“No allegations of ill-treatment by staff were received by any of the penitentiary establishments visited, and staff-prisoner relations appeared generally free of visible tension. However, the delegation once again observed that there was a general tendency for the management to partially delegate authority to a select number of inmates (the so-called ‘watchers’) who were at the top of the informal prison hierarchy and use them to keep control over the inmate population. The CPT called upon the Armenian authorities to take resolute steps to put an end to this practice. … The management at Noubarashen and Armavir prisons openly stated that the very low staff complement rendered this policy almost unavoidable. … The CPT must reiterate its view that such an approach constitutes not only a potential threat to good order within prisons but also a high-risk situation in terms of inter-prisoner intimidation, and leads to a culture of inequality of treatment between inmates. It is noteworthy that the delegation saw in the relevant documentation that requests for voluntary isolation were quite frequent in the prisons visited; at least some of the requests were expressly motivated by the prisoners’ fear of their fellow inmates (and of the prisoner hierarchy) and staff acknowledged the existence of the problem.”
“The CPT calls upon the Armenian authorities to take resolute steps to address the above-mentioned phenomena. It wishes to be informed of the concrete steps that will be taken to bring an end to these practices and of the timeframe within which they will be implemented.”
“All the cells, sanitary annexes and the kitchen at Armavir Penitentiary Establishment are provided with proper ventilation (natural ventilation). The storage facilities are fully provided with ventilation systems as well …”
“In all cases when persons try to intentionally violate the requirements of the internal regulations of penitentiary institutions, try to establish hierarchy amongst convicts, as well as wish to circumvent the legitimate demands of penitentiary officers in any way, various legitimate means – ranging from subjecting to disciplinary liability to sending to penitentiary institutions with a higher level of security – are unavoidably applied. For example, during 2015-6 ‘transfer to punishment cell’ disciplinary penalty has been imposed 1,649 times on persons attempting to establish hierarchical positions among convicts, as well on those ignoring legitimate demands of the penitentiary officers. The Penitentiary service is in complete control of the operational situation at penitentiary institutions and – if necessary – undertakes respective actions to prevent cases of unofficial hierarchy.”
“During the second half of 2018, after the political changes in the country, the RA Ministry of Justice expressed readiness and willingness to fight against the criminal sub-subcultures [sic], hierarchic relations and corruption existing [in] the penitentiary institutions. However, the members of the Monitoring Group did not record any positive change in this regard in the outcomes of its constant visits to the penitentiary institutions. The Monitoring Group is hopeful, the policy adopted by the RA Ministry of Justice will become an effective fight through presenting changes in practice.”
“Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the members of the Monitoring Group strictly condemn such conduct against hindrance of the Group’s activities and consider the restriction of the implementation of the Group’s activities as an attempt to conceal the facts of subjecting the prisoners or the convicts to alleged torture, since the restriction of the Monitoring Group’s activities is illegal and has an individual nature.”
“119. There is no basis to doubt the up to date information provided by 3 separate Government ministers is not accurate, honest and reliable. 120. I am satisfied that things have changed significantly since the Velvet Revolution and that the reports relied on [by] the Defendant do not reflect the current position. 121. The Defendant has not provided objective, reliable, specific and updated evidence to establish that there is a real risk of his Article 3 rights being breached if he is extradited. Although the Government has provided specific assurances it is not necessary to consider them as the presumption remains in place.”
“By contrast [to the lack of evidence of physical ill-treatment by staff], inter-prisoner violence, intimidation and extortion remained a problem in most of the establishments visited and it was clearly related to the persistent influence of the informal prisoner hierarchy. The Committee calls upon the Armenian authorities to step up their efforts to combat inter-prisoner violence and intimidation. Resolute steps must be taken to put an end to the existence of the informal prisoner hierarchy.”
“Some of the senior staff in the establishments visited expressed the view (also confirmed by the delegation’s own observations) that inter-prisoner violence was clearly related to the persistent influence of the informal prisoner hierarchy. The aforementioned phenomenon was also demonstrated by the continuing - despite assurances given to the delegation by senior officials from the Ministry of Justice and the penitentiary service at the outset of the visit - existence of strikingly better (sometimes even bordering on the “luxurious”) prisoner accommodation in some of the establishments (e.g. at Armavir and Sevan prisons …) and the presence of large amounts of prohibited items ... … As already stressed by the CPT in the past, it is essential and urgent that the prison administration and prison Directors strive to prevent situations in which certain prisoners exploit their wealth and influence within the informal prison hierarchy, and thus undermine the management’s efforts to keep firm control of the establishments. The Committee calls upon the Armenian authorities to step up efforts to combat inter-prisoner violence and intimidation. Prison staff must be especially alert to signs of trouble, pay particular attention to the treatment of vulnerable inmates by other prisoners, and be both resolved and properly trained to intervene where necessary. Resolute steps must be taken to put an end to the existence of the informal prisoner hierarchy. It is evident that the Armenian authorities will not manage to succeed in their struggle against inter-prisoner violence (and the power of informal prisoner hierarchy) without making a major investment in prison staff - not only as regards the staff complements and staff presence inside prison accommodation areas, but also in terms of staff salaries (so as to eliminate the temptation of corruption) and staff training. …”
“… despite the earlier assurances by the Armenian authorities, the problem of the lack of any effective ventilation system had not been solved and some parts of the prison (especially wings 1 and 2) were extremely filthy and infested with vermin.”
“the so-called ‘thieves in law’ and ‘prison bosses’ have abandoned their overt propaganda of traditions of the criminal subculture among a special contingent, maintain prima facie neutrality, spread the word among convicts and detained persons that they need not address them for criminal clarifications and for normalisation of interpersonal relations, as they are in the centre of attention of the law enforcement bodies and cannot interfere as before. The so-called ‘alpha dogs’ also maintain neutrality … many so-called ‘alpha dogs’ have openly given up that status …”
“… save [for] the absence of physical signs on cell doors [previously, the ‘thieves in law’ had eight-pointed stars on their doors], ‘nothing had changed’. She had interviewed people and the prison population was organised according to power and the informal hierarchies were still there will LGBT prisoners at the bottom. A rules system controlled by strong prisoners and the use of intimidation … she did, however, say, she did not observe risk of increased violence whereas, previously, they were subjected to violence if they did not follow ‘the rules’ of the hierarchy although she had only spoken to three prisoners.”
“The director of the prison she spoke to stated that there was violence on a daily basis. She was not presented with any arguments on what they had done to stop it. That is why she thought it was still an issue. There had been no change on prisoner staff ratio since 2019. On her September 2019 visit [we think that this must be a reference to the September 2021 visit] she had spoken to a foreign prisoner and a LGBT prisoner and 10 prison staff. Water was being cut off to cells was an issue during the daytime. The place where they place foreign prisoners, the cells were in poor condition.”
“22. While I can see why the district judge relied on the evidence given in Grabowski to fill in the gaps in the EAW in this case, I am quite clear that it was impermissible to do so. As the district judge observed, the matter could have been made clear by a simple statement from the Judicial Authority as to the meaning of the figures in the EAW. In my view, the matter not only could have been made clear by evidence, it should have been made clear by evidence from the Judicial Authority. The Judicial Authority was given the opportunity to clarify the significance of the figures in the EAW and failed to do so. 23. In the absence of such clarifying evidence, I do not accept that findings of fact in one case can legitimately be read across to another case as was done here. On the contrary, there is high judicial authority that the circumstance that a fact has been proved in one case does not enable the court to take judicial notice of it in another case; see Phipson on Evidence 18th Edition 3-20 and the speech of Lord Wright, with which all other members of the House of Lords agreed, in Lazard Brothers & Co v Midland Bank[1933] AC 289 at 297-298. The strictness of this rule is reflected in the criminal context in Archbold 2016 edition at 10-61. 24. This is not a case in which evidence was unnecessary; on the contrary, evidence was necessary and could not be found by referring to another case or cases where the facts had been proved. To this extent, I disagree with the approach of Sir Stephen Silber in Jaroszynski v Polish Judicial Authority[2015] EWHC 335 (Admin) at paragraph 33.”
“it is necessary to show strong grounds for believing that the person, if returned, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…”
“64. Thus, the position can be summarised as follows: (a) The prohibition of Article 3 ill-treatment is absolute. There is no distinction to be drawn between the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold in the domestic context and the minimum level required in the extra-territorial context. The extradition of a person by a contracting state will raise problems under Article 3 where there are serious grounds to believe that he would run a real risk of being subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the requesting state: see, most recently, Sanchez-Sanchez, at [99]. "Serious grounds" in this context means "strong grounds": Ullah, [24]. (b) Article 3 is not "relativist" in the sense suggested by Lord Hoffmann in Wellington. In an individual case, the question whether treatment in the requesting state will reach the Article 3 level of severity does not admit of a balancing exercise between the treatment on the one hand and the seriousness of the offence for which extradition is sought or the importance of the public interests in favour of extradition: Harkins & Edwards, [124]-[128]; Ahmad, [172]-[175]; Sanchez-Sanchez, [99]. (c) However, the question whether treatment reaches the minimum level of severity required to engage Article 3 is intensely fact-sensitive and contextual. In a domestic case, the court is looking backwards at a concrete factual situation. In an extra-territorial case, the court is looking forward and attempting to gauge whether there is a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. Given the highly contextual nature of the assessment required, this may make it more difficult to establish a real risk of a breach: Harkins & Edwards, [130]; Ahmad, [178]. (d) This is particularly so where the requesting state is one with a long history of respect of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, such as the USA: Harkins & Edwards, [131]; Ahmad, [179]. … 86. The question whether treatment reaches the high level of severity necessary to engage Article 3 depends on a holistic assessment of the conditions of detention. As to personal space, unusually, Muršić creates a bright line rule giving rise to a strong presumption of breach. As to other conditions of detention, it will be rare that one element taken on its own will be sufficient to trigger the application of Article 3 in the domestic context and, a fortiori, in an extradition case: see para. 64(c) and (d) above.”
“In those circumstances, the decision in Bivolaru and Moldovan cannot affect my decision in respect of this ground of appeal, which I would dismiss. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether Moldovan should prevail over the decisions of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU. That issue must await resolution if and when necessary in another case. I would however observe that in my view, the caution against "stereotypical assurances" should be regarded as an exhortation to focus on substance rather than form, and should not be taken as meaning that any use of a form of words which has also been used in another case must necessarily be regarded as inadequate to satisfy a court that art.3 obligations will be observed. There are, after all, only so many ways in which one can express an assurance that a particular prisoner will be guaranteed at least 3m² of personal space wherever he is detained.”
“We accept the broad points made by the Respondents as to the nature of the CPT system of inspection and response. We do not conclude that a Member State has an obligation to disclose a CPT report, or the state's response, in advance of the point when it would otherwise become available. To impose such an obligation would be likely to frustrate the CPT process. However, the duty of candour must also mean that evidence or assertions should not be advanced which are inconsistent with the factual position known to the requesting state. That basic component of the duty of candour must arise in relation, for example, to concerns raised by a CPT inspection, not yet published as a report, which are either accepted or cannot be contradicted by the requesting state. As often in such matters, there will frequently be room for argument as to what can and cannot properly be said. But in our view the principle is clear: a requesting state cannot in candour advance a position which the representatives of the state know to be false or misleading, on the basis of a CPT inspection or as yet unpublished report, or otherwise.”