It was taken on the basis of the criteria in the 2019 Regulations, and the Defendant's assessment that the Claimant's designation would further the objects of the legislation. The Claimant's case is therefore one of indirect discrimination at best, and the decisions in relation to him were objectively justified. 45). Mr Pobjoy therefore said that, had this been a conventional claim for judicial review, the Defendant's position would have been that there are “knock out points” in respect of each of the Claimant's six grounds and that permission should therefore be refused. 46). In the circumstances of this particular application, I am not in a position to reach a firm view that none of the Claimant's grounds is seriously arguable. I will therefore proceed on the assumption that at least one of the grounds of challenge raises a seriously triable issue, but I do not approach the balance of convenience on the basis that the Claimant's case is sufficiently compelling to be a material factor in support of his argument that the relief which he seeks should be granted. It is not. 47). It was not suggested on either side that damages would be an adequate remedy in the event that I granted or refused the application for interim relief, and that decision proved to be inconsistent with the outcome at the substantive hearing in July. 48). As to the balance of convenience it is, in my view, important to focus on what is at issue in this application. If the Claim does not succeed, it will remain the case that the Claimant is designated. His inability to enter the United Kingdom will be a fundamental difficulty in terms of his prospects of securing a Formula 1 contract and the damage to his career consequent upon him being out of action for two or more seasons will be sustained in any event. 49). For similar reasons, unless and until his Claim succeeds it is, in my judgment, highly likely that his designation will hamper his ability to negotiate a contract, even if he is granted the interim relief which he seeks. Put bluntly, any discussions would be conducted in the knowledge of the risk that his Claim will not succeed. This is likely to make potential hirers wary of entering into any commitments in relation to him unless and until it is clear that he will be able to fulfil any commitments which he makes. 50). The grant of interim relief is unlikely to alter this fact, unless on the basis that it creates a mistaken impression that it means that his Claim will succeed in due course or is likely to do so. It may or may not succeed. In this connection, it did appear from Mr Keith's pursuit of relief which would permit the Claimant to do things which he will not be doing anyway in the next six to nine weeks that the Claimant was hoping to use any order in his favour to paint an overly optimistic picture. Whether or not it would have this effect is, in my view, highly debatable, at least so far as the particular negotiators in a Formula 1 team are concerned, given that they are likely to be carefully advised and to scrutinise the position in this litigation closely in coming to any decisions. 51). There is also the point that whatever this court decides in relation to interim relief and the substantive application under section 38, the Claimant is sanctioned by Canada. In his witness statement Mr Collins says that an inability to enter a country where one of the Grand Prix is held will place the Claimant at a huge disadvantage in relation to his recruitment prospects. Although the evidence is that steps have been taken in Canada to challenge his sanctions there, as at today's hearing there is no evidence that a decision to suspend the sanctions against the Claimant in Canada is likely in the next six to nine weeks, if at all. Any negotiations for a seat in a Formula 1 team for 2024 would therefore also be conducted with an awareness of this on the part of the negotiating parties. 52). I take the point which Mr Keith made, in his usual powerful fashion, that this was not thought to be an issue as far as the President of the EU General Court was concerned and nor can it, or should it, be decisive that the Claimant is sanctioned elsewhere. If it were, then the Claimant would be placed in an impossible position, given that he would need to litigate in three different jurisdictions, and to win all three applications at the same time. Therefore, I see the force of Mr Keith's argument and accept that this point cannot be regarded as decisive. However, I do give it some weight as part of the realities of the situation in which the Claimant finds himself. 53). On the Claimant's own evidence, the prospects of getting a seat for the 2024 season do not appear strong in any event, given that he has been out of action for two seasons, given that 2021 was his only Formula 1 season, and given that he is seeking to operate in a highly competitive field and the number of places available is small. His pleaded case is that the application of sanctions to him effectively ended his Formula 1 career and the application before me has been described using words such as seeking to "resurrect" or "salvage" his career. 54). The key question in terms of what goes into the balance in favour of granting relief is as to how much the Claimant’s slim prospects of securing a contract would be improved if the relief sought were granted, rather than, for example, a choice between the certainty of a contract for the 2024 season if relief is granted, and the certainty that he will not be awarded one if relief is refused. Mr Keith submitted that I was not entitled to take this distinction into account in the balance in deciding what is just and convenient in the present case. I disagree. I accept Mr Keith's point that whether one is considering the mere hope of a contract or the certainty of a contract, he is entitled to submit that the opportunity to pursue it in the next six to nine weeks will be irremediably lost if relief is refused. However, it does seem to me that there is a material difference in terms of the damage likely to be suffered by the Claimant in the present case as compared with a case in which, for example, an existing contract would be terminated or the certainty of a contract would be prevented by the refusal of relief. 55). In terms of what the Claimant seeks to be permitted to do on an interim basis, it is also important to note that he is permitted to do all of the things set out in the draft order anywhere in the European Union, and indeed anywhere else in the world save for the United Kingdom and Canada. The question is as to how much difference it would make for him to be permitted, on an interim basis, to do these things in the United Kingdom specifically. According to Mr Collins' evidence, in 2023 Formula 1 Grand Prix events took place in six EU countries and 14 other countries, including three such events in the United States of America. 56). As far as timing is concerned, the question is as to the difference it would make were the Claimant permitted to do the things identified in the draft order around six weeks earlier than would otherwise be the case if his Claim succeeded. How much difference would that make to his prospects of securing a seat in a Formula 1 team for the 2024 season? As to this, the evidence of Mr Collins is that negotiations usually start in May/June each year. They intensify by around July to August and the leading teams have identified next season's drivers by September in most cases. The smaller teams tend to continue the process from autumn through to December. This broadly reflects the Claimant's own experience of starting negotiations with Formula 1 teams in the summer of 2020, as he describes it in his witness statement, and signing a contract in December 2020. The season then starts in March and lasts to around November each year. The Claimant does not suggest that he might get a seat for the 2023 season. His target is therefore the 2024 season. 57). Turning to the specifics of the draft order, in relation to para.1(a) the justification advanced by the Claimant is that he needs to meet the Formula 1 teams personally. Seven out of ten current Formula One teams are based in the United Kingdom and he therefore needs to be able to enter the United Kingdom for the purposes specified. In his first witness statement he says that no negotiations are possible unless he is able to enter the European Union and the United Kingdom. He says that he has a chance of being able to resurrect his career but only if he can also enter the United Kingdom given that many of the Formula 1 team suppliers trainers and promoters are here. 58). Mr Collins says that serious negotiations almost always take place where the Formula 1 teams are based and rarely ever at racetracks. He also says it is vital that a Formula 1 driver is able to visit his team's base to build personal relationships with the team's engineering staff before the beginning of the season. He expresses the opinion that: "33.a it will be practically impossible for him to be able to negotiate a place on a F1 team for 2024 unless he is free to travel to and from the UK, not just for the British F1 race, but for negotiations, briefings, engineering, design ergonomics specific to the driver, training and attending the team’s base. In my view whilst Mr Mazepin remains sanctioned in the UK, it is very unlikely he will be recruited to any team;” 59). Mr Collins goes on to conclude at para.34: "34. Accordingly, in my view, Mr Mazepin has a small window of opportunity to get back to F1 for the 2024 season and he needs to have commenced that process by the end of June 2023.” 60). But Mr Collins does not give any specific evidence of a need to attend personally at the present point in the negotiation cycle, nor at any time before the third week in July of this year. Nor does he give any specific evidence as to the feasibility of any attendance by the Claimant being by video link, at least in the early stages of the negotiations. Like the Claimant's first witness statement, Mr Collins' witness statement is directed more at the general and longer term implications for the claimant if he remains sanctioned in the United Kingdom. 61). In his second witness statement the Claimant gives evidence which appears to be based on conversations with his agent. He does not name the agent, purportedly for reasons of confidentiality, and he says this: "5. Furthermore, following suspensions of the EU sanctions against me, my F1 agent (whose name I must keep confidential) started informally talking to representatives of various F1 teams during Grand Prix rounds and other F1 related events concerning my potential recruitment. As I understand from my agent, the teams know that I am subject to certain sanctions, but they heard about suspension of the EU sanctions in particular. The teams my agent has talked to all make very practical observations about the sanctions: once I address the issue of my sanctions travel ban, I can come myself to talk to them and demonstrate my current performance before they could consider putting me on the list of candidates for the next season. 6. As Peter Collins indicated in paragraph 13 of his witness statement dated16 April 2023 and as I indicated in paragraph 49(a) of my First Witness Statement, the competition for places in F1 is very fierce. It is also obvious that with the 2-year pause in my F1 career I already find myself in a more difficult competitive position as compared to existing F1 drivers or to the successful F2 drivers. In such circumstance, as I understand from my previous experience and from my conversations with my agent and several other people from the F1 circle (like Peter Collins) in order for me to have serious discussions with any of the teams I need to do the following things. 7. First, I need to arrange for personal meetings, with F1 team managers, during which I would need to convince them of my strong desire to return to F1 and perform at the best possible level. During these meetings I will be asked to demonstrate my current performance and the steps I am taking to improve it (see more details in paragraph 8 below). In this regard, neither video calls, nor requests for meetings outside the UK could serve the purposes because, as explained in paragraph 5 above, in order to be included in the list of the next season candidates for consideration, I need to demonstrate that the sanctions do not limit my opportunities for training and participation in competitions, including through my physical presence in the UK. Even at the opening stages of discussions, it is not customary for teams to meet via video calling, and I stress again, that because of my more difficult competitive position and based on my agent’s experience, I cannot expect teams to make any special arrangements to meet with me. Doing this would only emphasise the travel restrictions I currently face.” 62). However, the Claimant also says, at para.8, that "there is generally no exact protocol for the negotiations process"