“The Government believe that the procedures for assessing licence applications and our decision-making processes are robust and have stood the test of time. We also believe that the eight criteria continue adequately to address the risks of irresponsible arms transfers and are fully compliant with our obligations under the EU common position and the arms trade treaty. Nevertheless it is appropriate to update these criteria in light of developments over the last 13 years. In particular: the list of international obligations and commitments in criterion 1 has been updated; there is explicit reference to international humanitarian law in criterion 2; and the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer is now addressed in criterion 7 rather than criterion 5. There are minor changes to improve the clarity and consistency of the language throughout the text. None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy. … As before they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by case basis taking account of all relevant information available at the time the licence application is assessed. While the Government recognise that there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the following criteria, we will not refuse a licence on the grounds of purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of the criteria. In making licensing decisions I will continue to take into account advice received from FCO, MOD, DFID, and other Government Departments and agencies as appropriate.”
“The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law. Having assessed the recipient country’s attitudes towards relevant principles established by international humanitarian rights instruments, the Government will: a) not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression; b) exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the European Union; c) not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law. For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end use or end user and used for internal repression. The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In considering the risk that items might be used for internal repression or in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit gender-based violence or serious violence against women and children.”
“In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations”
“The purpose of these best practices is to achieve greater consistency among Member States in the application of the criteria … by identifying factors to be considered when assessing export licence applications. They are intended to share best practice in the interpretation of the criteria rather than to constitute a set of instructions; individual judgement is still an essential part of the process, and Member States are fully entitled to apply their own interpretations. The best practices are for the use of export licensing officials and other officials in government departments and agencies whose expertise inter alia in regional, legal (e.g. human rights, public international law), technical, development as well as security and military related questions should inform the decision-making process.”
“2.13 Clear risk. A thorough assessment of the risk that the proposed export of military technology or equipment will be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law should include an inquiry into the recipient’s past and present record of respect for international humanitarian law, the recipient’s intentions as expressed through formal commitments and the recipient’s capacity to ensure that the equipment or technology transferred is used in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law and is not diverted or transferred to other destinations where it might be used for serious violations of this law. Isolated incidents of international humanitarian law violations are not necessarily indicative of the recipient country’s attitude towards international humanitarian law and may not by themselves be considered to constitute a basis for denying an arms transfer. Where a certain pattern of violations can be discerned or the recipient country has not taken appropriate steps to punish violations, this should give cause for serious concern.”
“Serious violations of international humanitarian law include grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Each Convention contains definitions of what constitutes grave breaches (Articles 50, 51, 130, 147 respectively). Articles 11 and 85 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 also include a broader range of acts to be regarded as grave breaches of that Protocol. For the list of these definitions, see Annex V. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international and non-international armed conflict, which it defines as war crimes (Article 8, sub-sections b, c and e; for the full text of the Rome statute, see http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm).”
“Article 8: War crimes ... 2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: (a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949 , namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: ... 2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: (i) Wilful killing; (ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; ... (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives; (iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; (iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives; ... (ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; ...”
“2.10 The main principles of international humanitarian law applicable to the use of weapons in armed conflict are the rules of distinction, the rule against indiscriminate attacks, the rule of proportionality, the rule on feasible precautions, the rules on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and the rule on environmental protection.”
“According to the principle of proportionality, expected incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects may be lawful (albeit regrettable) if they are not ‘excessive’ relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.”
“Any prediction about the future behaviour of human beings (as opposed to the phases of the moon or high water at London Bridge) is necessarily problematical. Reasonable and informed minds may differ and a judgment is not shown to be wrong or unreasonable because that which is thought likely to happen does not happen.”
“It is not for any court of law to substitute its own opinion for [the Secretary of State’s]; but it is for a court of law to determine whether it has been established that in reaching his decision… he had directed himself properly in law and had in consequence taken into consideration the matters which upon the true construction of the Act he ought to have considered and excluded from his consideration matters that were irrelevant to what he had to consider: see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223 , per Lord Greene MR, at p. 229. Or, put more compendiously, the question for the court is, did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?”
“1. The obligation upon the decision-maker is only to take such steps to inform himself as are reasonable. 2. Subject to a Wednesbury challenge, it is for the public body, and not the court to decide upon the manner and intensity of inquiry to be undertaken (R(Khatun) v Newham LBC[2005] QB 37 at §35, per Laws LJ). 3. The court should not intervene merely because it considers that further inquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the inquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision (per Neill LJ in R (Bayani) v. Kensington and Chelsea Royal LBC(1990) 22 HLR 406 ). 4. The court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision by the authority not to make further inquiries if no reasonable council possessed of that material could suppose that the inquiries they had made were sufficient (per Schiemann J in R (Costello) v Nottingham City Council(1989) 21 HLR 301 ; cited with approval by Laws LJ in (R(Khatun) v Newham LBC (supra) at §35). 5. The principle that the decision-maker must call his own attention to considerations relevant to his decision, a duty which in practice may require him to consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case, does not spring from a duty of procedural fairness to the applicant, but from the Secretary of State’s duty so to inform himself as to arrive at a rational conclusion (per Laws LJ in (R (London Borough of Southwark) v Secretary of State for Education at page 323D). 6. The wider the discretion conferred on the Secretary of State, the more important it must be that he has all relevant material to enable him properly to exercise it (R (Venables) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[1998] AC 407 at 466G).”
“Could a rational decision-maker, in this statutory context, take this decision without considering these particular facts or factors? And if the decision-maker was unaware of the particular fact or factor at the time, could he or she nevertheless take this decision without taking reasonable steps to inform him or herself of the same?”
“8. … [T]he MOD monitors all incidents of alleged [International Humanitarian Law] violations by the Coalition that come to its attention... The available information is assessed to identify whether... the responsible party’s actions are assessed as compliant with [International Humanitarian Law] or not.”
“The Royal Saudi Air Force are flying British-built aircraft in Yemen, and have been provided with precision-guided Paveway weapons. The Government is satisfied that the extant licences for Saudi Arabia are fully compliant with the UK’s export licence criteria. No export licences for Saudi Arabia have been reviewed in the last year. We continue to keep all arms sales under close review.”
‘Knowing what we know, is there a clear risk that materials we supply to foreign states might be used in breach of International Humanitarian Law?’
“Targeting Saada – Unlawful Coalition Airstrikes on SaadaCity in Yemen” (June 2015). (having conducted field investigations in Saada City Also spelt Sa’dah City. on 15th and16th May 2015 during a five-day ceasefire, interviewing 28 local residents and examining impact craters and dozens of buildings damaged or destroyed by airstrikes) which concluded that: “While many coalition strikes were directed at legitimate military targets in [Saada City], Human Rights Watch identified several attacks that appeared to violate international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, and resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Coalition attacks struck at least six residential houses not being used for military purposes. One attack killed 27 members of a single family, including 17 children. The airstrikes also hit at least five markets for which there is no evidence of military activity. Aerial attacks on an empty school and a crowded petrol station appear also to have violated the laws of war.”
“G. [W]hereas on several occasions air strikes by the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen have killed civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law, which requires all possible steps to be taken to prevent or minimise civilian casualties; …”
‘What military target was in my brother’s house?’
“This report documents 10 coalition airstrikes from April through August that appear to have violated international humanitarian law, the laws of war. … In the cases discussed in this report, which caused at least 309 civilian deaths and wounded at least 414 civilians, Human Rights Watch found either no evident military target, or that the attack failed to distinguish civilians from military objectives.”
“128. The coalition’s targeting of civilians through air strikes, either by bombing residential neighbourhoods or by treating the entire city of Sa’dah or region or Maran as military targets, is a grave violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. In certain cases, the Panel found such violations to have been conducted in a widespread and systematic manner. … 140. On 8 May, the entire city of Sa’dah and region of Maran were declared ‘military targets’ by the coalition. Sa’dah remains one of the most systematically targeted and devastated cities in Yemen, attributable to coalition airstrikes and the targeting of the entire city in direct violation of international humanitarian law… Sa’dah also faced systematic indiscriminate attacks, including on hospitals, schools and mosques. … 151. The denial of humanitarian assistance is constitutive of a war crime regardless of whether it occurs in an international or a non-international armed conflict… However, the commercial blockade also has an impact on the social and economic rights of the people of Yemen and, as such, on the right to life.”
“N. [W]hereas some EU Member States have continued to authorise transfers of weapons and related items to Saudi Arabia since the war started; whereas such transfers are in violation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms export control, which explicitly rules out the authorising of arms licences by Member States if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law and to undermine regional peace, security and stability; …”
“It has been well documented and reported by journalists and researchers on the ground in Yemen that there continues to be compelling evidence of serious violations of [International Humanitarian Law] conducted by both sides to the Yemeni conflict, including by the Saudi-led coalition, particularly regarding the coalition air strikes.”
“The number of casualties rose dramatically after the collapse of the cessation of hostilities in August 2016” and that “[Saudi Arabia-led coalition] airstrikes on civilian targets have continued into 2017”
“Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith the Statement issued by the Arab Coalition Forces to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen (Coalition). The Statement includes the following: 1. The Coalition’s reaffirmation of its respect, commitment and compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 2. The Coalition deeply regrets every human casualty in Yemen; and reaffirms that all possible measures are taken to protect all civilians in Yemen. 3. The Coalition reaffirms its support and cooperation with the United Nations and all the relevant humanitarian organizations to ensure the protection of all civilians in Yemen. 4. The establishment of an independent high-level team (Team) of civilian and military experts to assess reported incidents of civilian causalities, investigation procedures, and mechanisms of precision targeting. The Team is expected to issue a comprehensive and objective report covering each incident individually and containing recommendations and lessons learnt. 5. The Team will cooperate fully with the Yemeni National Committee in investigating alleged human rights abuses; and the relevant United Nations entities, including the United Nations Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee and its Panel of Experts, pursuant to their mandates. We take this opportunity to once again urge the Security Council to demand that all parties, and in particular the Houthis and their allies, ensure the protection of civilians…”
“Among the most important mechanisms and procedures of these rules in this matter are the following: 1. Mechanisms and procedures of targeting: 1. Identifying the military targets undergoes several stages. It starts from choosing a target, analyzing it and confirming that it’s a military target through several sources to ensure not to make any mistakes when targeting every site in the Yemen is supposed to be civilian unless the contrary is decisively proved. 2. Constantly working on developing the list of sites that are prohibited from being targeted including sites of civilian presence, places of worship, diplomatic quarters, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and committees, and cultural sites. The list is updated constantly and sent in a periodic basis, to all the levels of the coalition forces to insure that all the specialists are aware of it. 3. Legal advisers shall be constantly employed to work with planning and targeting cells in order to study the proposed target and approve them so no location is targeted unless assured of its legitimacy and compatibility with the international humanitarian law. 4. The coalition forces use precise and guided weapons, in spite of their high cost in addition to the lack of international legal commitment on the countries to use them, in order to avoid any mistakes, collateral damages and casualties. 5. The coalition forces in Yemen tend to drop warning publications in the areas where military targets exist as a protective measure before any operation to ensure that civilians are not in the vicinity of these locations. 6. The coalition forces in Yemen seek, during the conduct of their military operation, to constantly develop the usual targeting mechanisms, and their accomplishments in this regard include the following: • Constant development of the specialists’ capabilities in the coalition forces in the field of the targeting mechanisms through conducting specialized courses in this field with some international centers such as (San Remo) institute for international humanitarian law specialized in armed conflicts, and with collaboration with some friendly countries in the field of training specialists in these matters. • Increasing the number of coalition forces in Yemen within the perimeter of collateral damage which may resulted from targeting procedures that have a wide scope in comparison with what is applied in other countries. • Applying additional review elements of choosing targets to increase the level of assurance regarding the legitimacy of targeted site. • Adding protective procedures to prevent any errors including restraining bombings only after taking permission from observers on the front line who assure that there are no civilians in the vicinity of the targets. 2. After-targeting assessment and investigation procedures against accident claims. 1. After-targeting assessment procedures: • After each targeting operation a review and an analysis must be performed based on the operation records and reports of army units conducting the operation to check the accuracy of targeting operation and if there’s any unexpected collateral damage. • Quick assessment process to benefit from each operation assessment outcomes and avoid any future mistakes. • Referring any targeting operation that caused unexpected collateral damages (if any) to the internal investigation (Accidents Office). 2. Conducting investigations concerning claims about targeting civilians, civilian facilities and humanitarian organizations: • Coalition forces supporting legitimacy in Yemen are keen on establishing a separate investigation team in every incident regarding any of their operations. One of these efforts is establishing an office for accident at Air Force HQ to investigate each claim with a number of procedures. Some of these procedures are: - Listing all sites targeted in the areas of claims. - Reviewing after mission reports in the plane and from the forward air controller (FAC) - Reviewing sorties recordings at the claim area - Analyze investigations outcomes and take the legal necessary procedures including: a. Declaring all investigation results. b. Commitment to compensate for all collateral damage c. Take all precautions to avoid any mistakes, and to develop all targeting devices. d. Take action in questioning any convicted person with such incidents.” 2. Constantly working on developing the list of sites that are prohibited from being targeted including sites of civilian presence, places of worship, diplomatic quarters, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and committees, and cultural sites. The list is updated constantly and sent in a periodic basis, to all the levels of the coalition forces to insure that all the specialists are aware of it. 3. Legal advisers shall be constantly employed to work with planning and targeting cells in order to study the proposed target and approve them so no location is targeted unless assured of its legitimacy and compatibility with the international humanitarian law. 4. The coalition forces use precise and guided weapons, in spite of their high cost in addition to the lack of international legal commitment on the countries to use them, in order to avoid any mistakes, collateral damages and casualties. 5. The coalition forces in Yemen tend to drop warning publications in the areas where military targets exist as a protective measure before any operation to ensure that civilians are not in the vicinity of these locations. 6. The coalition forces in Yemen seek, during the conduct of their military operation, to constantly develop the usual targeting mechanisms, and their accomplishments in this regard include the following: • Constant development of the specialists’ capabilities in the coalition forces in the field of the targeting mechanisms through conducting specialized courses in this field with some international centers such as (San Remo) institute for international humanitarian law specialized in armed conflicts, and with collaboration with some friendly countries in the field of training specialists in these matters. • Increasing the number of coalition forces in Yemen within the perimeter of collateral damage which may resulted from targeting procedures that have a wide scope in comparison with what is applied in other countries. • Applying additional review elements of choosing targets to increase the level of assurance regarding the legitimacy of targeted site. • Adding protective procedures to prevent any errors including restraining bombings only after taking permission from observers on the front line who assure that there are no civilians in the vicinity of the targets. 1. After-targeting assessment procedures: • After each targeting operation a review and an analysis must be performed based on the operation records and reports of army units conducting the operation to check the accuracy of targeting operation and if there’s any unexpected collateral damage. • Quick assessment process to benefit from each operation assessment outcomes and avoid any future mistakes. • Referring any targeting operation that caused unexpected collateral damages (if any) to the internal investigation (Accidents Office). 2. Conducting investigations concerning claims about targeting civilians, civilian facilities and humanitarian organizations: • Coalition forces supporting legitimacy in Yemen are keen on establishing a separate investigation team in every incident regarding any of their operations. One of these efforts is establishing an office for accident at Air Force HQ to investigate each claim with a number of procedures. Some of these procedures are: - Listing all sites targeted in the areas of claims. - Reviewing after mission reports in the plane and from the forward air controller (FAC) - Reviewing sorties recordings at the claim area - Analyze investigations outcomes and take the legal necessary procedures including: a. Declaring all investigation results. b. Commitment to compensate for all collateral damage c. Take all precautions to avoid any mistakes, and to develop all targeting devices. d. Take action in questioning any convicted person with such incidents.”
“Starting today and as you all remember we have declared through media platforms and through the leaflets that were dropped on [Ma’aran and Saada], and prior warnings to Yemeni civilians in those two cities, to get away from those cities where operations will take place. This warning will end at 7 p.m. today and coalitions forces will immediately respond to the actions of these militias that targeted the security and safety of the Saudi citizens from now and until the objectives of this operation are reached. We have also declared Saada and Ma’aran as military targets loyal to the Houthi militias and as a result the operations will cover the whole area of those two cities and thus we repeat our call to the civilians to stay away from these groups, and leave the areas under Houthi control or where the Houthis are taking shelter.”
“A significant proportion of air operations are on the Saudi Arabian/ Yemen border, where the Houthis have continued to attack Saudi Arabia with cross boarder raid, missiles and rockets, creating a persistent threat on Saudi Arabia’s southern border, which has resulted in at least 90 Saudi civilian deaths. SCUD missiles have landed which potentially brings Riyadh and Mecca in range of attack. Indeed, on 27 October a Ballistic Missile was intercepted by Saudi missile defence systems 40km from Mecca, with the intended target assessed as being Jeddah international airport.”
“The Saudi officers went to great lengths to insist they comply with international Rules of Engagement (ROE) and LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict]. They showed me their "No-Strike List" (NSL) which includes more than 30,000 sites all over Yemen, including refugee camps and hospitals. Those Rules of Engagement state clearly: - Do not target any facility identified on the No-Strike List. - Presume all structures, objects, persons in Yemen are civilian unless otherwise apparent. They also explained their "Targeting Cycle", a circular chart detailing how air strikes are planned and executed, including a sign-off by a lawyer for every target chosen by the intelligence cell. "If we plan a target," a senior Saudi intelligence officer told me, "it's going to go through this cycle. If it's close to a mosque or a hospital then we don't hit it." But I pointed out this is exactly what has been happening, repeatedly, in Yemen, for the past 20 months. Coalition officers admit there have been some mistakes - but they reminded me that even the US Air Force, with its vast experience, has hit wrong targets in Afghanistan and recently at Deir Az-zour in Syria. "When you conduct a war in such circumstances," said Maj Gen al-Assiri referring to Yemen, "where the militias melt in with the civilians, it is too difficult. "Mistakes could happen, and we do what is necessary to protect the civilians. We are here to protect the civilians, we are not here to harm the civilians," he added.”
“If you remember at the beginning of the crisis we mentioned that we have limits for the military operation, there is not targeting for infrastructure, residential areas or places where civilians exist if there are hostile elements there, as I mentioned in the previous press conference we have accurate intelligence regarding the places of command and control centres, in addition to information regarding locations of arms stores and facilities belonging to the Houthi militia inside the residential buildings, hotels and other buildings that are hard to attack, where there could be a great loss among civilians, so we have what we call tactical patience and we do not deal with such targets.”
“We have taken into account recent NGO reports in our assessment and we are ensuring that we are meeting our responsibility to avoid any risk of “wilful blindness”
“MoD remain of the view that the Saudi targeting process for pre-planned targeting complies with NATO standards including a clear definition of what constitutes an acceptable military target, a recognisable process to assess potential civilian casualties (including tests of proportionality) and post incident battle damage assessment. However Saudi processes governing dynamic targeting are less robust than those governing their pre-planned targeting and we have little insight into these. […It is assessed that an increased proportion of airstrikes now involves dynamic targeting…]. We continue to engage with Saudi Arabia to better understand the dynamic targeting processes and to help improve any processes (as may be necessary). …”
“Such a small percentage of potential incidents of concern does not of course diminish the seriousness of the individual incidents. The figure is included to provide a quantifiable context in which risk assessments can be conducted, in particular to assist with analysis in relation to any allegations of systemic or process based failure by the Saudis to adhere to [International Humanitarian Law].”
“Overall assessment of Saudi compliance with [International Humanitarian Law]. • From all of the information available, we have not reached the view that there has been a violation (including a serious violation) of [International Humanitarian Law] by Saudi Arabia. In relation to some of the incidents, there is insufficient information to conclude that Saudi Arabia have violated [International Humanitarian Law] in relation to any individual strikes in the Yemen conflict. However, we nonetheless have significant concerns around [International Humanitarian Law] compliance in relation to some Saudi Arabia processes and the judgement as to whether the threshold has been met is finely balanced. […] We will need to monitor and follow up on these closely – in line with the […] about vigilant monitoring and doing all we can, using all channels available, actively to seek to address any concerns we may have. …” • From all of the information available, we have not reached the view that there has been a violation (including a serious violation) of [International Humanitarian Law] by Saudi Arabia. In relation to some of the incidents, there is insufficient information to conclude that Saudi Arabia have violated [International Humanitarian Law] in relation to any individual strikes in the Yemen conflict. However, we nonetheless have significant concerns around [International Humanitarian Law] compliance in relation to some Saudi Arabia processes and the judgement as to whether the threshold has been met is finely balanced. […] We will need to monitor and follow up on these closely – in line with the […] about vigilant monitoring and doing all we can, using all channels available, actively to seek to address any concerns we may have. …”
“ The Foreign Secretary advises BIS [Department of Business, Innovation and Skills] not to suspend extant licences and not to suspend the processes of new licence applications for the export of arms to Saudi Arabia. The Foreign Secretary agrees that licences for arms exports to Saudi Arabia should continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, against the Consolidated Criteria.”
“The new suspension mechanism will allow the Government to quickly suspend the processing of pending licence applications to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Suspension will not be invoked automatically or lightly, but triggered for example when conflict or crisis conditions change the risk suddenly or make conducting a proper risk assessment difficult. A case-by-case assessment of a particular situation will be necessary to determine whether a licensing suspension is appropriate. Any decision to suspend will be taken by the Licensing Authority based on advice from relevant Government Departments and reporting from our diplomatic posts. Parliament, industry and the media will be informed of any suspension. Suspension will be tailored to the circumstances in play and will not necessarily apply to all export licence applications to a country, but may instead be for applications for particular equipment (for example crowd control goods), or for applications for equipment going to a particular end-user. If a decision to suspend is made, work on licence applications in the pipeline will be stopped and no further licences issued pending ministerial review. Once the suspension is lifted, applications will not be required to be resubmitted.”
“Spoke to Saudi Foreign Minister Al Jubeir earlier. Raised concerns about attack #Sanaa #Yemen, vital urgent investigation underway”
“We briefed the Secretary of State at his Commons’ office last night [i.e. 10th February]. He clearly recognises the graveness of the issues. It was a positive and frank discussion with the SoS and [Special Advisor] asking all the right questions; [redacted] To be honest – and I was very direct and honest with the SoS – my gut tells me we should suspend. This would be prudent and cautious given the acknowledged gaps in knowledge about Saudi operations. I put this directly to the SoS in these terms. [redacted] And the FCO is the competent authority to make these assessments. …”
“SoS summarised that the decision to continue exporting to Saudi Arabia was finely balanced, but given the discussions he had had and the advice he had received from [redacted] Foreign Secretary (FS) and Defence Secretary (DS) he was minded to continue exporting. He noted that the situation was continuously evolving, and that this decision could easily change. As a result he wanted the situation to be monitored carefully, so that he could be advised of any changes. Ideally, he wanted weekly reports from the Foreign Office and MoD of the situation, so that should the evidence suggest that we can no longer meet the criteria for exporting to Saudi Arabia, then he can take the decision to suspend export licences. [The Permanent Secretary] suggested he write to the Permanent Secretary in the FCO, MoD and DfID, copying in the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, noting that this is a developing situation, and asking for their assistance with regular updates, and to notify BIS of any changes immediately.”
“…[I]solated incidents of international humanitarian law violations are not necessarily indicative of the recipient country's attitude towards international humanitarian law and may not by themselves be considered to constitute a basis for denying an arms transfer. Where a certain pattern of violations can be discerned or the recipient country has not taken appropriate steps to punish violations, this should give cause for serious concern.” (4) It is clear from the evidence that the third party reports upon which the Claimant relies were taken into account by the Secretary of State at each stage when considering his decision under Criterion 2c, together with all the other information and analyses available to him. The reports were often directed at broader considerations than International Humanitarian Law violations. (5) For example, in the United Nations Panel of Experts Report the following considerations are evident: (a) The mandate for the report was wide: it was to monitor the implementation of sanctions measures. (b) The Report refers to 119 allegations of International Humanitarian Law violations by the Coalition but does not contain a detailed or comprehensive explanation or analysis of them. (c) The allegations of International Humanitarian Law violations are, in many instances, very general (see e.g. paragraph 123 “all parties to the conflict in Yemen have violated the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution…”; paragraph 137 “The Panel documented 119 Coalition sorties related to violations of [International Humanitarian Law]” ; Annex 47 “Attacks on farms and agricultural areas – 3” and “Attacks on mosques – 3”). (d) Many of the alleged violations included in the report are not set out in any detail and, as Mr Watkins explains, consequently could not be recorded by the MoD on the Tracker (see e.g. Annex 54 which refers to "3 cases of attacks on fishing vessels and dhows, and 2 cases of attacks upon fishing markets and their communities", but only goes on to provide information about two of these attacks). (e) The sources used to compile the report were necessarily limited and are not qualitatively as sophisticated as the sources available to the MoD. Section V of the Report covers “Acts that violate international humanitarian law and human rights law and cross-cutting issues”
“In a previous witness statement I commented on the attitude, ability and direction of travel of the Saudi Armed Forces. The Saudis continue to seek to improve their processes and increase the professionalism of their Armed Forces and continue to be receptive to UK offers to provide training and advice, as demonstrated by the JIAT workshop … and [Special Instructions] workshop. The Saudis have been receptive to high-level military visits from the UK including into the SAOC [Saudi Air Ops Centre], and have shown a willingness to learn from UK experience and take on board UK advice. I assess that our engagement since August has further helped the RSAF [Royal Saudi Airforce] develop their capabilities and practices, and we have increased confidence that the RSAF operate in a manner compliant with the standards demanded by the Law of Armed Conflict.”