“a. Inmates shall be detained in cells that provide at least 3sqm of personal space. b. Inmates shall be detained in cells that contain a self-contained sanitary facility (and which is separated from the remainder of the cell). c. Inmates shall not be detained in the basement areas of wings B, C, D and E of the Lisbon Prison or any room which lacks artificial light. d. The commitment herein shall be recorded in the inmates personal penitentiary files. e. Should any temporary reduction in minimum personal space become necessary, as a result the prisoners own conduct, or in order to protect the health and safety of the prison population, the principles set out in Mursic v Croatia (7334/13, Grand Chamber judgment of20 October 2016 ) will be applied to ensure that conditions remain compatible withArticle 3 ECHR . f. During the short periods of time that the inmates remain to the custody of others entities (e.g. on Court or Police cells), the DGRSP will transmit them the Recommendations and principles set out in Mursic v Croatia to ensure those conditions remain compatible withArticle 3 ECHR . In particular: (i) any such reduction in personal space will be short, occasional and minor; (ii) any such reduction will be accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; (iii) for the duration of such reduction the extradited person will be confined in an appropriate detention facility with no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention…” (i) any such reduction in personal space will be short, occasional and minor; (ii) any such reduction will be accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; (iii) for the duration of such reduction the extradited person will be confined in an appropriate detention facility with no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention…”
“44. The RP [The Appellant] will have the same right of access to the national health service as the general population. The RP will be provided with medicines and access to health care professionals at the prison hospital. So the RP will receive adequate medical treatment. He can be provided with a special diet for his diabetes. 45. The RP has additional care needs but these are limited to assistance putting on socks and shoes and some assistance in bathing and occasional needs getting out of bed. The RP will be assessed upon his arrival in prison, including by healthcare professionals, which will ensure that his particular requirements are known to the authorities and provided for. Whilst there are concerns over staffing levels and the conditions of the building, they are not such as to indicate that the treatment of the RP will create a real risk of breach of his Article 3 rights. 46. If the RP’s needs reach a certain level there are alternatives to the RP serving his sentence in a prison, such as the prison hospital, which has a new residential unit, or in hospital or at home.”
“34 …. where a requesting state is asked to respond to concerns about the health of a person whose extradition from the UK they have requested, and to supply details of how they would propose to manage that person in a prison environment to assuage legitimate concerns about the person’s health were he to be extradited and incarcerated that are supported by detailed medical opinions, they must provide, so far as is reasonably practicable, a response which meets the concerns in respect of that specific individual. That is not to say that very lengthy documents or care plans need always be provided by way of reply. The starting point must be that in the case of an EU member state there is a rebuttable presumption that there will be medical facilities available of a type to be expected in a prison: Kowalski v Regional Court in Bielsko-Biala, Poland[2017] EWHC 1044 , para 20. From that starting point it might not [be] necessary to say very much more. In the case of an insulin dependent diabetic prisoner, for example, it might merely be necessary for the requesting state to indicate that the management of diabetes is understood, that insulin is available, and that arrangements can be made for the defendant’s blood sugar to be appropriately monitored. 35. However, in other cases where the treatment or management of the illness or condition is more complex, more detail may be required before the court considering matters under Part 1 of the EA 2003 can be satisfied that concerns arising from the defendant’s medical condition have been met such that there are no bars to extradition. The reason is that it is self-evident that the range of medical care that is provided in prisons is necessarily and inevitably more limited than that which is available in the outside world (as the Polish authorities in this case have expressly stated), and it is also obvious that the sort of medical care which can be provided in prisons is subject to constraints arising from security requirements and the like. Thus, in some cases it may be necessary for the requesting state to provide specific details of what concrete steps will be taken to address the specific issues arising from the defendant’s illness to ensure that he does not suffer severe hardship or oppression by reason of his incarceration resultant on extradition. In such a case, broad generalised assertions to the effect that the prison has a clinic, or that prisoners are entitled to heath care, or that (unspecified) medicines are available, may not be enough.”
“54. Even if a state’s prisons are such that, as a general proposition, compliance with Article 3 cannot be guaranteed – often despite the considerable efforts of that country to improve prison conditions and comply – although the presumption of compliance with the Article 3 obligations may be lost in that particular respect, that will not necessarily bear upon the reliability of that state in complying with a specific assurance it gives to this court as to (e.g.) where a prisoner will be detained. The nature of such a straightforward assurance is very different from that of the general obligation that lies upon a state in relation to its prison conditions in general. Similarly, the assessment of the risk of non-compliance will usually depend upon different factors. 55. In my view, in these circumstances, the starting point is that such a state is entitled to a presumption that it will comply with such a straightforward solemn assurance, even if it has lost the presumption in relation to its prison estate as a whole. Its general failures may, depending on the facts, bear upon its reliability in relation to an assurance; but that reliability will usually be tested in other ways, e.g. by its previous compliance (or non-compliance) with similar assurances...”