"He is fucking crackers."
“He’s fucking crackers”
“He’s not right, him. It’s gonna be another hour for the doc. He’s getting worse. He’s breathing like, but it’s ultra fast ….”
“12e. Had Mr Berry been considered to be suffering with serious alcohol withdrawal at an earlier stage in the evening and this was evident from around 19.40 he could have been either sent directly to hospital or an urgent medical assessment carried out and subsequently be sent to hospital. Had he been admitted to hospital a number of actions are likely to have been undertaken. He would have been given adequate sedation with further Diazepam and possibly other psychoactive drugs to reduce the effects of his alcohol withdrawal. This would have reduced a lot of the strain on his heart. He would have been observed and been in a significantly less anxious situation. I think his cardiac arrest would have been avoided. 12f. However, if he did have a continued level of anxiety despite the treatment offered when he sustained his cardiac arrest in hospital he would have had a much better chance of survival. He was an otherwise reasonably fit man with no significant underlying heart disease. I would have expected him to have survived his cardiac arrest as he would have had prompt treatment within the first two minutes of his collapse. I think to reap the benefits of being in hospital he would have had to be there by about 23.00 hours to allow time for assessment and the various treatments to act. Given the prompt ambulance response times I think there is a window of opportunity for him to have been sent to hospital for around three hours from 19.40 to 22.40. I think if he had been transferred to hospital within this timeframe he is highly likely to have survived this episode of alcohol withdrawal.”
“13c. I think if he had been in hospital he is highly likely to have survived and indeed is likely not to have sustained a cardiac arrest as his alcohol withdrawal syndrome would have been treated more aggressively.”
“I have read the evidence, including the statement and document bundles prepared by the IPCC, together with the IPCC Independent Investigation Final Report, the note of a conference between counsel and medical experts held of5 January 2015 , the advice of Adrian Waterman QC dated10 January 2015 and the charging advice of Mark Auty dated23 January 2015 . In accordance with the assurance given by the Attorney General in his 2003 review I sought the advice of Max Hill QC to conduct his own independent review to assist me in making a decision in the case. I viewed the CCTV footage at the IPCC offices. I have read the detailed representations made on your behalf by your solicitor in his letters dated29 May 2015 and23 October 2014 . I considered all of these representations very carefully and took account of them in coming to my decision.”
“PS Garland’s failures were: (i) not ensuring that the doctor was given the full details of Stephen’s condition when he was first contacted at 20.25 hours; (ii) agreeing that the doctor could delay his visit at 21.46 hours in circumstances where it should have been clear that Stephen required medical attention; (iii) not giving the doctor any details of Stephen’s condition at that time so that the doctor could himself make a proper assessment as to relative priorities; and (iv) the poor quality of his handover to PS Prest.”
“In my opinion, if PS Garland had ensured the doctor was properly briefed when he was first contacted at 20.25 hours; or if he had asked the doctor to attend immediately when he spoke to him at 21.46 hours, rather than agreeing to him delaying his visit; and/or if he had described the developing symptoms to the doctor at that time, it is likely that Stephen would have been taken to hospital prior to the start of his fatal cardiac arrest at 22.55 hours. According to Dr Perry, the cardiologist, if Stephen had received treatment in hospital he was highly likely to have survived and indeed, probably would not have suffered a cardiac arrest at all. He went on to say that if Stephen had suffered a cardiac arrest in hospital he would have had a 70-75% chance of survival. This means that there was a 20-25% (sic) chance of Stephen dying of a heart attack, even if he had been in hospital. I carefully considered whether this evidence would be enough for the Crown to prove that, “but for” the failures of PS Garland, Stephen would have survived. I conclude that the phrase “highly likely”, taken with the quoted percentage, lacked the degree of certainty to establish that Stephen would not have died if PS Garland had acted as he should have.”
“When assessing whether the failures were so serious as to amount to a crime I considered the following matters to be relevant: (i) there was no proof that custody sergeants were trained to recognise the danger signs and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal and especially of Delirium Tremens (DT); (ii) the condition of DT would rarely be experienced by custody staff; (iii) Stephen’s previous history in custody, and PS Garland’s previous knowledge of him and his behaviour; (iv) Professor Gilvarry’s view that PS Garland not recognising Stephen’s condition and allowing the FME to go off on another call was not unreasonable; (v) PS Garland’s checks on, and interaction with, Stephen throughout the evening of 29 March which showed him reacting to concerns expressed by the DO, and reassessing the risk; (vi) on the occasions when PS Garland spoke to Stephen he was coherent and responsive; (vii) The handover from PS Garland was poor; (viii) PS Prest had only been on duty a relatively short time when Mr Berry suffered the fatal cardiac event after which recovery was not possible; a reasonable custody officer may not have done a risk assessment in this time.”