“(1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision for the purpose of - (a) extinguishing fires in its area, and (b) protecting life and property in the event of fires in its area. (2) In making provision under subsection (1) a fire and rescue authority must in particular— (a) secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary efficiently to meet all normal requirements; (b) secure the provision of training for personnel; (c) make arrangements for dealing with calls for help and for summoning personnel; (d) make arrangements for obtaining information needed for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1); (e) make arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit damage to property resulting from action taken for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1).”
“Category A areas were generally focussed on parts of inner London which had main shopping centre and business buildings, theatres and other entertainment venues or high risk industrial property; significantly, there was no mention of housing in the Government’s ‘A’ risk category.”
“The effect of the Government’s targets was that prior to 2004, London’s emergency response and station locations were configured to provide a faster response in central and inner London than outer London and there was a cluster of resources in the inner London boroughs.”
“This is the first of a series of Guidance Notes designed to provide advice and assistance to fire authorities and those who are asked to develop Integrated Risk Management Plans (IRMPs). It explains what you need to do to produce an IRMP and what it might contain. The guidance is intended to be neither prescriptive nor exhaustive, and you may wish to develop your own arrangements based around the content of this document.”
“(1) The Secretary of State must prepare a Fire and Rescue National Framework. (2) The Framework - (a) must set out priorities and objectives for fire and rescue authorities in connection with the discharge of their functions; (b) may contain guidance to fire and rescue authorities in connection with the discharge of any of their functions; (c) may contain any other matter relating to fire and rescue authorities or their functions that the Secretary of State considers appropriate. (3) The Secretary of State must keep the terms of the Framework under review and may from time to time make revisions to it. (4) The Secretary of State must discharge his functions under subsections (1) and (3) in the manner and to the extent that appear to him to be best calculated to promote - (a) public safety, (b) the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of fire and rescue authorities, and (c) economy, efficiency and effectiveness in connection with the matters in relation to which fire and rescue authorities have functions. (5) In preparing the Framework, or any revisions to the Framework which appear to him to be significant, the Secretary of State - (a) must consult fire and rescue authorities or persons considered by him to represent them; (b) must consult persons considered by him to represent employees of fire and rescue authorities; (c) may consult any other persons he considers appropriate. (6) The Framework as first prepared, and any revisions to the Framework which appear to the Secretary of State to be significant, have effect only when brought into effect by the Secretary of State by order. (7) Fire and rescue authorities must have regard to the Framework in carrying out their functions.”
“The fact that fire deaths in the home have halved since the 1980s, and that since 2007 the number of accidental fire deaths in the home has stabilised at around 210 per year, is a significant testament to the commitment to prevention shown by fire and rescue authorities. There are new challenges. Fire and rescue authorities need to be able to deal with the continuing threat of terrorism, the impact of climate change, and the impacts of an ageing population, against the need to cut the national deficit. It is against this background that we launch this revised National Framework. One of the key principles of which is to acknowledge the proficiency and experience of fire and rescue authorities; and to allow them the freedom and flexibility to deliver the services for which they are respected and renowned without being hampered by Whitehall bureaucracy and red tape. The National Framework will continue to provide an overall strategic direction to fire and rescue authorities, but will not seek to tell them how they should serve their communities. They are free to operate in a way that enables the most efficient delivery of their services. This may include working collaboratively with other fire and rescue authorities, or with other organisations, to improve public safety and cost effectiveness. Ultimately, it is to local communities, not Government, that fire and rescue authorities are accountable.”
“Each fire and rescue authority must produce an integrated risk management plan that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate.”
“Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must: • demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a cost effective way • set out its management strategy and risk based programme for enforcing the provisions of theRegulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in accordance with the principles of better regulation set out in the Statutory Code of Compliance for Regulators, and the Enforcement Concordat” • demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a cost effective way • set out its management strategy and risk based programme for enforcing the provisions of theRegulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in accordance with the principles of better regulation set out in the Statutory Code of Compliance for Regulators, and the Enforcement Concordat”
“Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic accidents and emergencies within their area and in other areas in line with their mutual aid agreements, and reflect this in their integrated risk management plans.”
“Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must: • be easily accessible and publicly available • reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies, and partners • cover at least a three year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary to ensure that fire and rescue authorities are able to deliver the requirements set out in this Framework • reflect up to date risk analyses and the evaluation of service delivery outcomes” • be easily accessible and publicly available • reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies, and partners • cover at least a three year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary to ensure that fire and rescue authorities are able to deliver the requirements set out in this Framework • reflect up to date risk analyses and the evaluation of service delivery outcomes”
“ (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3) The relevant protected characteristics are [as defined above].”
“9. In accordance with sections 85-93 and Schedule 6 of the GLA Act, the Mayor is responsible for the preparation of the annual budgets for the GLA (which comprises two separate components for the purposes of budget setting – the Mayor and the London Assembly) and its functional bodies (LFEPA, Transport for London, Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the London Legacy Development Corporation). Under paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 the Mayor and Assembly are responsible for the preparation of (i) a component budget for each “constituent body”, that is, the Mayor, the Assembly, and each of the functional bodies, and (ii) a consolidated budget for the GLA. The Mayor must prepare a draft component budget for each constituent body, consulting the Assembly before preparing the draft component budgets for the Mayor and the Assembly, and the functional bodies before preparing their draft component budgets. (These component requirements are amounts to be raised from London’s council tax payers for these bodies and it is these that the London Assembly has the power to amend.) The Mayor must then prepare a consolidated budget for the GLA, consisting of the component budgets for each of the constituent bodies, which together constitute the consolidated budget for the GLA. This comprises the first stage, described as the ‘draft consolidated budget’, i.e. a statement of the amount of the component council tax requirement for each body and the calculations which give rise to this amount, and a statement of the aggregate of these component council tax requirements, called the consolidated council tax requirement. 10. After the draft consolidated budget has been approved (amended by the Assembly or not) the Mayor has to prepare a ‘final draft budget’, i.e. a final draft of the proposed consolidated budget. This may be the same as the draft consolidated budget, or the draft consolidated budget amended by the Assembly or the Mayor. The final draft budget is then to be presented to the Assembly for consideration at a further public meeting, and for approval with or without amendment. 11. The process of determination of the component and consolidated budgets is expected to take place between December, when central Government’s provisional financial settlement is published, and the end of February, when the final draft budget must be approved by the Assembly in accordance with paragraph 8(7) of Schedule 6. 12. Under section 110 of the GLA Act, the Mayor may request any information relating to the financial affairs of a functional body to be provided to the GLA where such information is required for the purpose of any functions exercisable by the Mayor or the Assembly. Under section 125, the Mayor may serve a notice on a functional body requiring it to provide him with such specified information as he needs for the purpose of deciding whether to exercise his powers and how to perform his functions concerning revenue and accounts.”
“Although the Government’s Spending Round announcement reduces further the funding for the fire service in 2015-16, the funding figure above for LFEPA includes additional support to offset this reduction. Therefore, LFEPA’s previous savings targets remain unchanged.”
“The [LFB] plans the allocation of its resources on a London-wide basis. By this I mean that we plan the location of fire appliances (and other resources) so they can arrive at incidents as quickly as possible, wherever the incident occurs in London. Since LSP2, the [LFB] has adopted as a guiding principle the concept that Londoners should have equal entitlement to the fastest possible attendance times, irrespective of whether they live in an area in which there is a higher likelihood or a lower likelihood of fire occurring in the first place. The [LFB’s] view is that in the event of a serious incident, each person should be entitled to expect a broadly similar response in terms of resources deployed and the time to arrive. Just because a person lives in an area with a lower likelihood of fire occurring, this does not mean that they should have a slower response time when a fire actually does occur. For convenience, this is referred to in this witness statement as the principle of “equal entitlement”
“64. The overriding aim of the [LFB] in responding to emergencies is to arrive at the scene of the incident as soon as possible. Arriving quickly at an incident is an important factor which affects the [LFB’s] ability to protect the public from fire, however there are complex and difficult judgment calls to make as to how to balance a desire for a fast response with the fact that in some areas the demand for emergency responses is lower. 65. For example, if Camden has better attendance times than Harrow, but Camden has more incidents, how should resources be allocated where it is necessary to make changes to the overall service in line with a budget reduction? In allocating resources should greater weight be accorded to improving attendance times in Camden, reflecting the higher incident numbers there, or, should greater weight be accorded to making improvements in Harrow where attendance times are poorer? 66. There are a number of different approaches which a fire and rescue authority could adopt in relation to protection of the public and which influence decisions in allocating resources. 67. One possible approach is to differentiate between different geographical areas, affording priority (and therefore allocating more resources) to responding to incidents faster in a particular area. If this principle was adopted, a fire service could take into account any number of factors in determining its “priority areas”, for example, a service could decide to prioritise attendance times in areas which have the most significant public buildings, or the most valuable property, or the highest population density, or the highest numbers of people with particular characteristics, or any combination of these factors. This may well involve difficult judgement calls as to which categories of people or premises should benefit from faster attendance times and thus be prioritised over others. Such an approach, in particular the prioritisation of particular groups of people, may practically be very difficult to organise because any identified “priority” areas would be likely to be dispersed around London. 68. Another option, and the one that has been adopted by the [LFB] since 2004, is the principle of seeking to achieve similar attendance times across the whole of the area covered by the service, without prioritising attendance times in particular areas. … this is referred to as the concept of “equal entitlement”
“In my opinion a person in Barking & Dagenham (for example) should not have to wait longer for an appliance than a person in Islington (for example) in the event of a fire, just because the former happens to live in an area with (for example) less high-rise buildings, less high profile buildings, or less vulnerable people than the latter (and vice versa). Further, in my opinion, a person in London should not be treated as being a lower priority for the [LFB] in the event that a fire does occur, simply because they live within an area in which the number of incidents is statistically lower. This is an opinion that was shared by my predecessor as Commissioner when LSP2 was introduced. As a result, the critical point that drives the [LFB’s] guiding principle is the desire to minimise attendance times to a fire wherever it occurs in London, subject to other objectives and operational constraints.”
“There is a powerful argument that at the point when a fire actually breaks out (notwithstanding those control measures that have been put in place) the risk is broadly the same whatever its location. In other words a fire in a bedroom in Westminster has the same potential consequence as a fire in a bedroom in Sutton or Bromley. In risk terms it is also difficult to argue that, just because one person is less likely to have a fire that it follows they should receive a slower response if they do have one. If this logic is accepted it moves us towards developing a single set of attendance standards across London.”
“We applaud the current Commissioner Ron Dobson for trying to equalise attendance times across London. But we do not accept reducing station numbers in inner London arrears is an acceptable method. We believe that if there is a requirement for equalisation, the same level of response currently received by Londoners in inner-city areas should also be delivered to those outer London areas as well. Where we differ is that it is our belief the only way this can be achieved is by increasing resources in the areas that are not meeting the attendance times. For instance, the Commissioner recognised this problem in LSP4, by the opening of a new fire station at Harold Hill on the outskirts of east London. Why? Because the [LFB] could not meet a suitable attendance time in a high area of life risk. This therefore proves that in areas where standards in outer London cannot be reached, the [LFB] should either increase staff numbers or build new fire stations as a blueprint to ensure the equality of service across London.” (Emphasis added.)
“We understand the need to equalise attendance times across London. But we do not accept reducing station numbers in inner London arrears is an acceptable method. We believe that if there is a requirement for equalisation, the same level of response currently received by Londoners in inner-city areas should also be delivered to those outer London areas as well. Where we differ is that it is our belief the only way this can be achieved is by increasing resources in the areas that are not meeting the attendance times. For instance, the Commissioner recognised this problem in LSP4, by the opening of a new fire station at Harold Hill on the outskirts of east London. Why? Because the [LFB] could not meet a suitable attendance time in a high area of life risk. This therefore proves that in areas where standards in outer London cannot be reached, the [LFB] should either increase staff numbers or build new fire stations as a blueprint to ensure the equality of service across London.” (Emphasis added.)
“10. In absolute terms for 1stappliance attendance times: • The following boroughs would see performance worsen, although in some cases by as little as one second and none by more than 45 seconds: Camden, City of London, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Hillingdon, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Redbridge, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, Westminster. (Claimant boroughs underlined.) • The following boroughs would see performance improve (between one and eight seconds): Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Harrow, Hounslow, Richmond upon Thames • The following boroughs would see no change: Barking and Dagenham, Bexley, Croydon, Ealing, Enfield, Haringey, Havering, Kingston upon Thames, Merton, Sutton. 11. In absolute terms for 2ndappliance times: • The following boroughs would see performance worsen, although in some cases by as little as one second and none by more than one minute 24 seconds: Bexley, Camden, City of London, Enfield, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Hillingdon, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Redbridge, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, Westminster. (Claimant boroughs underlined.) • The following boroughs would see performance improve (between one second and one minute 20 seconds): Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Harrow, Hounslow, Richmond upon Thames • The following boroughs would see no change: Barking and Dagenham, Croydon, Ealing, Haringey, Havering, Kingston upon Thames, Merton, Sutton.” • The following boroughs would see performance worsen, although in some cases by as little as one second and none by more than 45 seconds: Camden, City of London, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Hillingdon, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Redbridge, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, Westminster. (Claimant boroughs underlined.) • The following boroughs would see performance improve (between one and eight seconds): Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Harrow, Hounslow, Richmond upon Thames Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Harrow, Hounslow, Richmond upon Thames • The following boroughs would see no change: Barking and Dagenham, Bexley, Croydon, Ealing, Enfield, Haringey, Havering, Kingston upon Thames, Merton, Sutton. • The following boroughs would see performance worsen, although in some cases by as little as one second and none by more than one minute 24 seconds: Bexley, Camden, City of London, Enfield, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Hillingdon, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Redbridge, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, Westminster. (Claimant boroughs underlined.) • The following boroughs would see performance improve (between one second and one minute 20 seconds): Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Harrow, Hounslow, Richmond upon Thames Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Harrow, Hounslow, Richmond upon Thames • The following boroughs would see no change: Barking and Dagenham, Croydon, Ealing, Haringey, Havering, Kingston upon Thames, Merton, Sutton.”
“The revised Plan … continued to include the closure of Clerkenwell Fire Station in the south of Islington. This is one of the five busiest fire stations in London and covers an area with a very high incidence of high rise buildings, including a substantial amount of student accommodation and two residential blocks of 25 and 27 stories respectively. Fire crews from Clerkenwell could also be expected to assist at incidents in very high profile sites such as the Emirates Stadium, Kings Cross/St Pancras Station, the Royal Courts of Justice, the British Museum and numerous other important and high-profile sites.”
“First appliance response times would increase by 2:07 minutes (49%) in Clerkenwell ward to 6:26. In Barnsbury ward, second appliance response times would increase by 2:21 to 8:27 (38.5%) and in St Peter’s ward by 1:57 to 7:48 (33.3%) …. Three of sixteen wards would have first appliance response times above 6 minutes (Caledonian – 6:17, Clerkenwell – 6:26 and Mildmay – 6:41) and one ward would have a 2nd appliance response time above 8 minutes (Barnsbury – 8:27).”
“… • There are 67,925 young (18-30) people in Hackney, 28% of the population. • There are 157,240 non White-British people in Hackney, 63% of the population. According to the 2011 census, 14% of local households in Hackney reported that English was not a main language. Hackney has a low proportion of English language households compared with the national average (91%) but sits in line with the London average (74%). The proportion of English speakers is significantly lower than the national figure of 92% and two points lower than London’s figure which stands at 77.9%, and can be attributed to Hackney’s diverse migrant population. • There are 22,526 full time students in Hackney aged 16-74, 9% of the population. In the 2011 Census, 14.6% of Hackney respondents said they a long-term illness that limited their daily activities. In February 2012, 15,240 people, 6.1% of Hackney’s population, were claiming Disability Living Allowance or Attendance Allowance.” • There are 67,925 young (18-30) people in Hackney, 28% of the population. • There are 157,240 non White-British people in Hackney, 63% of the population. According to the 2011 census, 14% of local households in Hackney reported that English was not a main language. Hackney has a low proportion of English language households compared with the national average (91%) but sits in line with the London average (74%). The proportion of English speakers is significantly lower than the national figure of 92% and two points lower than London’s figure which stands at 77.9%, and can be attributed to Hackney’s diverse migrant population. • There are 22,526 full time students in Hackney aged 16-74, 9% of the population. In the 2011 Census, 14.6% of Hackney respondents said they a long-term illness that limited their daily activities. In February 2012, 15,240 people, 6.1% of Hackney’s population, were claiming Disability Living Allowance or Attendance Allowance.”
“In calculating response times accurately, this should include call time as well as driving times. Call times can be longer when callers speak English as a second language. This appears not to have been taken into account in assessing the impact of increases in probable response times. Two of the wards where first appliance response times will exceed the target are those with the highest proportions of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) residents and limited English fluency.”
“A 3rd appliance is often needed as the initial response to an incident, to ensure safe systems of work (e.g. a call to a fire in a high-rise domestic building), so we have looked at the impact on the arrival of the 3rd appliance. The modelled impact on average 3rd appliance response (+23 seconds London-wide) is greater than on both 1st appliance (+15 seconds) and 2nd appliance (+16 seconds) response times, as to be expected with 18 fewer pumping appliances. However, the 151/100 position does provide more equitable level of 3rd appliance coverage. London-wide, the percentage of incidents that receive a third appliance with 10 minutes falls by 2 percentage points (from 84.6 per cent to 84.4 per cent).”
“The production of ward level data for a third fire engine attending an incident is complicated by the, sometimes, very small numbers of historic incidents in some wards (over the last five years) where a third appliance would attend. At this point in time, we are not certain that it is possible to produce reliable data at ward level, because of the problem of very small numbers. However, we are continuing to examine this.”
“ORH has been working with the emergency services in the UK and overseas, using these modelling techniques, for over 26 years, and in that time has undertaken about 600 studies for over 100 clients. ORH has worked with 14 Fire and Rescue Services using this modelling approach, typically supporting their IRMP process.”
“ORH provides a bespoke modelling service based on proven Operational Research (OR) techniques. ORH models have been designed to help understand the complex relationships between demand, performance, resources and efficiency, for services involving emergency response (Fire, Ambulance and Police) and public access to facilities. The modelling process involves validation (accurately representing the current situation), optimisation (identifying the ‘best’ solutions), simulation (asking ‘what if?’ questions) and sensitivity modelling (testing that solutions are robust) ….”
“97. In the context of the claim that is brought, it is important to understand that emergency cover for London is planned on a risk-based approach. One of the ways in which this is achieved is through populating the model with historical data about incidents. There is a strong correlation between where we have attended incidents in the recent past and those we currently attend, so we know that the historical data is a very strong predictor of future demand on the service given the strong year-on-year correlation between incident locations. For the purposes of the optimisation process, the model is run against all serious incidents occurring over the last five years that are not false alarms (i.e. those incidents that receiving two or more appliances in attendance). However, all incidents are considered when the model is simulating the outcomes that have been proposed during the optimisation stage in order to see the real effect of any changes on the [LFB]. This approach means that the options generated during the optimisation process are not influenced unduly by the number and location of automatic false alarms, however all incidents are considered when the simulation process is run to ensure that true impact of the proposals are measured. 98. Historical data on serious incidents are a good proxy for risk as they represent all the occasions over a five year period where risk has given rise to an actual incident (likelihood) and a response of two or more fire engines was sent (consequence). The location of serious incidents is highly correlated between the five years of incident data used for optimisation modelling and is a sound basis for predicting where the [LFB] might get called in the future ….”
“9. To validate against periods when normal operational activity is being carried out is essential as the primary use of the model will require comparison to the base position of 169 appliances across 112 stations. The most recent complete financial year (April 2011 to March 2012) can be confidently taken as a reliable sample period for demand rates and performance measurement. 10. The geographical distributions of incidents (for each of the five incident types …) are mapped in Appendices B1 to B5 using a five year sample period (April 2007 to March 2012). The distribution of false alarm incidents … are highly concentrated around Central London. The most evenly distributed incidents are one appliance fires …. 11. A geographical correlation analysis (covering the five year sample) is presented for each of the five incident types in Appendix B6. As expected, false alarm incidents have the strongest year on year correlations. For all incident types the analysis shows that the correlations become only marginally weaker as the time period increases; this supports the use of a five year sample for incident distributions to be used in the model validation.”
“I also understand that it is said by the Claimants that the decision in relation to resource allocation does not take account of the characteristics of particular boroughs, for example the types of premises located in that borough such as high-rise buildings, high profile buildings and heritage buildings. However, this … misunderstands the modelling process. The model considers the location of all serious incidents across London for the last five years. Given that serious incidents includes any incident to which two or more fire appliances have attended that is not a false alarm, the model will take account of any fires that have taken place in high-rise buildings, high profile buildings and heritage buildings across London over the last five years. Given the strong correlation between the locations of these incidents year on year, the modelling process optimises the location of resources in order to best respond to these serious incidents, including, for example, high-rise buildings, heritage buildings, or high profile buildings. To the extent that particular types of premises or particular groups of people generate demand for the [LFB] to attend to serious incidents, this is taken into account in the model through the risk nodes. This means that the method adopted by the [LFB] is grounded in evidence of the actual likelihood of serious incidents occurring in particular localities. The Claimants appear to be advocating an approach which looks at the theoretical likelihood of a fire occurring at a particular type of premises, for example high-rise buildings or high profile buildings. However, the approach adopted by the [LFB] is to look at actual evidence as to the likely locations of serious incidents based on historical data and to plan by reference to this.”
“22. The ORH travel time matrices are developed using a node system, with an appropriate geographical distribution of nodes essential for modelling purposes. The requirement for a large number of nodes to improve the granularity (and potentiallythe accuracy of travel times) must be balanced with the need to avoid introducing too many redundant nodes and to ensure a quick processing speed of the models. 23. The travel time matrix currently used for the LFEPA models is based on the distribution of Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) across London, of which there are 4,765. Incident weighted centroids were defined for each LSOA and nodes were therefore created at these locations; for the larger LSOAs (in terms of size and incident volumes), additional nodes were placed to improve the relationship between incident locations and nodes. This gave a total of 4,935 nodes across London including the station locations. 24. Advancements to computer processing power and enhancements to the models used by ORH have enabled an increase in the number of nodes for the travel time matrix in London. 25. Although the LSOAs have remained the principal building blocks in terms of generating an appropriate node set, the smaller census boundaries – Output Areas (OAs) – have been used across substantial sections of London with high demand, or where the underlying LSOA is too large in terms of geographical area. As a result, there are now 6,697 nodes within London to which incidents can be assigned, an increase of 40% from the previous travel time matrix ….”
“The optimisation modelling used 6,700 risk nodes across London which were populated with the analysed demand of serious incidents. In this respect, the size of a node does not relate to the size of the geographical area to which it relates, but to the number of incidents in the area to which it relates.”
“The Claimants argue that LSP5 and the methodology underlying the proposals do not take account of the likelihood of fire at ward level. This overlooks the point that the model considers risk at a much more detailed level than even ward-level as there are 6,700 risk points, and only 649 wards across London. For example, there are ordinarily a number of risk points within each ward ….”
“Priority 1 postcodes used to identify and target the people with lifestyles which make them more at risk from fire The Brigade’s Incident Risk Analysis Toolkit (iRAT) helps target community safety activity by analysing and identifying those lifestyle characteristics which mean that people are more likely to experience a fire or suffer the consequences of the fire in the home. We call these P1 (priority one) households. We have used this data to look at the impact of the option on those households. The impacts on range coverage are as follows: • Average 1st appliance range cover deteriorates by 13 seconds (London-wide). The proportion of incidents within 6 minutes deteriorates by 5.0 per cent. • Average 2nd appliance range cover deteriorates by 10 seconds (London-wide). The percentage of incidents within 8 minutes deteriorates by 1.1 per cent.” • Average 1st appliance range cover deteriorates by 13 seconds (London-wide). The proportion of incidents within 6 minutes deteriorates by 5.0 per cent. • Average 2nd appliance range cover deteriorates by 10 seconds (London-wide). The percentage of incidents within 8 minutes deteriorates by 1.1 per cent.”
“This sensitivity measure uses the fire severity index developed for fires in the home which uses a range of factors to categorise fires as severe, significant, moderate and slight. The analysis has used data since 2008 and is the historic location of fires in the home with a fire severity categorisation of ‘severe’ or ‘significant’ and considered range cover …. The impacts on range coverage are as follows: • Average 1stappliance range cover deteriorates by 11 seconds (London-wide). The percentage of incidents within 6 minutes deteriorates by 4.9 per cent. • Average 2ndappliance range cover deteriorates by 10 seconds (London-wide). The percentage of incidents within 8 minutes deteriorates by 0.5 per cent. • Presently, there are four boroughs where average second appliance range cover to fires in the homes with fire severity of significant is greater than the 8-minute standard ….” • Average 1stappliance range cover deteriorates by 11 seconds (London-wide). The percentage of incidents within 6 minutes deteriorates by 4.9 per cent. • Average 2ndappliance range cover deteriorates by 10 seconds (London-wide). The percentage of incidents within 8 minutes deteriorates by 0.5 per cent. • Presently, there are four boroughs where average second appliance range cover to fires in the homes with fire severity of significant is greater than the 8-minute standard ….”
“This sensitivity analysis has looked at the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and has considered range cover to the lower super output areas rated as being the top 10 per cent most deprived. The current position and impacts of our proposals on range coverage are as follows: Presently: • There are two boroughs where just first appliance average range cover is greater than the 6-minute standard. • There is one borough where just second appliance average range cover is greater than the 8-minute standard. • There is one borough where both first and second appliance average range cover falls outside of the standards for LFB-wide first and second response. The changes would mean: • One borough would improve its average second appliance range cover to within 8 minutes. • No borough, already outside of either the first or second standard for LFB-wide response to rescues, would deteriorate further. • No borough would deteriorate from within, to outside of, either the first or second standards for LFB-wide first and second response to rescues.” • There are two boroughs where just first appliance average range cover is greater than the 6-minute standard. • There is one borough where just second appliance average range cover is greater than the 8-minute standard. • There is one borough where both first and second appliance average range cover falls outside of the standards for LFB-wide first and second response. • One borough would improve its average second appliance range cover to within 8 minutes. • No borough, already outside of either the first or second standard for LFB-wide response to rescues, would deteriorate further. • No borough would deteriorate from within, to outside of, either the first or second standards for LFB-wide first and second response to rescues.”
“127. During the consultation process, sensitivity analysis was undertaken in relation to the impact of the 151/100 proposal at ward level. The sensitivity analysis therefore focussed on the impact of the proposals on particular types of premises and particular sectors of the population. Whilst these factors had already been factored into the optimisation process indirectly by way of the 6,700 risk nodes representing the likelihood of fires in particular locations, the sensitivity analysis was a method to ensure that the direct impact on particular sectors of the population, particular areas or premises, and the consequences of the fire were not unacceptably worse under the proposals. I therefore do not accept the Claimants’ argument that the proposals were formulated without regard to particular characteristics of particular areas.”
“… it is important to understand that the attendance standards are not a proxy for risk. This is important, because the Claimants’ case appears to proceed on the wholly mistaken assumption that it was the attendance standards which drove my deployment proposals, as an alternative to risk. This was not the case. The Brigade’s overall aim is to get to emergency incidents as quickly as possible anywhere in London. Performance against this objective is measured by reference to the attendance standards, which operate as key performance indicators. Whilst I accept that the speed of attendance is an important factor in mitigating the risk of casualties from fire, there is no clear dividing line in relation to the risk of casualties as between an attendance time of 5:59 and 6:01. Therefore, where the average attendance time for a particular borough exceeds the attendance standard, this does not mean that an unacceptable risk is therefore posed to people living and working in that borough. The same can be said in relation to individual wards within boroughs. In setting the attendance standards at 6 minutes for the first appliance and 8 minutes for the second appliance, I acknowledge that some responses will be faster and some will be slower than those averages. It is inherent in the use of average attendance times that there will be some variability in performance either side of the average. In short, the attendance standards are principally used to measure performance on an ongoing basis, however they can also be used to feed into decisions in relation to reallocation of resources to ensure that proposals do not result in undesirable outcomes at borough level. One of the reasons for adopting the third attendance time measure in LSP3 (i.e. an appliance to arrive within 12 minutes in 95% of occasions) is to ensure that no incident has an exceptionally protracted attendance time.”
“… the potential for … serious consequences are the same whether the elderly disabled person lives at the top of a high-rise block in (say) Islington or (say) Barking & Dagenham. … crudely put, the question therefore arises whether an elderly disabled person living in Islington should benefit from a faster attendance time at the expense of the elderly disabled person living in Barking & Dagenham because there are more elderly disabled persons living in high-rise blocks in Islington than in Barking & Dagenham. I accept, and have recognised throughout, that it is potentially legitimate to answer “yes” to that question. However, my view (and the Brigade’s view since 2004) is that as the potential consequences that might be experienced by an elderly disabled person living at the top of a high-rise block are the same no matter where in London he or she lives, he or she should not receive a slower attendance times simply because of the nature of the milieu in which he or she happens to live.”
“4. It would be impossible, in my opinion, to challenge the rationality of including waiting time as one of the factors properly to be taken into account by a housing authority when deciding to whom an available dwelling should be allocated. But why should waiting time be the determinative factor? Why should apparently greater needs of one person in the priority band be subordinated to apparently lesser needs of another person in the band simply because the latter had been longer on the waiting list? This was the question that [Counsel for the Claimant’s] submission posed for your Lordships. The question is, I think, best answered by posing a further question. What is the alternative? The formulation of sub-bands within the … priority band, with the sub-bands being placed in order of priority, has been suggested as a preferable alternative. A points system, with points allocated for various types of special need and priority accorded to the person having the highest number of points, has been suggested as another. But both these suggested alternatives have their drawbacks. 5. No matter how many priority sub-bands were to be formulated, and the formulations would be far from easy and likely to be contentious, there must always be some basis on which to distinguish between those within the same sub-band who are in competition for the same dwelling. To allow the choice to depend upon the judgment of a council official, or a committee of officials, no matter how experienced and well trained he, she or they might be, would lack transparency and be likely to lead to a plethora of costly litigation based on allegations of favouritism or discrimination. The waiting time criterion constitutes a basis of selection that has the merit of certainty, the absence of any subjective evaluation and that, therefore, avoids these drawbacks.”
“15. … even if the scheme is not unlawful because it fails to comply with section 167(2), is it unlawful because it is irrational? The earlier decisions in the High Court and Court of Appeal … concluded that a policy was irrational if it did not contain “a mechanism for identifying those with the greatest need and ensuring that so far as possible and subject to reasonable countervailing factors (for example, past failure to pay rent etc) they are given priority” …. There are numerous problems with that approach. … The trouble is that any judicial decision, based as it is bound to be on the facts of the particular case, that greater weight should be given to one factor, or to a particular accumulation of factors, means that lesser weight will have to be given to other factors. The court is in no position to rewrite the whole policy and to weigh the claims of the multitude who are not before the court against the claims of the few who are. Furthermore, relative needs may change over time, so that if the council were really to be assessing the relative needs of individual households, it would have to hold regular reviews of every household on the waiting list in order to identify those in greatest need as vacancies arose. No one is suggesting that this sort of refinement is required. It would be different, of course, if the most deserving households had a right to be housed, but that is not the law.”
“22. It is fitting to conclude by endorsing these words of the deputy judge (para 49 of his judgment): “It is apparent that all judges considering this problem have stressed that it is for the local authority to provide an allocation scheme according to its Part VI duty, and the merits as to who, how and when priority should be afforded is a matter for the local authority subject to its special duties. Judges must be particularly slow in entering the politically sensitive area of allocations policy by over-broad use of the doctrine of irrationality. A particular scheme cannot be castigated as irrational simply because it is not a familiar one to the court or is not considered to be the perfect solution to a difficult, if not impossible, question to resolve.”
“51. The main argument for the claimant is that it is indeed irrational to include every applicant who satisfies one or more of paragraphs (a) to (e) of section 167(2) in the same band, and then to select successful applicants by how long they have satisfied this criterion. It is undoubtedly a rough and ready system. However, it has many advantages over a more nuanced system. Thus, it is very clear, relatively simple to administer, and highly transparent. Once an authority has a number of different bands based on degree of need, or the degree to which the section 167(2) factors are satisfied, the banding exercise will be much more expensive, much more time consuming, much more based on value judgment, much more open to argument, much more opaque, and, as Baroness Hale pointed out, it would require much more monitoring, as applicants’ circumstances will inevitably be liable to change.”
“… It is important to understand what is meant by “risk”
“… the best way to reduce the likelihood of fire occurring (and therefore the likelihood of casualties from fire in London) is through proper fire prevention and protection and it is important to understand that LSP5 promotes a holistic approach to addressing the likelihood and consequence of fire by incorporating a large number of fire prevention and protection measures alongside the new proposals for resource allocation to respond to emergency incidents. For example, LSP5 promotes a number of activities to further fire prevention and fire protection, including campaigning for the installation of domestic sprinklers, enforcing safety regulations, influencing the planning process to ensure the built environment is more resilient against fire, and educating people to change their behaviours to reduce the likelihood of fire. This complements our emergency response work and together provides our integrated risk management approach as reflected in LSP5.”
“Developed during 2005 and launched in the autumn of 2006, iRAT combines what we know about incidents with the information we know about people and where and how they live. iRAT identifies the areas of London, and the lifestyles of the people, where incidents are most likely to occur so that preventative campaigns can be focused in those areas to reduce incidents, stop fatalities and casualties and improve London-wide performance. iRAT can be used to identify the likelihood of any type of incident occurring, but most of the work in developing the models has focused on accidental dwelling fires (ADFs) – fires in peoples’ homes, where most fire fatalities occur – where we target our home fire safety visits (HFSVs) and the majority of our prevention campaigns. In 2008, the outputs from the statistical modelling and our knowledge about lifestyle risk were combined to create ‘priority postcodes’ for targeted HFSVs. Priority postcodes (which are sometimes referred to as “P1s”) enable the iRAT risk information to be more easily interpreted and provide an easy tool for station-based staff to plan and prioritise their HFSV work.”
“To understand which types of people are at the greatest risk from accidental fires in the home, Mosaic lifestyle profile data has been used. Mosaic is a commercial product (used by many public sector organisations and service providers) that describes households by different lifestyles. The segmentation approach adopted by Mosaic combines various data about household composition and activities to characterise households into groups and types. The Brigade collects detailed information about the people involved in fatal fires, but less data is collected about people who experience fire in the home but are not killed by it. The Mosaic data can be matched to those individual incident records to give an approximation for the types of people who experience the most fires. For this reason, the Mosaic data is a valuable product as it covers every identifiable home in London in a standard and comparable format. To determine which groups are ‘at risk’ the number of incidents, by Mosaic group, is compared with the base number of those lifestyles present within London. If accidental fires in the home are a random event, then the rates should be similar (for example, if Group A make up x per cent of London, then they should also have x per cent of the fire incidents). However, the data shows that fire adversely affects some groups more than others.”
“The identification of priority postcodes forms a key focus of the Brigade’s fire prevention activities. Priority postcodes areas are situated in all London boroughs, although there are more priority postcode areas in the inner London boroughs, including in the Claimant boroughs. This means that our fire prevention work in these areas is more directly focussed on the inner London boroughs, and in the claimant boroughs. For example, in 2011/12, the Brigade was able to target more than 47,000 high risk households for HFSVs and the majority of these were in inner London boroughs. We continue to undertake visits to priority postcode households on a regular basis. In 2013/14 (despite the reduction of resources from the closure of some fire stations and removal of some fire engines) we aim to conduct 72,500 HFSVs, of which 58,000 will be visits to priority postcodes - an increase on the previous year 2012/13. Many of our prevention priorities, including those involving priority postcodes, are more effectively delivered by working with services that are currently located at borough level (for example, social services, planning/building control, housing providers). Furthermore, in many cases additional funding for prevention work is available for and controlled by local councils (e.g. local strategic partnerships).”
“As part of the research and analysis undertaken in formulating LSP5, I looked at projected incidents from the present until 2030. The purpose of this exercise was to ensure that my proposals took into account any anticipated changes to the number of incidents and considered whether the downward trend is likely to continue. It is anticipated that by 2030 the number of fires and overall incidents will have decreased further, in particular the number of fires is estimated to decrease by 23% between 2010 and 2030. I understand that representatives of the London Boroughs of Islington and Southwark express the view that the downward trend in incidents and fire deaths is not expected to continue, however I do not believe that this view is supported by empirical data or evidence. The analysis undertaken by the Brigade is that the downward trend in relation to the number of incidents (in particular fires) will continue.”
“We also know that on very few occasions are we called to a fire immediately after it starts. On less than seven per cent of occasions are we called straight away. For two-thirds of the home fires we attend, the 999 call was made five or more minutes after the start of the fire – the point after flashover can occur. The fatality rate in fires where we are called in the first five minutes is low (at around 15 fatalities per 1,000 fire casualties). When we are called between five and 10 minutes this rises slightly to 19 fatalities per 1,000 fire casualties. But in fires where we are called to the fire after the first 10 minutes, the rate more than doubles to around 47 fatalities per 1,000 fire casualties. When the Brigade responds to the incident in less than five minutes (but including any delay before the 999 call was made) the fatality rate is around 39 fatalities per 1,000 fire casualties. When the response time is between six and 10 minutes the rate is 38 fatalities per 1,000 fire casualties (97 per cent of all fatal incidents were responded to in less than 10 minutes).”
“… The average number of appliances sent to any incident in London is 1.6. In terms of incident type, the highest number of appliances attending an incident is an average of 2.1, namely for primary fires, with all other types of incident being sent on average less than 2 appliances. Further, there are currently no attendance standards associated with third appliance attendance times. The combination of the very low number of serious incidents attended by a third appliance and the absence of a standard means that modelling the impact on third appliance response performance is not as straightforward as the other LSP5 work in modelling terms. Further, third appliances may often not be immediately mobilised but may be sent later, for example if it becomes apparent that two appliances are unlikely to be sufficient to deal with the incident. Similarly, on some occasions a third (or even fourth or fifth appliance) will be sent as part of a PDA for particular buildings and a third appliance is not, at a given incident, actually required. The relatively low number of incidents, coupled with the variety of factors that influence the mobilisation of a third appliance means that it is more difficult to model. It is important to recognise that irrespective of the complexities of modelling the data in this area, my view is that only a limited amount of insight or understanding about the Brigade’s response is brought about by information based on the attendance of a third appliance at a small number of incidents.”
“… This does not mean, however, that the process of determining the application of resources overlooked the need for a third appliance to attend some incidents, as the Claimants suggest. The optimisation process takes into account serious incidents and therefore any incident that required three or more appliances was factored into the 6,700 risk nodes.”
“113. The Brigade’s estate has a number of complexities that need to be taken into account, including that many of the stations are either of some age, or Grade II listed buildings or located in a conservation area which restrict the ability to develop and modernise the stations to ensure they meet modern operational needs. Some stations have received substantial levels of recent investment and have been recently upgraded, including a number in central London. I did not think that it was reasonable or responsible for the Brigade to consider closure of those fire stations which had benefited from significant additional investment for particular purposes. In my view, it would be unreasonable, for example, to close a fire station which had just undergone a£10 million investment in order to refurbish it for a special purpose, namely to accommodate particular vehicles. Such a closure would amount to a considerable waste of public money. 114. Similarly, some stations are in a government funded PFI programme and I thought it was appropriate that these stations be retained as they represent a good opportunity to secure better quality accommodation that is more flexible and fit for purpose which confers an overall benefit in terms of fire-fighting in London. Other stations had particular features which meant that it was not sensible to close them, for example, some stations provide space for resources that are difficult to locate such as the Bulk Foam Unit or specialist protective equipment. Taking into account these factors, I concluded that 28 stations in London should be protected from closure by any changes to the allocation of resources. However, I kept open the possibility that these stations could be subject to a change in the number of appliances accommodated, for example, a station that was protected from closure could be reduced from a two appliance station to a one appliance station (or vice versa).”
“… I have carefully considered and planned for the short term closures of these two stations to minimise the impact on attendance times and the works have been co-ordinated to ensure that both stations are not closed at the same time. The rebuilding of Old Kent Road fire station is phase 1 of the PFI project and will be completed by October 2014 when it will be necessary to close Dockhead fire station as part of phase 2 of the PFI project. Plans have been made to reallocate appliances to nearby stations during this period and this forms part of the broader consideration that has been given to the arrangements for temporary reallocation of appliances whilst PFI building works are being carried out. I took account of these closures in considering the proposals (as I did in respect of other stations when applying my professional judgment to the proposals).”
“In the past decade, firefighters, fire engineers, fire investigators, fire inspectors, community safety specialists, information analysts and many other staff in London Fire Brigade have made huge progress in advancing the cause of fire safety. Compared to ten years ago, the Brigade attends half as many fires, a third fewer house fires and almost a third fewer incidents overall. But there is always more to be done. In the future, the resources available to the Brigade will reduce and the number of people who can work for the Brigade and provide our services will also reduce; we have passed the point where we can make the necessary level of savings without any impact on our fire stations. In this draft plan, I set out how I propose to make those savings, while continuing to provide an excellent emergency response service and also protecting the delivery of community safety and fire safety services. This has involved difficult considerations, but I have made my central concern the protection of the emergency response targets set by the Authority in 2005. I believe the targets to be the highest standards in the country and our performance in meeting them has been excellent. Under the proposals in this plan, the Brigade would maintain its existing target attendance time of getting its first fire engine to an emergency within an average six minutes and the second fire engine, when needed, within eight minutes. But I also acknowledge that it is not possible to make reductions in fire stations and fire engines without impacting on arrival times at incidents. Whilst we have worked hard to make changes that minimise the impact, our incident response will not always be the same as currently and these changes would see different standards of performance to some incidents in some parts of London, albeit maintaining performance within our 1st and 2nd appliance targets London-wide. An understandable concern of all Londoners is that the Brigade is prepared and equipped to deal effectively with major incidents, such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters. This plan sets out a strong commitment to continue to deliver against our national resilience priorities and to maintain our specialist vehicles, equipment and capabilities to their current levels. Working closely with our resilience partners is a core ongoing commitment for the Brigade. I remain committed to my long term vision for London Fire Brigade to remain a world class fire and rescue service for London, Londoners and visitors. This draft plan sets out in more detail how I plan to continue to achieve that over the next three years. I welcome your views.” (Emphasis added.)
“The plan sets out how the fire and rescue service could be delivered over the next few years. Amongst other things, it includes plans to keep within our target attendance times for getting to incidents and details how savings worth£28.8m could be made. These proposals also involve the closure of 12 fire stations, the removal of 18 fire engines, the redeployment of four fire engines and a reduction in the number of firefighter posts of 520.”
“Using the Entec Bands at a London Ward level (small units of Local Authority administration), together with LFB’s data on incidents and fire casualties, we can calculate the Entec predicted number of fire fatalities. Based on a three year average for fire casualties (2009/10 to 2011/12), with the current arrival time bands, the Entec calculation predicts 49 fire deaths a year (48.70). In the proposals to change fire cover in LSP5, 47 of London’s 649 Wards would change Entec Bands. Three would move from the 6-10 min band to the 0-5 min band and 44 would move from the 0-5 band into the 6-10 min band. Based on a three year average for fire casualties (2009/10 to 2011/12), with the changed arrival time bands, the Entec calculation predicts 49 fire deaths a year (49.09) [a change of 0.39 fire fatalities to 2dp].”
“Using the Entec Bands at a London Ward level we can calculate the Entec predicted number of fire fatalities. Based on a three year average for fire casualties (2009/10 to 2011/12), with the current arrival time bands, the Entec calculation predicts 49 fire deaths a year; with the changed arrival time bands, the Entec calculation still predicts 49 fire deaths a year.”
“What needs to be published about the proposal is very much a matter for the judgment of the person carrying out the consultation, to whose decision the courts will accord a very broad discretion …. But, in my judgment, sufficient information to enable an intelligible response requires the consultee to know not just what the proposal is in whatever detail is necessary, but also the factors likely to be of substantial importance to the decision, or the basis upon which the decision is likely to be taken. I accept what Silber J said in R (Capenhurst) v Leicester City Council(2004) 7 CCLR 557 .”
“… Although I accept without hesitation that knowledge of the detail can affect the nature and degree of opposition to the principle, and that the results of the consultation in all probability would have shown greater opposition in principle if the routes to the north had been identified in detail, that does not make such a process so unfair here as to be unlawful.”
“The relatively low number of incidents, coupled with the variety of factors that influence the mobilisation of a third appliance means that it is more difficult to model. It is important to recognise that irrespective of the complexities of modelling the data in this area, my view is that only a limited amount of insight or understanding about the Brigade’s response is brought about by information based on the attendance of a third appliance at a small number of incidents.” “… the view that was held by myself and the Deputy Commissioner was that very limited conclusions could properly be drawn from the information on the predicted attendance times for third appliances at ward level given the very low number of incidents involved.”
“The new proposals are to reduce Fire Rescue Units (FRU’s) by two, still leaving the Brigade with the highest number of FRU’s in the country at 14, and continuing to provide London with the FRU capability it needs in order to respond to a range of incidents. In addition, the proposals include reducing the crewing levels of each FRU from 5 to 4. This proposal is made on the basis that other options were sought, and based on the utilisation of FRU appliances reducing to an average rate of 4 per cent, with the number of mobilisations reducing by 720 since 2010/11. The cost saving of reducing the fleet of FRUs from 16 to 14 and reducing the minimum crewing levels on fire rescue units from five firefighters to four provides a combined saving of£6m , which would be used to keep two fire stations open and four pumping appliances on the road. Under the proposals the FRUs would be removed from Hornchurch and Millwall fire stations.”
“Looking for additional savings 119. Taking all of this into account, I tasked officers to go back and do what some people asked us to do (particularly those Council Leaders who said that they believed that there were savings to be made elsewhere, with more effort from officers), which is to try and find savings which do not affect front line pumping appliances. It has not been my first choice to do this and my draft proposals reflect my belief that it is possible to safely make operational reductions from the pumping appliance fleet. However, I do not want to ignore what I have heard during the consultation and so I have gone back and looked again at the operational fleet as a whole. 120. The action already taken to introduce more widespread use of alternate crewing, together with the proposals in the draft plan, have consumed the available opportunities for a significant saving that does not reduce the number of front line vehicles. The aerial fleet has been protected in recent years, despite low levels of utilisation, but my sense is that these appliances have the same characteristics as pumping appliances in terms of their perceived value. Consequently, I now propose to make savings by reducing the spend on Fire Rescue Unit (FRU) resources.”
“… I identified that the capabilities of FRUs are for the most part carried out by four FRU qualified personnel, save for level 2 rescue operations where five FRU personnel are required. In these incidents two FRUs are mobilised and therefore it would be possible to contemplate a reduction in crewing levels from a minimum of 5 to a minimum of 4. This proposal would save£3.6m and in my view will have no detrimental impact on capabilities. Further, in light of the low level of utilisation of FRUs (namely 4%) I considered that the fleet could be reduced by two units, namely those at Millwall and Hornchurch, the reasons for these locations being identified in my report to the Authority … resulting in a further saving of£2.2m .”
“It is in the nature of consultation that revisions might be proposed which were not the subject of the original consultation, but so long as those revisions are not clearly beyond the scope of the original consultation there is no obligation to consult further.’ In a case on the legal principles governing the need to re-consult (East Kent Hospital NHS Trust) the judge said, ‘In determining whether there should be further re-consultation, a proper balance has to be struck between the strong obligation to consult … and the need for decisions to be taken that affect the running of the … service. This means that there should only be re-consultation if there is a fundamental difference between the proposals consulted on and those which the consulting party subsequently wishes to adopt.”
“179. The Commissioner is proposing to include in the final LSP5 some revisions to the draft LSP5 which was consulted on. Some of those revisions (the FRU proposals and the deployment of an additional appliance to East Greenwich fire station) did not feature in the consultation. It is in the nature of consultation that revisions might be proposed which were not the subject of the original consultation, but so long as those revisions are not clearly way beyond the scope of the original consultation there is no obligation to consult further. I am satisfied that members can properly decide whether to adopt those proposed revisions. 180. In considering the revisions members should have regard to the reasons for them, the Commissioner’s professional advice, the merits of any reasonably practicable alternative courses of action (including the option of retention of the savings produced by the FRU proposals to set against future budgetary constraints) and their fit with the underlying principles guiding the preparation of LSP5. I am satisfied that the revisions can be properly decided upon by members.”
“A consultation procedure, if it is to be as full and fair as it ought to be, takes considerable time, and meanwhile the underlying facts and projections are changing all the time. It is not just a question of an iterative process which can speedily be run through a computer. Each consultation process if it produces any changes has the potential to give rise to an expectation in others that they will be consulted about any changes. If the courts are to be liberal in the use of their power of judicial review there is a danger that the process will prevent any change – either in the sense that the authority will be disinclined to make any change because of the repeated consultation processes which this might engender, or in the sense that no decisions get taken because consultation never comes to an end. One must not forget that there are those with legitimate expectations that decisions will be taken.”
“So I approach the issue of whether there should have been re-consultation by the defendants in this case, on the proposals now under challenge on the basis that the defendants had a strong obligation to consult with all parts of the local community. The concept of fairness should determine whether there is a need to re-consult if the decision-maker wishes to accept a fresh proposal but the courts should not be too liberal in the use of its power of judicial review to compel further consultation on any change. In determining whether there should be further re-consultation, a proper balance has to be struck between the strong obligation to consult on the part of the health authority and the need for decisions to be taken that affect the running of the Health Service. This means that there should only be re-consultation if there is a fundamental difference between the proposals consulted on and those which the consulting party subsequently wishes to adopt.” (Emphasis added.)
“The relevant legal principles are now well established and were not in dispute …. I would emphasise the need for the court to ask whether as a matter of substance there has been compliance; it is not a tick box exercise. At the same time the courts must ensure that they do not micro-manage the exercise ….”
“… The thought processes of decision makers need to include having regard for the duties in the 2010 Act. The section 149 duty must be kept in mind by decision makers throughout the decision-making process. It should be embedded in the process but can have no fixed content, bearing in mind the range of potential factors and situations …. What observance of that duty requires of decision makers is fact-sensitive; it inevitably varies considerably from situation to situation, from time to time and from stage to stage ….”
“Each analysis outlines the purpose of the policy, the anticipated impact on people who share protected characteristics, and evidence to support any such impacts. Each analysis has also been updated to take account of further information collated as part of the public consultation on LSP5. This specifically includes analysis of comments provided by under represented or disadvantaged groups, and summarises general observations made by respondents as a whole.”
“Reducing the numbers of stations would mean that physical access to the closed stations is removed. However, each borough is served by a Borough Commander, and local community and partnership initiatives, particularly those that target people most at risk will remain in place, either delivered centrally or by area teams. Removing the station will not affect this important work, and there will be no anticipated impact on people with protected characteristics. Indeed our prevention and protection work is focussed on those who are most at risk, many of whom will share protected characteristics, and this will continue to be our priority.”
“Impacts of the proposal on boroughs as a whole have been outlined in section 3. In terms of impacts on users of the service, it is difficult to quantify the exact effect on people who share protected characteristics. The Brigade targets its fire safety work on lifestyles of individuals rather than groups of people who share protected characteristics. This is because information about incidents collected by the Brigade indicates that the behaviour and lifestyles of individuals remains one of the primary factors in the number of fires that LFB attends. Whilst it is true that certain lifestyles identified as being at higher risk will also contain people who share protected characteristics, belonging to a protected characteristic group in the first place does not place individuals at risk.”
“32. Looking across most of protected characteristic groups, the 155/102 option would introduce a range of impacts for the London boroughs that place in the top 5 for people with these characteristics. Some boroughs would have improved attendance, others would remain the same, and some would get worse. However, even where attendance times are slower as a result of the proposal, some boroughs are still better than the London-wide averages for first and second appliance attendance, and the majority remain inside the six and eight minute attendance standards respectively. 33. It is anticipated that the effect of the changes will be the same across the community. As previously stated, information collected by the Brigade indicates that lifestyle is much more of a factor in determining the level of risk of fire rather than protected characteristics. However, some individuals who share protected characteristics will also lead lifestyles that increase their risk to fire – as such, it is possible that the operational efficiency proposals will impact these people negatively.”
“52. In Secretary of State for Trade & Industries v Rutherford (No.2)[2006] ICR 785 , an issue arose as to the pool of employees to be chosen in considering the disparate impact of a proposal and whether the entire workforce should be chosen. The applicants were male employees dismissed when they were over 65. It was held that the provisions applied to the same proportion of women in that group as men and there was no indirect sex discrimination. Baroness Hale of Richmond, with whom Lord Scott of Foscote and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry agreed, stated, at paragraph 77: “But in my view one should not be bringing into the comparison people who have no interest in the advantage in question.” 53. Baroness Hale added, at paragraph 82: “The common feature is that all these people are in the pool who want the benefit - or not to suffer the disadvantage - and they are differentially affected by a criterion applicable to that benefit or disadvantage. Indirect discrimination cannot be shown by bringing into the equation people who have no interest in the advantage or disadvantage in question. If it were, one might well wish to ask whether the fact that they were not interested was itself the product of direct or indirect discrimination in the past.”
“Rutherford (No 2) seems to me to be a striking illustration of Lord Nicholls’ proposition that the assessment of disparate impact is a question of fact, limited like all questions of fact by the dictates of logic. In discrimination claims the key determinant of both elements is the issue which the claimant has elected to pose and which the tribunal is therefore required to evaluate by finding a pool in which the specificity of the allegation can be realistically tested. Provided it tests the allegation in a suitable pool, the tribunal cannot be said to have erred in law even if a different pool, with a different outcome, could equally legitimately have been chosen. We do not accept that Rutherford is authority for the routine selection of the widest possible pool; nor therefore that any question arises of “looking at” a smaller pool for some unspecified purpose short of determining the case.”
“The importance of complying with s.149 is not to be understated. Nevertheless, in a case where the council was fully apprised of its duty under s.149 and had the benefit of a most careful Report and EIA, I consider that an air of unreality has descended over this particular line of attack. Councils cannot be expected to speculate on or to investigate or to explore such matters ad infinitum; nor can they be expected to apply, indeed they are to be discouraged from applying, the degree of forensic analysis for the purpose of an EIA and of consideration of their duties under s.149 which a QC might deploy in court. The outcome of cases such as this is ultimately, of course, fact specific …. All the same, in situations where hard choices have to be made it does seem to me that to accede to the approach urged by [Counsel for the claimants] in this case would, with respect, be to make effective decision making on the part of Local Authorities and other public bodies unduly and unreasonably onerous.”
“I take my duties under the Equality Act very seriously and that is why I provided such comprehensive equality analyses of my proposals, including one for the five main policy areas and an additional one for staff. As the equality analyses make clear the fact that someone may share protected characteristics does not in itself place that person at risk from fire. The lifestyle of an individual is a much more relevant factor and whilst certain lifestyles identified as being higher risk will also contain people who share protected characteristics, belonging to a protected characteristic group in the first place does not place individuals at risk. During consultation there was considerable focus on the impact of attendance times at the ward level. Nevertheless I did not undertake a further equality analysis at this level, partly because the Brigade’s emergency cover has always been planned and resourced on a pan-London strategic basis, but mainly because the analysis of the data at the borough level showed that whilst the original draft proposals would have had an impact on attendance times, they would not have disproportionately affected those with protected characteristics. This is because people who share protected characteristics live across London. Providing a further breakdown at a ward level would not have revealed anything different – there would have just been more data. I also updated each equality analysis following consultation to address concerns about my proposals, including those from people who share protected characteristics. This included providing further information about how we would address the concerns of those who felt they were vulnerable. I am satisfied therefore that the information in respect of the equality analyses was sufficient to enable the Authority to satisfy itself that it was able to comply withSection 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 .”
“In your opinion, are you satisfied that the proposals you put forward are appropriate for keeping Londoners safe in the light of the responses received to the consultation and the budgetary considerations?”
“I am satisfied that my original and revised proposals are appropriate for keeping Londoners safe. Some respondents were concerned that the increase in attendance times in some parts of London would result in a higher number of deaths from fire. I gave this careful consideration during the consultation period and, although I do not generally favour this methodology (for reasons that are explained fully in the draft plan) I responded to requests to do so and used the government’s methodology to calculate whether or not my proposals would lead to an increase in such deaths. The methodology predicts that even the original draft proposals would not have resulted in a higher number of fire deaths. Given that the proposals I put to the Authority in July have the effect of ameliorating some of the greatest effects in the original proposals I am confident that my revised proposals will not increase the number of people who die from fire. It must be remembered that on average fire appliances in London spend less than 8 per cent of their available time attending incidents and that the evidence shows that there is sufficient capacity to continue to provide an excellent response across London. My proposals also mean that I can continue to focus efforts on prevention and protection work, work that is vital if we are to further reduce the number of people who die or are injured in fires, thereby making Londoners safer.”
“… I note that [the increased attendance time is] still more than 1 minute 30 seconds within the attendance standard for a second appliance and one of fastest second appliance attendance times in London. It is also said that a third appliance will be needed to respond to fires in her block and attendance times for a third appliances will increase across Southwark. It is incorrect … that three appliances are needed before fire-fighting commences at the block in which Mrs Richardson lives. The Claimants also state that it will be more difficult to evacuate Mrs Richardson and her husband. High-rise buildings are designed to protect the occupants in their own flat for up to an hour (or four hours in some cases) and the only occupants who need to immediately evacuate are those in the flat in which the fire starts. Many high-rise buildings are constructed with mobility refuges on each floor which is a place where those with mobility issues can wait safely for a planned evacuation. Nothing in [the Plan] will impact the ability of the Brigade to evacuate people from premises as crewing levels of pumping appliances will not be changed.”
“The courts have long made it clear that, though they will readily review the way in which decisions are reached, they will respect the margin of appreciation or discretion which a chief constable has. He knows through his officers the local situation, the availability of officers and his financial resources, the other demands on the police in the area at different times: Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans[1982] 1 WLR 1155 , 1174. Where the use of limited resources has to be decided the undesirability of the court stepping in too quickly was made very clear by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B[1995] 1 WLR 898 , 906 and underlined by Kennedy LJ in the present case. In the former the Master of the Rolls said in relation to the decisions which have to be taken by health authorities ‘difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. That is not a judgment which the court can make.’ The facts here are different and the statutory obligations are different but mutatis mutandis the principle is relevant to the present case….”