“(5) In considering the rate of import duty that ought to apply to any goods in a standard case, the Treasury must have regard to— (a) the interests of consumers in the United Kingdom, (b) the interests of producers in the United Kingdom of the goods concerned, (c) the desirability of maintaining and promoting the external trade of the United Kingdom, (d) the desirability of maintaining and promoting productivity in the United Kingdom, and (e) the extent to which the goods concerned are subject to competition. (6) In considering the rate of import duty that ought to apply to any goods in a standard case, the Treasury must also have regard to any recommendation about the rate made to them by the Secretary of State. (7) In considering what recommendation to make, the Secretary of State must have regard to the matters set out in subsection (5)(a) to (e). (8) In this section ‘a standard case’ means a case other than one to which any of sections 9 to 15 or 19(4) apply (preferential rates, quotas, tariff suspension, safeguarding, etc).”
“(1) Regulations may make provision for determining the amount of import duty applicable to any goods that are subject to a quota. (2) Goods are subject to a quota for the purposes of this section if— (a) Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom makes arrangements with the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom and the arrangements contain provision for the goods concerned to be subject to a quota, or (b) the Treasury otherwise consider that it is appropriate for the goods concerned to be subject to a quota. (3) Regulations may make any provision that the person making them considers appropriate for the purposes of this section, including (for example)— (c) provision for a quota in respect of specified goods to be subject to a licensing or allocation system (see also subsection (4)) … (6) The power to make regulations under this section providing for a quota in respect of specified goods to be subject to a licensing or allocation system is exercisable by the Secretary of State. (7) The power to make regulations under this section containing any other provision is exercisable by the Treasury; and, in considering what provision to include in the regulations, the Treasury must have regard to any recommendation made to them by the Secretary of State.”
“[o]f course, in order to have any market at all for ACP/LDC suppliers, the UK must retain a viable refining industry”
“Should the refiner close, this will lead to losses of over 850 skilled manufacturing jobs in a disadvantaged area and ACP producers would no longer be able to export raw sugar to the UK. The effect of this would eventually be a monopolistic market which would affect both competition and food security, as British Sugar would subsequently have no domestic competition[…].”
“DIT has considered whether, pursuant to Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol, it needs to notify the ATQ to the EU Commission as a State aid. It has concluded that it is not necessary”
“The question is not how large does the ATQ for subsidised sugar imports need to be before white sugar production becomes uneconomic. The right question is how much non ACP cane sugar does ASR/ Tate and Lyle need in order to remain viable”
“The volume of the ATQ was set with that objective in mind”
“There is no suggestion at all in the documents that the Government thought other operators could or would use the ATQ other than at an inconsequential level”
“Nor can the selective nature of a measure be inferred from the mere fact that it is of a transitional nature, since the decision to limit its application ratione temporis, with a view to ensuring a gradual transition between old and new tax rules, falls within the discretion of the Member States ….” iv). Further, the justifications offered in the Government’s response were supportive of the fact that there would be a long-term supply of tariff-free raw cane sugar for refining into the UK market. Thus, the response noted that one reason for setting the ATQ at 260,000 mt was the desire to preserve a negotiating position which would allow more tariff-free raw cane sugar to be imported through FTAs providing “permanent, preferential access”
“A consistent recognition that the effect of the ATQ would be to reduce the imports of refined sugar from the EU”
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”
“The General Court stated in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the judgment under appeal that the 1996 Law affected only France Télécom and that, as a result, it was selective. According to the General Court, the test requiring a comparison of the beneficiary with other operators in a comparable factual and legal situation in the light of the aim pursued by the measure in question is based on, and justified by, the assessment of whether measures of potentially general application are selective and that test is therefore irrelevant where, as in the present case, it would amount to assessing the selective nature of an ad hoc measure which concerns just one undertaking and is intended to modify certain competitive constraints which are specific to the undertaking.”
“Likewise, the fact that, in the present instance, Lübeck Airport is in direct competition with Hamburg Airport or other German airports and that only airlines using Lübeck Airport benefit from any advantages conferred by the 2006 schedule is not sufficient to establish that that schedule is selective. In order for the 2006 schedule to be selective, it would have to be established that, within the context of a legal regime under which all those airports fall, that schedule confers an advantage on airlines using Lübeck Airport to the detriment of airlines using the other airports which are, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, in a ‘comparable factual and legal situation’.”
“It is clear from that finding that, in the present instance, it is not Paragraph 43a(1) of the LuftVZO or other legislation applicable to all airports — from which the 2006 schedule might have derogated in favour of airlines using Lübeck Airport — that lays down the airport charges applicable to an airport, but the schedule adopted for this purpose by the airport operator itself in the exercise of a power limited to that airport. Accordingly, it is apparent that … the relevant reference framework for examining whether the 2006 schedule had the effect of favouring certain airlines over others which were in a “comparable factual and legal situation” was that of the regime applicable to Lübeck Airport alone.”
“[I]t must be recalled that the fact that only taxpayers satisfying the conditions for the application of a measure can benefit from the measure cannot, in itself, make it into a selective measure”
“Measures entailing differences in treatment between categories of undertakings or between sectors of activity may be justified by the nature or structure of the system of which they form part … In the present case, however, the sole circumstance, put forward by the applicant, that the PRI was aimed at modernising the commercial vehicles on the road in Spain in the interest of environmental protection and improving road safety cannot suffice for a finding that the PRI constituted a system or a general measure in itself or formed part of any ‘Spanish system’, which, moreover, the applicant does not even identify. If that argument were followed, it would be sufficient for the public authorities to invoke the legitimacy of the objectives which the adoption of an aid measure sought to attain for that measure to be regarded as a general measure outside the scope of Article 92(1) of the Treaty. That provision does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects …”
“The fact that undertakings are treated differently does not automatically imply the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article [87](1) of the Treaty. There is no such advantage where the difference in treatment is justified by reasons relating to the logic of the system …”
“The search for a common intention is likely to be both elusive and unnecessary. Elusive, because the contracting parties may never have had a common intention: only an agreement as to a form of words. Unnecessary, because the rules for the interpretation of international treaties focus on the words and meaning and not the intention of one or other contracting party, unless that intention can be derived from the object and purpose of the treaty …. or a subsequent agreement as to interpretation … or practice which establishes an agreement as to its interpretation.”
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 : (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
“Subject to Article 10, the United Kingdom may in particular: (a). reimburse duties levied pursuant to the provisions of Union law made applicable by paragraph 3 in respect of goods brought into Northern Ireland; (b). provide for circumstances in which a customs debt which has arisen is to be waived in respect of goods brought into Northern Ireland; (c). provide for circumstances in which customs duties are to be reimbursed in respect of goods that can be shown not to have entered the Union; and (d). compensate undertakings to offset the impact of the application of paragraph 3. In taking decisions under Article 10, the European Commission shall take the circumstances in Northern Ireland into account as appropriate.”
“The future relationship will be based on a balance of rights and obligations, taking into account the principles of each Party. This balance must ensure the autonomy of the Union's decision making and be consistent with the Union's principles, in particular with respect to the integrity of the Single Market and the Customs Union and the indivisibility of the four freedoms. It must also ensure the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and the protection of its internal market, while respecting the result of the 2016 referendum including with regard to the development of its independent trade policy and the ending of free movement of people between the Union and the United Kingdom”. ii). Paragraphs 17 and 18 provided: “Against this backdrop, the Parties agree to develop an ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced economic partnership. This partnership will be comprehensive, encompassing a Free Trade Agreement, as well as wider sectoral cooperation where it is in the mutual interest of both Parties. It will be underpinned by provisions ensuring a level playing field for open and fair competition, as set out in Section XIV of this Part. It should facilitate trade and investment between the Parties to the extent possible, while respecting the integrity of the Union's Single Market and the Customs Union as well as the United Kingdom's internal market, and recognising the development of an independent trade policy by the United Kingdom. The Parties will retain their autonomy and the ability to regulate economic activity according to the levels of protection each deems appropriate in order to achieve legitimate public policy objectives such as public health, animal health and welfare, social services, public education, safety, the environment including climate change, public morals, social or consumer protection, privacy and data protection, and promotion and protection of cultural diversity. The economic partnership will recognise that sustainable development is an overarching objective of the Parties. The economic partnership will also provide for appropriate general exceptions, including in relation to security.”
“As regards the alleged breach of the prohibition of State aid, it must be noted that Articles 92 to 94 of the EEC Treaty cover ‘aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever’. The financial advantage which traders derive from receiving a share in the quota is not granted through State but resources through Community resources because the levy which is waived is part of Community resources”
“‘subsidy’ means financial assistance which: (i) arises from the resources of the Parties, including: (A) a direct or contingent transfer of funds such as direct grants, loans or loan guarantees; (B) the forgoing of revenue that is otherwise due; or (C) the provision of goods or services, or the purchase of goods or services; (ii) confers an economic advantage on one or more economic actors; (iii) is specific insofar as it benefits, as a matter of law or fact, certain economic actors over others in relation to the production of certain goods or services; and (iv) has, or could have, an effect on trade or investment between the Parties.”
“For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as ‘government’), i.e. where: … (i). government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits).”
“For the purposes of point (b)(iii) of paragraph 1: (a) a tax measure shall not be considered as specific unless: (i) certain economic actors obtain a reduction in the tax liability that they otherwise would have borne under the normal taxation regime; and (ii) those economic actors are treated more advantageously than others in a comparable position within the normal taxation regime; for the purposes of this point, a normal taxation regime is defined by its internal objective, by its features (such as the tax base, the taxable person, the taxable event or the tax rate) and by an authority which is autonomous institutionally, procedurally, economically and financially and has the competence to design the features of the taxation regime; (b) notwithstanding point (a), a subsidy shall not be regarded as specific if it is justified by principles inherent to the design of the general system; in the case of tax measures, examples of such inherent principles are the need to fight fraud or tax evasion, administrative manageability, the avoidance of double taxation, the principle of tax neutrality, the progressive nature of income tax and its redistributive purpose, or the need to respect taxpayers' ability to pay; (c) notwithstanding point (a), special purpose levies shall not be regarded as specific if their design is required by non-economic public policy objectives, such as the need to limit the negative impacts of certain activities or products on the environment or human health, insofar as the public policy objectives are not discriminatory.”
“(i) identify the tax treatment that applies to the … alleged subsidy recipients; (ii) identify a benchmark for comparison; and (iii) compare the challenged tax treatment and the reasons for it with the benchmark tax treatment”
“In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as ‘certain enterprises’) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles shall apply: (a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific. (b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification. (c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered. Such factors are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. In applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation.”
“We now address Canada's argument that, if an import duty exemption were necessarily treated as revenue foregone, a subsidy would exist every time a WT O Member applied a rate lower than its bound rate, and this would be contrary to the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, which explicitly identifies tariff reductions as contributing to the objectives of the Agreement. In our view, a Member's bound rate merely represents the maximum duty a Member may impose in respect of imports from WTO Members; the mere fact that a WTO Member applies a level of duties lower than the bound rate would not mean that it is foregoing revenue that is ‘otherwise due’. More importantly, while the preamble to the WTO Agreement recognises that the ‘substantial reduction of tariffs’ contributes to fulfilling certain objectives of the WTO Agreement, it does not follow that tariff reductions will always be WTO-consistent. For example, the reduction of tariffs in a discriminatory manner could give rise to a violation of Article I of GATT 1994. Similarly, we consider that the foregoing of government revenue otherwise due, in the form of customs duties, and in a manner which is specific within the meaning of Article 2, may give rise to a subsidy which is subject to the disciplines of the [WTO] Agreement. Canada also argues that, if an import duty exemption were necessarily treated as revenue foregone, a subsidy would exist every time generalised preferences or duty drawbacks were granted by a WTO Member. In our view, however, these examples advanced by Canada involve factual and legal considerations distinct from those in the case at hand. For instance, a generalised system of preferences accords favourable treatment to certain products from certain countries, and all such products from those countries receive favourable treatment. That situation is distinct from the case at hand, where some importers of a product – the manufacturer beneficiaries – are accorded favourable treatment as compared with other importers of the same product from the same country.”
“a government provides goods or services”