“…the County Council as local planning authority HEREBY PERMITS:- Stepaside Industrial Heritage Project at Stepaside in accordance with the application and plans submitted by you on 7th May, 1986 to the Council, subject to the development being begun on a date which is not later than 5 years from the date of this permission and subject also to the following conditions:- … 2. The permission now granted is for the change of use of land only and details of new buildings, alterations and other operations will be subject to separate planning applications, including listed building consent, to the local planning authority. …”
“The Company hereby covenants with the County Council :- (i) that the caravans and tents currently situated on that part of the said property and shown edged ORANGE on the said Plan No.1 shall be relocated on that part of the said property shown edged BLUE within a period of 12 months from the date of the commencement of any works on site and that the use of the parcel shown edged ORANGE as a caravan and camping site shall be consequently discontinued and extinguished; and (ii) that the parcel of land shown edged ORANGE shall be used only as a car park for the purposes of the Stepaside Industrial Heritage Project and for no other form of development whatsoever without the prior written approval of the County Council. … (iv) that no building or other operations or change of use in connection with the planning permission hereby granted other than those required in Clause 3(ii) shall be undertaken, either on the application site or on other adjoining land under their control before a) the necessary facilities for disposal of sewage and b) the highway improvement works as specified in the Third Schedule and shown on Plan No.3 attached thereto have been completed to the satisfaction of the County Council.” (Emphasis added.)
“Application dated1st May 1986 (Reference No.C3/104) for detailed planning permission for development works in furtherance of the Stepaside Industrial Heritage Project incorporating inter alia the resiting of the caravans and tents currently sited on the parcel of land edged orange to the parcel of land edged blue on the said Plan No.1. ”
“3. The land which is the subject of this consent shall not be brought into use as a Bird and Animal Park until the Local Planning Authority has certified in writing that it is satisfied that car parking authorized by planning permission has been provided and is available for use by people visiting the Bird and Animal Park. The car parking is to provide for a minimum of 50 car parking spaces. 4. If at any time the car parking referred to in condition No. 3 ceases to be available for use by customers of the Animal and Bird Park, the area of land which is the subject of this consent shall cease to be used as an Animal and Bird Park and shall be closed to the public.”
“The application site is located within a C2 flood zone and a Flood Consequence Assessment has been submitted with the application. This has been provided to Environment Agency Wales for comment. EAW’s response to consultation on this current proposal offers no objection to the application. This is upon the basis of the existing extant consent on the site for touring caravans and that the proposed static caravan pitches would result in a benefit and betterment in terms of flood risk at the site. Given this advice it is considered that the proposal complies with the requirements of Policy 113. ”
“6.15 Parcels A and F are primarily located within flood zone C2 - an area of the flood plain without significant flood defence infrastructure. In respect of the proposed bases to accommodate lodges (to be within the definition of a caravan) on Parcel A, residential premises including caravan parks are defined by TAN15 as “highly vulnerable development” in terms of flood risk.TAN15 states that highly vulnerable development should not be considered in flood zone C2. This element of the Proposal is therefore contrary to guidance in TAN15 and thus policy GN.1 in that the proposal would result in unacceptable harm to health and safety including by reason of flooding. Whether there exists any other material considerations that might outweigh this policy conflict is addressed further in this report. Natural Resources Wales (NRW) confirm that there exists no change in vulnerability in respect of Parcel F. However, due to flood risk and potential flood depth during a flood event, flood resilient measures must be incorporated into design. This could be assured by planning condition. … 6. 40 Planning permission for an amendment to the layout of the site and replacement of 95 static and 55 touring caravan pitches with 132 static pitches was approved on14th March 2016 (ref.11/0585/PA). This consent remains extant. 30 pitches remain to be provided and, of these, the planning permission includes the siting of 29 static caravans on land Parcel A. This current application proposes instead 23 bases to accommodate lodges on land Parcel A. Having regard to the total number of bases that are proposed (75No.) compared to the number under the extant consent, and the conflict with planning policy that has been addressed, this “fall-back” position should be accorded limited weight (including in terms of the planning balance that should be applied to the issue of flood risk in respect of the “fall-back” position). It is also noted that the lodges that are intended to occupy the bases appear to be twin units (up to 15m x 6m on land parcel A); twin units are specifically excluded by reason of a condition on planning permission ref.11/0585/PA and, in respect of flood risk at Parcel A, are likely to accommodate more visitors per unit when compared to single static caravans.” (Emphasis added.)
“2. None of the 29 re-located caravan units within the area of the former craft village car park as shown on Drawing Number 1203/M/14 Rev A received6th February 2012 shall be twin-unit caravans. Reason: To limit the visual impact of the development and to accord with Policy 78 of the Joint Unitary Development Plan for Pembrokeshire (adopted13 July 2006 ). … 7. The “proposed public car park” as shown on Drawing Number 1203/M/11 Rev B received6th February 2012 , shall be constructed and available for public use prior to the occupation of any of the 29 caravan units within the area of the former craft village car park. This car park shall at all times be available for public use. Reason: To ensure adequate parking provision and to accord with Policy 100 of the Joint Unitary Development Plan for Pembrokeshire (adopted13 July 2006 ).”
“The grant of the 2016 Permission (application reference 11/0585/PA) is not considered a nullity and it is considered that a lawful planning permission was issued, one that has since been implemented.”
“Condition 2 6. 1 Condition 2 precludes twin-unit caravans “to limit the visual impact of the development”
“6.14 The proposed conditions can therefore be modified in accordance with the recommendations in this report. In respect of condition 2, the visual impact of any twin-units would not be significantly greater than a single-unit caravan and would not result in an unacceptable visual impact subject to compliance with the layout that has already been approved and the design parameters that have been included. In respect of condition 7, the objective of the current condition would not be prejudiced by its proposed modification. 6. 15 When considering the application with regard to the development plan, it is considered that there would be no conflict with the LDP but in any event the fall-back position of the existing consent should be afforded substantial weight and therefore there is no basis upon which to reconsider the principle of permission.”
“Chair: 1:28:52 So, in terms of the impact of this proposal to amend the exiting consent the impact over and above the impact of the previous consent as regards flooding is not – perhaps appreciable is the wrong word – it cannot be quantified, it’s not significant enough, simply because it’s not something which was quantified by the size of the bases in the previous consent. The impact over and above the previous consent is not something which is necessarily going to be – in fact it’s possible it could be reduced, is it David? It’s the unknown?? Mr Popplewell 1:29.37 Well, it is an unknown, and again the point is that, you've heard comments that a twin unit caravan is larger than the single unit caravan and that is the case for standard sizes of single unit caravan, but as there is no legal definition of a caravan which includes a size limit there is nothing to stop, technically, somebody putting a single unit caravan of a size equivalent to or even greater than the size of a twin unit caravan. There are questions as to the likelihood of that which we have considered. Clearly getting an off-the-shelf single unit caravan will potentially come in a range of standard sizes which are typically smaller than twin unit caravans, but that does not mean that a larger than standard size single unit caravan could not be procured. The layout has been designed in a way, you know, to accommodate development in a way that respects the character of the area, respects the character of the Scheduled Ancient Monuments and so, when considering, you know, that unit restriction, that twin unit restriction, was something of a blunt tool to try and restrict the size of caravans, but it didn't restrict the size of single unit caravans and it may be a product of its time and that as the leisure industry grows and expands, the use of non-standard sized units is becoming more and more of a factor that needs to be considered. Chair: 1:31:24 Well, thank you again, what I said perhaps wasn’t articulated well, but I think I understand now clearly that what was granted previously and what’s already on the books might have a more harmful impact potentially or could have a better impact it’s such a wide gamut on the previous consent that this amendment to it, it’s not likely to … It’s very difficult to explain. I understand it, but I can’t explain it, and I think you explained it as best as we could probably, but the impact over and above, created by this proposal as regards flooding is not necessarily any greater than what cold have been implemented by the previous concerns [consents?].” (Emphasis added.)
“1:34:53 … Condition two was not attached to the consent due to flood risk reasons, it was attached to the consent due to visual amenity reasons. The reason condition two isn't there for flood risk reasons is because in 2016 under the 2016 consent, there were tourers on the site, benefiting from the previous consents that were close to the watercourse and therefore as Mr Popplewell mentioned, that consent provides for a betterment - those 29 units, is a betterment in terms of flood risk, compared with the previous consent. … … 1:39:18 Councillor Dennis's second question, if I'm right, asked about the provision of the southern car park, which he is right and you are right, is substantially there at present. To comply with the condition there probably needs to be, you know, further signage and more sort of formality to that, but the car park is nevertheless there. But what needs to be understood is that under the existing planning condition number seven; condition number seven doesn't afford any protection for the existing northerly car park. Under the planning permission that exists at present, that car park could be removed tomorrow. So, you know, the condition seven simply states that none of the units on the 29 unit site can be occupied before the southern car park that's already substantially provided, is provided in its entirety, and the application before you is that rather than none of the units being occupied, that those units outside the existing car parking area can be occupied so there's no additional prejudicial negative for the retention of the existing car park. The 29 units, caravans, could be provided under the existing consent. It’s only their occupation that is controlled …”
“the Council does not consider that there is any planning purpose of the covenant and the car park as envisaged by the 1987 Permission. This is because no subsequent applications for development were submitted and the car park was and is not therefore required in connection with any development on site or, for that matter, in connection with any adjoining development – the Animal and Bird Park for e.g. has ceased to operate.”
“(1) This section applies, subject to subsection (4), to applications for planning permission for the development of land without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted. (2) On such an application the local planning authority shall consider only the question of the conditions subject to which planning permission should be granted, and— (a) if they decide that planning permission should be granted subject to conditions differing from those subject to which the previous permission was granted, or that it should be granted unconditionally, they shall grant planning permission accordingly, and (b) if they decide that planning permission should be granted subject to the same conditions as those subject to which the previous permission was granted, they shall refuse the application.”
“If regard is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to be made under the planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise.”
“27. Of the five points I mentioned in BDW Trading Ltd. (at paragraph 21), three seem particularly relevant here: that “the decision-maker must understand the relevant provisions of the plan, recognizing that they may sometimes pull in different directions”; that “section 38(6) does not prescribe the way in which the decision-maker is to go about discharging the duty”; but that “the duty can only be properly performed if the decision-maker, in the course of making the decision, establishes whether or not the proposal accords with the development plan as a whole”. 28. In R. v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Milne[2000] EWHC 650 (Admin) … Sullivan J., as he then was, said (in paragraph 48): “48. It is not at all unusual for development plan policies to pull in different directions. A proposed development may be in accord with development plan policies which, for example, encourage development for employment purposes, and yet be contrary to policies which seek to protect open countryside. In such cases there may be no clear cut answer to the question: “is this proposal in accordance with the plan?”
“… [The decision-maker] will … have to consider whether the development proposed in the application before him does or does not accord with the development plan. There may be some points in the plan which support the proposal but there may be some considerations pointing in the opposite direction. He will require to assess all of these and then decide whether in the light of the whole plan the proposal does or does not accord with it. …”.”
“… The respective roles of the planning authorities and the courts have been fully explored in two recent cases in this court: Tesco Stores Ltd v 983, and Hopkins Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2017] UKSC 37 ;[2017] 1 WLR 1865 . In the former Lord Reed, while affirming that interpretation of a development plan, as of any other legal document, is ultimately a matter for the court, also made clear the limitations of this process: “Although a development plan has a legal status and legal effects, it is not analogous in its nature or purpose to a statute or a contract. As has often been observed, development plans are full of broad statements of policy, many of which may be mutually irreconcilable, so that in a particular case one must give way to another. In addition, many of the provisions of development plans are framed in language whose application to a given set of facts requires the exercise of judgment. Such matters fall within the jurisdiction of planning authorities, and their exercise of their judgment can only be challenged on the ground that it is irrational or perverse …” (para 19) In the Hopkins Homes case (paras 23-34) I warned against the danger of “over-legalisation” of the planning process. I noted the relatively specific language of the policy under consideration in the Tesco case, contrasting that with policies: “expressed in much broader terms [which] may not require, nor lend themselves to, the same level of legal analysis …””
“40. The Planning Court – and this court too – must always be vigilant against excessive legalism infecting the planning system. A planning decision is not akin to an adjudication made by a court (see paragraph 50 of my judgment in Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council). The courts must keep in mind that the function of planning decision- making has been assigned by Parliament, not to judges, but – at local level – to elected councillors with the benefit of advice given to them by planning officers, most of whom are professional planners, and – on appeal – to the Secretary of State and his inspectors. … Planning officers and inspectors are entitled to expect that both national and local planning policy is as simply and clearly stated as it can be, and also – however well or badly a policy is expressed – that the court’s interpretation of it will be straightforward, without undue or elaborate exposition. Equally, they are entitled to expect – in every case – good sense and fairness in the court’s review of a planning decision, not the hypercritical approach the court is often urged to adopt. 41. The principles on which the court will act when criticism is made of a planning officer’s report to committee are well settled. To summarize the law as it stands: (1) The essential principles are as stated by the Court of Appeal in R. v Selby District Council, ex parte Oxton Farms[1997] E.G.C.S. 60 (see, in particular, the judgment of Judge L.J., as he then was). They have since been confirmed several times by this court … and applied in many cases at first instance … (2) The principles are not complicated. Planning officers’ reports to committee are not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge (see the judgment of Baroness Hale of Richmond in R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire County Council[2011] UKSC 2 , at paragraph 36, and the judgment of Sullivan J., as he then was, in R. v Mendip District Council, ex parte Fabre (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 500, at p.509). Unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, it may reasonably be assumed that, if the members followed the officer’s recommendation, they did so on the basis of the advice that he or she gave (see the judgment of Lewison L.J. in Palmer v Herefordshire Council[2016] EWCA Civ 1061 , at paragraph 7). The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the officer has materially misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error has gone uncorrected before the decision was made. Minor or inconsequential errors may be excused. It is only if the advice in the officer’s report is such as to misdirect the members in a material way – so that, but for the flawed advice it was given, the committee’s decision would or might have been different – that the court will be able to conclude that the decision itself was rendered unlawful by that advice. (3) Where the line is drawn between an officer’s advice that is significantly or seriously misleading – misleading in a material way – and advice that is misleading but not significantly so will always depend on the context and circumstances in which the advice was given, and on the possible consequences of it. There will be cases in which a planning officer has inadvertently led a committee astray by making some significant error of fact (see, for example R. (on the application of Loader) v Rother District Council[2016] EWCA Civ 795 ), or has plainly misdirected the members as to the meaning of a relevant policy (see, for example, Watermead Parish Council v Aylesbury Vale District Council[2017] EWCA Civ 152 ). There will be others where the officer has simply failed to deal with a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law (see, for example, R. (on the application of Williams) v Powys County Council[2017] EWCA Civ 427 ). But unless there is some distinct and material defect in the officer’s advice, the court will not interfere.” (Emphasis added.)
“The status of a fallback development as a material consideration in a planning decision is not a novel concept. It is very familiar. Three things can be said about it: (1) Here, as in other aspects of the law of planning, the court must resist a prescriptive or formulaic approach, and must keep in mind the scope for a lawful exercise of planning judgment by a decision-maker. (2) The relevant law as to a “real prospect” of a fallback development being implemented was applied by this court in Samuel Smith Old Brewery (see, in particular, paragraphs 17 to 30 of Sullivan LJ’s judgment, with which the Master of the Rolls and Toulson L.J. agreed; and the judgment of Supperstone J. in R. (on the application of Kverndal) v London Borough of Hounslow Council[2015] EWHC 3084 (Admin) , at paragraphs 17 and 42 to 53). As Sullivan L.J. said in his judgment in Samuel Smith Old Brewery, in this context a “real” prospect is the antithesis of one that is “merely theoretical” (paragraph 20). The basic principle is that “… for a prospect to be a real prospect, it does not have to be probable or likely: a possibility will suffice” (paragraph 21). Previous decisions at first instance, including Ahern and Brentwood Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1996] 72 P. & C.R. 61 must be read with care in the light of that statement of the law, and bearing in mind, as Sullivan L.J. emphasized, “… “fall back” cases tend to be very fact- specific” (ibid.). The role of planning judgment is vital. And “[it] is important … not to constrain what is, or should be, in each case the exercise of a broad planning discretion, based on the individual circumstances of that case, by seeking to constrain appeal decisions within judicial formulations that are not enactments of general application but are themselves simply the judge’s response to the facts of the case before the court” (paragraph 22). (3) Therefore, when the court is considering whether a decision-maker has properly identified a “real prospect” of a fallback development being carried out should planning permission for the proposed development be refused, there is no rule of law that, in every case, the “real prospect” will depend, for example, on the site having been allocated for the alternative development in the development plan or planning permission having been granted for that development, or on there being a firm design for the alternative scheme, or on the landowner or developer having said precisely how he would make use of any permitted development rights available to him under the GPDO. In some cases that degree of clarity and commitment may be necessary; in others, not. This will always be a matter for the decision-maker’s planning judgment in the particular circumstances of the case in hand.”
“One such consideration, and no doubt one to which WCC might have wanted to ascribe great weight, was the fact that there was a permitted scheme in existence, which if it went ahead would include the restoration of the listed building. It may be that, on applying s 70(2) TCPA 1990 and s 38(6) PCPA 2004 that fallback position would have outweighed the clear objective of CM 28.1 of preventing a development with basements such as these from being built, with the consequent disruption of the street scene and of neighbours for an extended period. But assessment of the weight to be given to the fallback position must have looked at the likelihood of it going ahead without the proposed 2016 amendments, and of the likelihood of a scheme not going ahead which would not have included basements of the scale proposed here. Those considerations were simply never explored by WCC. I do not suggest what weight should be given, nor how the competing advantages or disadvantages should be weighed the one against the other, or the s 38(6) balance determined. That is a matter for the local planning authority, and not for the Court.”
“So far as ex post facto reasons are concerned, the authorities draw a distinction between evidence elucidating those originally given and evidence contradicting the reasons originally given or providing wholly new reasons: Ermakov, pp.325-6. Evidence of the former kind may be admissible; evidence of the latter kind is generally not. Furthermore, reasons proffered after the commencement of proceedings must be treated especially carefully, because there is a natural tendency to seek to defend and bolster a decision that is under challenge: Nash, [34(e)].”
“Development will not be permitted where: i) it involves land which is at a risk of flooding, including tidal inundation; or ii) it is likely to increase the risk of flooding elsewhere; and iii) the development would hinder flood control or maintenance works.”
“GN.1 General Development Policy Development will be permitted where the following criteria are met: … 7. It would not cause or result in unacceptable harm to health and safety; … GN.19 Static Caravan Sites A. Proposals for new static caravan and chalet sites or extension to existing sites by an increase in the number of pitches will be permitted where: 1. the site is within the Settlement Boundary of a defined settlement; B. The enlargement of the area of a static caravan or chalet site will be permitted where it would achieve a demonstrable overall environmental improvement both for the site and its setting in the surrounding landscape. C. Upgrading of touring pitches to static pitches will be permitted where: 1. The site is well-related to a settlement identified in the hierarchy as a Service Village, Service Centre or Town; or 2. The site is well-related to a Local Village, and will provide a community facility not present within the existing settlement, and 3. In all cases the following should apply: i) There is no overall increase in the number of pitches; and ii) There would be a demonstrable overall environmental improvement both for the site and its setting in the surrounding landscape; and iii) The site is outside the Community Council areas of Amroth, St Florence, East Williamston, Penally, Saundersfoot and St Mary out Liberty.”
“…the upgrading of existing touring pitches in sustainable locations can offer the opportunity to improve the overall stock of holiday bed spaces in the static caravan sector and improve existing touring sites. It will apply only to existing touring pitches that are fully authorised by express planning permission. Development should not have adverse landscape impacts and should incorporate screening to ensure that the site blends into the landscape.”
“6.2 New development should be directed away from zone C and towards suitable land in zone A, otherwise to zone B, where river or coastal flooding will be less of an issue. In zone C the tests outlined in sections 6 and 7 will be applied, recognising, however, that highly vulnerable development and Emergency Services in zone C2 should not be permitted. All other new development should only be permitted within zones C1 and C2 if determined by the planning authority to be justified in that location. Development, including transport infrastructure, will only be justified if it can be demonstrated that:- i. Its location in zone C is necessary to assist, or be part of, a local authority regeneration initiative or a local authority strategy required to sustain an existing settlement; or, ii Its location in zone C is necessary to contribute to key employment objectives supported by the local authority, and other key partners, to sustain an existing settlement or region; and, iii It concurs with the aims of PPW and meets the definition of previously developed land (PPW fig 2.1); and, iv The potential consequences of a flooding event for the particular type of development have been considered, and in terms of the criteria contained in sections 5 and 7 and appendix 1 found to be acceptable.”
“The 1987 permission was definitely implemented. In particular, the car park has been available for use in the north of the site since the late 1980s. This article from the Western Mail27th May 1989 records the public opening of the Stepaside Industrial Heritage Project.”
“THIS MONTH saw the official opening of the Stepaside Industrial Heritage Society project and Spring Bank Holiday weekend will be its first opening to the public. These events marked an important milestone which was reached largely thanks to the support and efforts of South Pembrokeshire District Council and over many years the dedicated enthusiasts who formed the basis of the Stepaside Industrial Heritage Society. What is now open to the public is still a small scale attraction – an interpretative centre and shop, tea room in a landscaped picnic area and horticultural training unit from which plants can be purchases [sic].”
“The short-term agreements regarding car parking, site access, etc had enabled the smooth operation of the car park and visitor reception. Saundersvale Estates had agreed to an extension of these arrangements, to be reviewed in October; they had been given an assurance that once the required approval from the WDA had been received then the lease negotiations would be concluded. A car parking charge of£1.00 per parked car was being collected by a member of the Project Staff, who had been engaged in Section 15 works in the car park… 9 – SECTION 15/16 WORKS In respect of Land Reclamation Scheme Works, decisions were awaited from the WDA. Work, however, continued on Section 15 funded Schemes, including land-scaping and general environmental work. Under the WDA Section 15 Scheme, 80% grants for the Improvement of the Environment approval had been received for a submitted scheme … for works to the main car park, site entrance and landscaping. The total cost over three years would be£70,000 , which meant that the Project could incur this expenditure over 48 months as from 1.4.90. This grant would underpin the proposals for entrance improvements, bridge re-construction, etc.”
“…the highway authority recommend a conditional consent, but suggest a condition that adequate facilities for parking and turning shall be made available at all times within the site. In fact there is no scope for visitor parking within the site. The original bird park relied on joint use of the main Stepaside Heritage car park at the northern end of the caravan site. This car park has been used, but is limited in size and is in a different private ownership. I do not think that a major expansion of the bird park/zoon should be allowed reliant on this alone.” (Emphasis added.)
“A matter which does concern you and which I have pointed out to the County Secretary relates to the observed pitching of a tent on Friday 14th June on an area covered by the Section 52 Agreement in 1987 for use as a car park only (Clause 3(ii)); the use for caravanning and tents was to have ceased under Clause 3(i). It may have been that this was an oversight by your staff in this instance and I invite your comments but I trust you will abide by the legal agreement you signed in 1987 in the future.”
“Thank you for your letter of 17/6/91. As you are aware the whole future of the Stepaside area depends on the conclusion by SPDC of the agreement to purchase or lease the land they require for the project. This has led to the delay in signing and implementing the new section 52 agreement, and delay in the sale or lease of the land you refer to to SPDC. This has inevitably led to a number of false starts and changes in respect of the land areas and their useage. I understand from SPDC that their final proposal is now with WDA and that a conclusion will be reached shortly. In the meantime we have reached agreement with them over a smaller care park area as an interim measure, which is designed to assist them to provide a presence on the site prior to formal agreement. In addition we have agreed with the Saundersfoot Steam Railway Co for a temporary line whilst they await the grant of the LRO to enable the whole project to proceed. This was the subject of a separate application to SPDC which has been approved. Our error appears to have been simply one tent, and I hope that very shortly the position with SPDC will be clarified to enable all the loose ends in this respect to be tidied up.”
“I enclose a copy of the decision notice and would like to draw your attention to: … (c) conditions 1 and 6. Before the decision was issued Saundersvale Holiday Estates, represented by a Director whose signature is indecipherable and Mr A. Caine as Secretary, singed an agreement unders.52 of the Town and County Planning Act 1971 with the County and District Councils. That agreement which is binding to successors in title, required … (ii) the removal of caravans and tents from an area to the north of the Company’s site to be relocated to the north, north-east, east and south-east of Golden Grove and the vacated land to be used only as a car park for the purposes of the Project and for no other form of development without the prior approval of the County Council; … Although there was a clear delineation on the 1987 plan between the SIHP area and the caravan park the application site, delineated by a red line included the existing touring caravan and tent park and where it was to be relocated. Therefore there is no permission other than that granted in 1987 for the relocation of 41 touring caravan pitches as described in (ii) above near to Golden Grove, on land which straddles the National Park Boundary, and this permission is linked to a number of other aspects of the caravan park and on highway works by conditions and agreement. You can not therefore implement the touring caravan element without the other matters referred to above. … The planning situation with regard to your land holding at Stepaside as well as having been extremely contentious is obviously extremely complex as apart from the above there are decisions made by the National Park and the District Council for the land wholly within their administrative areas. From the short visit to your site it was difficult to ascertain whether the works you have been undertaking are within the terms of the various permissions or whether they can be considered permitted development. Therefore, before the meeting between officers of the three authorities and your representatives can take place I would ask that the enforcement officers from the authorities look at the site in more detail as soon as possible and prepare reports for the planning officers involved so that they will have as much information as possible available to them when discussing your proposal in more detail. …” (Emphasis added.)
“The highway works have been completed but the sewage facilities have not. Therefore, no other development included in the planning application should be carried out until the facilities are n place. Whilst clause (ii) was exempt from this limiting requirement, Condition 2 on the decision notice makes it quite clear that the planning permission was for change of use only. Therefore the earthworks carried out at the end of last year (below Golden Grove) by your predecessor was unauthorised and the position needs to be regularised before the area can be used for touring caravan pitches.”
“What is clear to the residents on the ground is that the use of the land at the northern end of the site did change. Since the 1980s, it has only been used as a car park, and not a caravan site. The lawful use of the northern area thus became car park use and any reversion to caravan use would, as I understand matters, require a new planning consent to be granted.”
“The press article states ‘what is open to the public is a small scale attraction – an interpretative centre and shop, tea room in landscaped picnic area and horticultural training unit from which plants can be purchases (sic).’ The description of what was open to the public does not refer to the development described in the 1987 Permission but rather refers to the development (planning permission D3/1209/88 for Tearoom, Crane Exhibit, Horticultural unit and Flank stone walls to entrance) within a number of sites to the west of the site of the 1987 Permission.”
“The only difference between a twin unit caravan and a single unit caravan is that a standard single unit caravan in general is 4.2672m (14ft) in width. The reason for this is that 14ft-wide caravans can be transported by road with little complication, however the regulations from the Department for Transport (Road Vehicle Authorisation of Special Types General Order 2003 ) states that loads over 6.1m (20 feet) can be transported by special order. It could therefore be possible to install single unit caravans over 20ft on the site which would be the same size as a standard twin unit caravan.”
“6.9 … Policy GN.19 (Static Caravan Sites) of the current LDP supports proposals for extensions to existing sites by an increase in the number of pitches when that site is within a settlement and thus the proposal, if a new application, would fail to accord with policy GN.19. However planning consent 11/0585/PA has been lawfully implemented and the 29 caravan units could also be lawfully provided under the same consent. …” (Emphasis added)