“no practice involving exposures to radiation should be adopted unless it produces sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to society to offset the radiation detriment it causes”
“… no person shall, except in accordance with an authorisation granted in that behalf under this subsection, dispose of any radioactive waste on or from any premises which are used for the purposes of any undertaking carried on by him, or cause or permit any radioactive waste to be so disposed of, if (in any such case) he knows or has reasonable grounds for believing it to be radioactive waste.”
“[The Contracting Parties] RECOGNISING that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry and will permit the advancement of the cause of peace, CONVINCED that only a joint effort undertaken without delay can offer the prospect of achievements commensurate with the creative capacities of their countries, RESOLVED to create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical processes and contribute, through its many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples, ANXIOUS to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public, DESIRING to associate other countries with their work and to co-operate with international organisations concerned with the peaceful development of atomic energy…”
“The Institutions of the Community”
“If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.”
“Whereas the protection of the health of workers and the general public requires that any activity involving danger arising from ionising radiation must be made subject to regulation”
“Scope, Reporting and Authorization”) provides: “This Directive shall apply to the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, transport and disposal of natural and artificial radioactive substances and to any other activity which involves a hazard arising from ionising radiation.”
“Limitation of Doses for Controllable Exposures”): “The limitation of individual and collective doses resulting from controllable exposures shall be based on the following general principles: (a) [I have already set this out in paragraph 3, and repeat it for convenience] every activity resulting in exposure to ionizing radiation shall be justified by the advantages which it produces; (b) all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable; (c) without prejudice to Article 11 [which deals with what are called ‘planned special exposures’], the sum of the doses and committed doses received shall not exceed the dose limits laid down in this Title for exposed workers, apprentices and students and members of the public. …”
“Some human activities increase the overall exposure to radiation, either by introducing whole new blocks of sources, pathways, and individuals, or by modifying the network of pathways from existing sources to man and thus increasing the exposure of individuals or the number of individuals exposed. The Commission calls these human activities ‘practices’. Other human activities can decrease the overall exposure by influencing the existing form of the network. These activities may remove existing sources, modify pathways, or reduce the number of exposed individuals. The Commission describes all these activities as ‘intervention’.”
“The Commission defines the scope of its dose limits for public exposure by confining it to the doses incurred as the result of practices. Doses incurred in situations where the only available protective action takes the form of intervention are excluded from the scope of the dose limits. Separate attention has to be paid to potential exposures… The intended emission of radionuclides from installations, including the emission of naturally occurring radionuclides from installations such as mines and waste disposal sites, should be treated as practices. The resulting doses should be subject to the dose limits…”
“Decisions concerning the adoption and continuation of any human activity involve a choice between possible options and are often carried out in two stages. The first stage is the examination of each option separately in order to identify those options which can be expected to more good than harm. This provides a ‘short list’ from which the preferred option can then be selected. The second stage, the final selection, will often involve the replacement of one existing practice by another. The net benefit of the change will then be the relevant feature rather than the net benefit of each option separately. The Commission recommends that, when practices involving exposure, or potential exposure, to radiation are being considered, the radiation detriment should be explicitly included in the process of choice. The detriment to be considered is not confined to that associated with the radiation – it includes other detriments and the costs of the practice. Often, the radiation detriment will be a small part of the total. The justification of a practice thus goes far beyond the scope of radiological protection. It is for these reasons that the Commission limits its use of the term justification to the first of the above stages, i.e. it requires only that the net benefit be positive. To search for the best of all the available options is usually a task beyond the responsibility of radiological protection agencies.”
“We will retain our nuclear deterrent with fewer warheads to meet our twin challenges of minimum credible deterrence backed by a firm commitment to arms control.”
“60. Deterrence is about preventing war rather than fighting it. All our forces have an important deterrent role but nuclear deterrence raises particularly difficult issues because of the nature of nuclear war. The Government wishes to see a safer world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons. Progress on arms control is therefore an important objective of foreign and defence policy. Nevertheless, while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security. 61. The Strategic Defence Review has conducted a rigorous re-examination of our deterrence requirements… We have concluded that we can safely make further significant reductions from Cold War levels… 62. With the withdrawal of the last RAF WE177 bombs in March 1998, Trident is our only nuclear weapon. We need to ensure that it can remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years. This is why we need a force of four Trident submarines… … 64. … taking into account Trident’s greater accuracy than Polaris, the Review has concluded that we need a stockpile of less than 200 operationally available warheads. This is a reduction of a third from the maximum of 300 announced by the previous government and represents a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of the deterrent since the end of the Cold War. … 70. On nuclear arms control, the Government hopes for further bilateral reductions in US and Russian strategic weapons through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty process. We also hope to see progress towards reducing the thousands of Russian shorter range weapons. Our own arsenal, following the further reductions described above, is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the foreseeable future and very much smaller than those of the major nuclear powers. Considerable further reductions in the latter would be needed before further British reductions could become feasible.”
“The Government’s General Election Manifesto therefore promised to retain Trident as the ultimate guarantee of the United Kingdom’s security while pressing for multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons. When we are satisfied with progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in negotiations.”
“For as long as Britain has nuclear forces, we will ensure that we have a robust capability at the Atomic Weapons Establishment to underwrite the safety and reliability of our nuclear warheads, without recourse to nuclear testing. There are no current plans for any replacement for Trident, and no decision on any possible successor system would be needed for several years. But we have concluded that it would be premature to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident should this prove necessary. However, the Government’s aim is to take forward the process of nuclear disarmament to ensure that our security can in future be secured without nuclear weapons.”
“1.2.1 The Atomic Weapons Establishments at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire undertake the design, manufacture and servicing of Trident nuclear warheads, conduct research and development into warhead technology and carry out decommissioning of redundant Chevaline nuclear warheads and associated process plants. 1.2.2 Manufacturing and decommissioning operations produce solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive wastes which principally contain tritium, uranium or plutonium. Small quantities of radioactive waste containing cobalt and caesium are also produced from maintenance of AWE Aldermaston’s HERALD nuclear research reactor which is not operational and has been shut down for several years awaiting decommissioning.”
“These principles also form the basis of the… Directive… adopted under [the EURATOM Treaty].”
“The UK Government considers that the EURATOM treaty does not apply to military activities. Government Defence policy relies on having nuclear weapons. The Government affirmed its commitment to an independent nuclear deterrent in the Strategic Defence Review (1998)… [there follows a quotation from paragraph 14 of the Fifth Supporting Essay, which I have already set out above at paragraph 12. Then:] The practice of designing, constructing, maintaining and dismantling nuclear warheads at AWE is a key part of the UK’s defence capability. 4.10.3 The [respondent] took the view that in consulting on AWE’s application for authorisation, it was appropriate under the ICRP system of protection to identify the benefits and detriments of practices at AWE… 4.10.4 The principal benefits associated with the operation of AWE are:- delivery of a UK defence requirement for an independent nuclear deterrent”
“ … The [respondent]… has concluded that the practice of designing, constructing, maintaining and dismantling nuclear warheads at AWE is justified in the light of the Government’s defence policy.”
“… In the next 10 years the majority of discharges of radioactivity will not arise from warhead production but from the decommissioning of both nuclear plants and nuclear weapons; over 80% of tritium discharges and 55% of plutonium discharges will arise from such decommissioning work. This legacy of radioactive waste would remain, irrespective of the status of Trident production operations…”
“The [respondent] considers that these responses are beyond the scope of determining AWE’s applications for disposal of radioactive wastes under RSA… and has instead passed the responses to both the Secretary of State for the Environment and also the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.”
“The [respondent] did not consider that there was an obligation on the [respondent] (or indeed that the [respondent] had the power) to weigh the benefits and detriments of the UK having an independent nuclear deterrent.”
“In my [first] statement I stated at paragraph 68 that operations at AWE are more properly viewed as a single practice, namely the maintenance of a UK nuclear deterrent. I pointed out that both warhead decommissioning and Trident production operations are conducted in the same facilities and often by the same teams of workers. In fact the production and decommissioning of nuclear warheads are closely related and part of a single continuous cycle. The process of manufacture of a nuclear weapon involves the melting of plutonium returned from redundant warheads, the casting and machining of a new warhead, assembly into a weapon, disassembly from a weapon, and return of the plutonium for re-melting and casting into a new weapon. Each step is linked to the next in a continuous production cycle in pursuit of a single purpose, namely the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent, and in my opinion was properly considered as a single practice by the [respondent].”
“2.5.8 [After referring to the SDR] “In the [respondent]’s view, the balancing of benefits and detriments is already taken into account in the Government’s policy and so it does not propose to repeat this balancing exercise for AWE sites specifically.”
“… in making the decisions under challenge in this application, the [respondent] addressed the principle of justification, and sought to identify the benefits and detriments associated with the operation of the AWE.”
“For the reason set out above the [respondent] considered that it was entitled to rely on the Government’s commitment to an independent nuclear deterrent as a principal benefit. The [respondent] was also convinced that it had captured the principal benefits and main detriments of the practice. There were no further benefits or detriments raised in the consultation that I thought I should include. I therefore did not alter the balance of benefits and detriments…”
“It is in my opinion clear that the disposition and armament of the armed forces are and for centuries have been within the exclusive discretion of the Crown and that no one can seek a legal remedy on the ground that such discretion has been wrongly exercised. I need only refer to the numerous authorities gathered together in China Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General [[1932] 2 KB 197 ]. Anyone is entitled, in or out of Parliament, to urge that policy regarding the armed forces should be changed; but until it is changed, on a change of Government or otherwise, no one is entitled to challenge it in court.”
“The appellants' counsel said that he wanted to call evidence on such matters as the devastating effects and consequences of nuclear discharge, the dangers of accidental explosions, the technical difficulty of distinguishing approaching nuclear missiles from other harmless objects in the sky, the possibility and likelihood of retaliation to this country if we set ourselves up with nuclear armament. Now some of these arguments or considerations do, no doubt, rest on a basis of fact or expert knowledge and properly qualified persons could give evidence before a jury as to their views or opinions based on such facts or knowledge: some, on the other hand, are intrinsically no more than matters of political decision or judgment. But, even if all these matters were to be investigated in court, they would still constitute only various points of consideration on the ultimate general issue, is it prejudicial to the interests of the State to include nuclear armament in its apparatus of defence? I do not think that a court of law can try that issue or, accordingly, can admit evidence upon it. It is not debarred from doing so merely because the issue is what is ordinarily known as ‘political’. Such issues may present themselves in courts of law if they take a triable form. Nor, certainly, is it because Ministers of the State have any inherent general authority to prescribe to the courts what is or is not prejudicial to the interests of the State. But here we are dealing with a matter of the defence of the realm and with an Act designed to protect State secrets and the instruments of the State's defence. If the methods of arming the defence forces and the disposition of those forces are at the decision of Her Majesty's Ministers for the time being, as we know that they are, it is not within the competence of a court of law to try the issue whether it would be better for the country that that armament or those dispositions should be different. The disposition and equipment of the forces and the facilities afforded to allied forces for defence purposes constitute a given fact and it cannot be a matter of proof or finding that the decisions of policy on which they rest are or are not in the country's best interests. I may add that I can think of few issues which present themselves in less triable form… The more one looks at it, the plainer it becomes, I think, that the question whether it is in the true interests of this country to acquire, retain or house nuclear armaments depends upon an infinity of considerations, military and diplomatic, technical, psychological and moral, and of decisions, tentative or final, which are themselves part assessments of fact and part expectations and hopes. I do not think that there is anything amiss with a legal ruling that does not make this issue a matter for judge or jury.”
“There will be some questions of ‘high policy’ such as the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of Ministers where the courts as a matter of discretion do not intervene, because the matters are simply not justiciable.”
“Wilson J discussed Chandler at some length, putting a gloss on Lord Radcliffe’s observations at several points. However, she does not appear to have been referred to the CCSU case. Her observations on Chandler are in our opinion incompatible with the consistent view in the United Kingdom that the disposition of the armed forces is non-justiciable.”
“Accordingly it seems to me that the Commission is not entitled to differ from the opinion of the Secretary of State on the question of whether, for example, the promotion of terrorism in a foreign country by a United Kingdom resident would be contrary to the interest of national security.”
“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?”
“78… States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets… If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use would also be contrary to that law. 79… these fundamental rules… constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.”
“96. Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence… when its survival is at stake. Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as ‘policy of deterrence’, to which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for many years… 97. Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole… the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake.”
“The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the practice known as the ‘policy of deterrence’. It notes that it is a fact that a number of States adhered to that practice during the greater part of the Cold War and continue to adhere to it. Furthermore, the members of the international community are profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50 years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris . Under these circumstances the Court does not consider itself able to find that there is such an opinio juris .”
“ANXIOUS to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public”
“Each Member State shall establish the facilities necessary to carry out continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil and to ensure compliance with the basic standards. The Commission shall have the right of access to such facilities; it may verify their operation and efficiency.”
“Les dispositions de l’article 34 s’appliquent a toutes les experiences particulierement dangereuses, civiles ou militaries.”
“For its part, the French Government submitted at the hearing that the provisions of Chapter 3 of the [EURATOM] Treaty do not apply to nuclear activities in the military sphere.”