"[Mr A] was unknown to Superintendent [Y] and Garda [X] prior to June 1999. He was introduced to both Gardai by …, his business partner. Through receipt of confidential information, both Gardai suspected Mr [A] was previously involved in the importation of smuggled tobacco and drugs. After a number of meetings, [Mr A] indicated to both Gardai how he had been approached to bring a consignment of drugs to Ireland from the Continent. [Mr A] indicated he needed the money and was prepared to do the drugs run for the money. He also indicated he would be prepared to assist the Gardai in the recovery of the drugs and arrests if they wished. Both Gardai spoke to [Mr A] of the dangers involved for both himself and his family and also the risk of being arrested in the Continent in possession of drugs. [Mr A] indicated on a number of occasions he would proceed with the drug importations whether the Gardai wanted them or not as he needed the money. The predicament facing both Gardai was as follows: A) Did they listen to the information he was prepared to give them voluntarily with the hope of making sizeable captures of illegal drugs and the arrest of some of the top Drug Barons in Ireland? B) Did they ignore this, refuse to have anything to do with [Mr A] and allow the drug shipments to Ireland? Without full time surveillance on [Mr A] (which was not viable) Gardai would not have been in a position to ascertain if he was bringing drugs into the country or not. It was decided to run with option A and as a result the captures [referred to in a conversation with the French visitor to Ireland] came about. [Mr A] was never in a position to tell either Gardai of exactly where in Europe he was to pick up the drugs until he returned to Ireland. Contact was only made with him while en route as to whether or not the drugs were available for collection and where. He sometimes went to Europe in the expectation of getting a consignment of drugs to bring back to Ireland, but for various reasons, the organisers of such importation cancelled them while he was en route. [Mr A] did provide invaluable assistance to Gardai in the past which lead to the capture of almost£3,000,000 worth of drugs, the arrest of some of the biggest drug dealers in this country, and the recovery of guns and stolen property. He was an excellent informant. I have little doubt, but that if he managed to return to Ireland with the drugs he was found with in Lyon in August, 2000 that Gardai would have been in a position to recover them and make arrests. Both Superintendent Y and Garda X wish to emphasise the following. A. There was no personal gain in this for either Garda. B. [Mr A] was not forced or coerced in any way to carry out this work. C. It was [Mr A] himself who offered to assist the Gardai but indicated because he needed cash he was willing to do such work whether the Gardai wanted to get involved or not. D. He had been paid a financial reward following each of the previous two captures from Secret Funds. E. Mr A was aware of the dangers involved in such work and of being arrested in possession of drugs in Ireland and the Continent."
"Whereas [Mr A] has acknowledged having imported these narcotic drugs into France and has claimed to be acting in agreement with the Irish police who have confirmed his allegations; whereas, nevertheless, this agreement, of which it is not even contended that the French authorities had been advised, does not constitute a case of irresponsibility [1] ; Whereas in effect, the French authorities have never been asked, either by Superintendent [Y], or by any other Irish authority, and contrary to all the principles of international mutual repressive [2] assistance, to implement the French legislative provisions concerning surveillance of the transport of substances being used to commit crimes or offences of narcotic drugs trafficking, measures provided for by the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances adopted in Vienna on19th December 1988 , to which Ireland and France are both party; Whereas likewise, only the officers of the criminal investigation department can be authorised to carry out undercover operations subject to strict arrangements concerning their execution, and not suspect individuals, habitually indulging in dubious illegal activities and prey to financial difficulties; whereas [Mr A] does not thus assume the status of undercover agent, which, moreover, has never been awarded him by the Irish police authorities; Whereas in this regard, Superintendent [Y] and the police officer, [Mr X], have affirmed that [Mr A] was already suspected of importing into Ireland smuggled tobacco, which he has acknowledged, and narcotic drugs when he offered his services to them, explaining that he needed money and that he was ready, in any case, to indulge in drugs trafficking whether that interested the police services or not; whereas they have stated that [Mr A] was perfectly informed of the dangers inherent in this activity and the risks of being arrested in possession of narcotic drugs in Ireland and on the continent; whereas [Mr A] cannot describe as inoperative the declarations of those he considered as his "protectors", without producing the slightest probative argument in support of his allegations; Whereas in this way, whatever is true of the agreements made by the narcotic drugs importers and the Irish police, it has been perfectly established that [Mr A] has knowingly committed the offences of importing, acquiring, holding and transporting without authorisation 187 kilograms of cannabis resin, offences committed in France, of which he must be, by confirmation of the appealed judgment, declared guilty; whereas the customs crime of the irregular circulation of prohibited goods reputed to have been smuggled, in this instance cannabis resin, is equally settled;"
"Whereas there is scarcely the need to underline the seriousness of the acts of drugs trafficking committed by the defendant, who remained remarkably circumspect on the conditions in which he was supplied and being very careful not to supply the slightest indication which would make it possible to catch the importers who will be able to pursue their activity as soon as they have found a replacement for him; whereas his conscious participation in such acts which are as lucrative for the perpetrators as they are harmful to public health, justifies sentencing him to 4 years imprisonment; …[T]he interested party had only come to France in order there to commit the offences being prosecuted."
"The plaintiff claims damages against the defendants for negligence, breach of duty, breach of contract, in quasi-contract, misrepresentation and for breach of constitutional rights, and under the European Convention on Human Rights. The claim arises from the role engaged by the plaintiff at all material times as a garda informant. The plaintiff claims that he entered into an agreement with the [Garda] in July, 1999 that he would so act as informant in relation to the activities of certain persons thought to be engaged in drug trafficking activities believed to be criminal in nature. The plaintiff claims that it was an express term of the agreement and/or that it was represented to him that the first defendant would take all necessary steps to safeguard his safety, keep his identity confidential and protect him from criminal prosecution in the State, or abroad. … It is not denied by the [Garda] that the plaintiff did perform some surveillance role or role as a person providing information, nor is it denied that payments were made to him in consideration of information that he provided to the first defendant."
"It is not and could not be within the power of the Garda Siochana to interfere with criminal proceedings of a Court in another jurisdiction. … It is denied that [Mr A] was given any assurance as to his safety from prosecution should he be discovered in possession of drugs outside the jurisdiction."
"The Plaintiff and Defendants have agreed, in full and final settlement of the above proceedings and all claims howsoever arising between the parties (to include all claims arising out of the European Arrest Warrant proceedings in the United Kingdom and France) to compromise same on the following terms: 1. The Defendants shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of€300,000 …, comprising€250,000 by way of damages and€50,000 by way of contribution towards the Plaintiff's costs in defending the European Arrest Warrant proceedings in the United Kingdom, … . 2. It is hereby acknowledged by An Garda Siochána that [Mr A] was a participating informant between 1999 and his arrest in France in August 2000, that An Garda Siochána owed a duty of care in that regard, and that An Garda Siochána breached their duty of care to [Mr A]. 3. The Defendants shall pay to the Plaintiff the costs of these proceedings, … ."
"The prosecutor must act in good faith. Thus if he knew he had no real case, but was pressing the extradition request for some collateral motive and accordingly tailored the choice of documents accompanying the request, there might be a good submission of abuse of process. …"
"If any criminal court at any time has cause to suspect that a prosecutor may be manipulating or using the procedures of the court in order to oppress or unfairly to prejudice a defendant before the court, I have no doubt that it is the duty of the court to inquire into the situation and ensure that its procedure is not being abused. Usually no doubt such inquiry will be prompted by a complaint on the part of the defendant. But the duty of the court in my view exists even in the absence of a complaint."
"33 … The focus of this implied jurisdiction is the abuse of the requested state's duty to extradite those who are properly requested, and who are unable to raise any of the statutory bars to extradition. The residual abuse jurisdiction identified in R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office … and the Tollman case … concerns abuse of the extradition process by the prosecuting authority. We emphasise those latter two words. That is the language of those cases. It is the good faith of the requesting authorities which is at issue because it is their request coupled with their perverted intent and purpose which constitutes the abuse. If the authorities of the requesting state seek the extradition of someone for a collateral purpose, or when they know that the trial cannot succeed, they abuse the extradition processes of the requested state. 34 The abuse jurisdiction of the requested state does not extend to considering misconduct or bad faith by the police of the requesting state in the investigation of the case or the preparation of evidence for trial. 35 The reason for the distinction lies in the respective functions of the courts of the requested and requesting state in the European arrest warrant framework. The former are entitled to ensure that their duties and the functions under theExtradition Act 2003 Part I are not being abused. It is the exclusive function of the latter to try the issues relevant to the guilt or otherwise of the individual. This necessarily includes deciding what evidence is admissible, and what weight should be given to particular pieces of evidence having regard to the way in which an investigation was carried out. It is for the trial court in the requesting state to find the facts about how statements were obtained, which may go to admissibility or weight, both of which are matters for the court conducting the trial. It is the function of that court to decide whether evidence was improperly obtained and if so what the consequences for the trial are. It is for the trial court to decide whether its own procedures have been breached. 36 As those issues are for decision by the trial court in the requesting state, it cannot be an abuse of the extradition process of the requested state for such an issue to be shown to exist and for its resolution to be available only in the courts of the requesting state. The courts of the requested state cannot decide, let alone do so on partial and incomplete evidence, what it is for courts of the requesting state within the European arrest warrant framework … to decide about such issues and with what effect on the trial."
"The second safeguard lies in the inherent right of an English court, as the executing court, to ensure that its process is not abused. One form of abuse of process is the fortunately rare case in which the prosecutor has manipulated the process of the executing court for a collateral and improper purpose: …"
"43. It is clear from statements of this court in R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office … ( 'Bermingham' ), R (Government of the USA) v Bow Street Magistrates' Court … ( 'Tollman' ) and Symeou v Public Prosecutor's Office at the Court of Appeals, Patras, Greece … ( 'Symeou' ) that both the Magistrates' Court and the High Court on appeal retain an implied jurisdiction to refuse to extradite a requested person under Part 1 of the EA on the basis that there has been an abuse of the process of requesting extradition by the prosecuting authority or other emanation of the judicial authority seeking extradition. In Tollman (which involved extradition proceedings under both Parts 1 and 2 of the EA) and in Symeou (Part 1 extradition) the court emphasised that the abuse of the process has to be that of the prosecuting authority. But, given that, under the Framework Decision of 2002 on which Part 1 of the EA is based, all extradition requests must be made by a Judicial Authority, it seems to us that the court has an implied jurisdiction to consider whether there has been an abuse of the extradition process under Part 1 of the EA by a requesting judicial authority. We note, of course, the point made by Sir John Thomas, then President of the Queen's Bench Division, at [49]-[50] of Swedish Prosecution Authority v Assange[2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) that the acts of a prosecutor, in contradistinction to those of a judge, must be subjected to "rigorous scrutiny" because a prosecutor is (unlike a judge) a party to the criminal proceedings in the requesting state. That "rigorous scrutiny" must be applied when considering whether a prosecuting authority, acting as a Judicial Authority for the purposes of the extradition request, has conducted itself in a way that is an abuse of the extradition process. It is important to note that the abuse of process jurisdiction does not extend to considering misconduct or bad faith by the police of the requested state in the investigation of the case nor in the preparation of evidence for the trial in the requesting state: see [34] of Symeou . 44. However, whether it is the prosecuting authority's behaviour or that of another entity that constitutes the Judicial Authority of the requesting state that is being criticised, it will only amount to an abuse of the extradition process if the statutory regime in the EA is being 'usurped' (see [97] of Bermingham ). It would, for example, be 'usurped' by bad faith on the part of the Judicial Authority in the extradition proceedings or a deliberate manipulation of the extradition process. But any issues relating to the internal procedure of the requesting state are outside the implied abuse of process jurisdiction concerning extradition proceedings: see [36] of Symeou . Moreover, as is clear from the decision of this court in Federal Public Prosecutor, Brussels, Belgium v Bartlett[2012] EWHC 2480 (Admin) , this 'usurpation' of the statutory extradition regime has to result in the extradition being 'unfair' and 'unjust' to the requested person. In this regard it has also to be shown that, as a result of the 'usurpation' of the statutory regime, the requested person will be unfairly prejudiced in his subsequent challenge to extradition in this country or unfairly prejudiced in the proceedings in the requesting country if surrendered there."
"Secondly, the court will only exercise the jurisdiction if it is satisfied, on cogent evidence, that the Judicial Authority concerned has acted in such a way as to "usurp" the statutory regime of the EA or its integrity has been impugned. We say "cogent evidence" because, in the context of the European Arrest Warrant, the UK courts will start from the premise, as set out in the Framework Decision of 2002, that there must be mutual trust between Judicial Authorities, although we accept that when the emanation of the Judicial Authority concerned is a prosecuting authority, the UK court is entitled to examine its actions with "rigorous scrutiny."
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; … 2. … 3. … 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful."
"… it is clear that the purpose of Article 5 (4) is to assure to persons who are arrested and detained the right to a judicial supervision of the lawfulness of the measure to which they are thereby subjected: … . Where the decision depriving a person of his liberty is one taken by an administrative body, there is no doubt that Article 5 (4) obliges the Contracting States to make available to the person detained a right of recourse to a court; but there is nothing to indicate that the same applies when the decision is made by a court at the close of judicial proceedings. In the latter case, the supervision required by Article 5 (4) is incorporated in the decision; this is so, for example, where a sentence of imprisonment is pronounced after "conviction by a competent court" (Art. 5 (I) (a) of the Convention)."
"34. Article 3 can in principle apply where a Contracting State proposes to extradite a person to another state, whether or not that other state is itself a party to the ECHR. As it happens France is, like the United Kingdom, a party to the ECHR. 35. There must be substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited, the Appellant faces a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. 36. Once such evidence has been adduced by the Appellant it is for the requesting state to dispel any doubts about it: see Saadi v Italy[2009] 49 EHRR 30 , at prargraphs. 129 and 140. 37. There is a presumption that parties to the ECHR, such as France, are willing and able to fulfil their obligations, in the absence of "clear, cogent and compelling" evidence to the contrary. However, that presumption can be rebutted where that evidence comes from an internationally recognised source or is specific to an individual. 38. There may also be a duty on the Court in this jurisdiction to request further information from the state concerned where this is necessary to dispel any doubts. 39. In the context of prison overcrowding, there will be a strong presumption of a breach of Article 3 if any of the following criteria are absent: (1) a private sleeping place within a prison cell; (2) at least 3m² of floorspace per prisoner; and (3) an overall surface area of the cell which is such as to allow the detainees to move freely between the furniture items. 40. Where a detainee is allocated between 3 and 4m² of personal space, a violation of Article 3 will be found if there are other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions: in particular, regard will be had to access to outdoor exercise; natural light or air; availability of ventilation; adequacy of room temperature; access to private toilet facilities; and compliance with basic sanitary and hygiene requirements."
"Recommendation 1 The right to individual imprisonment must be effective for all detained persons. This right implies that the cells of a place, because of their area less than 11 m², are occupied by only one person. People who express the wish to be or who, in fact, are in a group must be in a room suitable in terms of living space and equipment. An action plan to reduce the use of extra mattresses must be implemented without delay, having regard to the unacceptable worsening of the conditions of detention which results for people and the consequences which seriously jeopardize their prospects for reintegration. Recommendation 2 The calculation of places and capacity of penal establishments must be reviewed and updated in a standard of a regulatory nature. This standard must take into account the recommendations of Council of Europe bodies. In addition, no other data than operational capacity should be taken into account when calculating the occupancy rate of an establishment. In addition to the number of people detained, the number of operational places and the occupancy rate per establishment, it is necessary for the prison administration to acquire more precise statistical tools for measuring prison overcrowding and individual cell occupancy. The rate of individual cell occupancy and the number of additional mattresses must be produced each day by establishment, with regard to the specific characteristics of each of these, in particular the number and type of cells (individual, double or multiple). The notion of density should be further developed in remand centres, in order to know the area allocated to each person detained and to measure overcrowding. The monthly statistics should show, by establishment, the number of vacant places and calculate the difference between the operational capacity, reduced vacant places, and the number of persons detained. Recommendation 3 The implementation of a policy to reduce the prison population cannot be seriously envisaged for lack of precise knowledge of the state of overcrowding and the execution of sentences. The management of the prison administration must once again be able to produce, via the GENESIS software, statistics relating to the composition of the penal population of each establishment. Recommendation 4 The lack of staff and the resulting "degraded mode" management have detrimental effects on the conditions of detention which prison overcrowding aggravates, when it is not one of the causes. Failing to fill the posts provided for in the staff organizational charts within the establishments, the prison administration must define criteria for the abolition of posts and prohibit some, in particular those having the consequence of reducing access to visiting rooms, to healthcare, medical and other activities. Recommendation 5 Overcrowding must cease to be understood as an essentially prison problem. The fight against prison overcrowding must become real public policy, to which clear and lasting resources must be allocated. Recommendation 6 Judges who pronounce prison sentences must be attentive to the conditions of detention in remand prisons under their jurisdiction and ensure that this incarceration can make sense. It is the responsibility of the magistrates to know the places of detention and the context specific to the establishments under their jurisdiction. To do this, they must in particular effectively monitor places of detention and rely on sentence enforcement commissions to put in place real policies to combat overcrowding, by intensifying the exchange of information on data available and by creating suitable management tools. Recommendation 7 It is time to take the necessary steps to end the excessive use of the prison sentence; to readjust the perimeter of the prison sentence in application of the principle of the need for punishment, in particular by replacing prison terms for certain offenses by other penalties, as well as by decriminalizing measures. Recommendation 8 The public authorities must question the effect of short prison sentences which most often have the effect of causing real disruption in the life of a convicted person without being able to benefit from any assistance in prison because of the brevity of the stay. Recommendation 9 The way in which our criminal jurisdictions operate and the whole process of the execution and enforcement of sentences needs to be thought through, in conjunction with the goal of prison deflation. Quantified targets must be set and subject to reinforced monitoring. Recommendation 10 A national prison regulation mechanism must be set up by legislation and be accompanied by binding local protocols, associating the various actors under the responsibility of the judicial authorities. Its purpose is to prevent any establishment from exceeding an occupancy rate of 100%."
"1. From one division to another, the cells are identical to a few details: 3.94m deep by 2.46m wide and 2.99m high, i.e. an area of 9.69m² and a volume of 28.93m²" "2 – the current situation, with three persons in a cell of 9.8 m², constitutes an assault on the dignity and is not acceptable" "3 – The cells are in principle individual, approximately 10 m². In these cells, once the size of the beds (three bunk beds), toilets and table has been deducted, three people must then live in a space of barely 6 m²" "4. These cells are only 10 m², once you deduct the bed space, the toilets and the table…."
"… smaller single cells (8 to 9m²) (excluding sanitary facilities) have space for one or two detainees, leaving a minimum of 4m² per person. As of23 July 2018 , the 386 larger single cells (10m²) accommodated three detainees, i.e. 3m² per person (excluding sanitary facilities)."
"In Fresnes permanent eradication of bed bugs is a priority action, with regular 'disinsectisation' operations two or three times a week and whenever a specific report is made …"
"259. In the cases examined, the Court noted that the Government had produced information on the end of the applicants' detention or on the date of their end of sentence. On the other hand, it notes that the accuracy of the information communicated by the Government on the applicants' personal space is limited. These are sometimes non-existent, as is the case for detainees from Faa'a-Nuutania, Baie-Mahault and Nice. For others, they are incomplete because they do not always specify the area of the cells and do not indicate whether the sanitary annexes are included in these areas. Finally, the information is not always supported by a written document such as a co-ownership history. The Court noted these evidentiary shortcomings in the applications concerning the prisons of Ducos and Fresnes. In addition, the Court was unable to know precisely the area of the sanitary part of the cells, with the exception of those of the MA of Nîmes, which made it difficult to calculate the applicants' personal space when it had information on the total area of the cell. It then assumed that such a space was between 1 and 2m². … 260. In these circumstances, and while admitting the overcrowding situation in all the prisons concerned, the Court considers that the Government have not convincingly refuted the allegations made by the applicants of the CP of Ducos, Faa'a-Nuutania, Baie-Malhaut, Nice and Fresnes (as regards RM and AT for this last establishment) according to which they would have had less than 3 m² of personal space during their entire detention (paragraphs 29, 49, 59, 92 and 113 above). These allegations are further corroborated by relevant information from national authorities such as the CGLPL or from international bodies such as the CPT. … 299. Having regard to what it said in paragraph 260 above, and as regards the detention of RM and AT, the Court concludes that there is a strong presumption of violation ofArticle 3 of the Convention . This presumption cannot be called into question in the absence, in this case, of the first of the three cumulative factors challenging this rebuttal, namely periods of "short, occasional and minor" reduction in the applicants' personal space compared to at the minimum required. It follows that there is no need to examine the other factors (mutatis mutandis, Nikitin and others, cited above, § 184). 300. As regards ABA, the Court held that he had a personal space of approximately 4 m² (see paragraph 113 above). In their observations, the Government indicate that the personal space of ABA is not less than 3 m² (see paragraph 250 above). In these circumstances, the Court considers that it must be held that the applicant had personal space of between 3 and 4 m² throughout his detention. The Government also indicate that the recreation and the possibility of playing sports are sufficient to consider that the threshold of gravity required byArticle 3 of the Convention has not been reached. In view of the findings of the judge hearing the application for interim measures, the CGLPL and the CPT, which observe and describe the very degraded conditions of detention within the MA of Fresnes (see paragraphs 6, 108, 151 and 152 above), the Court does not share this point of view. It notes that it appears from their decisions and reports that the MA of Fresnes, obsolete because of its age and lack of renovation, is repeatedly confronted with the presence of pests, and in particular bedbugs in the beds of detainees, and that the latter suffer from the lack of light and humidity in the cells (idem). It also notes that if the length of the exercise walks in the prison courtyards is not disputed by the applicants, it is the condition of these places which is in question: in its emergency recommendations published in December 2016, the CGLPL indicated that the areas were cramped (twenty-five people in 45 m²) and lacked shelters and toilets and that the rats were moving around there en masse (see paragraph 106 above). The Court does have no information on the current state of these facilities but the description made by the applicants detained in Fresnes at the time of the introduction of their request in 2017 corresponds to that which was made by the CGLPL in 2016 (paragraph 106 above) and the finding of the domestic judge in 2018 who considered that the conditions under which the exercise walks take place are detrimental to the dignity of detained persons (see paragraph 109 above). In view of the above, the Court considers that the conditions of detention of A.B.A. amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning ofArticle 3 of the Convention ."
"there are 480 single cells measuring 9 to 10m² including sanitary facilities, meaning that there is 8 to 9m² of space, i.e. a minimum of 4m² for the one to two detainees. The double cells measure from 11m² to 12m² including sanitary facilities i.e. 5m² per person. The 40 cells (as of27 August 2018 ) with three detainees have at least 3m² per prisoner. Less than 10% of Villepinte's prisoners have less than 4m² floorspace, the other 90% have more than 4m²"
"The Penitentiary Centre of Fresnes (men and women …) includes 1,391 cells: - 1,376 cells of 9 to 10 m² - 3 cells of 10 to 11 m² - 6 cells of 11 to 12 m² - 4 cells of 13 to 14 m² - 2 cells from 19 to 24 m² - the size of the sanitary facilities being a little less than 2 m² - showers not in the cells In the men's area, 1,063 cells can accommodate 3 prison inmates. As of29 May 2020 , the prison of Fresnes allows 1,551 inmates … Apart from one cell, none accommodates more than two inmates. Six hundred and ninety three inmates are individually locked up, representing 44% of the total number of inmates …"
"… it has been observed that cells were supposed to be individual, and adding extra beds implies continuous promiscuity [sic], being 2 or 3 per cells. The surface of cells is generally around 10.5m² …"
"We don't have a lot of information about Corbas. … The CGLPL reports … are quite old, but the infrastructure and the furniture didn't changed [sic] since then."
"I have considered the affidavits of Dominique Tricaud. The witness states that the RP is likely to be placed at either Lyon-Corbas or Villefranche Sur Saone prisons. I note the Visit Reports at the prisons date back to 2009/2012/2014. The RP bears the burden to satisfy a real risk that detention there would create a real risk of a breach of his Art 3 rights. The witness has not suggested that the RP would be accommodated in space less than 3m². As regards mattresses have been added to the floor, their Lordships in Shumba rejected the suggestion that the same would breach Article 3 and stated that: 'There is no proper basis for asserting that there would be additional furniture such as to impede free movement, nor would the presence of mattresses interfere with it.' … I am not persuaded that the RP has discharged the burden upon him that there would be a breach of his Article 3 rights."
"Bed deprivation, the obligation to sleep on a mattress placed on the floor, the lack of available space and the ensuing promiscuity in the cell, constitute serious attacks on the dignity of persons. This situation must be ended."
"There should have been a more detailed consideration [by the District Judge] of the material within the 2017 CGLPL report, in which the ratios of cell space to occupancy were still accurate. A cell area of 9sqm, taking out the area for sanitary facilities of 1.6sqm, equates to 7.4sqm. Therefore, for the 112 detainees who are in two-man cells, the space per person is between 3-4sqm (3.7sqm). However, for the 102 detainees who share three to a cell, there would be under 3sqm of space (2.47sqm). Without any further information or assurances to the contrary, this therefore represents a plain breach of Article 3."